Linguistics & Semantics
Meaning and Communication
Mead traces the emergence of linguistic forms of communication using as his guideline the step-by-step transformation of obiective or natural meanings of systemically ordered mean-ends relations between observed behavioral responses into the meanings that these modes of behavior take on for the participating organisms themselves. Symbolic meanings arise from a subjectivizing or internalizing of objective structures of meaning. As these structures are mainly found in the social behavior of animals, Mead tries to explain the emergence of language through the fact that the semantic potential residing in gesture-mediated interaction becomes symbolically available to participants through an internalization of the language of gestures. Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action, Vol 2, p.7-8
Meaning is thus a development of something objectively there as a relation between certain phases of the social act; it is not a psychical addition to that act and it is not an 'idea' as traditionally conceived. A gesture by one organism, the resultant of the social act in which the gesture is an early phase, and the response of another organism to the gesture, are the relata in a triple or three-fold relationship of gesture to first organism, of gesture to second organism, and of gesture to subsequent phases of the given social act; and this three-fold relationship constitutes the matrix within which meaning arises, or which develops into the field of meaning. Mead, Mind, Self and Society, p.76 in Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action, Vol 2, p.8
Mead illustrates the latter with examples of gesture-mediated interactions between animals belonging to the same species, such as a fight between two dogs. The interaction is set up in such a way that the beginnings of movement on the part of one organism are the gestures that serve as the stimulus eliciting a response on the part of the other; the beginnings of this latter movement become in turn a gesture that calls forth an adaptive response on the part of the first organism: "I have given the illustration of the dog-fight as a method of presenting the gesture. The act of each dog becomes the stimulus to the other dog for his response. There is then a relationship between these two; and as the act is responded to by the other dog, it, in turn, undergoes changes. The very fact that the dog is ready to attack another becomes a stimulus to the other dog to change his own position or his own attitude. He has no sooner done this than the change of attitude in the second dog in turn causes the first dog to change his attitude. We have here a conversation of gestures. Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action, Vol 2, p.7
In adopting toward themselves the critical attitude of others when the interpretation of communicative acts goes wrong, they develop rules for the use of symbols. They can now consider in advance whether in a given situation they are using a significant gesture in such a way as to give the other no grounds for a critical response. In this manner, meaning conventions and symbols that can be employed with the same meaning take shape. Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action, Vol 2, p.15
[…] we can specify the transformations that have to take place along the way from gesture-mediated to symbolically mediated interaction. First, gestures are transformed into symbols through replacing meanings that exist for individual organisms with meanings that are the same for both participants. Second, the behavior of participants changes in such a way that an interpersonal relation between speaker and addressee replaces the causal relation between stimulus-response- stimulus in interacting with one another, participants now have a communicative intent. Finally, there is a transformation of the structure of interaction, in that the participants learn to distinguish between acts of reaching understanding and actions oriented to success. The problem of the transition from the stage of gesture-mediated interaction to the stage of symbolically mediated interaction is resolved in these three steps. Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action, Vol 2, p.9
If S learns to adopt toward himself the negative positions that T, U, V... take toward him when he goes wrong "semantically" (and if T, U, V, for their part, deal with similar disappointments in like manner), the members of this tribe learn to address calls to one another in such a way that they anticipate critical responses in cases where q0 (the expression / utterance) is used inappropriately to the context. And on the basis of this anticipation, expectations of a new type can take shape, behavioral expectations (c) based on the convention that a vocal gesture is to be understood as "g" only if it is uttered under specific contextual conditions. With this we have reached the state of symbolically mediated interaction in which the employment of symbols is fixed by meaning conventions. Participants in interaction produce symbolic expressions guided by rules, that is, with the implicit expectation that they can be recognized by others as expressions conforming to a rule. Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action, Vol 2, p.22
The use of the same symbols with a constant meaning has to be not only given as such; it has to be know. able for the symbol users themselves. And this sameness of meaning can be secured only by the intersubjective validity of a rule that "conventionally" fixes the meaning of a symbol. In this respect the transition from gesture-mediated to symbolically mediated interaction also means the constitution of rule-governed behavior, of behavior that can be explained in terms of an orientation to meaning conventions. I would like to recall here Wittgenstein's analysis of the concept of a rule […]. In the concept of a rule, the two moments characteristic of the use of simple symbols are combined: identical meaning and intersubjective validity. The generality that constitutes the meaning of a rule can be represented in any number of exemplary actions. […] The concept of rule competence refers not only to the ability to produce symbolic expressions with communicative intent and to understand them; nevertheless it is a key to our problem because we can explain what we mean by the sameness of meaning in connection with the ability to follow a rule […]. “[…] It is not possible to obey a rule privately”: The point of this consideration is that S cannot be sure whether he is following a rule at all if there is no situation in which his behavior is exposed to critique by T - a critique that is in principle open to consensus. Wittgenstein wants to show that the identity and the validity of rules are systematically interconnected. To follow a rule means to follow the same rule in every single case. The identity of the rule in the multiplicity of its realizations does not rest on observable invariants but o n the intersubjectivity of its validity. […] With this analysis of the concept of following a rule, Wittgenstein demonstrates that sameness of meaning is based on the ability to follow intersubjectively valid rules together with at least one other subject; both subjects must have a competence for rule-governed behavior as well as for critically judging such behavior. Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action, Vol 2, p.16-21
Mead thinks he can explain the genesis of meanings that are the same for at least two participants by one organism internalizing the relation between its own gesture and the response of the other; the internalization comes about through one organism taking up the attitude in which the other responds to its gesture. If this were the case, it would remain only to specify the conditions under which taking the attitude of the other - that is, the process of internalizing objective meaning structures - can get under way. Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action, Vol 2, p.11
Meaning, Denotation and Context
Αν μεταφέρουμε μια καρέκλα απ’ την κουζίνα στο σαλόνι, είναι προφανές ότι η χρήση της δε θα μεταβληθεί και πολύ. Αν όμως την πάρουμε απ’ το σαλόνι και την πάμε ως έκθεμα στο μουσείο, η χρήση της εκεί θα είναι ριζικά διαφορετική. Η αλλαγή χώρου μπορεί να μη σημαίνει τίποτε, μπορεί όμως να σημαίνει πολλά. Αυτό που καταλαβαίνουμε ακούγοντας μια λέξη, νομίζουμε πως είναι κάτι που η λέξη κουβαλάει μαζί της (σαν ένα είδος φωτοστέφανου), επειδή είναι αυτή που είναι. Κι αυτό οφείλεται στο ότι συνήθως τη βλέπουμε σ’ έναν στερεότυπο γλωσσικό περίγυρο. Επειδή εκεί μέσα έχει πάνω-κάτω την ίδια χρήση, παρασυρόμαστε να νομίζουμε ότι το νόημά της είναι ιδιότητα της ίδιας της λέξης, που αυτή διατηρεί, όπου κι αν τη βάλουμε. Αλλά η λέξη δεν είναι τίποτα περισσότερο από ένα γρανάζι ενός μηχανισμού. Και το νόημά της είναι το έργο που επιτελεί στον μηχανισμό, και όχι η μορφή της. Θα μπορούσε κάλλιστα να αποτελέσει τμήμα κάποιου άλλου μηχανισμού, και εκεί να επιτελεί μια εντελώς διαφορετική λειτουργία. Τότε η διατήρηση της μορφής της θα ήταν το επουσιωδέστερο των πραγμάτων. Κωβαίος, Όλα Κυοφορούνται μεσ’ στη Γλώσσα, σ.95 (Εργαλεία και Τεχνικές της Γλωσσανάλυσης)
Frege - Sign, Sense and Reference
They are signs or names as long as they name or designate something.
- The referent of both signs above is the same (the intersection point) - The sense of the signs is different (although their referent is the same)
In a similar manner, Venus is referred to as both “evening star” and “morning star”. The sense of the two signs is different but the referent the same. The fact that the two signs refer to the same object is true knowledge (as is the truth of the statement “The point of intersection of a and b is the same as the point of intersection of b and c”.
The sense of a proper name is grasped by everybody who is sufficiently familiar with the language or totality of designations to which it belongs. Frege, on Sense and Reference, p. 210
Comprehensive knowledge of the referent would require us to be able to say immediately whether every given sense belongs to it. To such knowledge we never attain. Frege, on Sense and Reference, p. 211
How is this thought connected to structuralism in linguistics?
If I know an object, then I also know all the possibilities of its occurrence in atomic facts. (Every such possibility must lie in the nature of the object.) A new possibility cannot subsequently be found. Wittgenstein’s TLP 2.0123
The referent and sense of a sign are to be distinguished from the associated conception. If the referent of the sign is an object perceivable by the senses, my conception of it is an internal image, arising from memories or sense impressions I have had and activities, both internal and external, which I have performed. Such a conception is often saturated with a feeling; the clarity of its separate parts varies and oscillates. The same sense is not always connected, even in the same man, with the same conception. The conception is subjective: One man’s conception is not that of another. There result, as a matter of course, a variety of differences in the conceptions associated with the same sense. A painter, a horseman, and a zoologist will probably connect different conceptions with the name “Bucephalus”. This constitutes an essential distinction between the conception and the sign’s sense, which may be the common property of many and therefore is not a part or a mode of the individual mind. For one can hardly deny that mankind has a common store of thoughts which is transmitted from one generation to another. […] If two persons conceive the same, each still has his own conception. It is indeed sometimes possible to establish differences in the conceptions, or even in the sensations, of different men; but an exact comparison is not possible, because we cannot have both conceptions together in the same consciousness. Frege, On Sense and Reference, p.212-213
The referent of a proper name is the object itself which we designate by its means; the conception, which we thereby have, is wholly subjective; in between lies the sense, which is indeed no longer subjective like the conception, but is yet not the object itself. The following analogy will perhaps clarify these relationships. Somebody observes the moon through a telescope. I compare the moon itself to the referent; it is the object of the observation, mediated by the real image projected by the object glass in the interior of the telescope, and by the retinal image of the observer. The former I compare to the sense, the latter to the conception or experience. The optical image in the telescope is indeed one-sided and dependent upon the standpoint of observation; but it is still objective, in as much it can be used by several observers. At any rate it could be arranged for several to use simultaneously. But each one would have his own retinal image. On account of the diverse shapes of the observers’ eyes, even a geometrical congruence could hardly be achieved, and a true coincidence would be out of the question. Frege, On Sense and Reference, p.213
A proper name (word, sign, sign combination, expression) expresses its sense, refers to or designates its referent. By means of a sign we express its sense and designate the referent. Frege, On Sense and Reference, p.214
[…] A thought is contained in a declarative sentence. By a thought I understand not the subjective performance of thinking but its objective content, which is capable of being the common property of several thinkers. […] the thought of the sentence “The morning star is a body illuminated by the sun” differs from that of the sentence “The evening star is a body illuminated by the sun”. Anybody who did not know that the evening star is the morning star might hold one to be true, the other false. The thought, accordingly, cannot be the referent of the sentence, but must be considered as the sense. Frege, on Sense and Reference, p.214-215
The thought loses value for us as soon as we recognize that the referent of one of its parts is missing. We are therefore justified in not being satisfied with the sense of a sentence, and in inquiring also as to its referent. But now why do we want every proper name to have not only a sense, but also a referent? Why is the thought not enough to us? Because, and to the extent that, we are concerned with its truth value. This is not always the case. In hearing an epic poem, for instance, apart from the euphony of the language we are interested only in the sense of the sentences and the images and feelings thereby aroused. The question of truth would cause us to abandon aesthetic delight for an attitude of scientific investigation. […] It is the striving of truth that drives us always to advance from the sense to the referent. Frege, on Sense and Reference, p.215-216
We are therefore driven into accepting the truth value of a sentence as its referent. By the truth value of a sentence I understand the circumstance that it is true or false. There are no further truth values. For brevity I call the one the true, the other the false. Every declarative sentence concerned with the referents of its words is therefore to be regarded as a proper name, and its referent, if it exists, is either the true or the false. These two objects are recognized, if only implicitly, by everybody who judges something to be true […]. In every judgement, no matter how trivial, the step from the level of thoughts to the level of referents (the objective) has already been taken. [A judgement, for me, is not the mere comprehension of a thought, but the recognition of its truth.] Frege, On Sense and Reference, p.216
If now the truth value of a sentence is its referent, then on the one hand all true sentences have the same referent and so, on the other hand, do all false sentences. From this we see that in the referent of the sentence all that is specific is obliterated. We can never be concerned only with the referent of a sentence; but again the mere thought alone yields no knowledge, but only the thought together with its referent, i.e., its truth value. Frege, On Sense and Reference, p.217
“Reference” is often referred to as “Denotation”
Frege suggested that the terms of a language have both a sense and a denotation, i.e., that at least two semantic relationships are required to explain the significance or meaning of the terms of a language. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2024/entries/frege/#FrePuz
Frege noticed that this account of truth (‘a=b’ is true if and only if the object a just is (identical to) the object b) can’t be all there is to the meaning of identity statements. The statement ‘a=a’ has a cognitive significance (or meaning) that must be different from the cognitive significance of ‘a=b’. We can learn that ‘Mark Twain = Mark Twain’ is true simply by inspecting it; but we can’t learn the truth of ‘Mark Twain = Samuel Clemens’ simply by inspecting it — you have to examine the world to see whether the two persons are the same. So the puzzle Frege discovered is: how do we account for the difference in cognitive significance between ‘a=b’ and ‘a=a’ when they are true? Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2024/entries/frege/#FrePuz
Frege, in effect, noticed the following counterexample to the Principle of Identity Substitution. Consider the following argument: John believes that Mark Twain wrote Huckleberry Finn. Mark Twain = Samuel Clemens. Therefore, John believes that Samuel Clemens wrote Huckleberry Finn. This argument is not valid. There are circumstances in which the premises are true and the conclusion false. We have already described such circumstances, namely, one in which John learns the name ‘Mark Twain’ by reading Huckleberry Finn but learns the name ‘Samuel Clemens’ in the context of learning about 19th century American authors (without learning that the name ‘Mark Twain’ was a pseudonym for Samuel Clemens). John may not believe that Samuel Clemens wrote Huckleberry Finn. The premises of the above argument, therefore, do not logically entail the conclusion. So the Principle of Identity Substitution appears to break down in the context of propositional attitude reports. The puzzle, then, is to say what causes the principle to fail in these contexts. Why aren’t we still saying something true about the man in question if all we have done is changed the name by which we refer to him? Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2024/entries/frege/#FrePuz
Even though the names ‘Mark Twain’ and ‘Samuel Clemens’ denote the same individual, they express different senses. (See May 2006b for a nice discussion of the question of whether Frege believed that the sense of a name varies from person to person.) Using the distinction between sense and denotation, Frege can account for the difference in cognitive significance between identity statements of the form ‘a=a’ and those of the form ‘a=b’. Since the sense of ‘a’ differs from the sense of ‘b’, the components of the sense of ‘a=a’ and the sense of ‘a=b’ are different. Frege can claim that the sense of the whole expression is different in the two cases. Since the sense of an expression accounts for its cognitive significance, Frege has an explanation of the difference in cognitive significance between ‘a=a’ and ‘a=b’, and thus a solution to the first puzzle. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2024/entries/frege/#FreTheSenDen
Moreover, Frege proposed that when a term (name or description) follows a propositional attitude verb, it no longer denotes what it ordinarily denotes. Instead, Frege claims that in such contexts, a term denotes its ordinary sense. This explains why the Principle of Identity Substitution fails for terms following the propositional attitude verbs in propositional attitude reports. The Principle asserts that truth is preserved when we substitute one name for another having the same denotation. But, according to Frege’s theory, the names ‘Mark Twain’ and ‘Samuel Clemens’ denote different senses when they occur in the following sentences: John believes that Mark Twain wrote Huckleberry Finn. John believes that Samuel Clemens wrote Huckleberry Finn. If they don’t denote the same object, then there is no reason to think that substitution of one name for another would preserve truth. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2024/entries/frege/#FreTheSenDen
Frege - On Sense and ReferencePDF

