Sorel also argued that ideas, in the form of myths, could potentially perform a mobilising and transformative function. The distinction drawn by Sorel between myth and utopia is interesting in its own right, but doubly so when compared with the analysis offered by Karl Mannheim, probably the most well-known theorist of utopia; for Mannheim’s argument similarly insists on this transformative potential, while attributing it to utopia. Part of the difference between the two is terminological, with Sorel’s use of the term myth having strong similarities with Mannheim’s definition of utopia. There are, however, also differences of substance, particularly concerning the emphasis on human will and the political evaluation of myth or utopia: Sorel celebrates the non-rationality of myth for its effectiveness; Mannheim fears the irrationality of utopia as well as the possibility of its extinction. The focus for both writers is […] on the role of ideas in social change; but whereas in Marxist hands utopia is defined in terms of the negative function of preventing social change, here myth and utopia, respectively, are defined in terms of the positive function of promoting it. Levitas, The Concept of Utopia, p. 69
Myth and Utopia in Sorel
Myths are necessary because without them, revolts will not provoke revolution. Whether they bear any relation to future history is irrelevant to their power and their value. At the centre of the myth lies the experience of grasping the inner self, of becoming and possessing oneself more intensely than is possible in normal life. Utopias, on the other hand, are cognitive constructs, products of the intellect, of reason. As such they are divorced from the soul of the proletariat, have no real connection with anything, are at best impotent and at worst diversionary and reactionary. Myths emphasise process, utopias portray ends. Levitas, The Concept of Utopia, p. 78
Utopia, as defined by Sorel, embodies several distinct characteristics which are presumed to be inseparable. It includes plans for a future society and failure to grasp the real possibilities and processes of social change, thus eliding in a familiar way two elements which have no intrinsic connection. Utopias are also condemned for being abstract, and for being essentially products of the intellect rather than the will. Levitas, The Concept of Utopia, p. 75
“Experience shows that the framing of a future, in some indeterminate time, may … be very effective and have very few inconveniences; this happens when the anticipations of the future take the form of those myths, which enclose with them all the strongest inclinations of a people, of a party or of a class, inclinations which recur to the mind with the insistence of instincts in all the circumstances of life; and which give an aspect of complete reality to the hopes of immediate action by which, more easily than by any other method, men can reform their desires, passions and mental activity.” [Sorel, Reflections on Violence, Allen and Unwin, p. 133.] The particular myth which is central to revolutionary syndicalism is the myth of the proletarian general strike, construed both as a possible actual event in the future and more importantly as a myth which mobilises people to action. Sorel observes that ‘men who are participating in a great social movement always picture their coming action as a battle in which their cause is certain to triumph’; it is to these images that he applies the term myth. The function of any such myth is to facilitate action and it must therefore be judged in these terms, not in terms of its empirical accuracy, so that it should not be taken seriously as a prediction. It operates intuitively rather than intellectually, and thus is fundamentally different from a utopia. The myth of the general strike is ‘a body of images capable of evoking instinctively all the sentiments which correspond to the different manifestations of the war undertaken by Socialism against modern society’. Revolutionary myths are thus expressions of will rather than descriptions of the future and as such ‘lead men to prepare themselves for a combat which will destroy the existing state of things’. A myth cannot be separated into its constituent parts and judged against reality, for it only operates as a whole, and it is not susceptible to refutation by empirical evidence: "A myth cannot be refuted since it is, at bottom, identical with the convictions of a group, being the expression of these convictions in the language of movement; and it is, in consequence, unanalysable into parts which could be placed on the plane of historical descriptions.” [Sorel, Reflections on Violence, Allen and Unwin, p. 33.] Levitas, The Concept of Utopia, p. 75-76
His [Sorel’s] identification of socialism as a movement rather than a state of society to be treated as a historical goal recalls Marx’s assertion that communism is the real movement which abolishes the present state of things: "Socialism is the workers’ movement, the revolt of the proletariat against ruling institutions. It is the organization which is both economic and ethical at the same time, which we see forming before our eyes, and whose purpose is to struggle against bourgeois traditions.” [Stanley, From Georges Sorel, Oxford University Press, p. 147.] Levitas, The Concept of Utopia, p. 76