Frege - On Sense and Reference

Conception

Truth Values as the Referents of Sentences

Frege’s Puzzle About Identity Statements

Frege’s Puzzle About Propositional Attitude Reports

Russell - On Denoting
By a “denoting phrase” I mean a phrase such as any one of the following: a man, some man, any man, every man, all men, the present King of England, the centre of mass of the Solar system at the first instant of the twentieth century, the revolution of the earth around the sun, the revolution of sun around the earth. Thus a phrase is denoting solely in virtue of its form. We may distinguish three cases: 1) A phrase may be denoting, and yet not denote anything; e.g. “the present King of France”. 2) A phrase may denote one definite object; e.g. “the present King of England”. 3) A phrase may denote ambiguously; e.g. “a man” denotes not many man but an ambiguous man. Russell, On Denoting, p.479
My theory, briefly, is as follows: I take the notion of the variable as fundamental; I use “C(x)” to mean a proposition in which x is a constituent, where x, the variable, is essentially and wholly undetermined. Then we can consider two notions: - “C(x) is always true” - “C(x) is sometimes true” (which can be defined by means of the first as: “It is not true that ‘C(x) is false’ is always true”) Then, everything and nothing and something (which are the most primitive of denoting phrases) are to be interpreted as follows: - C(everything) means “C(x) is always true”; - C(nothing) means “ ‘C(x) is false’ is always true”; - C(something) means “It is false that ‘C(x) is false’ is always true” (or “C(x) is not always false” or “C(x) is sometimes true”). Here the notion of “C(x) is always true” is taken as ultimate and indefinable and the others are defined by means of it. Everything, nothing and something are not assumed to have any meaning in isolation, but a meaning is assigned to every proposition in which they occur. This is the principle of the theory of denoting I want to advocate: that denoting phrases never have any meaning in themselves, but that every proposition in whose verbal expression they occur has a meaning. Russell, On Denoting, p.480
The difficulties concerning denoting are, I believe, all the result of a wrong analysis of propositions whose verbal expressions contain denoting phrases. Russell, On Denoting, p.480
Cognitive Science
To explain the mind, we have to show how minds are built from mindless stuff, from parts that are much smaller and simpler than anything we would consider smart. Unless we can explain the mind in terms of things that have no thoughts or feelings of their own, we’ll only have gone around in a circle. Marvin Minsky, The Society of Mind, p.18
When first you found some building toys in early childhood, you probably spent joyful weeks of learning what to do with them. If such toys are now relatively dull, then you must ask yourself how you have changed. Before you turned to more ambitious things, it once seemed strange and wonderful to be able to build a tower or a house of blocks. Yet, though all grown-up persons know how to do such things, no one understands how we learn to do them? And that is what will concern us here. To pile up blocks into heaps and rows: these are skills each of us learned so long ago that we can’t remember learning them at all. Marvin Minsky, The Society of Mind, p.21
Common sense is not a simple thing. Instead, it is an immense society of hard-earned practical ideas - of multitudes of life-learned rules and exceptions, dispositions and tendencies, balances and checks. If common sense is so diverse and intricate, what makes it seem obvious and natural? This illusion of simplicity comes from losing touch with what happened during infancy, when we formed our first abilities. As each new group of skills matures, we build more layers on top of them. As time goes on, the layers below become increasingly remote until, when we try to speak of them in later life, we find ourselves with little more to say than “I don’t know”. Marvin Minsky, The Society of Mind, p.22
For us, therefore, communism is not a finality. There is no "transition" towards it. It is transition entirely: it is en chemin, in transit. The different ways of living will never cease to chafe and move against each other, to clash with and occasionally combat each other. Everything will always have to be rethought. There are bound to be the usual Leninists who will reject an immanent conception of communism such as this, by citing the necessity of a vertical, strategic articulation of the struggle, and an instant later we're sure to hear the lumbering "question of organization." The "question of organization" is still and always the Leviathan. In a time when the apparent unity of the Self can no longer mask the chaos of forces, attachments, and participations that we are, how could we still believe in the fable of organic unity? The myth of "organization" owes everything to the depictions of the hierarchy of natural faculties that were handed down to us by ancient psychology and Christian theology. We are no longer nihilistic enough to think that inside us there is something like a stable psychic organ-a will, let's say-that directs our other faculties. This neat invention of the theolo­gians, much more political than it appears, had a dual purpose: first, to make man, newly provided with a "free will," into a moral subject and to deliver him over in this way to the Last Judgment and the century's punishments; second, based on the theological idea of a God having "freely'' created the world and essentially standing apart from his action, to institute a formal separation between being and acting. For centuries, this separation, which was to mark Western political ideas in a durable way, made ethical realities illegible-the plane of forms-of-life being precisely that of a non­ differentiation between what one is and what one does. So "the question of organization" exists since those Bolsheviks of Late Antiquity, the Church Fathers. It was the instrument of legitimation of the Church just as it would later be that of the legitimation of the Party. Against this opportunistic question, against the postulated existence of the "will”, it's necessary to emphasize that what "wants" within us, what inclines us, is never the same thing. That it is a simple outcome, crucial at certain moments, of the combat waged within and outside us by a tangled network of forces, affects, and inclinations, resulting in a temporary assemblage in which some force has just as temporarily subdued other forces. That the sequence of these assemblages produces a kind of coherence that may culminate in a form is a fact. But to always label with the same noun something that in a contingent way finds itself in a position to dominate or give the decisive impetus, to convince oneself that it's always a matter of the same authority, to convince oneself finally that every form and every decision are dependent on a decision organ, is to perform quite a trick, but one that's been repeated all too long. By believing in such an organ for such a long time, by stimulating that imaginary muscle over and over again, one ends up in a fatal aboulia that seems nowadays to be afflicting the late offspring of the Christian Empire that we happen to be. In opposition to that, we propose paying careful attention to situations and to the forces that inhabit and traverse beings, in conjunction with an art of decisive assemblages. The Invisible Committee, Now, p.154-157
[…] it must surely be admitted that the visions which come in sleep are like paintings, which must have been fashioned in the likeness of things that are real, and hence that at least these general kinds of things — eyes, head, hands and the body as a whole — are things which are not imaginary but are real and exist. For even when painters try to create sirens and satyrs with the most extraordinary bodies, they cannot give them natures which are new in all respects; they simply jumble up the limbs of different animals. Descartes, Meditations of First Philosophy, Edited by John Cottingham, Cambridge University Press 2017, p.17
Aris Goudouras
Interesting approach for theories of the subject here: Having different centers of will that affect us in various situations in contingent ways, not one that decisively takes over and controls our will.
History
Revolutionary Movements
Workers movement
The assault of the first workers movement against the whole organization of the old world came to an end long ago, and nothing can bring it back to life. It failed. Certainly it achieved immense results, but not the ones it had originally intended. No doubt such deviation toward partially unexpected results is the general rule in human actions; but the one exception to this rule is precisely the moment of revolutionary action, the moment of the all-or-nothing qualitative leap. The classical workers movement must be reexamined without any illusions, particularly without any illusions regarding its various political and pseudotheoretical heirs, for all they have inherited is its failure. The apparent successes of this movement are actually its fundamental failures (reformism or the establishment of a state bureaucracy), while its failures (the Paris Commune or the 1934 Asturian revolt) are its most promising successes so far, for us and for the future. This movement must be precisely delineated in time. The classical workers movement can be considered to have begun a couple decades before the official formation of the International, with the first linkup of communist groups of several countries that Marx and his friends organized from Brussels in 1845. And it was completely finished after the failure of the Spanish revolution, that is, after the Barcelona May days of 1937. We need to rediscover the whole truth of this period and to reexamine all the oppositions between revolutionaries and all the neglected possibilities, without any longer being impressed by the fact that some won out over others and dominated the movement; for we now know that the movement within which they were successful was an overall failure. Marx's thought is obviously the first which must be rediscovered -- a task that should not present much difficulty in view of the extensive existing documentation and the crudeness of the lies about it. But it is also necessary to reassess the anarchist positions in the First International, Blanquism, Luxemburgism, the council movement in Germany and Spain, Kronstadt, the Makhnovists, etc. Without overlooking the practical influence of the utopian socialists. All this, of course, not with the aim of scholarship or academic eclecticism, but solely in order to contribute toward the formation of a new, profoundly different revolutionary movement, a movement of which we have seen so many premonitory signs over the last few years, one of which is our own existence. We must understand these signs through the study of the classical revolutionary project and vice versa. It is necessary to rediscover the history of the very movement of history, which has been so thoroughly hidden and distorted. There is no other way to be faithful to, or even simply to understand, the actions of our comrades of the past than to profoundly reconceive the problem of revolution, which has been increasingly deprived of thought as it has become posed more intensely in concrete reality. Situationist International, The Bad Days will End, Internationale Situationniste #7, https://libcom.org/article/bad-days-will-end-0
What provided the impetus for a new conception of revolution and communism (as communisation) was not simply an understanding of the content of communism derived from a close reading of Marx and Bordiga, but also the influence of a whole wave of class struggles of the late sixties and early seventies which would give a new meaning to “the refusal of work” as a specific content of the revolution. By the early 1970s journalists and sociologists began to speak of a “revolt against work” afflicting an entire new generation of workers in traditional industries, with rapidly rising rates of absenteeism and sabotage, as well as a widespread disregard for the authority of the union. Commentators variously blamed: the feeling of expendability and insecurity brought about by automation; the increasing assertiveness of traditionally oppressed minorities; the influence of an anti-authoritarian counter-culture; the power and sense of entitlement afforded by the prolonged post-war boom and its hard-won “social wage”. Whatever the reason for these developments, what seemed to characterize the new struggles was a breakdown in the traditional forms through which workers sought to gain control over the labour process, leaving only the expression of an apparent desire to work less. For many of those who had been influenced by the SI, this new proletarian “assault” was characterized by a “refusal of work” shorn of the techno-utopian and bohemian-artistic elements which the SI had never been able to abandon. Groups like Négation and Intervention Communiste argued that it was not only the power of the union which was being undermined in these struggles, but the entire Marxist and Anarchist programme of the liberation of work and the triumph of “workers’ power”. Far from liberating their work, bringing it under their own control, and using it to seize control of society through self-managing their workplaces, in the French May and the subsequent “creeping May” in Italy, the “critique of work” took the form of hundreds of thousands of workers deserting their workplaces. Rather than an indication that struggles hadn't gone far enough, the absence of workers’ councils during this period was thus understood as an expression of a rupture with what would come to be known as “the old workers’ movement.” Endnotes, Bring out your Dead, Endnotes #1, https://endnotes.org.uk/articles/bring-out-your-dead
For Mouvement Communiste, Négation, Intervention Communiste, and others the breakdown of the old workers’ movement was something to be celebrated, not because the corrupt leadership of the workers’ organisations would no longer be able to restrain the autonomy of the masses, but because such a shift represented a transcendence of the historical function of the workers’ movement, a transcendence that would mark the reemergence of the communist movement, the “real movement which abolishes the present state of things”. And it did so in an immediate sense, for the riots and wildcat strikes of that decade were read by these writers as a total refusal of all the mediations of the workers’ movement, not in favour of some other more “democratic” mediation like that of workers’ councils, but in a way that posed the immediate production of communist relations as the only possible revolutionary horizon. Thus whereas communism had previously been seen as something that needed to be created after the revolution, the revolution was now seen as nothing other than the production of communism (abolishing wage labour and the state). The notion of a period of transition was jettisoned. Endnotes, Bring out your Dead, Endnotes #1, https://endnotes.org.uk/articles/bring-out-your-dead
The workers’ failures were necessary since it was capital that constituted their organizing principle: “The example of the German, and above all, of the Russian revolutions, shows that the proletariat was fully capable of destroying a social order which presented an obstacle to the development of the productive forces, and thus to the development of capital, but that at the moment that it became a matter of establishing a different community, it remained a prisoner of the logic of the rationality of the development of those productive forces, and confined itself within the problem of managing them.” [Jacques Camatte, ‘Proletariat and Revolution’, 1975] In a recent text Dauvé sums up this estimation of the old workers’ movement: “The workers’ movement that existed in 1900, or still in 1936, was neither crushed by fascist repression nor bought off by transistors or fridges: it destroyed itself as a force of change because it aimed at preserving the proletarian condition, not superseding it. … The purpose of the old labour movement was to take over the same world and manage it in a new way: putting the idle to work, developing production, introducing workers’ democracy (in principle, at least). Only a tiny minority, ‘anarchist’ as well as 'marxist', held that a different society meant the destruction of State, commodity and wage labour, although it rarely defined this as a process, rather as a programme to put into practice after the seizure of power…” [Gilles Dauvé, ‘Out of the Future’ in Eclipse and Reemergence of the Communist Movement (1997) pp. 12-13.] Endnotes, Bring out your Dead, Endnotes #1, https://endnotes.org.uk/articles/bring-out-your-dead
Spanish Revolution
The assault of the first workers movement against the whole organization of the old world came to an end long ago, and nothing can bring it back to life. It failed. Certainly it achieved immense results, but not the ones it had originally intended. No doubt such deviation toward partially unexpected results is the general rule in human actions; but the one exception to this rule is precisely the moment of revolutionary action, the moment of the all-or-nothing qualitative leap. The classical workers movement must be reexamined without any illusions, particularly without any illusions regarding its various political and pseudotheoretical heirs, for all they have inherited is its failure. The apparent successes of this movement are actually its fundamental failures (reformism or the establishment of a state bureaucracy), while its failures (the Paris Commune or the 1934 Asturian revolt) are its most promising successes so far, for us and for the future. This movement must be precisely delineated in time. The classical workers movement can be considered to have begun a couple decades before the official formation of the International, with the first linkup of communist groups of several countries that Marx and his friends organized from Brussels in 1845. And it was completely finished after the failure of the Spanish revolution, that is, after the Barcelona May days of 1937. We need to rediscover the whole truth of this period and to reexamine all the oppositions between revolutionaries and all the neglected possibilities, without any longer being impressed by the fact that some won out over others and dominated the movement; for we now know that the movement within which they were successful was an overall failure. Marx's thought is obviously the first which must be rediscovered -- a task that should not present much difficulty in view of the extensive existing documentation and the crudeness of the lies about it. But it is also necessary to reassess the anarchist positions in the First International, Blanquism, Luxemburgism, the council movement in Germany and Spain, Kronstadt, the Makhnovists, etc. Without overlooking the practical influence of the utopian socialists. All this, of course, not with the aim of scholarship or academic eclecticism, but solely in order to contribute toward the formation of a new, profoundly different revolutionary movement, a movement of which we have seen so many premonitory signs over the last few years, one of which is our own existence. We must understand these signs through the study of the classical revolutionary project and vice versa. It is necessary to rediscover the history of the very movement of history, which has been so thoroughly hidden and distorted. There is no other way to be faithful to, or even simply to understand, the actions of our comrades of the past than to profoundly reconceive the problem of revolution, which has been increasingly deprived of thought as it has become posed more intensely in concrete reality. Situationist International, The Bad Days will End, Internationale Situationniste #7, https://libcom.org/article/bad-days-will-end-0
In this preliminary issue of Endnotes we have assembled a series of texts (basically an exchange between two communist groups in France) all concerned with the history of revolutions in the twentieth century. As the texts make clear, the history of these revolutions is a history of failure, either because they were crushed by capitalist counter-revolution or because their “victories” took the form of counter-revolutions themselves — setting up social systems which, in their reliance on monetary exchange and wage-labour, failed to transcend capitalism. Yet the latter was not simply a “betrayal”; any more than the former was the result of “strategic errors” or missing “historical conditions.” When we address the question of these failures we cannot resort to “what if” counterfactuals — blaming the defeat of revolutionary movements on everything (leaders, forms of organisations, wrong ideas, unripe conditions) other than the movements themselves in their determinate content. It is the nature of this content which is at issue in the exchange which follows. Endnotes, Bring out your Dead, Endnotes #1, https://endnotes.org.uk/articles/bring-out-your-dead
Counter-Revolutions
The rise of fascism in the start of the 20th century
It is significant that fascism first defined itself as a form of organisation and not as a programme. The word referred both to a symbol of state power (fasces, or bundles, borne before high officials in Ancient Rome), and to a will to get people together in bundles (groups). Fascism’s only programme is to organise, to forcibly make the components of society converge. Giles Dauve, When Insurrections Die, Endnotes #1, https://endnotes.org.uk/articles/when-insurrections-die
Fascism’s goal was the authoritarian restoration of the state, in order to create a new state structure capable (in contrast to democracy, Mussolini said) of limiting big capital and of controlling the commodity logic which was eroding values, social ties and work. For decades, the bourgeoisie had denied the reality of social contradictions. Fascism, on the contrary, proclaimed them with violence, denying their existence between classes and transposing them to the struggle between nations, denouncing Italy’s fate as a “proletarian nation”. Mussolini was archaic in so far as he upheld traditional values ruined by capital, and modern in so far as he claimed to defend the social rights of the people. Giles Dauve, When Insurrections Die, Endnotes #1, https://endnotes.org.uk/articles/when-insurrections-die
On August 1st, the Alliance of Labour, which included the railway workers’ union, the CGL and the anarchist USI, called a general strike. Despite broad success, the Alliance officially called off the strike on the 3rd. In numerous cities, however, it continued in insurrectionary form, which was finally contained only by a combined effort of the police and the military, supported by naval cannon, and, of course, reinforced by the fascists. Who defeated this proletarian energy? The general strike was broken by the state and the fasci, but it was also smothered by democracy, and its failure opened the way to a fascist solution to the crisis. What followed was less a coup d’état than a transfer of power with the support of a whole array of forces. The “March on Rome” of the Duce (who actually took the train) was less a showdown than a bit of theatre: the fascists went through the motions of assaulting the state, the state went through the motions of defending itself, and Mussolini took power. His ultimatum of October 24 (“We Want To Become the State!”) was not a threat of civil war, but a signal to the ruling class that the National Fascist Party represented the only force capable of restoring state authority, and of assuring the political unity of the country. The army could still have contained the fascist groups gathered in Rome, which were badly equipped and notoriously inferior on the military level, and the state could have withstood the seditious pressure. But the game was not being played on the military level. Under the influence of Badoglio in particular (the commander-in-chief in 1919-21) legitimate authority caved in. The king refused to proclaim a state of emergency, and on the 30th he asked the Duce to form a new government. The liberals — the same people anti-fascism counts on to stop fascism — joined the government. With the exception of the socialists and the communists, all parties sought a rapprochement with the PNF and voted for Mussolini: the parliament, with only 35 fascist MPs, supported Mussolini’s investiture 306-116. Giolitti himself, the great liberal icon of the time, an authoritarian reformer who had been head of state many times before the war, and then again in 1920-21, whom fashionable thought still fancies in retrospect as the sole politician capable of opposing Mussolini, supported him up to 1924. Democracy not only surrendered its powers to the dictator, but ratified them. We might add that in the following months, several unions, including those of the railway workers and the sailors, declared themselves “national”, patriotic, and therefore not hostile to the regime: repression did not spare them. Giles Dauve, When Insurrections Die, Endnotes #1, https://endnotes.org.uk/articles/when-insurrections-die
Programming
Functional Programming
Notable People
Aris Goudouras
Pandoc creator & maintainer
Aris Goudouras
Co-authored the https://haskellbook.com/ book.
Aris Goudouras
fp-ts creator & maintainer
Aris Goudouras
Wadler was a principal designer of Haskell, currently works with Agda and has written a textbook for it. Came up with type classes and monadic IO.
Books
Haskell Programming from First Principles - Allen & MoronukiPDF
Graham Hutton - Programming in Haskell (2018, Cambridge University Press)PDF
The Dao of Functional Programming (Last Updated 09/01/2025) - MilewskiPDF
Monoid
Commutativity
Associativity
Appending as condensing a set of values to a summary value
Abelian or Commutative Monoid
Could be interesting for CRDT implementations
CRDTs are, in the basic case, a idempotent commutative monoid, aka an idempotent abelian monoid. https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=7891598#:~:text=CRDTs%20are%2C%20in%20the%20basic%20case%2C%20a%20idempotent%20commutative%20monoid%2C%20aka%20an%20idempotent%20abelian%20monoid.
Folding & Foldable
Algebras and Laws
Algebras in Haskell
The importance of taking advantage of mathematical laws when programming
Functor
The Law of Composition in Functors
The Law of Identity in Functors
Lifting
Natural Transformations
`Either` and `Validation`: Natural Transformations, differing in the`Applicative` Instance
Lifting
Precise Definition of Lifting
Metaphor: Lifting a Function over a Layer of Structure
Metaphor: Lifting a Function into a Context
Applicative Functor
Applicatives as Monoidal Functors
Applicative - `pure` Function
Example: Applicative and Maybe
Example: Applicative and Lists
Monoid for Smashing Structure, Functor for Mapping Values
`liftA2` - `fmap` and `apply` working together
`Either` and `Validation`: Natural Transformations, differing in the`Applicative` Instance
Difference in using `Applicative` or `Monad` functions in sequences
Monad
Monad’s `join` (flattening structure) in action
Monad as a generalization of concat, with the ability to collapse/merge structure
Difference in using `Applicative` or `Monad` functions in sequences
Binding in the context of Monads
Kleisli Composition (that accounts for structure) in Monads
`mapM` as a special case of `traverse`
Parsing: A Case Study for Monads Usage
Monad Transformers
When you are trying to explain what a monad is to a Haskell programmer, how do you explain? It’s like, well, there is the Maybe Monad. Well, okay. And there’s the List Monad. Okay. And there’s the Continuation Monad. It’s like your fingers sticking out of water, right? Each finger is separate. Where is the hand? So, the way that I finally tried to explain monad is that it’s in composition. You are trying to compose things and there is this new way of composing things that is different. It’s sort of like composing functions, right? But these are not simple functions. These are functions that return some funny stuff, right? And how do you compose functions that return funny stuff? They accept normal stuff, but they return something that’s weird. […] There is something miraculous that happens with monads. The question is like, how come that all these weird effects that you can think of, they have all the explanations in terms of functions returning some functor? Why is it so? Whether it’s IO or maybe or list. Bartosz Milewski, https://haskell.foundation/podcast/30/, 32:07
Effects and I/O
Monad’s `join` (flattening structure) in action
Ordering effects by nesting lambdas
It is not possible to perform I/O outside of the IO monad – your code will not compile – and, furthermore, I/O “colours” all the functions which call it, because if you are calling something which returns IO, then you have to be returning IO as well. This might look like a lot of bureaucracy, but it actually does two very helpful things: firstly, it immediately tells the programmer “hey, this function performs side-effects in I/O” which means that they don’t have to read the code in order to understand what it does, just the type signature; secondly, it means that you cannot accidentally perform I/O in a function you thought was pure – this, in itself, eliminates whole classes of bugs in which one may think one understands all the dependencies of a function, but actually something is affecting it which you did not realise, because it can perform side-effects. - https://www.gtf.io/musings/why-haskell
Traversable
`sequenceA`: flipping layers of structure around
`mapM` as a special case of `traverse`
When to use `Traversable`
Reader
`fmap` over functions as function composition
`fmap` in partially applied functions
- Computation type: Computations which read values from a shared environment. - Binding strategy: Monad values are functions from the environment to a value. The bound function is applied to the bound value, and both have access to the shared environment. - Useful for: Maintaining variable bindings, or other shared environment. https://wiki.haskell.org/All_About_Monads#The_Reader_monad
Functor, Applicative and Monad instances for `Reader`
State
- Computation type: Computations which maintain state. - Binding strategy: Binding threads a state parameter through the sequence of bound functions so that the same state value is never used twice, giving the illusion of in-place update. - Useful for: Building computations from sequences of operations that require a shared state. https://wiki.haskell.org/All_About_Monads#The_State_monad
How the `State` monad’s bind operation threads the state parameter through the sequence of functions
MonadState functions (`get` and `put`)
Haskell
Parsing
Domain Driven Design and Functional Programming
Using “Smart” Constructors to Ensure Validation Rules are Applied
Avoid Domain Events within a Bounded Context (FP + DDD)
Invariants and how to express them formally in the Type System
Example of Capturing Business Rules with the Type System
Modeling Business Workflows as Pipelines
Modeling Dependencies (FP + DDD)
Functional Programming - Paradigm & Mental Models
Why Functional Programming
Declarative vs Imperative / Global vs Local / Denotational vs Operational Approach in Problem Solving
Mental models and thinking in Functional Programming
Aris Goudouras
Haven’t read this yet but seems relevant
Folding & Foldable
Folding and Monoid
Folding in lists and its significance
`foldr` specifying the binary associative operation explicitly
`foldr` (right fold) and `foldl` (left fold) in lists
How to write folds
Catamorphisms as the generalization of folds
How `foldl` associates
How `foldr` associates
`foldl` implementation
`foldr` implementation
The “rest of the fold” in `foldr`
Folding as a two-stage process (traversal and folding)
Example of folding usage (Source: https://hackage.haskell.org/package/recursion-schemes-5.2.3#readme)
Pattern-Matching
Prefer non-overlapping patterns
Category Theory and Functional Programming
Objects and Elements
Category Theory and Structure
Composition, Application and Identity
Category Theory and other Mathematical Theories
Category Theory and Thought Processes
Morhpism/Function Types
Types
Functors
Important Categories for Programming
Natural Transformations
Algebras
Recursion Schemes, Algebras and Coalgebras
Catamorphisms in recursion schemes
Anamorphisms in recursion schemes
Functors and recursion schemes
Idea & intuition behind recursion schemes

Definitions & Tutorials

Discussion: What are good use cases, if any?

Implementation / Libraries

Agda
Software Design
Domain Driven Design
Domain Driven Design touches on how you can work with domain experts to model the problem in a way that makes sense. A core argument there is that good software design is heavily based on communication and developing common vocabulary with domain experts, therefore gradually improving your modeling of the real world problem at hand. Also, it emphasizes on how context matters when communicating terms and even naming things in code, which is really connected to philosophy of language matters. There is something core in these ideas which I can't really express yet because it's quite blur on my mind. It goes along the lines that: when writing software, we are expressing in a formal way our model for a specific problem or domain. Language and communication are key to this practice, as it's through them that we forge our models. So there is a connection between philosophy of language, communicative acts maybe some other areas (maybe philosophy of mathematics because software can be similar to math in a way?) and the practice of designing software.
Domain Modeling Made FunctionalPDF
Entities, Value Objects and Aggregates in DDD
Domain Driven Design and Functional Programming
(Business) Consistency in DDD
Hardware
Programming Languages Theory
Type Systems
Aris Goudouras
Interesting for dependent types.

People

Agda

Thinkers and Think Tanks
Endnotes
Endnotes #2 - Misery and the Value Form
Endnotes - Misery and Debt
Endnotes - Communisation and Value-Form Theory
Endnotes #4 - Unity in Separation
Endnotes - An Identical Abject-Subject?
Endnotes #1 - Preliminary Materials for a Balance Sheet of the 20th Century
Endnotes - Bring out your Dead
Endnotes #3 - Gender, Race, Class and other Misfortunes
Endnotes - The Logic of Gender
Endnotes #5 - The Passions and the Interests
Friends of Classless Society - Contours of the World Commune
Marx
Marx - Capital
Habermas’ critique to Marx’s theory of value
Bookchin’s critique to Marx’s theory of value
Labor-power and its value
The sphere of circulation
Marx’s method & ontology
Marx - Capital (By Chapter)
The effects of changes in the productivity of labor to social relations and value
Marx’s method & ontology
Marxian Dialectics
Form and Content
Macro-economic, sociological approach
Notes on Translations and Editions of Marx’s Works
[Πέτρος]: Η σταντάρ αγγλική μετάφραση του Πρώτου Τόμου του Κεφαλαίου είναι αυτή που έχουμε στον σκληρό από Ben Fowkes, εκδόσεις Penguin. Πρόσφατα βγήκε και νέα μετάφραση από North και Reitter. Κι αυτή υπάρχει στον σκληρό. Αν θυμάμαι καλά, η καινούργια αυτή μετάφραση, μολονότι πιο σύγχρονη, δεν ενημερώνεται από τη δουλειά που έχει γίνει στο MEGA2. Οπότε όλοι αυτοί οι μελετητές του Μαρξ που έχουν εμπλακεί στην επανέκδοση των απάντων του δεν την εκτιμούν ιδιαίτερα, διότι δεν ενσωματώνει τα ευρήματά τους. Η ελληνική μετάφραση του Γκιούρα με την οποία δουλέψαμε, αντιθέτως, είναι "εγκεκριμένη" από το επιτελείο του MEGA2, καθώς φέρει ένα προλογικό σημείωμα από έναν εξ αυτών. Παλιότερες μεταφράσεις, όπως αυτή των Moore και Aveling, δεν τις συνιστώ.
[Πέτρος]: Η MECW έχει νόημα να μπει σε αντιπαραβολή συνολικά με το MEGA και MEGA2 ως πρότζεκτ. Η MECW είναι η αγγλική έκδοση των απάντων. Ας πούμε όπως η Σύγχρονη Εποχή έχει εκδώσει τα Άπαντα του Λένιν στα ελληνικά. Έχει ολοκληρωθεί ως project. Το MEGA2 είναι ιστορική-κριτική έρευνα μεγαλύτερης έκτασης και βάθους. Είναι αρχειακή δουλειά, όχι μεταφραστικό εγχείρημα. Και δεν έχει ολοκληρωθεί ακόμη.
The MECW’s somewhat clunky translation of the Grundrisse makes the manuscript, already difficult to read, still more so. To its credit, the translation does follow the text set out in the MEGA edition of the Grundrisse. However, those reading in English translation are still better served by Martin Nicolaus’s rendering (London: Penguin, 1973). https://sdonline.org/issue/37/comparing-two-editions-marx-engels-collected-works
Marx - Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts
We proceed from an actual economic fact. The worker becomes all the poorer the more wealth he produces, the more his production increases in power and size. The worker becomes an ever cheaper commodity the more commodities he creates. The devaluation of the world of men is in direct proportion to the increasing value of the world of things. Labour produces not only commodities: it produces itself and the worker as a commodity— and this at the same rate at which it produces commodities in general. This fact expresses merely that the object which labour produces—labour's product—confronts it as something alien, as a power independent of the producer. The product of labour is labour which has been embodied in an object, which has become material: it is the objectification of labour. Labour's realisation is its objectification. Under these economic conditions this realisation of labour appears as loss of realisation for the workers; objectification as loss of the object and bondage to it; appropriation as estrangement, as alienation. Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts, Marx Engels Collected Works Volume 3 (International Publishers), p.271-272
Till now we have been considering the estrangement; the alienation of the worker only in one of its aspects, i.e., the worker's relationship to the products of his labour. But the estrangement is manifested not only in the result but in the act of production, within the producing activity itself. How could the worker come to face the product of his activity as a stranger, were it not that in the very act of production he was estranging himself from himself? The product is after all but the summary of the activity, of production. If then the product of labour is alienation, production itself must be active alienation, the alienation of activity, the activity of alienation. In the estrangement of the object of labour is merely summarised the estrangement, the alienation, in the activity of labour itself. What, then, constitutes the alienation of labour? First, the fact that labour is external to the worker, i.e., it does not belong to his intrinsic nature; that in his work, therefore, he does not affirm himself but denies himself, does not feel content but unhappy, does not develop freely his physical and mental energy but mortifies his body and ruins his mind. The worker therefore only feels himself outside his work, and in his work feels outside himself. He feels at home when he is not working, and when he is working he does not feel at home. His labour is therefore not voluntary, but coerced; it is forced labour. It is therefore not the satisfaction of a need; it is merely a means to satisfy needs external to it. Its alien character emerges clearly in the fact that as soon as no physical or other compulsion exists, labour is shunned like the plague. External labour, labour in which man alienates himself, is a labour of self-sacrifice, of mortification. Lastly, the external character of labour for the worker appears in the fact that it is not his own, but someone else's, that it does not belong to him, that in it he belongs, not to himself, but to another. Just as in religion the spontaneous activity of the human imagination, of the human brain and the human heart, operates on the individual independently of him—that is, operates as an alien, divine or diabolical activity—so is the worker's activity not his spontaneous activity. It belongs to another; it is the loss of his self. […] This relation [the relation of labour to the act of production] is the relation of the worker to his own activity as an alien activity not belonging to him; it is activity as suffering, strength as weakness, begetting as emasculating, the worker's own physical and mental energy, his personal life—for what is life but activity?—as an activity which is turned against him, independent of him and not belonging to him. Here we have self-estrangement, as previously we had the estrangement of the thing. Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts, Marx Engels Collected Works Volume 3 (International Publishers), p.274-275
In creating a world of objects by his practical activity, in his work upon inorganic nature, man proves himself a conscious species-being, i.e., as a being that treats the species as its own essential being, or that treats itself as a species-being. Admittedly animals also produce. They build themselves nests, dwellings, like the bees, beavers, ants, etc. But an animal only produces what it immediately needs for itself or its young. It produces one-sidedly, whilst man produces universally. It produces only under the dominion of immediate physical need, whilst man produces even when he is free from physical need and only truly produces in freedom therefrom. An animal produces only itself, whilst man reproduces the whole of nature. An animal's product belongs immediately to its physical body, whilst man freely confronts his product. An animal forms objects only in accordance with the standard and the need of the species to which it belongs, whilst man knows how to produce in accordance with the standard of every species, and knows how to apply everywhere the inherent standard to the object. Man therefore also forms objects in accordance with the laws of beauty. It is just in his work upon the objective world, therefore, that man really proves himself to be a species-being. This production is his active species-life. Through this production, nature appears as his work and his reality. The object of labour is, therefore, the objectification of man's species-life: for he duplicates himself not only, as in consciousness, intellectually, but also actively, in reality, and therefore he sees himself in a world that he has created. In tearing away from man the object of his production, therefore, estranged labour tears from him his species-life, his real objectivity as a member of the species, and transforms his advantage over animals into the disadvantage that his inorganic body, nature, is taken away from him. Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts, Marx Engels Collected Works Volume 3 (International Publishers), p.276-277
Marx adopts an instrumental disposition against nature in this manuscript.
An immediate consequence of the fact that man is estranged from the product of his labour, from his life activity, from his species-being is the estrangement of man from man. When man confronts himself, he confronts the other man. What applies to a man's relation to his work, to the product of his labour and to himself, also holds of a man's relation to the other man, and to the other man's labour and object of labour. In fact, the proposition that man's species-nature is estranged from him means that one man is estranged from the other, as each of them is from man's essential nature. The estrangement of man, and in fact every relationship in which man [stands] to himself, is realised and expressed only in the relationship in which a man stands to other men. Hence within the relationship of estranged labour each man views the other in accordance with the standard and the relationship in which he finds himself as a worker. Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts, Marx Engels Collected Works Volume 3 (International Publishers), p.277-278
If the product of labour does not belong to the worker, if it confronts him as an alien power, then this can only be because it belongs to some other man than the worker. If the worker's activity is a torment to him, to another it must give satisfaction and pleasure. Not the gods, not nature, but only man himself can be this alien power over man. We must bear in mind the previous proposition that man's relation to himself only becomes for him objective and actual through his relation to the other man. Thus, if the product of his labour, his labour objectified, is for him an alien, hostile, powerful object independent of him, then his position towards it is such that someone else is master of this object, someone who is alien, hostile, powerful, and independent of him. If he treats his own activity as an unfree activity, then he treats it as an activity performed in the service, under the dominion, the coercion, and the yoke of another man. […] through estranged labour man not only creates his relationship to the object and to the act of production as to powers" that are alien and hostile to him; he also creates the relationship in which other men stand to his production and to his product, and the relationship in which he stands to these other men. Just as he creates his own production as the loss of his reality, as his punishment; his own product as a loss, as a product not belonging to him; so he creates the domination of the person who does not produce over production and over the product. Just as he estranges his own activity from himself, so he confers upon the stranger an activity which is not his own. Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts, Marx Engels Collected Works Volume 3 (International Publishers), p.278-279
Private property thus results by analysis from the concept of alienated labour, i.e., of alienated man, of estranged labour, of estranged life, of estranged man. True, it is as a result of the movement of private property that we have obtained the concept of alienated labour (of alienated life) in political economy. But analysis of this concept shows that though private property appears to be the reason, the cause of alienated labour, it is rather its consequence, just as the gods are originally not the cause but the effect of man's intellectual confusion. Later this relationship becomes reciprocal. Only at the culmination of the development of private property does this, its secret, appear again, namely, that on the one hand it is the product of alienated labour, and that on the other it is the means by which labour alienates itself, the realisation of this alienation. Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts, Marx Engels Collected Works Volume 3 (International Publishers), p.279-280
Hegel
Phenomenology of Spirit
Companion Material
Schopenhauer
Situationist International
Reacting against the alienation of Christian society has led some people to admire the completely irrational alienation of primitive societies. But we need to go forward, not backward. We need to make the world more rational — the necessary first step in making it more exciting. Debord, Report on the Creation of Situations, theanarchistlibrary.org, p.6
Unitary urbanism
Our perspectives of action on the environment ultimately lead us to the notion of unitary urbanism. Unitary urbanism is defined first of all as the use of all arts and techniques as means contributing to the composition of a unified milieu. Such an interrelated ensemble must be envisaged as incomparably more far-reaching than the old domination of architecture over the traditional arts, or than the present sporadic application to anarchic urbanism of specialized technology or of scientific investigations such as ecology. Unitary urbanism must, for example, determine the acoustic environment as well as the distribution of different varieties of food and drink. It must include both the creation of new forms and the détournement of previous forms of architecture, urbanism, poetry and cinema. Integral art, which has been talked about so much, can be realized only at the level of urbanism. But it can no longer correspond to any of the traditional aesthetic categories. In each of its experimental cities unitary urbanism will act by way of a certain number of force fields, which we can temporarily designate by the classic term “district.” Each district will tend toward a specific harmony distinct from neighboring harmonies; or else will play on a maximum breaking up of internal harmony. Secondly, unitary urbanism is dynamic, in that it is directly related to styles of behavior. The most elementary unit of unitary urbanism is not the house, but the architectural complex, which combines all the factors conditioning an ambience, or a series of clashing ambiences, on the scale of the constructed situation. Spatial development must take into account the emotional effects that the experimental city is intended to produce. One of our comrades has advanced a theory of “states-of-mind” districts, according to which each district of a city would be designed to provoke a specific basic sentiment to which people would knowingly expose themselves. It seems that such a project draws appropriate conclusions from the current tendency to depreciate randomly encountered primary sentiments, and that its realization could contribute to accelerating that depreciation. The comrades who call for a new, free architecture must understand that this new architecture will primarily be based not on free, poetic lines and forms — in the sense that today’s “lyrical abstract” painting uses those terms — but rather on the atmospheric effects of rooms, hallways, streets — atmospheres linked to the activities they contain. Architecture must advance by taking emotionally moving situations, rather than emotionally moving forms, as the material it works with. And the experiments conducted with this material will lead to new, as yet unknown forms. Debord, Report on the Creation of Situations, theanarchistlibrary.org, p.12
They argued that a city that reflects desire would undo the crippling effects that a highly organized urban terrain has on the human mind. The practice of living beyond a highly rational organized environment would be realized in experimental cities designed according to the principles of what was termed unitary urbanism. The main unit of a city so designed was the architectural complex. These complexes are an ensemble of constructed situations producing certain ambiances. Unitary urbanism does not conform to the logic of capitalism; thus its space is highly political because the unitary city stresses play, unpredictability, and diversion in its design. https://www.britannica.com/topic/Situationist-International
The SI's minimum program is the development of complete environments, which must extend to a unitary urbanism, and research into new modes of behavior in relation to these environments. Unitary urbanism is defined as the complex, ongoing activity that consciously recreates man's environment according to the most advanced conceptions in every domain. The solution to problems of housing, traffic, and recreation can only be envisaged in relation to social, psychological and artistic perspectives that are combined in one synthetic hypothesis at the level of daily life. Unitary urbanism, independently of all aesthetic considerations, is the fruit of a new type of collective creativity; the development of this spirit of creation is the prior condition of unitary urbanism. All means are usable, on condition that they serve in a unitary action. The coordination of artistic and scientific means must lead to their total fusion. Artistic and scientific research must attain total freedom. The construction of a situation is the edification of a transient micro-ambiance and of the play of events for a unique moment in the lives of several persons. Within unitary urbanism, it is inseparable from the construction of a general, relatively more lasting ambiance. A constructed situation is a means for unitary urbanism, just as unitary urbanism is the indispensable basis for the construction of situations as at once play and as seriousness in a freer society Constant & Debord, The Amsterdam Declaration, Internationale Situationniste #2, https://libcom.org/article/amsterdam-declaration-constant-guy-debord, as edited by https://libcom.org/article/corrections-adopting-eleven-points-amsterdam
1. A mistake made by all the city planners is to consider the private automobile (and its by-products, such as the motorcycle) as essentially a means of transportation. In reality, it is the most notable material symbol of the notion of happiness that developed capitalism tends to spread throughout the society. The automobile is at the center of this general propaganda, both as supreme good of an alienated life and as essential product of the capitalist market: It is generally being said this year that American economic prosperity is soon going to depend on the success of the slogan "Two cars per family." 2. Commuting time, as Le Corbusier rightly noted, is a surplus labor which correspondingly reduces the amount of "free" time. 3. We must replace travel as an adjunct to work with travel as a pleasure. 4. To want to redesign architecture to accord with the needs of the present massive and parasitical existence of private automobiles reflects the most unrealistic misapprehension of where the real problems lie. Instead, architecture must be transformed to accord with the whole development of the society, criticizing all the transitory values linked to obsolete forms of social relationships (in the first rank of which is the family). 5. Even if, during a transitional period, we temporarily accept a rigid division between work zones and residence zones, we must at least envisage a third sphere: that of life itself (the sphere of freedom and leisure -- the essence of life). Unitary urbanism acknowledges no boundaries; it aims to form an integrated human milieu in which separations such as work/leisure or public/private will finally be dissolved. But before this is possible, the minimum action of unitary urbanism is to extend the terrain of play to all desirable constructions. This terrain will be at the level of complexity of an old city. 6. It is not a matter of opposing the automobile as an evil in itself. It is its extreme concentration in the cities that has led to the negation of its function. Urbanism should certainly not ignore the automobile, but even less should it accept it as its central theme. It should reckon on gradually phasing it out. In any case, we can envision the banning of auto traffic from the central areas of certain new complexes, as well as from a few old cities. […] 9. Revolutionary urbanists will not limit their concern to the circulation of things, or to the circulation of human beings trapped in a world of things. They will try to break these topological chains, paving the way with their experiments for a human journey through authentic life. Debord, Situationist Theses on Traffic, Internationale Situationniste #3, https://libcom.org/article/situationist-theses-traffic-guy-debord
Psychogeographical research
Psychogeographical research, “the study of the exact laws and specific effects of geographical environments, whether consciously organized or not, on the emotions and behavior of individuals,” thus takes on a double meaning: active observation of present-day urban agglomerations and development of hypotheses on the structure of a situationist city. The progress of psycho- geography depends to a great extent on the statistical extension of its methods of observation, but above all on experimentation by means of concrete interventions in urbanism. Before this stage is attained we cannot be certain of the objective truth of our initial psychogeographical findings. But even if those findings should turn out to be false, they would still be false solutions to what is nevertheless a real problem. Debord, Report on the Creation of Situations, theanarchistlibrary.org, p.13
The Dérive
A rough experimentation toward a new mode of behavior has already been made with what we have termed the dérive: the practice of a passional journey out of the ordinary through a rapid changing of ambiences, as well as a means of psychogeographical study and of situationist psychology. But the application of this striving for playful creativity must be extended to all known forms of human relationships, so as to influence, for example, the historical evolution of sentiments like friendship and love. Debord, Report on the Creation of Situations, theanarchistlibrary.org, p.14
Principles and theses for cultural revolution
The only valid experimental proceeding is based on the accurate critique of existing conditions and the deliberate supersession of them. It must be understood once and for all that something that is only a personal expression within a framework created by others cannot be termed a creation. Creation is not the arrangement of objects and forms, it is the invention of new laws on such arrangement. Debord, Report on the Creation of Situations, theanarchistlibrary.org, p.12
We now have to undertake an organized collective work aimed at a unitary use of all the means of revolutionizing everyday life. ThDebord we must first of all recognize the interdependence of these means in the perspective of increased freedom and an increased control of nature. We need to construct new ambiences that will be both the products and the instruments of new forms of behavior. To do this, we must from the beginning make practical use of the everyday processes and cultural forms that now exist, while refusing to acknowledge any inherent value they may claim to have. The very criterion of formal invention or innovation has lost its sense within the traditional framework of the arts — insufficient, fragmentary forms whose partial renovations are inevitably outdated and therefore impossible. We should not simply refuse modern culture; we must seize it in order to negate it. No one can claim to be a revolutionary intellectual who does not recognize the cultural revolution we are now facing. An intellectual creator cannot be revolutionary by merely supporting some party line, not even if he does so with original methods, but only by working alongside the parties toward the necessary transformation of all the cultural superstructures. Debord, Report on the Creation of Situations, theanarchistlibrary.org, p.11
A revolutionary action within culture must aim to enlarge life, not merely to express or explain it. It must attack misery on every front. Revolution is not limited to determining the level of industrial production, or even to determining who is to be the master of such production. It must abolish not only the exploitation of humanity, but also the passions, compensations and habits which that exploitation has engendered. We have to define new desires in relation to present possibilities. In the thick of the battle between the present society and the forces that are going to destroy it, we have to find the first elements of a more advanced construction of the environment and new conditions of behavior — both as experiences in themselves and as material for propaganda. Everything else belongs to the past, and serves it. Debord, Report on the Creation of Situations, theanarchistlibrary.org, p.11
Our specific concern is the use of certain means of action and the discovery of new ones, means which are more easily recognizable in the domain of culture and customs, but which must be applied in interrelation with all revolutionary changes. Debord, Report on the Creation of Situations, theanarchistlibrary.org, p.3
The traditional goal of aesthetics is to produce, by means of art, impressions of certain past elements of life in circumstances where those elements are lacking or absent, in such a way that those elements escape the disorder of appearances subject to the ravages of time. The degree of aesthetic success is thus measured by a beauty that is inseparable from duration, and that even goes so far as pretensions of eternity. The goal of the situationists is immediate participation in a passionate abundance of life by means of deliberately arranged variations of ephemeral moments. The success of these moments can reside in nothing other than their fleeting effect. The situationists consider cultural activity in its totality as an experimental method for constructing everyday life, a method that can and should be continually developed with the extension of leisure and the withering away of the division of labor (beginning with the division of artistic labor). Debord, Theses on Cultural Revolution, Internationale Situationniste #1, https://libcom.org/article/theses-cultural-revolution-guy-debord
Art can cease being a report about sensations and become a direct organization of more advanced sensations. The point is to produce ourselves rather than things that enslave us. Debord, Theses on Cultural Revolution, Internationale Situationniste #1, https://libcom.org/article/theses-cultural-revolution-guy-debord
Mascolo is right in saying (in Le Communisme) that the reduction of the work day by the dictatorship of the proletariat is “the most certain sign of the latter’s revolutionary authenticity.” Indeed, “if man is a commodity, if he is treated as a thing, if human relations are relations of thing to thing, this is because it is possible to buy his time.” But Mascolo is too quick to conclude that “the time of a man freely employed” is always well spent, and that “the purchase of time is the sole evil.” There can be no freely spent time until we possess the modern tools for the construction of everyday life. The use of such tools will mark the leap from a utopian revolutionary art to an experimental revolutionary art. Debord, Theses on Cultural Revolution, Internationale Situationniste #1, https://libcom.org/article/theses-cultural-revolution-guy-debord
The role of revolutionary artists and intellectuals
Those who want to supersede the old established order in all its aspects cannot cling to the disorder of the present, even in the sphere of culture. In culture as in other areas, it is necessary to struggle without waiting any longer for some concrete appearance of the moving order of the future. The possibility of this ever-changing new order, which is already present among us, devalues all expressions within existing cultural forms. If we are ever to arrive at authentic direct communication (in our working hypothesis of higher cultural means: the construction of situations), we must bring about the destruction of all the forms of pseudocommunication. Debord, Theses on Cultural Revolution, Internationale Situationniste #1, https://libcom.org/article/theses-cultural-revolution-guy-debord
Previous avant-garde movements presented themselves by declaring the excellence of their methods and principles, which were to be immediately judged on the basis of their works. The SI is the first artistic organization to base itself on the radical inadequacy of all permissible works; and whose significance, and whose success or failure, will be able to be judged only with the revolutionary praxis of its time. The Use of Free Time, Internationale Situationniste #4, https://libcom.org/article/use-free-time-0
There is no revolutionary problem of leisure — of an emptiness to be filled — but a problem of free time. As we have already said: “There can be no free use of time until we possess the modern tools for the construction of everyday life. The use of such tools will mark the leap from a utopian revolutionary art to an experimental revolutionary art” (Debord, “Theses on Cultural Revolution,” Internationale Situationniste #1). The supersession of leisure through the development of an activity of free creation-consumption can only be understood in relation with the dissolution of the traditional arts — with their transformation into superior modes of action which do not refuse or abolish art, but fulfill it. In this way art will be superseded, conserved and surmounted within a more complex activity. Its traditional elements may still be partially present, but transformed, integrated and modified by the totality. The Use of Free Time, Internationale Situationniste #4, https://libcom.org/article/use-free-time-0
What would be the principle characteristics of the new culture and how would it compare with ancient art? Against the spectacle, the realised situationist culture introduces total participation. Against preserved art, it is the organisation of the directly lived moment. Against particularised art, it will be a global practice with a bearing, each moment, on all the usable elements. Naturally this would tend to collective production which would be without doubt anonymous (at least to the extent where the works are no longer stocked as commodities, this culture will not be dominated by the need to leave traces.) The minimum proposals of these experiences will be a revolution in behaviour and a dynamic unitary urbanism capable of extension to the entire planet, and of being further extensible to all habitable planets. Against unilateral art, situationist culture will be an art of dialogue, an art of interaction. Today artists - with all culture visible - have become entirely separated from society, just as they are separated from each other by competition. But faced with this impasse of capitalism, art has remained essentially unilateral in response. This enclosed era of primitivism must be superseded by complete communication. At a higher stage, everyone will become an artist, i.e., inseparably a producer-consumer of total culture creation, which will help the rapid dissolution of the linear criteria of novelty. Everyone will be a situationist so to speak, with a multidimensional inflation of tendencies, experiences, or radically different "schools" - not successively, but simultaneously. We will inaugurate what will historically be the last of the crafts. The role of amateur-professional situationist - of anti-specialist - is again a specialisation up to the point of economic and mental abundance, when everyone becomes an "artist," in the sense that the artists have not attained the construction of their own life. However, the last craft of history is so close to the society without a permanent division of labour, that when it appeared amongst the S.I., its status as a craft was generally denied. Situationist Manifesto, Internationale Situationniste #4, https://libcom.org/article/situationist-manifesto
Situationist critique and construction concerns, at every level, the use value of life. Just as our conception of urbanism is a critique of urbanism; just as our experience of leisure is in fact a refusal of leisure (in the dominant sense of separation and passivity); our designation of everyday life as our field of action means a critique of everyday life, one that will have to be "radical critique accomplished, and no longer advocated or indicated" […]. We do not claim to have invented extraordinary ideas within modern culture, but rather to have begun to draw attention to how extraordinary the nothingness of modern culture is. Specialists in cultural production are the ones who resign themselves most easily to their separation, and thus to their deficiency. But it is the whole of present society that cannot avoid the problem of the recuperation of its countless alienated, uncontrolled capabilities. The Situationist Frontier, Internationale Situationniste #5, https://libcom.org/article/situationist-frontier
People's creativity and participation can only be awakened by a collective project explicitly concerned with all aspects of lived experience. The only way to "arouse the masses" is to expose the appalling contrast between the potential constructions of life and the present poverty of life. Without a critique of everyday life, a revolutionary organization is a separated milieu, as conventional and ultimately as passive as those holiday camps that are the specialized terrain of modern leisure. [...] The revolution of everyday life cannot draw its poetry from the past, but only from the future. Instructions for an Insurrection, Situationiste Internationale #6, https://libcom.org/article/instructions-insurrection
Such demands today are not based on some sort of utopianism. They are based first of all on the struggle of the proletariat at all levels, and on all the forms of explicit refusal or profound indifference that the unstable ruling society constantly has to combat with every means. They are also based on the lesson of the fundamental defeat of all attempts at less radical changes. Finally, they are based on the extremist strivings and actions appearing today among certain sectors of youth (despite all the efforts at disciplining them and repressing them) and in a few artistic milieus. But this basis is indeed utopian in another sense of the word, in that it involves inventing and experimenting with solutions to current problems without being preoccupied with whether or not the conditions for their realization are immediately present. (It should be noted that this utopian type of experimentation now also plays a key role in modern science). This temporary, historical utopianism is legitimate; and is necessary because it serves to incubate the projection of desires without which free life would be empty of content. It is inseparable from the necessity to dissolve the present ideology of everyday life, and therefore the bonds of everyday oppression, so that the revolutionary class can disabusedly discover present and future possibilities of freedom. Utopian practice makes sense, however, only if it is closely linked to the practice of revolutionary struggle. This latter, in turn, cannot do without such utopianism without being condemned to sterility. Those seeking an experimental culture cannot hope to realize it without the triumph of the revolutionary movement, while the latter cannot itself establish authentic revolutionary conditions without resuming the efforts of the cultural avant-garde toward the critique of everyday life and its free reconstruction. Canjuers & Debord, A Unitary Revolutionary Program, 1960 (Situationist International Anthology, PM Press, p.392)
Situations
We must develop a systematic intervention based on the complex factors of two components in perpetual interaction: the material environment of life and the behaviors which that environment gives rise to and which radically transform it. Debord, Report on the Creation of Situations, theanarchistlibrary.org, p.12
A person’s life is a succession of fortuitous situations, and even if none of them is exactly the same as another the immense majority of them are so undifferentiated and so dull that they give a definite impression of sameness. As a result, the rare intensely engaging situations found in life only serve to strictly confine and limit that life. We must try to construct situations, that is to say, collective ambiences, ensembles of impressions determining the quality of a moment. If we take the simple example of a gathering of a group of individuals for a given time, it would be desirable, while taking into account the knowledge and material means we have at our disposal, to study what organization of the place, what selection of participants and what provocation of events are suitable for producing the desired ambience. The powers of a situation will certainly expand considerably in both time and space with the realizations of unitary urbanism or the education of a situationist generation. Debord, Report on the Creation of Situations, theanarchistlibrary.org, p.14
The construction of situations begins beyond the ruins of the modern spectacle. It is easy to see how much the very principle of the spectacle — nonintervention — is linked to the alienation of the old world. […] The role played by a passive or merely bit-part playing “public” must constantly diminish, while that played by those who cannot be called actors, but rather, in a new sense of the term, “livers,” must steadily increase. […] Situationist theory resolutely supports a noncontinuous conception of life. The notion of unity must cease to be seen as applying to the whole of one’s life (where it serves as a reactionary mystification based on the belief in an immortal soul and, in the final analysis, on the division of labor); instead, it should apply to the construction of each particular moment of life through the unitary use of situationist methods. In a classless society there will no longer be “painters,” but only situationists who, among other things, sometimes paint. The main emotional drama of life, aside from the perpetual conflict between desire and reality hostile to desire, seems to be the sensation of the passage of time. In contrast to the aesthetic modes that strive to fix and eternalize some emotion, the situationist attitude consists in going with the flow of time. In so doing, in pushing ever further the game of creating new, emotionally provocative situations, the situationists are gambling that change will usually be for the better. In the short term the odds are obviously against that bet. But even if we have to lose it a thousand times, we see no other choice for a progressive attitude. Debord, Report on the Creation of Situations, theanarchistlibrary.org, p.14, 15
Our central idea is the construction of situations, that is to say, the concrete construction of momentary ambiences of life and their transformation into a superior passional quality. […] Our action on behavior, linked with other desirable aspects of a revolution in mores, can be briefly defined as the invention of games of an essentially new type. The most general goal must be to expand the nonmediocre part of life, to reduce the empty moments of life as much as possible. One could thus speak of our enterprise as a project of quantitatively increasing human life, an enterprise more serious than the biological methods currently being investigated, and one that automatically implies a qualitative increase whose developments are unpredictable. The situationist game is distinguished from the classic notion of games by its radical negation of the element of competition and of separation from everyday life. On the other hand, it is not distinct from a moral choice, since it implies taking a stand in favor of what will bring about the future reign of freedom and play. Debord, Report on the Creation of Situations, theanarchistlibrary.org, p.12
We have to multiply poetic subjects and objects — which are now unfortunately so rare that the slightest ones take on an exaggerated emotional importance — and we have to organize games for these poetic subjects to play with these poetic objects. This is our entire program, which is essentially transitory. Our situations will be ephemeral, without a future. Passageways. Our only concern is real life; we care nothing about the permanence of art or of anything else. Eternity is the grossest idea a person can conceive of in connection with his acts. Debord, Report on the Creation of Situations, theanarchistlibrary.org, p.14
The "moment" is mainly temporal, forming part of a zone of temporality, not pure but dominant. Articulated in relation to a given place, the situation is completely spatio-temporal (cf. A. Jorn on the space-time of life, and A. Franklin on the plane-ification of individual existence.) Moments constructed into "situations" might be thought of as moments of rupture, of acceleration, revolutions in individual everyday life. The Theory of Moments and the Construction of Situations, Internationale Situationniste #4, https://libcom.org/article/theory-moments-and-construction-situations
Like the moment, the situation "can be extended in time or be condensed." But it seeks to found itself on the objectivity of artistic production. Such production breaks radically with durable works. It is inseparable from its immediate consumption as a use value essentially foreign to conservation as a commodity. The Theory of Moments and the Construction of Situations, Internationale Situationniste #4, https://libcom.org/article/theory-moments-and-construction-situations
Material aspects & situations
The events that happen in individual existence as it is organized, the events that really concern us and require our participation, are generally precisely those that merit nothing more than our being distant, bored, indifferent spectators. In contrast, the situation that is seen in some artistic transposition is rather often attractive, something that would merit our participating in it. This is a paradox to reverse, to put back on its feet. This is what must be realized in acts. As for this idiotic spectacle of the fragmented and filtered past, full of sound and fury: it is not a question now of transmitting it — of “rendering” it, as is said — in another neatly ordered spectacle that would play the game of neatly ordered comprehension and participation. No. Any coherent artistic expression already expresses the coherence of the past, already expresses passivity. It is necessary to destroy memory in art. To undermine the conventions of its communication. To demoralize its fans. What a task! Debord, Critique of Separation (Film), 1961 - https://remixedcity.wordpress.com/2014/02/17/critique-of-separation-english-subtitles-by-guy-debord-1961/
We have invented nothing. We adapt ourselves, with a few variations, into the network of possible courses. We get used to it, it seems. No one has the enthusiasm on returning from a venture that they had on setting out on it. My dears, adventure is dead. Debord, Critique of Separation (Film), 1961 - https://remixedcity.wordpress.com/2014/02/17/critique-of-separation-english-subtitles-by-guy-debord-1961/
The Spectacle
Within the current framework of consumerist propaganda, the fundamental mystification of advertising is to associate ideas of fulfillment with objects (televisions, or garden furniture, or automobiles, etc.) and furthermore by destroying the natural link these objects may have with other objects, so as to have them above all become a material environment with "status." This imposed image of fulfillment also constitutes the explicitly terrorist nature of advertising. Nevertheless, "fulfillment" (the moment of happiness) depends upon a global reality that involves nothing less than people in a given situation: living persons and the moment that gives them light and direction (their margin of possibility). In advertising, objects are treated as embodying passion in a passionate way ("how changed your life will be when you own a marvelous car like this”). The Situationist Frontier, Internationale Situationniste #5, https://libcom.org/article/situationist-frontier
Situationist critique and construction concerns, at every level, the use value of life. Just as our conception of urbanism is a critique of urbanism; just as our experience of leisure is in fact a refusal of leisure (in the dominant sense of separation and passivity); our designation of everyday life as our field of action means a critique of everyday life, one that will have to be "radical critique accomplished, and no longer advocated or indicated" […]. We do not claim to have invented extraordinary ideas within modern culture, but rather to have begun to draw attention to how extraordinary the nothingness of modern culture is. Specialists in cultural production are the ones who resign themselves most easily to their separation, and thus to their deficiency. But it is the whole of present society that cannot avoid the problem of the recuperation of its countless alienated, uncontrolled capabilities. The Situationist Frontier, Internationale Situationniste #5, https://libcom.org/article/situationist-frontier