Ideology and Utopia in Mannheim
His [Mannheim’s] discussion of utopia forms part of his best-known book *Ideology and Utopia*, which was published in German in 1929 and in English in 1936. As the title of the book implies, Mannheim makes a distinction between ideologies and utopias, and it is a distinction based upon their social function. Both ideologies and utopias are ideas, and are ideas which are ‘incongruous with’ and transcend the reality within which they occur, being oriented towards objects which do not exist in the actual situation. The difference is that ideologies operate to sustain the existing state of affairs, while utopias operate to change it: "Only those orientations transcending reality will be referred to by us as utopian which, when they pass over into conduct, tend to shatter, either partially or wholly, the order of things prevailing at the time.” "Utopias … are not ideologies in the measure and in so far as they succeed through counteractivity in transforming the existing historical reality into one more in accord with their own conceptions.” Levitas, The Concept of Utopia, p. 79
Mannheim is quite clear that form and content are not the defining characteristics of utopia. He argues that ‘the utopian element in our consciousness is subject to changes in content and form’ and ‘it is not always the same forces, substances, or images which can take on a utopian function, i.e. the function of bursting the bonds of the existing order’.33 Because of this focus on function rather than form or content in the definition of utopia, Mannheim’s object of analysis differs from that conventionally assumed in the liberal-humanist tradition. He is not concerned with a literary genre, or even with the somewhat wider category of visions of ideal societies. Indeed such visions may be ideological rather than utopian, that is they may act as forces to maintain rather than to transform the status quo. He points out that the medieval idea of paradise, while located outside of society in an other-wordly sphere, was an integral part of the maintenance of that society. It is only when such images take on a revolutionary function, as in such millennial sects as the Anabaptists, that they become utopian rather than ideological. Levitas, The Concept of Utopia, p. 80
The use of the term utopia to refer to a category of social fictions is rejected by Mannheim as historically naïve and descriptive rather than analytical. Levitas, The Concept of Utopia, p. 80
The use of the term utopia to refer to a category of social fictions is rejected by Mannheim as historically naïve and descriptive rather than analytical. Literary works commonly designated utopias are, at least initially, only individual expressions; they can become truly utopian only if and when they become the expression of the will of a social group, and the inspiration of successful social action in pursuit of change. Much of what is conventionally (and sometimes pejoratively) regarded as utopian is therefore excluded on this definition and consigned to the realm of ideology. Levitas, The Concept of Utopia, p.80
Mannheim’s typology of utopias
Mannheim distinguishes four types of utopia: chiliasm; the liberal-humanist idea; the conservative idea; and the socialist-communist utopia. Each of these is characterised by a different orientation to, and experience of, time; and it is the treatment of historical time which Mannheim sees as the organising principle of the utopian mentality. Levitas, The Concept of Utopia, p.82
This [Chiliasm’s] essence is an experiential one, for in chiliastic or millennial groups Mannheim argues that action is not inspired by ideas, but by something much more deeply rooted in the ‘vital and elemental levels of the psyche’. Whereas millennialism appears to be orientated to the future, Mannheim argues that the chiliast ‘is not actually concerned with the millennium that is to come’, but with a leap over into ecstasy. "The only true, perhaps the only direct, identifying characteristic of Chiliastic experience is absolute presentness … . For the real Chiliast, the present becomes the breach through which what was previously inward bursts out suddenly, takes hold of the outer world and transforms it.” [Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia, Routledge & Kegan Paul 1979, p.173] Chiliasm is therefore implicitly hostile to all actually existing conditions and processes of becoming, as it seeks this breaking through into a qualitatively different kind of existence, and what it seeks ‘can only be adequately satisfied in Kairos’. Kairos is a theological term, whose meaning is explained by Paul Tillich as ‘fulfilled time, the moment of time which is invaded by eternity’, and distinguished from ‘perfection or completion in time’. Levitas, The Concept of Utopia, p.82