Whether dramatic or documentary, the cinema functions to present a false, isolated coherence as a substitute for a communication and an activity that are absent. Debord, Critique of Separation (Film), 1961 - https://remixedcity.wordpress.com/2014/02/17/critique-of-separation-english-subtitles-by-guy-debord-1961/
Our epoch accumulates powers and dreams of itself as being rational. But no one recognizes these powers as their own. No one becomes an adult — there is only the possible eventual transformation of this long restlessness into a routine somnolence. Because no one ceases to be held under guardianship. The problem is not that people live more or less poorly, but that they live in a way that is always out of their control. Debord, Critique of Separation (Film), 1961 - https://remixedcity.wordpress.com/2014/02/17/critique-of-separation-english-subtitles-by-guy-debord-1961/
Until the environment is collectively dominated, there will be no individuals — only specters haunting the objects anarchically presented to them by others. In chance situations we meet separated people moving randomly. Their divergent emotions neutralize each other and maintain their solid environment of boredom. As long as we are unable to make our own history, to freely create situations, striving toward unity will introduce other separations. The quest for a central activity leads to the formation of new specializations. Debord, Critique of Separation (Film), 1961 - https://remixedcity.wordpress.com/2014/02/17/critique-of-separation-english-subtitles-by-guy-debord-1961/
The society sends back to itself its own historical image as a merely superficial and static history of its rulers. Those who incarnate the external fatality of what is done. The sector of rulers is the very sector of the spectacle. The cinema suits them well. Regardless of its subject matter, the cinema presents heroes and exemplary conduct modeled on the same old pattern as the rulers. Debord, Critique of Separation (Film), 1961 - https://remixedcity.wordpress.com/2014/02/17/critique-of-separation-english-subtitles-by-guy-debord-1961/
All existing equilibrium, however, is brought back into question each time unknown people try to live differently. But it’s always far away. We learn of it through the papers and newscasts. We remain outside it, confronted with just another spectacle. We are separated from it by our own nonintervention. It makes us disappointed in ourselves. At what moment was choice postponed? We haven’t found the arms we needed. We have let things go. I have let time slip away. I have lost what I should have defended. This general critique of separation obviously contains and covers some particular memories. A less recognized pain, the awareness of a less explainable indignity. Exactly what separation was it? How quickly we have lived! It is to this point in our unreflecting history that I bring us back. Everything that concerns the sphere of loss — that is to say, the past time I have lost, as well as disappearance, escape, and more generally the flowing past of things, and even what in the prevalent and therefore most vulgar social sense of the use of time is called wasted time — all this finds in that strangely apt old military expression, en enfants perdus, its meeting ground with the sphere of discovery, of exploration of unknown terrains; with all the forms of quest, investigation, adventure, avant-garde. It is the crossroads where we have found and lost ourselves. Debord, Critique of Separation (Film), 1961 - https://remixedcity.wordpress.com/2014/02/17/critique-of-separation-english-subtitles-by-guy-debord-1961/
The events that happen in individual existence as it is organized, the events that really concern us and require our participation, are generally precisely those that merit nothing more than our being distant, bored, indifferent spectators. In contrast, the situation that is seen in some artistic transposition is rather often attractive, something that would merit our participating in it. This is a paradox to reverse, to put back on its feet. This is what must be realized in acts. As for this idiotic spectacle of the fragmented and filtered past, full of sound and fury: it is not a question now of transmitting it — of “rendering” it, as is said — in another neatly ordered spectacle that would play the game of neatly ordered comprehension and participation. No. Any coherent artistic expression already expresses the coherence of the past, already expresses passivity. It is necessary to destroy memory in art. To undermine the conventions of its communication. To demoralize its fans. What a task! Debord, Critique of Separation (Film), 1961 - https://remixedcity.wordpress.com/2014/02/17/critique-of-separation-english-subtitles-by-guy-debord-1961/
The spectacle in its entirety is the era, an era in which a certain youth has recognized itself. It is the gap between this image and its results; the gap between the vision, the tastes, the refusals and the projects that previously defined it and the way it has advanced into ordinary life. Debord, Critique of Separation (Film), 1961 - https://remixedcity.wordpress.com/2014/02/17/critique-of-separation-english-subtitles-by-guy-debord-1961/
[…] like the proletariat, we cannot claim to be unexploitable in the present conditions; the best we can do is to work to make any such exploitation entail the greatest possible risk for the exploiters. Now, The SI, Internationale Situationniste #9, https://libcom.org/article/now-si
Detournement
The new architecture shall undertake its first practical exercises with the detournment of once well-defined affective blocks of ambiance (the castle, for example). The use of detournement, in architecture as in the constructing of situations, signifies the reinvestment of products abstracted from the ends contemporary socio-economic organization gives them, and a break with the formalist wish to abstractly create the unknown. This means liberating existing desires at once, and deploying them within the new dimensions of an unknown actualization. The Situationist Frontier, Internationale Situationniste #5, https://libcom.org/article/situationist-frontier
A good example of detournement is Trivizas’ The Three Little Wolves and the Big Bad Pig, which is an inverted version of the classic Three Little Pigs fable.
Work, Play and Leisure Time
What are the organisational perspectives of life in a society which authentically "reorganises production on the basis of the free and equal association of the producers"? Work would more and more be reduced as an exterior necessity through the automation of production and the socialisation of vital goods, which would finally give complete liberty to the individual. Thus liberated from all economic responsibility, liberated from all the debts and responsibilities from the past and other people, humankind will exude a new surplus value, incalculable in money because it would be impossible to reduce it to the measure of waged work. The guarantee of the liberty of each and of all is in the value of the game, of life freely constructed. The exercise of this ludic recreation is the framework of the only guaranteed equality with non-exploitation of man by man. The liberation of the game, its creative autonomy, supersedes the ancient division between imposed work and passive leisure. Situationist Manifesto, Internationale Situationniste #4, https://libcom.org/article/situationist-manifesto
The element of competition must vanish in favour of a more authentically collective concept of play: the communal creation of selected ludic ambiences. The central distinction made between play and everyday life, which keeps play as an isolated and temporary anomaly, must be surpassed. Johan Huizinga writes, “Into an imperfect world and into the confusion of life, [play] brings a temporary, a limited perfection.” Everyday life, which was previously determined by the question of survival, can now be rationally controlled (this possibility is at the heart of every conflict of our time). Play, radically breaking with a delimited ludic time and space, must invade the whole of life. Perfection cannot be its endpoint, insofar as this perfection signifies a static construction opposed to life. However one can propose to push the beautiful chaos of life to its perfection. […] In this historical perspective, play — the constant experimentation with ludic innovations — only comes into being alongside ethics and questions of life’s meaning. The only success which we can appreciate in play is the immediate success of its ambience, and the constant increase of its powers. In its present co-existence with the residues of the phase of decline, play cannot completely free itself from a competitive aspect, it must at least aim to provoke conditions favourable to living directly. In this sense it is still both a struggle and a representation: a struggle for a life measured by desire, and a concrete representation of such a life. Play often feels imaginary, owing to its fringe existence in comparison to the oppressive reality of work, but the Situationists’ work is precisely the preparation of the ludic possibilities to come. Contribution to a Situationist Definition of Play, Internationale Situationniste #1, https://libcom.org/article/contribution-situationist-definition-play
The task of the workers councils will thus be not the self-management of the existing world, but its unceasing qualitative transformation: the concrete supersession of the commodity (that enormous detour in the history of human self-production). This supersession naturally implies the abolition of work and its replacement by a new type of free activity, thereby eliminating one of the fundamental splits of modern society: that between an increasingly reified labor and a passively consumed leisure. […] work itself must now be attacked. Far from being “utopian,” the abolition of work is the first condition for the effective supersession of commodity society, for the elimination within each person’s life of the separation between “free time” and “work time” — those complementary sectors of alienated life — that is a continual expression of the commodity’s internal contradiction between use-value and exchange-value. Only when this opposition is overcome will people be able to make their vital activity subject to their will and consciousness and see themselves in a world that they themselves have created. On the Poverty of Student Life - Members of Situationist International and Students of Strasbourg University (1966), theanarchistlibrary.org, p.18
The next phase of play’s advance seems to require the disappearance of any element of competition. The question of winning or losing, which has to date been nearly inseparable of ludic activity, appears to be tied to every other expression of competition between people in the appropriation of goods. The sense of importance in winning, which concerns concrete (or more frequently illusory) satisfactions, is the wretched product of a wretched society. The feeling [of winning] is, of course, exploited by every conservative force to conceal the monotony and the brutality of the conditions of life they impose. Simply consider the [social] demands détourned by competitive sports, which was most clearly established in its modern form in Great Britain, alongside the rise of factories. Not only do the crowds identify with professional players or clubs (which assume the same mythic role as the movie stars who live, and the statesmen who make decisions, in their place), but the endless sequence of match results also keeps hold over the passions of the spectators . Direct participation in a game, even in those requiring a certain degree of intellectual exertion, becomes uninteresting as soon as the established rules of play involve the acceptance of competition for its own sake. Contribution to a Situationist Definition of Play, Internationale Situationniste #1, https://libcom.org/article/contribution-situationist-definition-play
The Situationist International (SI) inherited the surrealists’ opposition between the concrete political means of the liberation of work and the utopian end of its abolition. In this sense the SI's theory represents the last sincere gesture of faith in a revolutionary conception of self-management integral to the programmee that propelled their conception of revolutionary activity. This latter consisted of a radical rethinking of the liberation of work, along lines which emphasised the refusal of any separation between revolutionary action and the total transformation of life — an idea expressed implicitly in their original project of “creating situations”. The importance of this development should not be underestimated, for the “critique of separation” here implied a negation of any temporal hiatus between means and ends (thus of any period of transition), as well as a refusal of any synchronic mediations — insisting on universal (direct democratic) participation in revolutionary action. […] It was thus on the basis of an existing workers’ power at the points of production that they saw the abolition of work as becoming possible, both from a technical and organisational standpoint. In transposing the techniques of the cyberneticians and the gestures of the bohemian anti-artist into the trusted, calloused hands of the organised working class, the situationists were able to imagine the abolition of work as the direct result of its liberation; that is, to imagine the overcoming of alienation as a result of an immediate technical-creative restructuring of the workplace by the workers themselves. In this sense the SI's theory represents the last sincere gesture of faith in a revolutionary conception of self-management integral to the programme of the liberation of work. Endnotes, Bring out your Dead, Endnotes #1, https://endnotes.org.uk/articles/bring-out-your-dead
We have invented nothing. We adapt ourselves, with a few variations, into the network of possible courses. We get used to it, it seems. No one has the enthusiasm on returning from a venture that they had on setting out on it. My dears, adventure is dead. Debord, Critique of Separation (Film), 1961 - https://remixedcity.wordpress.com/2014/02/17/critique-of-separation-english-subtitles-by-guy-debord-1961/
The present era can test innumerable innovations, but it is incapable of putting them to good use because it is chained to the fundamental conservation of an old order. Over and over, in all our innovating formulations, we must stress the need for a revolutionary transformation of society. Now, The SI, Internationale Situationniste #9, https://libcom.org/article/now-si
The Frankfurt School
Though detached from any working class milieu, the Frankfurt School had attempted to keep alive a critical and emancipatory Marxism against its development as an apologetic ideology for state-centred accumulation in Russia. The affinity with council communism is most clearly on display in earlier texts such as Horkheimer’s Authoritarian State, which the anti-authoritarian students published to the disapproval of the rather conservative later Horkheimer. Nonetheless a radical critique of capitalist society remains at the centre of Adorno’s less obviously political texts of the fifties and sixties — indeed perhaps even precisely due to their avoidance of the logic of immediate political effectiveness. While the “ultra-left” had attempted to keep alive the emancipatory promise of Marxist theory against the actual developments of labour movements by emphasising working class autonomy against working class representation and institutions, the Frankfurt School had paradoxically attempted the same task by turning away from the immediate class struggle and “economic questions.” This meant that the radical re-appropriation of Marx in 1960s Germany necessarily took the form of both a continuation and a break from the legacy of the Frankfurt School. Endnotes, Communisation and Value Form Theory, Endnotes #2 (2010), https://endnotes.org.uk/articles/communisation-and-value-form-theory
Descartes
Whatever I have up till now accepted as most true I have acquired either from the senses or through the senses. But from time to time I have found that the senses deceive, and it is prudent never to trust completely those who have deceived us even once. Descartes, Meditations of First Philosophy, Edited by John Cottingham, Cambridge University Press 2017, p.16
[…] it must surely be admitted that the visions which come in sleep are like paintings, which must have been fashioned in the likeness of things that are real, and hence that at least these general kinds of things — eyes, head, hands and the body as a whole — are things which are not imaginary but are real and exist. For even when painters try to create sirens and satyrs with the most extraordinary bodies, they cannot give them natures which are new in all respects; they simply jumble up the limbs of different animals. Descartes, Meditations of First Philosophy, Edited by John Cottingham, Cambridge University Press 2017, p.17
[…] although these general kinds of things — eyes, head, hands and so on — could be imaginary, it must at least be admitted that certain other even simpler and more universal things are real. These are as it were the real colours from which we form all the images of things, whether true or false, that occur in our thought. This class appears to include corporeal nature in general, and its extension; the shape of extended things; the quantity, or size and number of these things; the place in which they may exist, the time through which they may endure,’ and so on. So a reasonable conclusion from this might be that physics, astronomy, medicine, and all other disciplines which depend on the study of composite things, are doubtful; while arithmetic, geometry and other subjects of this kind, which deal only with the simplest and most general things, regardless of whether they really exist in nature or not, contain something certain and indubitable. For whether I am awake or asleep, two and three added together are five, and a square has no more than four sides. It seems impossible that such transparent truths should incur any suspicion of being false. Descartes, Meditations of First Philosophy, Edited by John Cottingham, Cambridge University Press 2017, p.17
Yet apart from everything I have just listed, how do I know that there is not something else which does not allow even the slightest occasion for doubt? Is there not a God, or whatever I may call him, who puts into me the thoughts I am now having? But why do I think this, since I myself may perhaps be the author of these thoughts? In that case am not I, at least, something? But I have just said that I have no senses and no body. This is the sticking point: what follows from this? Am I not so bound up with a body and with senses that I cannot exist without them? But I have convinced myself that there is absolutely nothing in the world, no sky, no earth, no minds, no bodies. Does it now follow that I too do not exist? No: if I convinced myself of something then I certainly existed. But there is a deceiver of supreme power and cunning who is deliberately and constantly deceiving me. In that case I too undoubtedly exist, if he is deceiving me; and let him deceive me as much as he can, he will never bring it about that I am nothing so long as I think that I am something. So after considering everything very thoroughly, I must finally conclude that this proposition, I am, I exist, is necessarily true whenever it is put forward by me or conceived in my mind. Descartes, Meditations of First Philosophy, Edited by John Cottingham, Cambridge University Press 2017, p.20-21
Thinking? At last I have discovered it — thought; this alone is inseparable from me. I am, I exist — that is certain. But for how long? For as long as I am thinking. For it could be that were I totally to cease from thinking, I should totally cease to exist. At present I am not admitting anything except what is necessarily true. I am, then, in the strict sense only a thing that thinks; that is, I am a mind, or intelligence, or intellect, or reason — words whose meaning I have been ignorant of until now. But for all that I am a thing which is real and which truly exists. But what kind of a thing? As I have just said — a thinking thing. Descartes, Meditations of First Philosophy, Edited by John Cottingham, Cambridge University Press 2017, p.22-23
Levitas
Levitas - The Concept of Utopia
Levitas - The Concept of Utopia - Introduction
Levitas - The Concept of Utopia - Chapter 1, Ideal Commonwealths: An Emerging Tradition
Levitas - The Concept of Utopia - Chapter 2, Castles in the Air: Marx, Engels and Utopian Socialism
Levitas - The Concept of Utopia - Chapter 3, Mobilising Myths: Utopia and Social Change in Georges Sorel and Karl Mannheim
Levitas - The Concept of Utopia - Chapter 4, Utopian Hope: Ernst Bloch and Reclaiming the Future
Levitas - Utopia as Method
Levitas - Utopia as Method - Introduction
Levitas - Utopia as Method - Chapter 1, From Terror to Grace
Levitas - Utopia as Method - Chapter 4, Between Sociology and Utopia
Levitas - Utopia as Method - Chapter 5, Utopia Denied
Levitas - Utopia as Method - Chapter 6, Utopia Revised
Levitas - Utopia as Method - Chapter 7, The Return of the Repressed
Althusser
Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses
[Marx started believing] [...] during the positivist transition represented by The German Ideology, that all philosophy should be purely and simply 'abolished', because philosophy was nothing but ideology, Marx set out on a study of 'positive matters', that is, after the failure of the 1848 revolutions, a study of political economy. Aware that he had so far acquired only hearsay knowledge of the subject, he undertook a serious examination of it, deciding in 1 850 'to begin everything at the beginning'. On the basis of this examination, as is well known, he produced, seventeen years later, the first volume of Capital (1867) . Unfortunately, if Capital contains a number of elements for a theory of ideologies, especially the ideology of the vulgar economists, it does not contain that theory itself, which depends to a large extent (we shall see to what extent when the time comes) on a theory of ideology in general that is still lacking in Marxist theory as such. I would like to take the considerable risk of proposing a preliminary, very schematic sketch of such a theory. Althusser, On the Reproduction of Capitalism, Verso 2014, p.173
a peculiar feature of ideology is that it is endowed with a structure and functioning such as to make it a nonhistorical - that is, an omni-historical - reality, in the sense that this structure and functioning are, in one and the same form, immutable, present throughout what is called history […]. Althusser, On the Reproduction of Capitalism, Verso 2014, p.175
The advantage of this theory of ideology […] is that it concretely shows how ideology 'functions' at its most concrete level, the level of individual 'subjects': that is, people as they exist in their concrete individuality, in their work, daily lives, acts, commitments, hesitations, doubts, and sense of what is most immediately self-evident. Althusser, On the Reproduction of Capitalism, Verso 2014, p.176
However, while admitting that these ideologies do not correspond to reality and, accordingly, constitute an illusion, we also admit that they do make allusion to reality and that we need only 'interpret' them to discover the reality of this world beneath the surface of their imaginary representation of it (ideology = illusion/ allusion). There are different types of interpretation. […] The essential point is that, provided we interpret the imaginary transposition (and inversion) of ideology, we arrive at the conclusion that, in ideology, 'people represent (in imaginary form) their real conditions of existence'. This interpretation leaves one 'small' problem in abeyance: why do people 'need' this imaginary transposition of their real conditions of existence in order to 'represent' their real conditions of existence? […] The first interpretation (the eighteenth century's) has a simple solution to hand: priests or despots are to blame. They 'forged' Beautiful Lies so that people would, in the belief that they were obeying God, in fact obey the priests or despots, generally allied in their imposture, with the priests working in the despots' service or, depending on the aforementioned theorists' political positions, the other way around. There is therefore a cause for the imaginary transposition of real conditions of existence: that cause is a small handful of cynics who base their domination and exploitation of the 'people' on a skewed representation of the world, which they have imagined in order to enslave minds by dominating imaginations. Thank God, the imagination is a faculty common to one and all! The second interpretation (Feuerbach's, which Marx repeats word for word in his early works) is more 'profound', that is, just as false. It, too, seeks and finds a cause for the transposition and imaginary distortion of people's real conditions of existence - in short, for the alienation in the imaginary of the representation of people's conditions of existence. This cause is no longer priests or despots or their active imaginations and the passive imaginations of their victims. It is the material alienation reigning in people's very conditions of existence. All these interpretations thus take literally the thesis which they presuppose and on which they are based: that what is reflected in the imaginary representation of the world found in an ideology is people's conditions of existence, hence their real world. Althusser, On the Reproduction of Capitalism, Verso 2014, p.181-183
[…] ‘people' do not 'represent' their real conditions of existence in ideology, but, above all, their relation to those real conditions of existence. That relation is at the centre of every ideological, hence imaginary, representation of the real world. To put this in Marxist terms, if it is true that the representation of the real conditions of existence of individuals holding posts of agents of production, exploitation, repression, ideologization and scientific practice arises, in the last instance, from the relations of production and relations deriving from them, we may say the following: every ideology represents, in its necessarily imaginary distortion, not the existing relations of production (and the other relations deriving from them) , but, above all, individuals' (imaginary) relation to the relations of production and the relations deriving from them. What is represented in ideology is therefore not the system of real relations governing individuals' existence, but those individuals' imaginary relation to the real relations in which they live. Althusser, On the Reproduction of Capitalism, Verso 2014, p.183
'ideas', or representations and the like, which seem to make up ideology, have, not an ideal, idea-dependent [ideale, ideelle] or spiritual existence, but a material one. an ideology always exists in an apparatus and in the practice or practices of that apparatus. This existence is material. Of course, the material existence of ideology in an apparatus and its practices does not have the same modality as the material existence of a paving stone or rifle. However, at the risk of being called a neoAristotelian (let us note in passing that Marx held Aristotle in very high esteem), we shall say that 'matter is expressed in several senses' or, rather, that it exists in diff erent modalities, all rooted, in the last instance, in 'physical' matter. It accordingly appears that the subject acts insofar as he is acted by the following system (set out in the order of its real determination) : ideology existing in a material ideological apparatus, prescribing material practices regulated by a material ritual, which practices exist in the material acts of a subject acting in all good conscience in accordance with his belief. Althusser, On the Reproduction of Capitalism, Verso 2014, p.184-187
[…] our presentation reveals that we have retained the following notions: subject, consciousness, belief, acts. From this sequence, we shall immediately extract the decisive central term on which everything depends: the notion of the subject. And we shall immediately state two conjoint theses: 1) There is no practice whatsoever except by and under an ideology. 2) There is no ideology except by the subject and for subjects. […] In other words, there is no ideology except for concrete subjects (such as you and me) , and this destination for ideology is only made possible by the subject: in other words, by the category of the subject and its functioning. We mean by this that, even if it appears under this name (the subject) only with the advent of bourgeois ideology, legal ideology in particular (Which borrows the legal category of the 'subject of law' and transforms it into an ideological notion: man is by nature a subject), the category of the subject (which may function under other names: for example, the soul in Plato, God, and so on) is the category constitutive of all ideology, whatever its (regional or class) determination and whatever its historical date - since ideology has no history. We say that the category of the subject is constitutive of all ideology, but we also immediately add that the category of the subject is constitutive of every ideology only insofar as every ideology has the function (which defines it) of 'constituting' concrete subjects (such as you and me). The functioning of all ideology exists in the play of this twofold constitution, since ideology is nothing but its functioning in the material forms of existence of that functioning. Clearly to grasp what follows, we must bear firmly in mind that both he who is writing these lines and the reader who is reading them are themselves subjects, and therefore ideological subjects (the proposition is itself tautological). That is, we have to be aware that both author and reader of these lines live 'spontaneously' or 'naturally' in ideology, in the sense in which we have said that 'man is by nature an ideological animal'. As St Paul admirably puts it, it is in the 'Logos', in other words, in ideology, that we 'live and move and have our being?' It follows that the category of the subject is a primary 'self-evident fact' for you and me (self-evident facts are always primary): it is clear that you are a (free, moral, responsible, and so on) subject, and that I am, too. Like all self-evident facts, including those that make a word 'name a thing' or 'have a meaning' (including, therefore, the self-evident facts of the 'transparency' of language), the 'self-evident fact' that you and I are subjects - and that that is not a problem - is an ideological effect, the elementary ideological effect. For it is characteristic of ideology to impose self-evident facts as self-evident facts […]. […] you and I are always already subjects and, as such, constantly practice the rituals of ideological recognition, which guarantee for us that we are indeed concrete, individual, unmistakable and, naturally, irreplaceable subjects. Althusser, On the Reproduction of Capitalism, Verso 2014, p.187-189
[Translator’s Note]: The verb interpeller and the corresponding noun are common words in French. In addition to the senses Althusser mentions - hailing to get someone's attention and, not infrequently, as a prelude to harassment such as disciplinary measures in school or police identity checks - interpeller is often used in conversation to mean 'to shake up', 'to really get to': ' Her report on our army's reliance on torture really got to me (m'a interpelle'')' . Althusser, On the Reproduction of Capitalism, Verso 2014, p.187
Clearly to grasp what follows, we must bear firmly in mind that both he who is writing these lines and the reader who is reading them are themselves subjects, and therefore ideological subjects (the proposition is itself tautological). That is, we have to be aware that both author and reader of these lines live 'spontaneously' or 'naturally' in ideology, in the sense in which we have said that 'man is by nature an ideological animal'. Althusser, On the Reproduction of Capitalism, Verso 2014, p.188
As St Paul admirably puts it, it is in the 'Logos', in other words, in ideology, that we 'live and move and have our being?' It follows that the category of the subject is a primary 'self-evident fact' for you and me (self-evident facts are always primary): it is clear that you are a (free, moral, responsible, and so on) subject, and that I am, too. Like all self-evident facts, including those that make a word 'name a thing' or 'have a meaning' (including, therefore, the self-evident facts of the 'transparency' of language), the 'self-evident fact' that you and I are subjects - and that that is not a problem - is an ideological effect, the elementary ideological effect. For it is characteristic of ideology to impose self-evident facts as self-evident facts […]. Althusser, On the Reproduction of Capitalism, Verso 2014, p.188-189
[…] you and I are always already subjects and, as such, constantly practice the rituals of ideological recognition, which guarantee for us that we are indeed concrete, individual, unmistakable and, naturally, irreplaceable subjects. […] That an individual is always-already a subject, even before she is born, is nevertheless the plain fact of the matter, accessible to everyone and not a paradox at all. Freud shows that individuals are always 'abstract' with respect to the subjects they always-already are, simply by noting the ideological ritual that surrounds the expectation of a 'birth', that 'happy event'. Everyone knows how much, and how (a good deal could be said about that 'how'), an unborn child is expected. This comes down to saying, very prosaically, if we agree to leave aside 'sentiments', in other words, the forms of familial ideology (paternal/maternal/conjugal/fraternal) in which the unborn child is expected, that it is certain in advance that it will bear its father's name and so have an identity and be irreplaceable. Before its birth, then, a child is always-already a subject, marked out [assi gne] as a subject in and by the particular familial ideological configuration in which it is 'expected' once it has been conceived ('deliberately' or 'by accident'). There is no need to add that this familial ideological configuration is, in its singularity, terribly structured, and that it is in this implacable, more or less 'pathological' (if any meaning can be assigned to that word) structure that the quondam subject-to-be has to 'find' 'its' place, that is, 'become' the sexual subject (boy or girl) it already is in advance. It needs no genius to suggest that this ideological constraint and marking out, and all the rituals of family child-rearing-and-training and family education, bear some relation to what Freud studied in the forms of the pre-genital and genital 'stages' of sexuality, and thus to the 'take' [prise] of what he identified, by its effects, as the unconscious. […] Apart from the limit case of the 'prenatal child', this means, concretely, the following. When religious ideology begins to function directly by interpellating the little child Louis as a subject, little Louis is already-subject - not yet religious-subject, but familial-subject. When legal ideology (later, let us suppose) begins to interpellate little Louis by talking to him about, not Mama and Papa now, or God and the Little Lord Jesus, but Justice, he was already a subject, familial, religious, scholastic, and so on. I shall skip the moral stage, aesthetic stage, and others. Finally, when, later, thanks to auto-heterobiographical circumstances of the type Popular Front, Spanish Civil War, Hitler, 1940 Defeat, captivity, encounter with a communist, and so on, political ideology (in its differential forms) begins to interpellate the now adult Louis as a subject, he has already long been, always-already been, a familial, religious, moral, scholastic and legal subject … and is now, lo and behold, a political subject! This political subject begins, once back from captivity, to make the transition from traditional Catholic activism to advanced - semi-heretical - Catholic activism, then begins reading Marx, then joins the Communist Party, and so on. So life goes. Ideologies never stop interpellating subjects as subjects, never stop 'recruiting' individuals who are always-already subjects. The play of ideologies is superposed, criss-crossed, contradicts itself on the same subject: the same individual always-already (several times) subject. Let him figure things out, if he can… Althusser, On the Reproduction of Capitalism, Verso 2014, p.189, 192-193
I like Althusser’s break with the conception of ideology as “false-consciousness” and the observation that we are constituted as subjects by ideology (there can be no position outside ideology). But I don’t understand how this is compatible with Marx’s base/superstructure framework, which he retains ([without this thesis] “nothing in the structure or functioning of a mode of production or social formation would be intelligible”). Why is that, really? We just have to abandon this framework and its reductionism/essentialism, like Laclau & Mouffe did in “Hegemony and Socialist Strategy”. It’s just that abandoning this framework moves us away from Marx (I still don’t get why Laclau & Mouffe are considered Marxists), which is fine. Besides, religion existed as ideology and was constituting subjects well before capitalism. It’s a mistake to believe that it exists to reproduce the capitalistic relations of production. Yes, it does reproduce relations of domination, but they are not necessarily capitalist. He also retains the ideology/science binary, which is paradoxical considering that he argues that ideology pervades all our thinking, and that should include science. Again, this requires the refutation of Marxist as science, which is the healthy point of view in my opinion.
[…] all ideology hails or interpellates concrete individuals as concrete subjects, through the functioning of the category of the subject. This proposition implies that we should distinguish, for the moment, between concrete individuals on the one hand and concrete subjects on the other, although, at this level, there is no concrete subject that does not have a concrete individual as its support. We shall go on to suggest that ideology 'acts' or 'functions' in such a way as to 'recruit' subjects among individuals (it recruits them all) or 'transforms' individuals into subjects (it transforms them all) through the very precise operation that we call interpellation or hailing. It can be imagined along the lines of the most commonplace, everyday hailing, by (or not by) the police: 'Hey, you there!' If, to offer readers the most concrete sort of concreteness, we suppose that the theoretical scene we are imagining happens in the street, the hailed individual turns around. With this simple 180-degree physical conversion, he becomes a subject. Why? Because he has recognized that the hail 'really' was addressed to him and that 'it really was he who was hailed' (not someone else). Althusser, On the Reproduction of Capitalism, Verso 2014, p.190-191
We may add that what thus seems to happen outside ideology […] really happens in ideology. What really happens in ideology thus seems to happen outside it. That is why those who are in ideology, you and I, believe that they are by definition outside ideology: one of the effects of ideology is the practical denegation of the ideological character of ideology by ideology. Ideology never says 'I am ideological'. One has to be outside ideology, in other words, in scientific knowledge, to be able to say 'I am in ideology' (a quite exceptional case) or (the general case) 'I was in ideology'. As is very well known, the accusation of being in ideology applies only to others, never to oneself (unless one is truly a Spinozist or Marxist, which, as far as this point goes, is to take exactly the same position). This amounts to saying that ideology has no outside (for itself), but, at the same time, that it is nothing but outside (for science and reality). Althusser, On the Reproduction of Capitalism, Verso 2014, p.191-192
Le Guin
Le Guin - The Dispossessed
Vea said, “But tell us about Anarres—what’s it really like? Is it so wonderful there really?” […] “I don’t know,” he [Shevek] said; his tongue felt half paralyzed. “No. It is not wonderful. It is an ugly world. Not like this one. Anarres is all dusty and dry hills. All meager, all dry. And the people aren’t beautiful. They have big hands and feet, like me and the waiter there. But not big bellies. They get very dirty, and take baths together, nobody here does that. The towns are very small and dull, they are dreary. No palaces. Life is dull, and hard work. You can’t always have what you want, or even what you need, because there isn’t enough. You Urrasti have enough. Enough air, enough rain, grass, oceans, food, music, buildings, factories, machines, books, clothes, history. You are rich, you own. We are poor, we lack. You have, we do not have. Everything is beautiful here. Only not the faces. On Anarres nothing is beautiful, nothing but the faces. The other faces, the men and women. We have nothing but that, nothing but each other. Here you see the jewels, there you see the eyes. And in the eyes you see the splendor, the splendor of the human spirit. Because our men and women are free—possessing nothing, they are free. And you the possessors are possessed. You are all in jail. Each alone, solitary, with a heap of what he owns. You live in prison, die in prison. It is all I can see in your eyes—the wall, the wall!” Le Guin, The Dispossessed, p.298-299 (HarperCollins 2002 ISBN 0-06-050400-5)
Benanav
Benanav - How to Make a Pencil
“digital socialists” see computers as the key to running a planned economy. Their focus is on algorithms: they want to design software that can take in information on consumer preferences and industrial production capacities—like a gigantic sieve feeding into a data grinder—and output the optimal allocations of resources. […] The digital socialist focus on algorithms presents a serious problem. It risks constraining the decision-making processes of a future socialist society to focus narrowly on optimization: producing as much as possible using the fewest resources. To travel down this road is to ignore and discard vast amounts of qualitative information, which remains crucial to achieving many of the ends and goals of a socialist society. After all, the societies of the future will want to do more than just produce as much as possible using the fewest resources. They will have other goals, which are more difficult to quantify, such as wanting to address issues of justice, fairness, work quality, and sustainability—and these are not just matters of optimization. This means that, no matter how powerful the planning algorithm, there will remain an irreducibly political dimension to planning decisions—for which the algorithm’s calculations, no matter how clever, can only serve as a poor substitute. Algorithms are essential for any socialist planning project because they can help clarify the options among which we can choose. But human beings, not computers, must ultimately be the ones to make these choices. And they must make them together, according to agreed-upon procedures. This is where planning protocols come in. They streamline decision-making by clarifying the rules by which decisions are made. Deployed in concert with algorithms, protocols enable a range of considerations—besides those available to an optimization program—to enter into the planning process. We might say there is a division of labor between algorithms and protocols: the former discard irrelevant or duplicate options, clarifying the decisions to be made via the latter. Putting both algorithms and protocols to work, people can plan production with computers in ways that allow their practical knowledge, as well as their values, ends, and aims, to become integral to production decisions. The result is something that neither capitalism nor Soviet socialism allowed: a truly human mode of production. Benanav, How to Make a Pencil, Logic Magazine, 2020, https://static1.squarespace.com/static/59821b9ff14aa110e16b69c0/t/5fff16140b08184f5aa63272/1610552855133/Benanav+How+to+Make+a+Pencil.pdf
It seems to me that Benanav tries to formulate arguments against the critique of socialist planning formulated by economists of the Austrian school like Mises and Hayek. He does see some relevant issues having arisen in USSR because of the absence of an efficient market and tries to find answers as an economist. For me, though, the potential of technology is more in creating a post-scarcity society, like Bookchin describes it.

Benanav: How to Make a Pencil

Technology helping with planning and protocols

With planning it helps solve the economic problem

With protocols it helps democratic decision making (efficient communication mechanism)

Benanav is trying to address the economic problem challenges posed by Mises and Hayek, especially regarding prices and their information signaling function.

For him, technology, by combining algorithms and protocols could both surface the important decisions to be discussed (algorithms) and help deliberate and decide on them (protocols).

I see it more as a means of implementing Habermas’ communicative rationality over the prevailing instrumental rationality.

It’s interesting that he also thinks about quantitative (algorithms) and qualitative (protocols) factors.

Braverman
Braverman - Labor and Monopoly Capital
Braverman - Labor and Monopoly Capital - Introduction
Braverman - Labor and Monopoly Capital - Chapter 2: The Origins of Management
Epistemology & Metaphysics
The Critique (of Pure Reason) investigates nothing less than the nature of human reason and knowledge (epistemology), and the basic constitution of the natural universe (metaphysics). Weigelt, Introduction of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason (Penguin Books), p.xvi-xvii
Kant defines metaphysics in terms of “the cognitions after which reason might strive independently of all experience” and his goal in the book [Critique of Pure Reason] is to reach a “decision about the possibility or impossibility of a metaphysics in general, and the determination of its sources, as well as its extent and boundaries […]”. https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2024/entries/kant/#KanProThePurRea
[…] although all our knowledge begins with experience, it does not follow that it arises from experience. For it is quite possible that even our empirical knowledge is a compound of that which we receive through impressions, and of that which our own faculty of knowledge (sensible impressions simply prompting it to do so) supplies from itself, an addition which we do not distinguish from that raw material until long practice has made us attentive to it and rendered us capable of separating one from the other. It is therefore a question which at least deserves closer investigation, and one that cannot be disposed of at first sight, namely, whether there exists a knowledge that is independent of experience and even of all impressions of the senses. Such knowledge is called a priori, and is distinguished from empirical knowledge, which has its sources a posteriori, that is, in experience. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, p.37-38
[…] the real problem of pure reason is contained in the question: How are synthetic judgements a priori possible? That metaphysics has hitherto remained in so vaccillating state of uncertainty and contradiction is entirely due to the fact that people have never previously thought of this problem, or perhaps even of a distinction between analytic and synthetic judgements. The solution of this problem, or the sufficient proof that a possibility which it demands to have explained does in reality not exist at all, is a question of life and death to metaphysics. David Hume, who among all philosophers came closest to this problem, though he was far from conceiving it with sufficient definitiveness and universality, confining his attention only to the synthetic proposition about the connection of an effect with its causes (principium causalitatis), believed he had discovered that such an a priori proposition is entirely impossible. According to his conclusions, everything which we call metaphysics would turn out to be a mere delusion of rational insight into what in reality is only borrowed from experience and has, by mere habit, assumed the appearance of necessity. If he had grasped our problem in all its universality, he would never have thought of an assertion that destroys all pure philosophy, because he would have perceived that, according to his argument, no pure mathematical science was possible either, on account of its certainly containing synthetic a priori propositions; and from such an assertion his good sense would probably have saved him. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, p.49
Analytic and Synthetic Judgements
In all judgements in which a relation between subject and predicate is thought, this relation is possible in two ways. Either the predicate B belongs to the subject A as something which is (covertly) contained in the concept A; or B lies outside concept A, though connected with it. In the former case I call the judgement analytic, in the latter synthetic. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, p.43
In synthetic judgements the connection of the predicate with the subject is thought without identity. […] Those add to the concept of the subject a predicate that had not been thought in it at all, and that could not have been extracted from it by any analysis. […] Empirical judgements, as such, are all synthetic. In synthetic judgements […] I add […] the predicate synthetically to the concept. For although neither of the concepts [the subject and the property/relation attributed as predicate] is contained in each other, yet they belong to each other, though only contingently, as parts of a whole, namely, of an experience which is itself a synthetic combination of intuition Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, p.43-44
Analytic judgements are therefore those in which the connection of the predicate with the subject is thought through identity. […] they are called elucidatory because […] nothing is added through the predicate to the concept of the subject, and the concept is only analyzed and broken up into its constituent concepts which had all along been thought in it (though confusedly). […] Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, p.43
In synthetic a priori judgements, this help [of experience] is entirely lacking. If I am to go beyond the concept A, and to know that another concept B is connected with it, then what is that on which I rely and which makes the synthesis possible, considering that I cannot have the advantage of looking about in the field of experience? Take the proposition: Everything that happens has its cause. The concept of a cause is entirely outside that concept [the event that happened] and indicates something different from that which happens; hence it is in no way contained in that representation. How then can I predicate of that which happens something totally different from it […] as belonging to it, and belonging to it necessarily? What is here the unknown […] on which the understanding relies when it believes it discovers, outside the concept A, a predicate B foreign to concept A, which it nevertheless believes to be connected with that concept? It cannot be experience, because the above principle, that all which happens has its cause, has added this second representation to the first, not only with greater generality, but also with the character of necessity, and therefore entirely a priori and from mere concepts. Upon such synthetic, i.e., expansive, principles rests the whole final aim of our speculative a priori knowledge; for the analytic principles are no doubt very important and necessary, but only to arrive at that distinctiveness of concepts which is requisite for a safe and wide synthesis as will lead to a genuinely new acquisition of knowledge. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, p.44-45
Examples of analytic judgements: - All bachelors are unmarried - All triangles have three sides https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Analytic%E2%80%93synthetic_distinction
Hegelian Tradition
Finally, from the ever-greater complexity and variety that raises sub­atomic particles through the course of evolution to those conscious, self­ reflexive life forms we call human beings, we cannot help but speculate about the existence of a broadly conceived telos and a latent subjectivity in substance itself that eventually yields mind and intellectuality. In the reactivity of substance, in the sensibility of the least-developed microor­ganisms, in the elaboration of nerves, ganglia, the spinal cord, and the layered development of the brain, one senses an evolution of mind so coherent and compelling that there is a strong temptation to describe it with Manfred Eigen's term, "inevitable." It is hard to believe that mere fortuity accounts for the capacity of life forms to respond neurologically to stimuli; to develop highly organized nervous systems; to be able to foresee, however dimly, the results of their behavior and later conceptu­alize this foresight clearly and symbolically. Bookchin, The Ecology of Freedom, p.364
The prospect that life and all its attributes are latent in substance as such, that biological evolution is rooted deeply in symbiosis or mutu­alism, indicates how important it is to reconceptualize our notion of "matter" as active substance. As Manfred Eigen has put it, molecular self-organization suggests that evolution "appears to be an inevitable event, given the presence of certain matter with specified autocatalytic properties and under the maintenance of the finite (free) energy flow [that is, solar energy] necessary to compensate for the steady produc­tion of entropy." This much is clear: we can no longer be satisfied with a passive "dead" matter that fortuitously collects into living substance. The uni­verse bears witness to an ever-striving, developing-not merely a "moving"-substance, whose most dynamic and creative attribute is its ceaseless capacity for self-organization into increasingly complex forms. Natural fecundity originates primarily from growth, not from spatial "changes" of location. Nor can we remove form from its central place in this developmental and growth process, or function as an indispensable correlate of form. The orderly universe that makes science a possible project and its use of a highly concise logic - mathematics - meaningful presupposes the correlation of form with function. From this perspec­tive, mathematics serves not merely as the "language" of science but also as the logos of science. This scientific logos is above all a workable project because it grasps a logos that inheres in nature-the "object" of scientific investigation. Bookchin, The Ecology of Freedom, p.359
My point here is that substance and its properties are not separable from life. Henri Bergson's conception of the biosphere as an "entropy­ reduction" factor, in a cosmos that is supposedly moving toward greater entropy or disorder, would seem to provide life with a cosmic rationale for existence. That life forms may have this function need not suggest that the universe has been exogenously "designed" by a supernatural demiurge. But it does suggest that "matter" or substance has inherent self-organizing properties, no less valid than the mass and motion at­tributed to it by Newtonian physics. Nor is there so great a lack of data, by comparison with the conven­tional attributes of "matter," as to render the new properties implausi­ble. At the very least, science must be what nature really is; and in na­ture, life is (to use Bergsonian terminology) a counteracting force to the second law of thermodynamics-or an "entropy-reduction" factor. Bookchin, The Ecology of Freedom, p.357
Bloch’s Not-Yet
The central idea of not yet carries the double sense of not yet (but expected, a future presence) and still not (a current absence and lack). The not yet operates at two levels: the subjective, individual not-yet-conscious, the essentially creative preconscious utopian impulse, that which is on the verge of coming to consciousness; and the objective, external condition of the world, the not-yet-become. The not yet is real; for Bloch, reality includes the horizon of future possibilities and the novum as it comes into being. He refers to the perception of the future in the present as Vor-Schein, pre-appearance or anticipatory illumination. Utopia as forward dreaming is not an esoteric byway of culture nor a distraction from class struggle, but an unavoidable and indispensable element in the production of the future, for ‘the hinge in human history is its producer’. Levitas, Utopia as Method, p. 6
The idea of the Not-Yet-Conscious is developed through a critique of Sigmund Freud. In Bloch’s view, Freud regarded the unconscious as a kind of rubbish bin of repressed material that was no longer conscious; this overly negative approach on Freud’s part disregarded the additional and countervailing characteristic of the unconscious, that of being a creative source of material on the verge of coming to consciousness. The unconscious is also the pre-conscious, is intrinsically creative and the source of the utopian impulse, which Bloch appears to regard as a fundamental human propensity. The expression of the Not-Yet-Conscious is of course subject to social determination and thus varies with individual and historical circumstance; hence the variation in utopian expression demonstrated in the rest of The Principle of Hope. The Not-Yet-Conscious is at its strongest in youth, is expressed par excellence in the creative arts and is intensely present in times of change, particularly revolutionary change. Thus ‘all times of change are filled with Not-Yet-Conscious, even overfilled; a Not-Yet-Conscious which is carried by a rising class’. Levitas, The Concept of Utopia, p. 101
What prevents the Not-Yet-Conscious from being a purely psychoanalytic or ontological category is that it is the subjective correlate of the Not-Yet-Become, a category which applies to material reality. It is fundamental to Bloch’s argument and to the concept of the Not-Yet-Become that the material world is essentially unfinished, the future is indeterminate and therefore that the future constitutes a realm of possibility. Once the world is seen as in a constant state of process, but a process whose direction and outcome is not predetermined, there are always many possible futures – futures which are real possibilities, rather than merely formal possibilities. Not all projected futures are real possibilities; there are of course constraints, and Bloch’s model is not one of pure voluntarism. Nor are all real possibilities desirable: they include ‘devastatingly, possible fascist Nothing’ as well as ‘finally feasible and overdue, socialism’. These possible futures must be seen as part of, rather than outside, reality despite the fact that the indeterminacy of the future means that there is no necessary development from potentiality to actuality, and despite the fact that not all real possibilities will in fact be realised. Levitas, The Concept of Utopia, p. 101-102
The designation of utopia as ‘anticipatory consciousness’, which is the subtitle of part two of The Principle of Hope, depends upon Bloch’s central concept, the Not Yet. It has two aspects, the Not-Yet-Conscious and the Not-Yet-Become – its ideological and material, or subjective and objective aspects. Levitas, The Concept of Utopia, p. 101
Sociology of Knowledge
The overall project of Ideology and Utopia is the development of the sociology of knowledge and Mannheim stresses two principles. First, it deals not with individuals but with styles of thought characteristic of particular groups in specific historical circumstance. Mannheim goes so far as to say that ‘strictly speaking it is incorrect to say that the single individual thinks. Rather ... he participates in thinking further what other men have thought before him’ – and this in a specific situation which is, from the point of view of the individual, predetermined. Secondly, and more importantly, he makes the point that thought is not a process of contemplation but is intrinsically bound up with action; this action is collective; and its guiding principle is the will to preserve or to change existing conditions. Levitas, The Concept of Utopia, p.93
Structuralism
The structuralist vigorously rejects any sort of ontological independence among the natural numbers. The essence of a natural number is its relations to other natural numbers. The subject-matter of arithmetic is a single abstract structure, the pattern common to any infinite collection of objects that has a successor relation, a unique initial object, and satisfies the induction principle. The number 2 is no more and no less than the second position in the natural number structure; and 6 is the sixth position. Neither of them has any independence from the structure in which they are positions, and as positions in this structure, neither number is independent of the other. Shapiro, Thinking About Mathematics, p.258, quoted by Seldin in Handbook of the History of Logic, Vol. 5, p.855
Life Forms
One can live a whole life without experiencing anything, by being very careful not to think and feel. Existence is then reduced to a slow process of degradation. It wears down and ruins, instead of giving form. After the miracle of the encounter, relations can only go from wound to wound towards their consumption. Life, on the contrary, gradually gives form to whoever refuses to live beside themselves, to whoever allows themselves to experience. They become a form of life in the full sense of the term. In sharp contrast to that, there are the inherited methods of activist construction, so grossly defec­tive, so exhausting, so destructive, when they are so focused on building. Communism does not hinge on self-renunciation but on the attention given to the smallest action. It's a question of our plane of perception and hence of our way of doing things. A practical matter. What the perception of entities-individual or collective­ bars our access to is the plane where things really happen, where the collective potentials form and fall apart, gain strength or dissipate. […] To live communism is not to work to ensure the existence of the entity we belong to, but to deploy and deepen an ensemble of ties, which sometimes means cutting certain ones. What is essential occurs at the level of the smallest things. […] Perception in terms of bonds dismisses the whole alternative between individual and collective, and does so positively. In a real situation, an "I" that says what needs to be said can be a "we" of extraordinary power. And so, the particular happiness of any "commune" reflects the plenitude of its singularities, a certain quality of ties, the radiant energy of each frag­ment of world that it harbors-good-bye to entities, to their protrusiveness, good-bye to individual and collective confinement, adios to the reign of nar­cissism. The Invisible Committee, Now, p.143-144
Contrary to what a bad philosophical legacy has taught us, form does not pertain to visible appearance but to dynamic principle. The real individuation is not that of bodies, but of forms. One only has to reflect on the process of ideation to be convinced of this: nothing better illustrates the illusion of the stable and individual Self than the belief that "I" have ideas, since it is abundantly clear that ideas come to me, even without my knowing from where, from neuronal, muscular, and symbolic processes so opaque that they pour in naturally while I'm walking, or when I'm falling asleep and the boundaries of the Self are giving way. An occurring idea is a good example of form: there enters into its realization, in a language envi­ ronment, something that's infra-individual-an intuition, a splinter of experience, a bit of affect­ in a constellation with something that's supra-indi­ vidual. A form is a mobile configuration that holds together, in a tense and dynamic unity, heteroge­ neous elements of the Self and the world. "The essence of form," said the young Lukacs in his idealist jargon, "has always resided in the process by which two principles that absolutely exclude each other become form without mutually abolishing each other. Form is the paradox that has mate­rialized, the reality of lived experience, the true life of the impossible. For form is not reconciliation but the war of conflicting principles, transposed into eternity." Form is born of the encounter between a situation and a necessity. Once born, it affects things far beyond itself. In the conflict of the spring of 2016, one could have seen the birth of a form from a perfectly singular, perfectly identifiable point. On the Austerlitz Bridge, a courageous little group forced the riot police to pull back. There was a first line of masked people sporting gas masks and holding a reinforced ban­ner, other masked ones backing them in case of attempted arrests and making up a bloc behind the first line, and behind that bunch and on the sides, baton-wielding masked folk who whacked on the cops. Once this little form had appeared, the video of its exploit circulated on the social media. And kept making babies in the weeks that followed, up to the acme ofJune 14, 2016 when its offspring could no longer be counted. The Invisible Committee, Now, p.152-154
Properties of Good Theories
“A theory appears beautiful or elegant […] when it’s simple; in other words when it can be expressed very concisely in terms of mathematics that we’ve already learned for some other reasons.” https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=anHgZru8acg&t=379s
Aris Goudouras
Quoted in https://haskell.foundation/podcast/62/ by Conal Elliott
Thinking & Research Methodology
[…] Our intuitions about logicality are not a kind of perception of an external reality: they are historical artifacts, a product of our logical and philosophical educations. To the extent that there is intersubjective agreement about them, it should be attributed to a shared tradition, not access to a tradition-independent reality. As Stewart Shapiro and others have pointed out, the very idea of “pretheoretical logical intuitions” is dubious. […] All our intuitions about logicality bear the stamp of theory. If we have the intuition that logic must be “formal”, this is not because of some extrasensory perception of the essence of logic, but because we have encountered the idea so often in the course of our philosophical training. MacFarlane, What does it mean to say that Logic is Formal?, p.26
This is not to say that we should ignore all our intuitions about logicality. But before invoking these intuitions in justifying or criticizing a proposed demarcation of logic, we ought to seek their sources in the philosophical tradition. By studying the history of conceptions of logicality we can see why philosophers have the intuitions they do. Knowing this, we can proceed to ask which intuitions we still have reasons to have, which go together, and which come from incompatible traditions. Historical reflection is a way to make our “brute intuitions” less “brute”. MacFarlane, What does it mean to say that Logic is Formal?, p.25-26
Philosophers tend to talk about philosophy. And even if such talk is motivated by infinite charity and fraternal good will, it provokes some response, comment or counter-argument to the ideas and theories presented. In print the same arguments have quite different impact; they can simply be registered without requiring an immediate response, or can be interpreted to suit one’s frame of mind, and as a last resort a page can be turned and a book can be closed. But in conversation courtesy demands that the addressee reacts and related himself. And this is, in Kant’s view, a dangerous exercise, and one that certainly lacks the productive element that Socrates may have found in it. Philosophers, or so Kant thought, work best in isolation - in an unsocratic environment where people and the world outside in general are kept at a distance and under editorial control, and are never permitted to intrude upon the indivisibility of that fragile unit formed by an idea and its objective formulation in writing. Weigelt, Introduction of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason (Penguin Books), p.xxiii-xxiv
This book may appear heterogeneous. In a sense, it is, and some explanation regarding the circumstances of its composition might be useful to the reader. The first part is formed by the text “Marxism and Revolutionary Theory” published in Socialisme ou Barbarie from April 1964 to June 1965. This text was itself the never-ending development of a “Note on the Marxist philosophy and theory of history”, which accompanied “The revolutionary movement under modern capitalism” and was circulated along with it among the group Socialisme ou Barbarie (Spring 1959). When the publication of Socialisme ou Barbarie was suspended, the remaining part of “Marxism and Revolutionary Theory” yet unpub­lished, although for the most part already drafted, was left among my papers. Written under the pressure of deadlines imposed by the publication of the journal, this part is itself not a completed work but a work in the making. Contrary to all the rules of composition, the walls of the building are displayed one after the other as they are erected, sur­rounded by the remains of scaffolding, piles of sand and rocks, odds and ends of wooden supports and dirty trowels. Without making this into a thesis, I am assuming this presentation as my own, dictated at first by “external” factors. It should be merely a commonplace, recognized by everyone, that in the case of a work of reflection, removing the scaffolding and clean up the area around the building not only is no benefit to the reader, but deprives him of something essential. Unlike the work of art, there is no finished edifice here, nor an edifice to be finished; just as much, and even more with the results, what is important is the work of reflection and it is perhaps mostly this that an author can make us see, if he can make us see anything at all. Presenting the result as a systematic and polished totality, which in truth it never is; or even presenting the construction process - as is often the case, pedagogically but erroneously, in so many philosophical works - in the form of a well-ordered and wholly-mastered logical process, can only serve to reinforce in the reader the disastrous illusion towards which he, like all of us, is already naturally inclined, that the edifice was constructed for him and that he has only, if he so desires, to move in and live there. Thinking is not building cathedrals or composing symphonies. If the symphony exists, it is the reader who must create it in his own ears. Castoriadis, Preface to the Imaginary Institution of Society, p.1-2
Genealogy
Genealogy means both the value of origin and the origin of values. Genealogy is as opposed to absolute values as it is to relative or utilitarian ones. Genealogy signifies the differential element of values from which their value itself derives. Genealogy thus means origin or birth, but also difference or distance in the origin. Genealogy means nobility and baseness, nobility and vulgarity, nobility and decadence in the origin. The noble and the vulgar, the high and the low - this is the truly genealogical and critical element. But, understood in this way, critique is also at its most positive. The differential element is both a critique of the value of values and the positive element of a creation. This is why critique is never conceived by Nietzsche as a reaction but as an action . Nietzsche contrasts the activity of critique with revenge, grudge or ressentiment. Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy, p.2-3
Declarative vs Imperative / Global vs Local / Denotational vs Operational Approach in Problem Solving
The way I understand functional/reactive programming is that it treats all input as it were pre-existing. So, instead of thinking of: okay, now the user moved the mouse or clicked or pressed a key and we have to react to it and have handlers for it and so on, we think like this: okay, here’s a list of all actions that the user will do, so it sort of says “I know everything about the universe, I know all the future”, this is the list of mouse clicks from now till the program terminates, this is the list of keys that the user will press, okay, here is a list of input from the network that will come, okay? Here, go and calculate something for me. And you just go and take this list and say: okay, I will apply a function to a list like `fmap`, or I can do a fold on this list, or I can merge two lists, stuff like this - you just work on the whole list as if it existed. Of course it doesn’t exist at the moment the program starts running but it doesn’t matter. It’s like, if you tell it ‘’do something for every digit of pi”, does it have every digit of pi? […] it doesn’t have everything at the same time. […] in a lazy language like Haskell we don’t care that we don’t have the whole list. Conceptually we do have the whole list. When time comes to get the next element, well maybe we’ll block / the system will block waiting for user input, but we don’t care: we just have a list and operate on the whole list […]. Bartosz Milewski, https://youtu.be/3XTQSx1A3x8?si=VXcQVdOJ6koJ16oa&t=1904
Don’t think about how things are implemented in hardware. What computers are is just one of the many models of computation. We shouldn’t get attached to it. You can perform computations in your mind, or with pen and paper. The physical substrate is irrelevant to the idea of programming. Milewski, The Dao of Functional Programming, p. 1
[…] when we write code in what now I’m calling programming only language – okay, what we’ll call programming language, I’m now calling a programming-only language, meaning it can only talk about the surface and only talk about the implementation, so it misses the heart of the matter and the reusability. I think that the purpose of my code is to take some data and transform it into other data. That’s, of course, a functional perspective, but even when you’re doing imperative programming, you’re still doing that just in a sequential way. Start with some data, you end up with some data. But I don’t think that’s really what computation is about. I think that’s what the surface layer is about. I think that’s what the executable is about. But the whole process of why am I generating this computation and why am I happy with it, or should I be happy with it, and if so, why, that is not about transforming. The purposeful computation, or meaningful computation, is not about transforming data into other data. It’s about transforming meaningful data into other meaningful data and doing it meaningfully. And what I mean by that is that when I write code to do, say, binary addition, there’s a reason for that code. It is not just because I have a vector of bits and a vector of bits. It’s because I have a particular interpretation of that vector of bits. I have a particular way in which I’m interpreting that vector of bits as a natural number. So my job in constructing computation is not to transform data to data. It’s to transform, in a way, an interpretation. So there’s a type of data, and there’s a type of its meaning, and then there’s a function from the formative ladder, from the representations to the meanings. That’s the domain. That’s what I’m transforming. That’s what I’m taking in, is meaningful data, is the data type interpreted in a particular way. And that’s what my computation is generating. That’s the whole thing. That’s the higher-dimensional thing that has the purposefulness in it and has the ability to then have the logical proof in it as well. When I’m just reflecting, I look back, and when I’m programming, of course, I have an interpretation in mind. Everybody has an interpretation of mine, but what often happens is maybe I’m working with you and we have different interpretations in mind and our programming language cannot capture either one of those. And so it cannot notice the difference. You write your code. I write my code. They’re both correct. We put them together. It’s not correct. Why not? Because we didn’t say what we meant. We said, “I’m transferring bit vectors to bit vectors. […] So our programs miss their purpose, and the languages cannot capture that purpose, and therefore they cannot support us in fulfilling it. Especially we, who like typed languages, for instance, appreciate that the program is helping us, supporting us in fulfilling our intentions. https://haskell.foundation/podcast/62/ (0:52:06)
[…] there's a mental bottleneck which is the von Neumann paradigm. The von Neumann style in the in the title of this during award lecture is exactly this. And it forces to think small. We cannot think clearly and profoundly and deeply and gain insight within the von Neumann model of programming. The von Neumann programming is still the dominant model of programming. Operational semantics, which is mainly what PL people are taught is essentially mirrors this weakness. it's an essentially sequential and mechanistic way of thinking which is not rooted in beauty. It is sort of fundamentally sequential, whereas computation isn't. If if you think it is, it's because you've been programmed right with this deep misunderstanding. […] So anyway, this turning a word lecture for me is really about breaking out of the Von Neumann bottleneck, the spiritual, mental, cognitive, right, philosophical bottleneck, and and and getting back into this programming. https://open.spotify.com/episode/4jPTxGfaUa84IqsQceKywL (1:04:55)
There's one meta idea that applies, I think, to everything everybody should ever do. Certainly applies to everything I do, which is you should understand what you're talking about in the simplest, most elegant compositional terms. That is denotational semantics. That's what I call giving, having a denotation. So all your types have a mathematical model. It's simple and of course it has to be precise. Otherwise simplicity is an illusion. OK, so it's as simple as it can possibly be. And then every operation that you provide can be fully explained in terms of that model and that model has nothing to do with the implementation at all. OK, so so it it it it's a very severe discipline that forces you to to think in the clearest well, it encourages you to think in the clearest possible way about what you're trying to say, independent of any bias about implementation. That's very hard for people who have been conditioned to think that programming is about making machines do stuff. Because any anything. You know, if you think computation and if you've been taught operational semantics and operational thinking, and like, like linear algebra is about arrays and machine learning is about neural Nets, all these like arbitrary bad choices about particular representation, or programming is about sequences of effects, all these harmful ways to look at things. https://open.spotify.com/episode/4jPTxGfaUa84IqsQceKywL?context=spotify%3Ashow%3A1gE06aXNjm4BEcwbsow0Zu (1:56:43)