The idea of breaking through into an experience of fulfilment, of wholeness, appears in different ways in both Sorel and Bloch. For Sorel the importance of proletarian violence is precisely that it generates an experience of freedom and full possession of the self, and it is the heroic state of mind produced that is important, rather than the actions that flow from it. Sorel’s debt to Bergson is explicit. Mannheim and Bloch are both critical of Sorel (and of Bergson) and particularly of the ease with which Sorel’s approach was incorporated into fascism. Yet both identify experience as an important element in utopia. Levitas, The Concept of Utopia, p.82-83
Mannheim’s second type of utopia is the liberal-humanitarian idea. Unlike chiliasm it is an essential feature of this type that ideas do guide activity, and there is an emphasis on reason and on free will. The gap between the existing state of things and the ideal world constructed by bourgeois liberalism was bridged by ‘the belief that reality moves continually towards an even closer approximation to the rational’ – a belief of which Mannheim is acutely critical in this context, although it later emerges as an essential element in his own argument. Whereas in chiliasm utopia must break in abruptly from outside, in this mode utopia becomes a goal set in the future, towards which existing processes are moving […]. The world-view embodied here represents not the oppressed strata, but ‘the middle stratum that was disciplining itself through conscious self-cultivation and which regarded ethics and intellectual culture as its principal self-justification (against the nobility) and unwittingly shifted the bases of experience from an ecstatic to an educational plane’. Its characteristic time-orientation involves progress rather than kairos. Levitas, The Concept of Utopia, p.84
The liberal-humanist utopia is followed by that of conservatism. In many ways it seems inappropriate, on Mannheim’s own definitions, to describe this as a utopia rather than as an ideology. For the conservative utopia emerges in response to the liberal utopia, in opposition to it in order to protect the social position of the dominant class, and is dedicated to re-enacting the past and preserving tradition. It celebrates the past as immanent in the present, and time is perceived as duration. Mannheim’s characterisation of conservatism applies with uncanny accuracy to neo-conservatism as it developed during the 1980s, some fifty years after he was writing; it is correct even in that neo-conservatism (at least in British politics) emerged as a reaction to the growth of economic liberalism within the Conservative Party. But if Mannheim’s description of the nature and function of conservatism is correct, why does he call it a utopia? Mannheim is aware of the paradox here. He argues that the ‘conservative mentality as such has no utopia’. However: "the counter-attack of opposing classes and their tendency to break through the limits of the existing order causes the conservative mentality to question the basis of its own dominance, and necessarily brings about among the conservatives historical-philosophical reflections concerning themselves. Thus, there arises a counter-utopia which serves as a means of self-orientation and defense.” [Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia, Routledge & Kegan Paul 1979, p.206,207] Levitas, The Concept of Utopia, p.85
But because he is examining the shifting constellation of the utopias of different social groups in their conflicts with one another, it becomes necessary to describe this mode of ‘incongruous’ thought as a utopia as well, in spite of the fact that his description makes it more properly an ideology than a utopia. What this illustrates above all is the problematic nature of the distinction between ideology and utopia in the first place, for when conservatism is provoked by its opponents into the need for political legitimation it may also find it necessary to do this by the affirmation of a particular form of society, even if it is a form deemed to be represented by the survivals of the past in the present, whose preservation for the future becomes the overriding concern. Levitas, The Concept of Utopia, p.85
Mannheim’s fourth form of utopian mentality is the socialist-communist utopia. Like conservatism this derives its preoccupations from the need to counter the other forms of utopia. Time here is seen as a series of strategic points in history, rather than a gradual progress as in the liberal-humanist idea; socialism shares with the liberal idea the location of a perfect world in the future, but here it occupies a much more specific point in time, the collapse of capitalism. It shares also the liberal opposition to the status quo, to the conservative affirmation of existing reality and to the chiliastic mentality, especially as it is expressed in anarchism. Levitas, The Concept of Utopia, p.85-86
Critique of Mannheim’s distinction between ideology and utopia