Yeah, so so I thought I got to think about 3D graphics in a a functional way, a compositional way. A way of what it means, not how it not what it does. OK. And that's the difference. The graphic systems are almost always implemented the way almost everything else is implemented. But especially graphics it seems is is if they are a graphics program is a sequence of commands, maybe structured, you know sequence of commands, the words like you might have loops and subroutines, what they used to call them, right. So procedure definition, so on. But they're essentially just ways of of organizing sequences of instructions that have side effects, right? But instead of the system memory, they're going to be the video memory, right? And the pattern that we want in memory after we're done as an emergent effect is one that looks like something to you like some geometry or something like that. All right. But that model is a terrible model if what you care about is clarity. Because it's extremely hard to reason about in exactly the way John [Backus] has said that that because of imperative programs, that is programs that are about sequences of effects and which have no nice mathematical properties, therefore they cannot give you any powerful insights. So what I did instead is: I said OK, what are graphics programs for? In other words, what are the meanings they are trying to convey? So I want to make a graphics program. It's because I want to help somebody look through a tool at something they are interested in. So I'm trying to invent a telescope for something. What is that something? And that's the important thing. And the secondary thing is how can I make a device that helps you look through it? How can I use a computer? How can I make a device you can look through to see what you want to see and then how can I make a language describe what you want to see? That's very different from the dominant design paradigm, which is how can I make a language or a library so that you can describe a sequence of effects right, that emerge that have this, you know eventually, you know that cause a billion effects whose whose overall aggregate result is to draw a picture, right? Because it because it messes up these two things. The essence of what it is that the the idea you're trying to describe and give somebody a a a opportunity to look at and then how the machine works and what are the kind of physics in a way what are the effects. So I divided those two things and instead of a language of rendering or even of affecting a data structure that would get rendered I designed a language with a library of vocabulary, typed, composable vocabulary of geometry and colors. I mean it's like essentially what Euclid did within a modern a more modern vocabulary, a more modern linguistic framework, right? So a collection of types and typed operations on three-dimensional things. […] https://open.spotify.com/episode/4jPTxGfaUa84IqsQceKywL?si=168fed48e7fe47fd (1:32:19)
Denotational Design Principles
So in denotational design, you say for most important thing is, what do I want to talk about? Ok, I'm going to talk about these linear maps. And then the second question is, what is a language? What's a vocabulary in which I can express these things? I can build them up. I combine them, build them out of nothing, all these things; it's these operations. What algebraic abstraction already exists? And we've already proven things. We've already learned it for some other reason. Then the next step is now we're going to say, OK, so then now I kind of understand the mathematical realm, the specification. That's the story I'm going to tell the user. Now what about the implementer? What I'm going to tell the implementer, which may be me, maybe somebody else. What I'm going to tell them is I want you to, I want you to find a way of implementing the first story. And there are two kinds of choices to make. One is the representation you're going to use for the things of interest. And the other is how you're going to implement the operations. Which operations? The one that the first model already wants to talk about. Now, how do you know how to implement them correctly? Well, there's two questions. What does it mean to be correct? And then how do you get there? What it means to be correct is always the same. It's a homomorphism. OK, So what homomorphism you have to talk about? How does the representation mean the things we're talking about? if you don't know what the representation means, you can't possibly address the question of how to implement operations on them because it's only the meaning that guides them. You have to know what the up the arguments mean and what the operation means.
Aris Goudouras
What is interesting here is how does it compare to Domain Driven Design. There, again, we need a shared vocabulary, but it’s closer to how the domain expert understands the domain. Here Elliott argues for a vocabulary that’s in the mathematical realm. Maybe in the cases he has in mind the language of mathematics is indeed the language of domain experts. But if not, we do have an important decision point. Do we express the problem in the language of mathematics & categories or using a vocabulary that’s closer to how domain experts communicate things?
Aris Goudouras
Milewski makes an interesting association between the declarative vs imperative way of thinking and the global vs local way of attacking problems in physics, as described by Feynman.
Aris Goudouras
Conal Elliott refers to a John Backus lecture (his Turing award lecture and the corresponding paper) where we renounces imperative (Von Neumann) style programming and argues for functional programming (or something close to it), although he received the award because of his work in Fortran - an imperative language. Elliott also says that Von Neumann’s style was mean to be a shortcut / experiment for pragmatic reasons and then we got stuck with it as the dominant paradigm. (starts around 54:28)
Aris Goudouras
Interesting discussion on programming paradigms.
Understanding the paradigms we use
That's why I was unsatisfied with every other answer I got from a hardware person about what timing analysis was. Of course they knew and I didn't. So it was kind of like absurdly arrogant of me to essentially not believe them, Right, But entirely justified as experts don't understand the essence. They understand their coping mechanisms. It really is a very unusual expert who understands the essence of a question and can distinguish it from their coping mechanism for being taught a really inelegant way to to even frame a question. https://open.spotify.com/episode/4jPTxGfaUa84IqsQceKywL?si=3396934d31004b3c, 2:21:43
Aris Goudouras
Although the way Conal Elliott puts it here is arrogant, I do think it’s important, rare and difficult to grasp the different paradigms of what you’re working on deeply.
Συνεντευξη ροδοστογλου, παρομοια σκεψη με καστοριαδη στην αλληλεπιδραση δημιουργου και αναγνωστη
Environments for Thinking
Με γοητεύει το παιχνίδι της γραφής και αγαπώ τη διαπεραστική χάρη των λέξεων, την ένταση των αισθημάτων και την οξυμένη ζωντάνια που εμπεριέχει η δημιουργία, αυτό το πάθος για μια ζωή πέρα απ΄ το θάνατο. Δεν θα ’λεγα όμως πως είμαι η κλασική περίπτωση ενός ανθρώπου που γράφει, αυτής της εικόνας δηλαδή που έχουμε για κάποιον που καθισμένος στο γραφείο του, μπροστά σε μία λευκή κόλα χαρτί, περιμένει να του έρθει η επιφοίτηση. Είμαι δεινός περιπατητής, οπότε μου αρέσει πολύ να περπατάω μέσα στο χάος του κέντρου της Αθήνας ή των προαστίων της και εκεί να αναστοχάζομαι τον εαυτό μου. Όντας ένας ευαίσθητος δέκτης, το μυαλό μου βρίσκεται διαρκώς σε εγρήγορση. Κάτι που βίωσα, κάτι που διάβασα, μία φράση που άκουσα, μπορεί να αποτελέσει το έναυσμα για να ξετυλιχθεί το νήμα μιας ιστορίας. Και άλλα πράγματα όμως, που δεν ξέρω πως μου συμβαίνουν. Πρόκειται για περιδινήσεις μου στη μνήμη, στο ονειρικό και στο άγνωστο, για ενορατικές συλλήψεις που έχουν την ρίζα τους στο υποσυνείδητο. Έχω λοιπόν πάντα μαζί μου ένα τετράδιο όπου εκεί, ανά πάσα στιγμή, καταγράφω σκέψεις και ιδέες, τις οποίες και επεξεργάζομαι κατά τη διάρκεια της μέρας. Και τις περισσότερες φορές, το βράδυ που θα γυρίσω στο σπίτι, η βασική μου ιδέα θα έχει σχεδόν ολοκληρωθεί. Θα κάνω κάποιες τελευταίες διορθώσεις και θα την καταγράψω. Γενικότερα, επειδή πιστεύω πολύ στο ξάφνιασμα της πρωτογενούς σύλληψης, τους στίχους ή τα ποιήματά μου δεν τα παιδεύω πολύ, με όλα τα προτερήματα ή τα μειονεκτήματα που μπορεί να έχει μία τέτοιου είδους πρακτική. Ροδοστόγλου, http://www.mic.gr/synenteyxi/pantelis-rodostogloy-otan-tithentai-yparxiaka-erotimata-tha-vrethoyme-anapofeykta-mprosta
Formation of Ideas
Θα έλεγα πως δεν έχω τέτοια άγχη και δεν πιέζω τον εαυτό μου να γράψει, για αυτό είμαι και σχετικά ολιγόγραφος. Και όσο περνούν τα χρόνια γράφω και σπανιότερα. Γενικότερα όμως να σας πω πως η έμπνευση ήταν πάντα ένα μυστήριο για μένα. Όσο μεγαλώνω όμως, τείνω να πιστεύω πως δεν είναι αυτό που νόμιζα πιο νέος, μία έκλαμψη της στιγμής δηλαδή, αλλά αποτέλεσμα μιας προεργασίας. Γνωρίζουμε πλέον από την ψυχανάλυση πως οι διαδικασίες που ποιούν, δομούν, οικοδομούν, συνεχίζονται ακόμα και σε στιγμές που δεν έχουμε συνειδητή επίγνωσή τους. Η σκέψη εξακολουθεί να εργάζεται με διάφορους τρόπους, σε πιο βαθιές περιοχές του ψυχισμού όπου δεν έχουμε τον απόλυτο έλεγχο. Αυτό βέβαια δεν σημαίνει πως αυτό που θα αναδυθεί είναι προϊόν χαλάρωσης ή κάποιας ονειροπόλησης, αλλά αντίθετα ανήκει σε τομείς στους οποίους έχουμε εργαστεί σκληρά και με πλήρη αφοσίωση. Για να μπορέσουν όλα αυτά βέβαια να γίνουν πράξη απαιτείται, πάντα, μία συνάντηση. Μία συνάντηση του εαυτού με έναν «κόσμο» (και με τη λέξη «κόσμος» εννοώ το σχήμα των σχέσεων νοήματος, μέσα στο οποίο υπάρχει ένα πρόσωπο και στο οποίο συμμετέχει). Θεωρώ λοιπόν, πως η έλλειψη έμπνευσης είναι η αδυναμία επίτευξης αυτής της συνάντησης, η απουσία συμβατότητας του εαυτού με τον «κόσμο». Και αυτό μπορεί να συμβεί για πολλούς λόγους, που ποικίλουν για τον καθένα. Απ' την άλλη -να το πούμε κι αυτό - δεν είναι και το ευκολότερο πράγμα του κόσμου, να είσαι διαρκώς ο εαυτός σου. Όσο ταλέντο, όση ευαισθησία και αν υπάρχει, η δημιουργικότητα έχει μία σκληρή απαίτηση: την έμπρακτη αποτύπωση των γεννημάτων της ψυχής και της σκέψης σου, ένα κομμάτι απ' τις σάρκες σου δηλαδή. Και αυτό, όσο γοητευτικό κι αν ακούγεται, υπάρχουν στιγμές που μπορεί να γίνεται οδυνηρό και ψυχοφθόρο. Αυτή είναι άλλωστε και η θεμελιώδης διαφορά και ένα από τα βασικά χαρακτηριστικά των πολύ μεγάλων καλλιτεχνών και συγγραφέων: έχουν απόλυτη προσήλωση στο έργο τους και μία ακούραστη δύναμη να καταδύονται με τέτοιο τρόπο γύρω τους και μέσα τους, ώστε να ακούνε τον τρόμο δίχως μεταμφιέσεις. Ροδοστόγλου, http://www.mic.gr/synenteyxi/pantelis-rodostogloy-otan-tithentai-yparxiaka-erotimata-tha-vrethoyme-anapofeykta-mprosta
Λὀγω της εμπλοκής μου με τα Διάφανα Κρίνα, με τη μουσική και τις συναυλίες ήρθα από πολύ νωρίς και από κοντά σε επαφή με τους ανθρώπους που αγαπάνε αυτά που γράφω. Και πάντοτε υπήρχε ένας αμοιβαίος σεβασμός, μία ειλικρινής ανταλλαγή σκέψεων και συναισθημάτων και σε πολλές περιπτώσεις μία μέθεξη από τη χαρά της συνάντησης που έδινε στην έννοια της ανθρώπινης επαφής την πραγματική της ουσία. Ήταν κάτι που δεν είχα φανταστεί απ' όταν έφηβος ακόμα ξεκινούσα να γράφω, σε μία προσπάθειά μου να εκτονώσω σκέψεις και συναισθήματα που με βάραιναν ή που δεν μπορούσα να κατανοήσω. Στην πορεία διάβασα, έμαθα, κατάλαβα πως η ανάγκη του ανθρώπου να βγει από τον ιδιωτικό του χώρο και να προσεγγίσει τους ομοίους του έχει τις ρίζες της σε πανάρχαια ένστικτα αυτοσυντήρησης με βαθιές υπαρξιακές προεκτάσεις. Και όταν τίθενται υπαρξιακά ερωτήματα θα βρεθούμε αναπόφευκτα μπροστά στον άλλο, τον Ξένο. Η σπουδαία ιδιότητα των καλλιτεχνικών δημιουργημάτων είναι ότι σχεδόν πάντα αποτελούν τον τόπο μιας συνάντησης. Κάποιο πρωταρχικό ένστικτο συλλογικὀτητας μας ωθεί να προσεγγίσουμε τους άλλους, να προσπαθήσουμε να τους μεταδώσουμε την ποιότητα και τη δύναμη αυτού που νιώσαμε. Επιχειρούμε να τους πείσουμε να αφεθούν κι εκείνοι σ' αυτό. Ο αναγνώστης (όπως και ο θεατής μίας συναυλίας ή ενός ζωγραφικού έργου), αν δεν είναι ένας παθητικός δέκτης, αλληλεπιδρά δημιουργικά και συμμετέχει στο καλλιτεχνικό έργο, η ματιά του το επηρεάζει και η αντίληψή του το μεταβάλλει, αποκαλύπτει κρυφές πτυχές και κρυμμένα νοήματα που ίσως ούτε και ο ίδιος ο συγγραφέας δεν είχε συνειδητοποιήσει ότι υπάρχουν. Έτσι ξεκινάει να αναπτύσσεται μία σχέση με αμοιβαίο ενδιαφέρον, κάποιου είδους συνομιλίας αν θέλετε, που πολλές φορές μπορεί να διαρκέσει για χρόνια. Ὀ, τι διαμοιράζεται μέσα από αυτή τη σχέση, είναι αυτά τα «δώρα της ζωής» που λέει πολύ όμορφα ο Νερούδα. Ή κατά τον Μανὀλη Πρατικάκη: «είμαστε πάντα οι άλλοι, τούτο το πυκνό πλήθος των ξένων που κρυώνει και σπαράζει». Ροδοστόγλου, http://www.mic.gr/synenteyxi/pantelis-rodostogloy-otan-tithentai-yparxiaka-erotimata-tha-vrethoyme-anapofeykta-mprosta
Πολλοί έχουν χαρακτηρίσει τα ποιήματά σου και τους στίχους σου από "μελαγχολικούς" έως "καταθλιπτικούς" - προσωπικά νομίζω όμως ότι από πίσω τους κρύβεται μια αισιοδοξία, κανένας άνθρωπος που δημιουργεί καλλιτεχνικά δεν μπορεί να μην είναι ζωντανός και δυνατός, αλλιώς δεν θα άντεχε να καταπιαστεί με οδυνηρά θέματα. Με άλλα λόγια, το βιβλίο μου έβγαλε όχι μια θλίψη αλλά μια ανάταση. Εσύ πώς θα χαρακτήριζες τους στίχους σου εν τέλει; Νομίζω πως αποτελεί δείγμα κοντόφθαλμης οπτικής το να αντιμετωπίζουμε τα καλλιτεχνικά δημιουργήματα με την ορολογία των φτηνών εγχειριδίων της σύγχρονης εκλαϊκευμένης ψυχολογίας του συρμού, γιατί με αυτή τη λογική θα έπρεπε να τα απορρίψουμε σχεδόν όλα. Κατανοώ βέβαια βαθιά την ανάγκη κάποιων ανθρώπων να είναι ξέγνοιαστοι και απροβλημάτιστοι ή να προσβλέπουν στη «θετικότητα», αλλά αυτός δεν είναι ο δικός μου τρόπος να υπάρχω στον κόσμο. Γι' αυτό και οι στίχοι μου λόγω ιδιοσυγκρασίας αποτελούν εκφάνσεις μιας ευαισθησίας που βιώνει και μετουσιώνει το υλικό της μέσω του δραματικού. Δεν θα μπορούσα να προσεγγίσω διαφορετικά αυτά που ήθελα να πω, αφού πιστεύω πως ο δραματικός τρόπος βρίσκεται πιο κοντά στην πραγματικότητα της ανθρώπινης κατάστασης. Ο λόγος έχει τις ρίζες του βυθισμένες στα θαμμένα βάθη της φύσης και της ψυχής και προκειμένου να μπορέσει να ανέλθει στο φως πρέπει να κατέλθει στα σκότη. Όπως και να το κάνουμε, η αναζήτηση, η εμβάθυνση και η ψηλάφηση είναι καταστάσεις που προϋποθέτουν ένα ορισμένο ποσοστό απογοήτευσης. Σε όλα τα μεγάλα κείμενα της ανθρωπότητας, με τον πόνο αρχίζει η αφήγηση. Από τη στιγμή δηλαδή που το ανθρώπινο πνεύμα βρέθηκε μπροστά στην κλειστή πόρτα του μυστηρίου, ο θάνατος θα γίνει το σκοτεινό θεμέλιο πάνω στο οποίο βασίζεται η γνώση. Γι' αυτό και η σκέψη είναι πάντοτε μελαγχολική, ακόμα και στις ευδιάθετες, κωμικές, ή χαρούμενες στιγμές της. Το γέλιο και η χαρά είναι σπουδαίες ανθρώπινες ιδιότητες γιατί αντικατοπτρίζουν την ευγένεια της ψυχής μπροστά στην απελπισία, όμως δεν παύουν να είναι εύθραυστες ιδιότητες που έχουν την τάση να αυτοεξαντλούνται όταν αφήνονται ελεύθερες να αναπτυχθούν. Και αυτό συμβαίνει γιατί - υποσυνείδητα τις περισσότερες φορές - επιδρά πάνω στον άνθρωπο μία μαγνητική δύναμη, μία πνοή υπογείου που μόλις παραβιάστηκε και διαχέεται από μία λιτανεία από φαντάσματα. Υπό το βάρος όλων αυτών, η δημιουργική πράξη είναι μία πράξη τρομακτικής σημασίας, αφού λειτουργεί παρηγορητικά για τον άνθρωπο και τον οδηγεί στην ψυχική κάθαρση και στη λύτρωση. Ο καλλιτέχνης είναι ένα ζωντανό ον που στην προσπάθειά του να αναζητήσει την αλήθεια και την ευτυχία του αποτυγχάνει. Και για να τις βρει θα πρέπει να βγει έξω από τα στενά όρια του ιδιωτικού του χώρου και να προσεγγίσει τους άλλους. Και δε γνωρίζω πιο ευγενική χειρονομία από αυτή. Ροδοστόγλου, http://www.mic.gr/synenteyxi/pantelis-rodostogloy-otan-tithentai-yparxiaka-erotimata-tha-vrethoyme-anapofeykta-mprosta
Λὀγω της εμπλοκής μου με τα Διάφανα Κρίνα, με τη μουσική και τις συναυλίες ήρθα από πολύ νωρίς και από κοντά σε επαφή με τους ανθρώπους που αγαπάνε αυτά που γράφω. Και πάντοτε υπήρχε ένας αμοιβαίος σεβασμός, μία ειλικρινής ανταλλαγή σκέψεων και συναισθημάτων και σε πολλές περιπτώσεις μία μέθεξη από τη χαρά της συνάντησης που έδινε στην έννοια της ανθρώπινης επαφής την πραγματική της ουσία. Ήταν κάτι που δεν είχα φανταστεί απ' όταν έφηβος ακόμα ξεκινούσα να γράφω, σε μία προσπάθειά μου να εκτονώσω σκέψεις και συναισθήματα που με βάραιναν ή που δεν μπορούσα να κατανοήσω. Στην πορεία διάβασα, έμαθα, κατάλαβα πως η ανάγκη του ανθρώπου να βγει από τον ιδιωτικό του χώρο και να προσεγγίσει τους ομοίους του έχει τις ρίζες της σε πανάρχαια ένστικτα αυτοσυντήρησης με βαθιές υπαρξιακές προεκτάσεις. Και όταν τίθενται υπαρξιακά ερωτήματα θα βρεθούμε αναπόφευκτα μπροστά στον άλλο, τον Ξένο. Η σπουδαία ιδιότητα των καλλιτεχνικών δημιουργημάτων είναι ότι σχεδόν πάντα αποτελούν τον τόπο μιας συνάντησης. Κάποιο πρωταρχικό ένστικτο συλλογικὀτητας μας ωθεί να προσεγγίσουμε τους άλλους, να προσπαθήσουμε να τους μεταδώσουμε την ποιότητα και τη δύναμη αυτού που νιώσαμε. Επιχειρούμε να τους πείσουμε να αφεθούν κι εκείνοι σ' αυτό. Ο αναγνώστης (όπως και ο θεατής μίας συναυλίας ή ενός ζωγραφικού έργου), αν δεν είναι ένας παθητικός δέκτης, αλληλεπιδρά δημιουργικά και συμμετέχει στο καλλιτεχνικό έργο, η ματιά του το επηρεάζει και η αντίληψή του το μεταβάλλει, αποκαλύπτει κρυφές πτυχές και κρυμμένα νοήματα που ίσως ούτε και ο ίδιος ο συγγραφέας δεν είχε συνειδητοποιήσει ότι υπάρχουν. Έτσι ξεκινάει να αναπτύσσεται μία σχέση με αμοιβαίο ενδιαφέρον, κάποιου είδους συνομιλίας αν θέλετε, που πολλές φορές μπορεί να διαρκέσει για χρόνια. Ὀ, τι διαμοιράζεται μέσα από αυτή τη σχέση, είναι αυτά τα «δώρα της ζωής» που λέει πολύ όμορφα ο Νερούδα. Ή κατά τον Μανὀλη Πρατικάκη: «είμαστε πάντα οι άλλοι, τούτο το πυκνό πλήθος των ξένων που κρυώνει και σπαράζει». Ροδοστόγλου, http://www.mic.gr/synenteyxi/pantelis-rodostogloy-otan-tithentai-yparxiaka-erotimata-tha-vrethoyme-anapofeykta-mprosta
Digital Media and Computing
Computers as creative tools
Principles and characteristics of creating tools fostering creativity and collaboration
Interoperability
Computer visionaries and pioneers of the 60s and 70s
New frontiers exploration needs a group of people doing heavy knowledge work with a new technology that enables it. Doug Engelbart, https://youtu.be/LpIYdyOXqkk?t=2789
“We also see this in the million startups that have reinvented the spreadsheet except constrained it to perform a particular set of things and realize: no, really, people use spreadsheets because they are unconstrained”. https://youtu.be/07j2AXC9BH8?si=aekq9ikZ-xjlaeS-&t=1037
Our Collective IQ is boosted by concurrently developing, integrating and applying knowledge. Doug Engelbart, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LpIYdyOXqkk&t=880s
The sense of a lost vision of computer pioneers of the 60s and 70s. Dynamics of digital media production
Now that we have all these wonderful devices, it should be the goal of society to put them in the service of truth and learning. And this is the way I propose. Not through obscure forms of "information retrieval;" not through newly oppressive forms of "computer-assisted instruction;" and not through a purported science of "artificial intelligence“ that will create new personalisms to irk us. All these obstructive oddities, I think, have developed as separate ideals because of the grand preposterosity of Professionalism that has created a world-wide cult of mutual incomprehensibility and disconnected special goals. Now we need to get everybody together again. We want to go back to the roots of our civilization - the ability, which we once had, for everybody who could read to be able to read everything. We must once again become a community of common access to a shared heritage. This was of course what Vannevar Bush said in 1945 in an article everybody cites but nobody reads. Ted Nelson, Computer Lib/Dream Machines, Hypertext
This all has a certain vagueness if you do not understand how bound you are today by paper— the problems of finding it , sorting it, looking things up. (If you write, that is, write a lot, you know all too well how intractable is paper, what a damned nuisance.) With a system like Engelbart's, now, whatever is written is instantly there. Whatever you want to look up Is instantly there, simultaneously interconnected to everything else l t should be connected to - source materials, footnotes, comments and so on. A document is completed the moment it is written: no human being has to retype i t . (It need not be typed on paper at all ,if it’s just for the workshop members: a printout is only needed if it has to go to someone outside the system). In many ways, Engelbart's system is a prototype for the world of the future, I hope. ALL HANDLING OF PAPER IS ELIMINATED. Whatever you write, you write on the screens with keyboard and pointer. (No more backs of envelopes, yellow pads, file cards, typewriters.) Whatever you transmit to fellow users of the system you simply 'release' - no physical paper changes hands. The group has also worked out some remarkable techniques for collaborative endeavor. Two people - say, one in California and one in New York - can work together through their screens, plus a phone link; it's as if they were side-by-side at a magic table. Each sees on his screen what the other sees; each controls a moving dot (or "cursor") that shows where he's pointing. The effect is somewhere between a blackboard and a desk; both may call up documents, point things out in them, change them, and anything else two people might do when working on something together. Basically the system Is a large-scale setup for the storage, bringing forth, viewing and revision of documents and connections among them. Ted Nelson, Computer Lib/Dream Machines, Doug Engelbart and “The Augmentation of Intellect”
[…] human action, or even human thought, can only take place through some kind of material medium and therefore can’t be understood without taking the qualities of that medium into account. Hence the importance in Turner’s analysis of the notion of material media of circulation. The media have qualities in and of themselves. For all the (often quite legitimate) criticisms of Jack Goody’s dichotomies between orality and literacy, for example, it is simply obvious that technologies of writing allow for possibilities that do not exist in speech (and equally, vice versa). Graeber, Toward an Anthropological Theory of Value, p.83
The open problem of writing and rendering math using inline equations
Back in the days of WYSIWYG web editors like Dreamweaver and Microsoft FrontPage you would often end up with this problem, where you try to do any edit in the WYSIWYG side and then you look at the generated HTML and is ridiculous: There's like 16 nested, empty span tags and no one would ever be able to maintain that. And my worry is basically that when you automatically create markup for something that has a very complex graphical representation, it's really like one way: maybe it will help you produce a compiled output, but it doesn't actually help you go back in edit and tweak the representation later. I think we really need to get to some kind of good intermediate representation that allows you to flexibly go both ways. Slim Lim, Metamuse Episode 48 Rich Text with Slim Lim, 47:35, https://open.spotify.com/episode/51u2e3Ak6E4yMfqmA0NOdm?si=c8WSrsIUTvqlq4tfmT1CRA
[Slim] And that goes back to something that Adam and I were chatting about earlier, which is that a lot of people gripe and complain, that LaTex is the best we have, and, you know, I'm one of them. But it really is the case that LaTex was this monumental effort by really a few people, and amount of effort that would be considered really impressive if I were to try to do the same thing but better today. Not a lot of people have spare time to do this all-in-one text formatting and packaging document representation project even though it would have a huge impact on the way people write and publish these kinds of documents. And so, in many ways, we're sort of just bottlenecked on the fact that it's hard to do incremental improvements to this particular area. We really depend on these software monoliths to keep us afloat. […] [Wiggins] And yeah, I agree. It's a monumental effort, but I mean mathematics is so important and foundational and so much of human endeavor that certainly seems like one worth investing in, although perhaps hard to reap a profit from and that makes it harder to put concentrated capital behind it. Slim Lim & Wiggins, Metamuse Episode 48 Rich Text with Slim Lim, 48:30, https://open.spotify.com/episode/51u2e3Ak6E4yMfqmA0NOdm?si=BHebRCxjQVSETJlrxi1McQ
[McGranaghan]: Isn’t the state of the art [for rendering equations in the browser] generating PNG and sticking it in the web page? [Slim]: Not exactly but almost. So MathML, which is an XML dialect or mathematical markup language was this effort to build XML style syntax for typesetting mathematics naturally. It is only implemented in Firefox, so that's really unfortunate. So in terms of the state of the art, there are basically two libraries that you can use to typeset mathematics: there's MathJax and KaTex. MathJax supports all valid LaTex […]. The problem is that MathJax is very slow. So if you ever go on MathOverflow or another related StackExchange and you see all of these answers with weird gaps, and then as you watch before you the page starting to load all of the rendered equations bumping everything down one level at a time, that's MathJax in action. And oftentimes it is doing what you're describing where it is outputting an SVG or a PNG or something like that. And it's reflowing the page with every equation. Then you have KaTex, which was a library developed at Khan Academy where they realize that MathJax’s performance was not satisfactory for their exercises. KaTex supports a much more limited subset of all of LaTex syntax, but it does it all using CSS and it doesn't reflow the page for every equation, it’s basically instant rendering. And basically, it means that your options if you want to render math are: - Only target Firefox - Use a limited subset of math that’s supported by KaTex - Constrain yourself to extremely slow, dozens-of-reflow, full-expressive-power rendering to inline PNGs. And that's just not a great situation to be in and we haven't even gotten to the question of how people write math. So I would say that people underestimate how open this problem space is. Just take a moment of silence to like recognize the gravity of the situation. Slim Lim, Metamuse Episode 48 Rich Text with Slim Lim, 52:05, https://open.spotify.com/episode/51u2e3Ak6E4yMfqmA0NOdm?si=kKrmc0JWRdey8N1s1OXC9A
Digital tools and human-computer interaction
Spreadsheets
Hypertext
I believe computer screens can make people happier, smarter, and better able to cope with the copious problems of tomorrow. But only if we do right, right now. WHY? The computer's capability for branching among events, controlling exterior devices, controlling outside events, and mediating in all other events, makes possible a new era of media. Until now, the mechanical properties of external objects determined what they were to us and how we used them. But henceforth this is arbitrary. The recognition of that arbitrariness, and re-consideration among broader and more general alternatives, awaits us. All the previous units and mechanisms of learning, scholarship, arts, transaction and confirmation, and even self-reminder, were based in various ways upon physical objects - the properties of paper, carbon paper, files, books and bookshelves. To read from paper you must move the physical object in front of you. Its contents cannot be made to slide, fold, shrink, become transparent, or get larger. But all this Is now changing, and suddenly. The computer display screen does all these things if desired, to the same markings we have previously handled on paper. The computer display screen is going to become universal very fast; this is guaranteed by the suddenly rising cost of paper. And we will use them for everything. [...] Our screen displays will be alive with animation in their separate segments of activity, and will respond to our actions as if alive physically too. Ted Nelson, Computer Lib/Dream Machines, Fantics
Harnessing Complexity
Software Longevity
[Wiggins]: For me, thinking about that word longevity, I tend to think about what is long, I guess. What is a span of time that counts as long and of course it depends a lot on what you're talking about. So if you're talking about all of society, culture, humanity, then perhaps you’re talking in the thousands of years, hundreds or thousands of years. So for example, the long now is a phrase that we use to the local-first paper, we tend to use it internally on our team to refer to longer-term. Thinking this comes from the Long Now Foundation, and the long now clock project, which is sort of this idea to build a clock that can keep time for 10,000 years and it's basically an art project, but it's designed to inspire us to think longer term, and that can obviously connect to things about climate change or human culture. And since humans are naturally inclined to think probably pretty short term, actually really short term: We think about the day that's ahead or the week that's ahead of us, maybe at most the year that's ahead of us, we don't tend to think in tens or hundreds or thousands of years. That's maybe a society level thing. I think for individuals and thinking about, you know, software as it impacts our lives as individuals, I think a human lifespan is actually is a pretty good chunk of time to compare something to. Wiggins and McGranaghan, Metamuse Episode 49, Software Longevity, 05:06, https://open.spotify.com/episode/1DCNy94TBt3aoGbM8PNlRv?si=8Ny-UxkNStWnvjGA1EnO-A
Data and rolling it over to newer versions
[Wiggins]: Now, some have argued that perhaps part of the challenge here is the rapid pace of change of that underlying system of those APIs. I think it's interesting here to contrast the Apple versus Microsoft approach. So I think that Microsoft with DOS and later Windows was really focused on backwards compatibility quite in an impressive level. I'm not exactly sure when the cut-offs are, but I think you could run DOS stuff natively on windows till well into the Windows lineage, and much later versions of Windows could run much earlier versions. But that's part of, I think, what also created the relative instability and unreliability of that line of operating systems, which is when you need to support every conceivable thing that's ever existed in the past and put it all together in the same box, and things get messy pretty fast. Apple with the iOS world has gone very much the other route which is they basically are releasing new stuff, a new OS update, once a year and if app developers don't keep up-to-date you pretty quickly just fall out of the App Store. […] You have this very demanding operating system that requires developers be doing active maintenance, or else it [your app] tends to go away. [McGranaghan]: While I don't doubt that there was some contribution in the Windows situation to instability from needing to support all versions forever, I think what really gets you is when you need to do that, and things that are really end-user-facing, like visual in particular, because the strategies that you typically use for providing stability are not viable in that world. So, if you look at things like Unix-style server, operating systems, many programming languages, these are things that can have backwards compatibility for a long time, certainly decades. But the way they do that is they just never ever, ever ever break any APIs. And if you want to do something new, either too bad, or call it "thing 2” and just keep “thing 1” around forever. […] you can't really do that with a windowing system, for example, or a user interface paradigm or how things look on the screen, right? You just got to pick something and do it, and the old thing needs to go. And so I think it does become very hard to have that culture of very long-lived durability that you see in those systems-y programs. [Wiggins]: Yeah, maybe that points to the fundamental trade-off there, which is durability in many cases means stability, which means less change. But change is how we get things that are new and better and the world technology and computers in the internet is so at the very beginning, there's so much unexplored space, and it would be a shame if we just said, okay, well we've been working on making these computers here for a few decades now, this is pretty much how they are, probably it is probably good for the next several hundred years, let's just hold it there. That's not what we want to do. We want to keep changing and improving. So yeah, there just is a trade-off between those two. [McGranaghan]: Yeah, I think there's a very real tension and I agree want to keep exploring. I do think that in adopting this attitude of exploring and taking risks, we are going to find some things that in retrospect were not good choices. The intuition here is, I think we're projecting these very dynamic system benefits over lives that we have historically associated with durable goods. So we get the shiny new computer-enabled, software-enabled thing, and it works great the first year, and we think: things like this, before we had computers, they worked for 20 or 30 years, therefore, this thing is going to work for 20 or 30 years, it's gonna be awesome. And we've kind of projected that out for, and I think in many cases that's not going to be true. And so we are going to have to confront the downside of that tradeoff. [Wiggins]: And do you think the downside there is mainly economic? You buy the smart refrigerator seems great for the first year, some cloud service goes offline suddenly and your refrigerator doesn't work anymore and you got to throw it out and get a new one, or do you think there's something beyond the economic side? [McGranaghan]: Unfortunately I think there are several potential very serious downsides. Just to give you a couple, one that we're already seeing is this issue of repairability or even modifiability. Again, if you look at these durable goods categories like tractors, which is very prominent example right now, traditionally people could service and maintain and change and modify and improve their own tractors. But as tractors increasingly become like iPhones, you know, these black-box computers in many ways, or highly computerized hardware, Potentially you can’t service them yourself, you can't repair them yourself, you can't modify them yourself and that has all kinds of second order effects. There's also this whole thing about surveillance basically that I think we're sleeping on a little bit, but we do need to go down that rabbit hole today. [Wiggins]: On the economic side, I think there's all sort of the incentive which is basically Apple and other phone manufacturers have done very very well by always creating that shiny new thing that comes out every year or two. And you think: I want to upgrade. It’s even often built into cell phone contracts and things, people want to get a new phone very frequently. And I think that's paired with sometimes the operating system upgrades, or maybe the visual refreshes, it's almost more like fashion, the fashion industry found this very clever way to get around the fact their IP isn't really protectable, which is they just make new fashion trends the totally change for a couple of years. So then you like need to go out and get a new wardrobe. It's not the clothes wore out necessarily. It's that you want to be up-to-date and you look behind the times when you’re strolling around in your bell bottoms and those have been out of fashion for three years or whatever it is. And so I think there's an element of this kind of a fashion or desire to get the new thing that has driven a lot of revenue for these companies. I don't mean to imply that that some kind of a cackling in the back layer, they're using this opportunity to improve and genuinely make their products better: Each version of the iPhone has that better camera, that better battery life, the bigger brighter screen, it is genuinely better, but it's also the companies are very incentivized for a high pace of change that has you buying new products all the time, as opposed to something longer-term. Wiggins and McGranaghan, Metamuse Episode 49, Software Longevity, 18:33 , https://open.spotify.com/episode/1DCNy94TBt3aoGbM8PNlRv?si=euUyYhr6SWC4C0KFtLmMHQ
Software environment and dependencies
The constituent parts of software longevity. Software as a special class of information
Preserving games as a form of cultural history preservation
Techniques for achieving software longevity
[Wiggins] […] one of the things that points to that to me feels like maybe the most fundamental is to just think about longevity in the first place and just care about it in the first place. Part of the reason I thought this topic would be an interesting one.I think, again, tech industry skews (?) young, I think also had the same gap in my thinking as a younger person, which was I just didn't have the longer experience to be able to see what it is like for software that I've created that's in production for three years, five years, ten years, and longer and what happens over time. It's a part of what I like with the SQLite long-term support page, they basically lead with a statement that our goal is to support this until the year 2050 and so, will they achieve that? hard to know… But just by making that statement, calling it out as a value for themselves and thinking about it actively, maybe this comes back to the long-now clock idea, which is, they may or may not succeed but certainly one good way to not succeed is to not think about it in the first place. And so this makes it a first-class concern. Wiggins & McGranaghan, Metamuse Episode 49, Software Longevity, 30:14, https://open.spotify.com/episode/1DCNy94TBt3aoGbM8PNlRv?si=UT2qfBJAQWWjr5QsUGkunw
Local-first and software longevity
In the fullness of time, the files you create are more important than the tools you use to create them. Apps are ephemeral, but your files have a chance to last. The ancient temples of Egypt contain hieroglyphs that were chiseled in stone thousands of years ago. The ideas hieroglyphs convey are more important than the type of chisel that was used to carve them. The world is filled with ideas from generations past, transmitted through many mediums, from clay tablets to manuscripts, paintings, sculptures, and tapestries. These artifacts are objects that you can touch, hold, own, store, preserve, and look at. To read something written on paper all you need is eyeballs. Today, we are creating innumerable digital artifacts, but most of these artifacts are out of our control. They are stored on servers, in databases, gated behind an internet connection, and login to a cloud service. Even the files on your hard drive use proprietary formats that make them incompatible with older systems and other tools. […] If you want your writing to still be readable on a computer from the 2060s or 2160s, it’s important that your notes can be read on a computer from the 1960s. You should want the files you create to be durable, not only for posterity, but also for your future self. You never know when you might want to go back to something you created years or decades ago. Don’t lock your data into a format you can’t retrieve. These days I write using an app I help make called Obsidian, but it’s a delusion to think it will last forever. The app will eventually become obsolete. It’s the plain text files I create that are designed to last. Who knows if anyone will want to read them besides me, but future me is enough of an audience to make it worthwhile. Steph Ango, File over App, https://stephango.com/file-over-app
Information Storage
But why should things be saved? Everything is deeply intertwingled. We save for knowledge and nostalgia, but what we thought was knowledge often turns to nostalgia, and nostalgia often brings us deeper insights that cut across our lives and very selves. Ted Nelson, Computer Lib/Dream Machines, The Heritage
Computers offer an interesting daydream: that we may be able to store things digitally instead of physically. In other words, turn the libraries to digital storage (see Hypertexts); digitize paintings and photographs (see "Picture Processing);even digitize the genetic codes of animals, so that species can be restored at future dates (see "The Hitiest Computer,"). Digital storage possesses several special advantages. Digitally stored materials may be copied by automatic meanB; corrective measures are possible, to prevent errors from creeping In— i.e., "no deterioration" In principle; and they could be kept in various places, lessening man- kind's dependence on its eggs being all in one basket (like the Library at Alexandria, whose burning during the occupation of Julius Caesar was one of the greatest losses in human history). But this would of course require far more compact and reliable forms of digital storage than exist right now. Nevertheless, we better start thinking about it. Ted Nelson, Computer Lib/Dream Machines, The Heritage
Paper moulders. Microfilm is inconvenient. In the best libraries it takes at least minutes to get a particular thing. But as to linking them together - footnoting Aeschylus with Marcus Aurelius, linking genetic data to 15th-century accounts of Indian tribes - well, you can only do it on paper by writing something new that ties them together. Isn't that ridiculous? When you could do it all electronically in seconds? Ted Nelson, Computer Lib/Dream Machines, Hypertext
Critique of digital media and computing in capitalism
Culture of digital media producers
[Mielke]: I just think that fundamentally analysis is great […] of history, especially in a field like tech, which is in some ways, pretty disconnected from its own history and there's almost kind of like a pride in that of moving, so quickly that we don't even look to the past. [Wiggins]: Yeah, all right. Almost listed as a sort of willful disregard of history because I think there's the classic Y Combinator startup founder, fresh out of school. It's actually their naivety that allows them to reinvent their not dragged down by the legacy baggage of how we do things today. They can just think about it and kind of of a greenfield way and dream up a new idea. […] But that comes at the expense of well actual naivety and reinventing everything and not using scholarship of the past to learn what's worked and what hasn't in order to kind of stand on the shoulders of giants or build the way that any other field would. Of course, you learn from the past and then you use that to inform what you should do, going forward into the future, and yeah, the young naive startup founder, other types that we hold up as our role models sometimes and technology are not into scholarship. Mielke & Wiggins, Metamuse ep.30 Computers and Creativity with Molly Mielke 16:50, https://open.spotify.com/episode/5HoFWZzo4PAzEhF5Tn3WbD?si=KRW6ed30T1KEm4G8fa8FSA
It’s not just that the culture of the digital media industry is disconnected from it’s history, it’s uncritical and often unreflective, just going after the short/mid term profit and driven by hype.
[…] let me bring the positive side, which is I totally agree that they did lay out a vision for computing. That is grounding in a world where we do seem stuck in social media consumer not exactly sure what; everything is oriented around commerce, and again things are all good: commerce entertainment, these things are fine, I consume these. But the reason I got interested in computers that are very young ages seeing their potential for creativity, and unlocking the noblest parts of the human spirit. Wiggins, Metamuse ep.30 Computers and Creativity with Molly Mielke 23:25, https://open.spotify.com/episode/5HoFWZzo4PAzEhF5Tn3WbD?si=AmfN5kUhQK669_VhAK9e7w
[…] there was these amazing visionaries who saw the potential for computers and creativity, sort of laid out a vision way back in what seems like just the stone age's to us the 1960s and 1970s and then in some ways we lost our way. And we ended up with, I don't know, social media and kind of lockdown appliance like smartphones. And in fact, there's this glorious world of Smalltalk, Dynabook and Mother of all Demos style stuff that we still need to build, or we haven't built or something like that. Wiggins, Metamuse ep.30 Computers and Creativity with Molly Mielke 14:30, https://open.spotify.com/episode/5HoFWZzo4PAzEhF5Tn3WbD?si=AmfN5kUhQK669_VhAK9e7w
Situationist critique of the Spectacle and the passiveness of culture is very relevant here. It’s more problematic that Wiggins thinks here.
Ultimately, the problem with commercial offers and decentralized software applications boils down to the same thing. In order to challenge state reLavabitn and capitalist exploitation effectively, it is necessary to stand and organize collectively against the state and capital. Cypherpunk initiatives like Lavabit or decentralized software can go a long way to challenge the status quo, but they are historically limited by their understanding of social change and social conflict. Social change is not simply a matter of consumer preference like the choice of an individual’s email provider, neither social conflicts are mere mathematical problems that can be resolved through a strategic application of mathematics. Radical technology collectives build political solidarity and nurture security behaviors within and between activist groups in addition to providing things like email and putting the right cryptographic algorithms in place. Autistici/Inventati - +KAOS - 10 Years of Hacking and Media Activism, Institute of Network Cultures 2021, p.12
Absence of interoperability and its relationship with capitalism and prevailing social structures
I think this is a prime example of the political economy issue. It's very easy to say we should have x. And even if x is relatively easy to do, which is not, in this case, there's still this huge issue of the “we should” that's quite the weasel phrase, right? If we were to accomplish this, we will need a bunch of companies or individual developers to temporarily make more work for themselves. Lower the profitability, make their products worse for their customers in the short term to get to some kind of global maximum. It’s a case where the coordination problem is really important. McGranaghan, Metamuse ep.30 Computers and Creativity with Molly Mielke 32:05, https://open.spotify.com/episode/5HoFWZzo4PAzEhF5Tn3WbD?si=AmfN5kUhQK669_VhAK9e7w
I think that the lack of interoperability or standardization between digital tools today, really, it means that all work created within a tool is confined to that tool and to me that seems very clearly antithetical to creativity and specifically the collaborative aspect of creativity. I think that there's so much to be said for tools. Amplifying the power of our brains and really taking over the mechanical aspects of human thought and limiting creation to a single piece of software's capabilities is just kind of crazy if you have step back and think about it. And I just think that standardization and having tools talk to each other, which is fundamentally change the tide of how we use them and introduced in more collaborators, and really just expand the projects constraints beyond any one tool. Mielke, Metamuse ep.30 Computers and Creativity with Molly Mielke 30:00, https://open.spotify.com/episode/5HoFWZzo4PAzEhF5Tn3WbD?si=KRW6ed30T1KEm4G8fa8FSA
Data silos and lack of interoperability can very well be a contradiction of capitalism when we think of the political economy of social media.
Political economy of digital media
The capitalist who produces surplus-value – i.e., who extracts unpaid labour directly from the labourers, and fixes it in commodities, is, indeed, the first appropriator, but by no means the ultimate owner, of this surplus-value. He has to share it with capitalists, with landowners, etc., who fulfill other functions in the complex of social production. Surplus-value, therefore, splits up into various parts. Its fragments fall to various categories of persons, and take various forms, independent the one of the other, such as profit, interest, merchants’ profit, rent, &c. It is only in Book III. that we can take in hand these modified forms of surplus-value. On the one hand, then, we assume that the capitalist sells at their value the commodities he has produced, without concerning ourselves either about the new forms that capital assumes while in the sphere of circulation, or about the concrete conditions of reproduction hidden under these forms. On the other hand, we treat the capitalist producer as owner of the entire surplus-value, or, better perhaps, as the representative of all the sharers with him in the booty. We, therefore, first of all consider accumulation from an abstract point of view – i.e., as a mere phase in the actual process of production. So far as accumulation takes place, the capitalist must have succeeded in selling his commodities, and in reconverting the sale-money into capital. Moreover, the breaking-up of surplus-value into fragments neither alters its nature nor the conditions under which it becomes an element of accumulation. Whatever be the proportion of surplus-value which the industrial capitalist retains for himself, or yields up to others, he is the one who, in the first instance, appropriates it. We, therefore, assume no more than what actually takes place. On the other hand, the simple fundamental form of the process of accumulation is obscured by the incident of the circulation which brings it about, and by the splitting up of surplus-value. An exact analysis of the process, therefore, demands that we should, for a time, disregard all phenomena that hide the play of its inner mechanism. Marx, Capital, Volume 1 (Progress Publishers, 1887), p.400
Those in charge have even made sure, therefore, that we humans having the leisure are not at liberty to make use of it as we please. It's as if we needed to work more as consumers in proportion as we work less as producers. As if consumption no longer signified a satisfaction, but rather a social obligation. Moreover the technological equipment of leisure increasingly resembles that of labor. While in our fooling around on the Internet all our clicks produce the data that the GAFA resell, work is tricked out with all the enticements of gaming by introducing scores, levels, bonuses and other infantilizing caveats. The Invisible Committee, Now, p.95
Aris Goudouras
Marx decides to initially simplify the problem here by not considering the sphere of circulation. This sphere is very critical for the model of advertising and modern social media and. The power they have obtained arguably makes them the main appropriators of value, even if they are not the ones directly appropriating the unpaid labor. Another interesting argument on this is Varoufakis’ regarding technofeudalism. E.g. if cloud capital extracts a big chunk of the surplus value in the economy as rent by controlling the sphere of circulation, how much does the general paradigm change? Is it still “traditional” capitalism or do we consider it something else, such as technofeudalism?
The sense of a lost vision of computer pioneers of the 60s and 70s. Dynamics of digital media production
[…] there was these amazing visionaries who saw the potential for computers and creativity, sort of laid out a vision way back in what seems like just the stone age's to us the 1960s and 1970s and then in some ways we lost our way. And we ended up with, I don't know, social media and kind of lockdown appliance like smartphones. And in fact, there's this glorious world of Smalltalk, Dynabook and Mother of all Demos style stuff that we still need to build, or we haven't built or something like that. Wiggins, Metamuse ep.30 Computers and Creativity with Molly Mielke 14:30, https://open.spotify.com/episode/5HoFWZzo4PAzEhF5Tn3WbD?si=AmfN5kUhQK669_VhAK9e7w
[…] let me bring the positive side, which is I totally agree that they did lay out a vision for computing. That is grounding in a world where we do seem stuck in social media consumer not exactly sure what; everything is oriented around commerce, and again things are all good: commerce entertainment, these things are fine, I consume these. But the reason I got interested in computers that are very young ages seeing their potential for creativity, and unlocking the noblest parts of the human spirit. Wiggins, Metamuse ep.30 Computers and Creativity with Molly Mielke 23:25, https://open.spotify.com/episode/5HoFWZzo4PAzEhF5Tn3WbD?si=AmfN5kUhQK669_VhAK9e7w
And it's a good reminder, to go back and look at some of this history, maybe, especially because these folks didn't have any of that prior stuff computers were still so new. Particularly personal computing was essentially, you know, they were in the process of inventing it thinking what can people do if they had access to computers with graphics and networking and all the things that nowadays we take for granted but they dreamed something very different from the world we have today and that can be very grounding to look back at that and take a bit of a blank slate from where we are today. So yeah, I personally take a lot of inspiration from all their work as well. Wiggins, Metamuse ep.30 Computers and Creativity with Molly Mielke 24:05, https://open.spotify.com/episode/5HoFWZzo4PAzEhF5Tn3WbD?si=AmfN5kUhQK669_VhAK9e7w
I also think that they were operating in an environment that was largely kind of independent from the actual business environment and like, the technology sector as we see it today. Mielke, Metamuse ep.30 Computers and Creativity with Molly Mielke 16:04, https://open.spotify.com/episode/5HoFWZzo4PAzEhF5Tn3WbD?si=5lptp_mFReqInuu1Bjsbnw
Both Mielke and McGranaghan acknowledge that it’s the political economy and the business needs that prevented computer pioneers’ vision to be materialized. But, especially McGranaghan remains uncritical of capitalism (quite the opposite basically). I think the latter is a general sense I have, not directly expressed in this partcular excerpt.
[…] a lot of this study analysis has been at the level of the tools. So it's like what's on the screen, how do you program it, what's the user interface even. But there’s an entire complex system around how software is developed and used and, like you were saying, I think the reason that the vision for the software and the reality the software don't line up is because we haven't understood or at least accounted for how that ecosystem works. Sometimes I call this the political economy of software development, there's weird path dependence, there's economic incentives; you got to understand all of that if you are going to understand how we came to where we are now. And on the flip side, if you want to predict and guide the future in that direction, you need to become a sort of of political economist of software, and get not only the interfaces in the code, but also the funding and the incentives and legal stuff and all that. McGranaghan, Metamuse ep.30 Computers and Creativity with Molly Mielke 18:57, https://open.spotify.com/episode/5HoFWZzo4PAzEhF5Tn3WbD?si=hDV9jmWRQPSyXg1tvFtVeQ
Important open problems for knowledge work primarily not tackled due to economic reasons
Human users dominated by computers instead of the opposite
I really think that the power of tools lies in their ability to amplify human action or thought, versus the power of human beings is really about our ability to think creatively. And so, if that's true, then why do computers often ask us to act as almost execution machines ourselves to create something when that's like very uniquely the computers strong suit. Mielke, Metamuse ep.30 Computers and Creativity with Molly Mielke 12:31, https://open.spotify.com/episode/5HoFWZzo4PAzEhF5Tn3WbD?si=k2HU7gp5TLWwojMeCIAQ2Q
In the factory we have a lifeless mechanism independent of the workman, who becomes its mere living appendage. “The miserable routine of endless drudgery and toil in which the same mechanical process is gone through over and over again, is like the labour of Sisyphus. The burden of labour, like the rock, keeps ever falling back on the worn-out labourer.” At the same time that factory work exhausts the nervous system to the uttermost, it does away with the many-sided play of the muscles, and confiscates every atom of freedom, both in bodily and intellectual activity. The lightening of the labour, even, becomes a sort of torture, since the machine does not free the labourer from work, but deprives the work of all interest. Every kind of capitalist production, in so far as it is not only a labour-process, but also a process of creating surplus-value, has this in common, that it is not the workman that employs the instruments of labour, but the instruments of labour that employ the workman. But it is only in the factory system that this inversion for the first time acquires technical and palpable reality. By means of its conversion into an automaton, the instrument of labour confronts the labourer, during the labour-process, in the shape of capital, of dead labour, that dominates, and pumps dry, living labour-power. Marx, Capital Volume 1 (Progress Publishers, 1887), p. 285-286
I do feel like more often than not in the modern world, stealing your attention is one example, you're sort of fighting against the computer. And perhaps, it's not the computer itself, it's the whole world of computing: the internet or email inboxes notifications, the way that the web works, and so on. You're often either fighting against this thing trying to make you do things you don't want to do, or take away your attention, or distract you, or it wants you to do its chores: you know, click this update, this do this fill up this box. And it should be be a tool quietly waiting for what you're asking of it and to co-create and help you. I like this, quote from the original Tron movie, which at a one point the bad guy basically says: “look, the system's overloaded because we don't have time to handle every little user request” and the guy speaking to is kind of the wizened old computer scientist arguing: “actually user requests is what computers are for”, and I feel like it's so often forgotten. They are here to serve us and sometimes it feels more often the human has to serve the computer or perhaps the business interests. I'm a capitalist, don’t get me wrong. But the business needs, the KPI of whoever designed the product is asking me to do things to serve that rather than my needs. Wiggins, Metamuse ep.30 Computers and Creativity with Molly Mielke 25:30, https://open.spotify.com/episode/5HoFWZzo4PAzEhF5Tn3WbD?si=nJ1xydCVRs2FqbkIw_4cbQ
Those in charge have even made sure, therefore, that we humans having the leisure are not at liberty to make use of it as we please. It's as if we needed to work more as consumers in proportion as we work less as producers. As if consumption no longer signified a satisfaction, but rather a social obligation. Moreover the technological equipment of leisure increasingly resembles that of labor. While in our fooling around on the Internet all our clicks produce the data that the GAFA resell, work is tricked out with all the enticements of gaming by introducing scores, levels, bonuses and other infantilizing caveats. The Invisible Committee, Now, p.95
We are required to live in the condition that Linda Stone has called “continuous partial attention”, where our attention is habitually distributed across multiple communication platforms. As Franco “Bifo” Berardi has argued, we now live in the tension between the infinity of cyberspace and the vulnerable finitude of the body and the nervous system. “The acceleration of information exchange has produced and is producing an effect of a pathological type on the individual human mind and even more on the collective mind,” Berardi writes in Precarious Rhapsody, "Individuals are not in a position to process the immense and always growing mass of information that enters their computers, their cell phones, their television screens, their electronic diaries and their heads. However, it seems indispensable to follow, recognise, evaluate, process all this information if you want to be efficient, competitive, victorious. [...] The necessary time for paying attention to the fluxes of information is lacking.” The consequence is a strange kind of existential state, in which exhaustion bleeds into insomniac overstimulation (no matter how tired we are, there is still time for one more click) and enjoyment and anxiety co-exist (the urge to check emails, for instance, is both something we must do for work and a libidinal compulsion, a psychoanalytic drive that is never satisfied no matter how many messages we receive). The fact that the smartphone makes cyberspace available practically anywhere at anytime means that boredom (or at least the old style, “Fordist” boredom) has effectively been eliminated from social life. Yet boredom, like death, posed existential challenges that are far more easily deferred in the always-on cyberspatial environment. Ultimately, communicative capitalism does not vanquish boredom so much as it “sublates” it, seeming to destroy it only to preserve it in a new synthesis. The characteristic affective tonality for the insomniac drift of cyberspace, in which there is always one more click to make, one more update to check, combines fascination with boredom. Mark Fisher & Darren Ambrose, Time-Wars: Towards an Alternative for the Neo-Capitalist Era, K-Punk: The Collected and Unpublished Writings of Mark Fisher, 2018, p.520-521
The consequence of the normalisation of uncertainty is a permanent state of low-level panic. Fear, which attaches to particular objects, is replaced by a more generalised anxiety, a constant twitching, an inability to settle. The uncertainty of work is intensified by digital communication technology. As soon as there is email, there are no longer working hours nor a workplace. What characterises the present moment more than our anxious checking — of our messages, which may bring opportunities or demands (often both at the same time), or, more abstractly, of our status, which, like the stock market is constantly under review, never finally resolved? Mark Fisher & Darren Ambrose, Time-Wars: Towards an Alternative for the Neo-Capitalist Era, K-Punk: The Collected and Unpublished Writings of Mark Fisher, 2018, p.519
Perhaps the feeling most characteristic of our current moment is a mixture of boredom and compulsion. Even though we recognise that they are boring, we nevertheless feel compelled to do yet another Facebook quiz, to read yet another Buzzfeed list, to click on some celebrity gossip about someone we don’t even remotely care about. We endlessly move among the boring, but our nervous systems are so overstimulated that we never have the luxury of feeling bored. No one is bored, everything is boring. Mark Fisher & Darren Ambrose, No One is Bored, Everything is Boring, K-Punk: The Collected and Unpublished Writings of Mark Fisher, 2018, p.558
The lack of creative ecology means that today’s great idea for a better society turns into tomorrow’s unemployed taxi drivers and homeless city dwellers. Welcome to platform monopoly capitalism. Groupon, AirBNB, Uber, MyWheels and countless others. Here, we do not witness so much a gross violation of the rules of appropriation as an attempt to reshape existing economic activities and drive labour to its bones: a disruption without a cause. Let’s not delude ourselves: we are not sharing anything when we rate the last wretched soul who gave us a cheap lift with his Uber cab. We do not share anything when we drive a Hertz or Avis rental car (except our likes). Sharing only happens in the absence of market transactions. And it doesn’t have to ‘scale’. This begs the question: can we still speak of creative industries, which in Europe’s policy world (and beyond) rests on the economization of culture? Everyone is keenly aware of the fact that Creative Industries as a policy meme has passed its use-by date. This is why we need to warn ourselves: changing labels will not help us much. https://networkcultures.org/geert/2014/11/20/the-creative-question-nine-theses/
the incursion of capitalist cyberspace into every area of life and the psyche has intensified the processes of de-socialisation. This is not to say that there are no progressive potentials in the web, but these have almost certainly been overrated, while the impact of cyberspace in de-socialising culture and subjectivity has been massively underestimated. Here I merely rehearse Bifo’s account of semio-capitalism and Jodi Dean’s critique of communicative capitalism, but it is important to operationalise this critique. Blogs and social media have allowed us to talk to ourselves (but not to reach out beyond the left bubbles); they have also generated pathological behaviours and forms of subjectivity which not only generate misery and anger — they waste time and energy, our most crucial resources. Email and handhelds, meanwhile, have produced new forms of isolation and loneliness: the fact that we can receive communications from work anywhere and anytime means we are exposed to work’s order-words when we are alone, without the possibility of support from fellow workers. In sum, the obsession with the web, its monopolisation of any idea of the new, has served capitalist realism rather than undermined it. Which does not mean, naturally, that we should abandon the web, only that we should find out how to develop a more instrumental relationship with it. Put simply, we should use it — as a means of dissemination, communication and distribution — but not live inside it. The problem is that this goes against the tendencies of handhelds. We all recognise the by now clichéd image of a train carriage full of people pecking at their tiny screens, but have we really registered how miserable this really is, and how much it suits capital for these pockets of socialisation to be closed down? Mark Fisher & Darren Ambrose, Abandon Hope (Summer is Coming) - Socialization Beyond Social Media, K-Punk: The Collected and Unpublished Writings of Mark Fisher, 2018, p.592
Aris Goudouras
This is a similar thought to Marx’s observation that machines appear as an alienating and dominating force for the worker in capitalism. I think that Wiggins makes an observation that aligns very much with Marx’s critique of capitalism here but refuses to follow it to its conclusion and blame capitalism for what’s wrong.
Important open problems for knowledge work primarily not tackled due to economic reasons
[McGranaghan]: Isn’t the state of the art [for rendering equations in the browser] generating PNG and sticking it in the web page? [Slim]: Not exactly but almost. So MathML, which is an XML dialect or mathematical markup language was this effort to build XML style syntax for typesetting mathematics naturally. It is only implemented in Firefox, so that's really unfortunate. So in terms of the state of the art, there are basically two libraries that you can use to typeset mathematics: there's MathJax and KaTex. MathJax supports all valid LaTex […]. The problem is that MathJax is very slow. So if you ever go on MathOverflow or another related StackExchange and you see all of these answers with weird gaps, and then as you watch before you the page starting to load all of the rendered equations bumping everything down one level at a time, that's MathJax in action. And oftentimes it is doing what you're describing where it is outputting an SVG or a PNG or something like that. And it's reflowing the page with every equation. Then you have KaTex, which was a library developed at Khan Academy where they realize that MathJax’s performance was not satisfactory for their exercises. KaTex supports a much more limited subset of all of LaTex syntax, but it does it all using CSS and it doesn't reflow the page for every equation, it’s basically instant rendering. And basically, it means that your options if you want to render math are: - Only target Firefox - Use a limited subset of math that’s supported by KaTex - Constrain yourself to extremely slow, dozens-of-reflow, full-expressive-power rendering to inline PNGs. And that's just not a great situation to be in and we haven't even gotten to the question of how people write math. So I would say that people underestimate how open this problem space is. Just take a moment of silence to like recognize the gravity of the situation. Slim Lim, Metamuse Episode 48 Rich Text with Slim Lim, 52:05, https://open.spotify.com/episode/51u2e3Ak6E4yMfqmA0NOdm?si=kKrmc0JWRdey8N1s1OXC9A
[Slim] And that goes back to something that Adam and I were chatting about earlier, which is that a lot of people gripe and complain, that LaTex is the best we have, and, you know, I'm one of them. But it really is the case that LaTex was this monumental effort by really a few people, and amount of effort that would be considered really impressive if I were to try to do the same thing but better today. Not a lot of people have spare time to do this all-in-one text formatting and packaging document representation project even though it would have a huge impact on the way people write and publish these kinds of documents. And so, in many ways, we're sort of just bottlenecked on the fact that it's hard to do incremental improvements to this particular area. We really depend on these software monoliths to keep us afloat. […] [Wiggins] And yeah, I agree. It's a monumental effort, but I mean mathematics is so important and foundational and so much of human endeavor that certainly seems like one worth investing in, although perhaps hard to reap a profit from and that makes it harder to put concentrated capital behind it. Slim Lim & Wiggins, Metamuse Episode 48 Rich Text with Slim Lim, 48:30, https://open.spotify.com/episode/51u2e3Ak6E4yMfqmA0NOdm?si=BHebRCxjQVSETJlrxi1McQ
Digital Commons and their Critique
Tomorrow’s digital collective ownership could manifest itself as a composite of free software, cracked software, bootleg devices, samizdat source code, modded appliances, sneakernets, invite-only bespoke networks, squatted game servers, and all sorts of computational apparatus strategically and knowingly used in relation to their limits and potentials to build infrastructures with a specific purpose at the service of a clearly articulated political ambition. The earlier the grieving process starts, the earlier new forms of organisation and mobilisationthere might not be a clear alternative to the digital commons. It is crucial to move forward with new strategies. The earlier the grieving process starts, the earlier new forms of organisation and mobilisation can start. https://collectiefeigendom.nl/en/ownership/digital-collective-ownership
Decentralized Media
Naming Systems
Petnames
Decentralized Identifiers (DIDs)
Security
Consent
Security Models and Decentralized Auth
End-to-End Encryption (E2EE)
Design Patterns
It’s challenging to design a social collaboration layer for distributed/decentralized productivity apps. - Users are very familiar with opening a web app and performing mutations (often with an account that is specific to this app). An example is adding a comment to a PR on GitHub. - In a decentralized setting, you often have cryptographic identity, which means that you have to sign mutations (or really anything that needs to be identifiable). This is currently tricky to do in a web browser (unless there are solutions I am not familiar with). - So the pattern often is, mutate in the desktop app which has easy access to the private key. Web views become view-only (mostly for public data). - Web apps are typically very useful for accessing information edited by many people easily. - Is web very tied to the client-server model? Do we need a post-web social layer when we do things with cryptographic identity?