There are four different objections which can be levelled at the dichotomy between ideology and utopia. Firstly, the categorisation of ideas into those which change and those which support the existing state of affairs is extremely crude. It leaves no space for ideas which may be neutral, or whose relationship to the present is ambiguous or paradoxical. In Mannheim’s view, almost all ideas are situationally transcendent and are thus either ideologies or utopias: ‘Ideas which correspond to the concretely existing and de facto order are … relatively rare and only a state of mind that has been sociologically fully clarified operates with situationally congruous ideas and motives’. [Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia, Routledge & Kegan Paul 1979, p.175] The second and third problems, namely the notion of ‘adequate realisation’ and the issue of causality, relate to the criterion of success as a defining characteristic of utopia. The idea of adequate realisation implies that one would not expect a utopia to be implemented in all its details; since these are ideal-typical concepts, actual utopias are contaminated with ideological elements. But what degree of realisation will be deemed to be adequate, and who is to make this judgement? Here, Mannheim’s concept of utopia is radically different from Sorel’s concept of myth, for Sorel does not require any correspondence between the content of a mobilising myth and the state of affairs which it brings about; its function is merely to mobilise people to action to overthrow the existing state of affairs. The issue of causality is a further difficulty: it is not merely a matter of utopia anticipating the future – of wanting something which the future turns out to hold – but of utopia creating the future. […] To identify an idea as a utopia, we have therefore to establish not only that a change has occurred sufficiently in line with its content, but also that the idea was instrumental in effecting the change, which in practice is very difficult to do even with the benefit of hindsight. […] Ricoeur, however, does make some extremely pertinent criticisms relating to our fourth area of difficulty, Mannheim’s view of reality. Ricoeur points out that in Mannheim’s analysis the differences between ideology and utopia are in some ways less important than the characteristic which they share, that of being incongruous with or transcending reality, or orientated to objects which do not exist in the actual situation; yet this is to beg the question of what is real. Mannheim treats this as unproblematic: "The nature of ‘reality’ or ‘existence as such’ is a problem which belongs to philosophy, and is of no concern here. However, what is to be regarded as ‘real’ historically or sociologically at a given time is of importance to us and fortunately can be definitely ascertained.” [Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia, Routledge & Kegan Paul 1979, p.174] Ricoeur argues that Mannheim’s notion of reality is inadequate; it is assumed to be something fixed and ‘out there’, of which objective knowledge is possible in a seemingly unproblematic way and which can be contrasted to the symbolic realm of ideas. Mannheim does not perceive that social reality is always and essentially socially mediated, rendering the opposition between ideas and reality, and hence the judgement of (non)congruence, untenable. Levitas, The Concept of Utopia, p.87-89
While the form and content of utopia may be historically variable, its defining characteristic is the capacity to transform the situation and realise itself. Ideologies, on the other hand, are those ‘situationally transcendent ideas which never succeed de facto in the realization of their projected contents’. Mannheim recognises the difficulty in applying this dichotomy. One reason why it is difficult is that ideologies and utopias are by definition tied up in struggles for social power and in these struggles groups have a vested interest in declaring each other’s ideas incongruous with reality. Political discourse consists precisely of the attempt to invalidate opposing views and legitimate one’s own. As Mannheim puts it, subordinate groups have an interest in unmasking the ideas of the dominant as ideological, and dominant groups have an interest in labelling ideas which challenge their authority as utopian (in the colloquial sense of unrealistic) as a means of invalidating them. Levitas, The Concept of Utopia, p.80-81
But because he is examining the shifting constellation of the utopias of different social groups in their conflicts with one another, it becomes necessary to describe this mode of ‘incongruous’ thought as a utopia as well, in spite of the fact that his description makes it more properly an ideology than a utopia. What this illustrates above all is the problematic nature of the distinction between ideology and utopia in the first place, for when conservatism is provoked by its opponents into the need for political legitimation it may also find it necessary to do this by the affirmation of a particular form of society, even if it is a form deemed to be represented by the survivals of the past in the present, whose preservation for the future becomes the overriding concern. Levitas, The Concept of Utopia, p.85