Major Challenges

Identity

Authorization

Post-Web / Post-Internet

Requirements (Decentralized Social Collaboration)

Data ownership (local-first)

Identity not controlled by central authority (sovereign?)

Content is searchable in the web for public projects

Critique of Decentralized Media
Ultimately, the problem with commercial offers and decentralized software applications boils down to the same thing. In order to challenge state reLavabitn and capitalist exploitation effectively, it is necessary to stand and organize collectively against the state and capital. Cypherpunk initiatives like Lavabit or decentralized software can go a long way to challenge the status quo, but they are historically limited by their understanding of social change and social conflict. Social change is not simply a matter of consumer preference like the choice of an individual’s email provider, neither social conflicts are mere mathematical problems that can be resolved through a strategic application of mathematics. Radical technology collectives build political solidarity and nurture security behaviors within and between activist groups in addition to providing things like email and putting the right cryptographic algorithms in place. Autistici/Inventati - +KAOS - 10 Years of Hacking and Media Activism, Institute of Network Cultures 2021, p.12
LLMs
Sorolop 15PDF
There are some aspects of LLMs that are indeed impressive: - The capability of processing input which is ambiguous and contextual. - The capability of analyzing complex knowledge artifacts like complex codebases. - The generality of their applicability
They are in a way the revenge of spam in our digital life.
According to Marx, despite the technical foundation of Industry was found in Manufacture, it was not until industry abolished handicraft and manufacturing systems that it was to effect a revolution in production: "[…] we see in Manufacture the immediate technical foundation of modern industry. Manufacture produced the machinery, by means of which modern industry abolished the handicraft and manufacturing systems in those spheres of production that it first seized upon. The factory system was therefore raised, in the natural course of things, on an inadequate foundation. When the system attained to a certain degree of development, it had to root up this ready-made foundation, which in the meantime had been elaborated on the old lines, and to build-up for itself a basis that should correspond to its methods of production. [...] At a certain stage of its development, modern industry became technologically incompatible with the basis furnished by it by handicraft and Manufacture. […] Modern industry had therefore itself to take in hand the machine, its characteristic instrument of production, and to construct machines by machines. It was not until it did this, that it built up for itself a fitting technical foundation, and stood on its own feet. (Marx, 2018, pp. 266–267)”. We believe we are starting to see a similar trend with software today. Software developing algorithms and other software - artificial intelligence - may indeed be the next revolution in the sphere of production.
Technical Considerations
At the top of the chute, people tell themselves they're going to use these tools as a kind of fancy autocomplete. As they descend, they say they'll spin up some agents to explore ideas, but they'll write the code themselves. Next their agents are generating the code for them, but don't worry, but they'll review all the output. Soon they're plummeting downward and well, they don't actually review the code being spat out much anymore, but they trust the agents, heck maybe the agents are actually better coders than they are they say. And where does it go from there? From "I don't even code anymore" to "I don't even prompt anymore"? https://dustycloud.org/blog/faulty-towers-vibe-sickness-and-the-vibe-bobsled/
Aris Goudouras
Lattner is a capitalist. He calls for intensification of labour and in general analyzes things from a tech executive perspective. But his knowledge of compilers and the fact that he seems to have read Claude’s implementation reveal interesting limitations on LLMs creativity.
Aris Goudouras
Lemmer-Webber’s main argument is that we give more and more freedom to agents and so we are gradually losing understanding over our code, which is very dangerous.
Environmental impact
Philosophical Aspects
Yes, AI is a buzzword, and we ourselves are hesitant to use it. But we should be humble enough to acknowledge that we don’t understand life and intelligence well enough to exclude the possibility of LLMs capturing an aspect of it. Maybe an aspect of intelligence (at least human-like intelligence) is emergent from language, and LLM researchers got it right.
Computation as a central ontological concept is becoming popular (e.g. Wolfram, Benjamin Bratton / Blaise Agüera y Arcas / Antikythera, Hassabis). It is an interesting idea and it’s connected with progress related to LLMs.
How do LLMs relate to theories in philosophy of language? I think they encode much of what Wittgenstein describes in Philosophical Investigations, where he calls for deciding meaning via how language is used in language games. This feels really close to how meaning is produced in the case of LLMs, but also in how they manage to resolve ambiguity.
Real wealth manifests itself, rather - and large industry reveals this - in the monstrous disproportion between the labour time applied, and its product, as well as in the qualitative imbalance between labour, reduced to a pure abstrac­tion, and the power of the production process it superintends. Labour no longer appears so much to be included within the production process; rather, the human being comes to relate more as watchman and regulator to the production process itself. (What holds for machinery holds likewise for the combination of human activities and the development of human intercourse.) No longer does the worker insert a modified natural thing [Naturgegenstand] as middle link between the object [Objekt] and himself; rather, he inserts the process of nature, transformed into an industrial process, as a means between himself and inorganic nature, mastering it. He steps to the side of the production process instead of being its chief actor. In this transformation, it is neither the direct human labour he himself performs, nor the time during which he works, but rather the appropriation of his own general productive power, his understanding of nature and his mastery over it by virtue of his presence as a social body - it is, in a word, the development of the social individual which appears as the great foundation-stone of production and of wealth. Marx, Grundrisse (Penguin Classics), p.705
Aris Goudouras
Doctorow has some points but I lean more towards Tante’s point of view. Maybe with the exception that what he’s saying seems to be pro-intellectual-property, which is indeed more fitting to capitalism.

Related to the dominant social formation (capitalism)

Increase in the productivity of labour

Ubiquitous surveillance / panopticon. Becomes very powerful with the pattern recognition capabilities of LLMs.

[On software and industries where vertical products are launched] Agentic workflows dictating the rhythm of software production. Intensification of labour (absolute surplus value extraction?). Interesting that capitalists talk openly about “software factories”.

Effects of division of labour. Maybe deskilling? Needs more thinking. See Marx, Braverman.

Radical Potential

LLMs a manifestation of the emergence of a collective intelligence from society’s knowledge work.

Provided that they are indeed part of revolutionizing the production process, they can help us move towards a post-scarcity society.

Social arguments against LLMs

Changing the technical foundation of production

Algorithms and software becoming the characteristic instrument of production.

Humans stepping to a supervisor role as production gets automated.

Logic
The most obvious answer to the question [of what logic is about] is that logic studies relations of implication and compatibility between claims. […] To be sure, logic does concern itself with relations of implication and compatibility between claims. The problem is that it is not the only science that does so. A logician can tell you that (1) Julie is a girl who loves every boy. implies (2) Every boy is loved by some girl. But to learn whether (3) This substance turns litmus paper red. implies (4) This substance is an acid, one has to ask a chemist, not a logician. MacFarlane, What does it mean to say that Logic is Formal?, p.1-2
It might be thought that logical implication can be characterized as implication that is knowledgeable a priori, necessary, and/or analytic (Alternatively, we might say that logic is the study of implication in the strict sense, and that implication in the strict sense must be knowable a priori, necessary and analytic.). All three criteria seem to weed out the inference from (3) to (4). We cannot know a priori that (3) implies (4): we must do experiments in order to see that there is a connection between turning litmus red and acidity. Nor is the inference from (3) to (4) necessary, in any deeper sense than “demanded by physical law”: if the laws of nature were different, acids might not turn litmus red. Finally, our understanding of the meanings of “acid”, “litmus paper” and “red” does not give us a sufficient basis for accepting that (3) implies (4). But there are three problems with characterizing logic as the study of a priori, necessary, and/or analytic implication. First, this approach presupposes that we have a reasonably clear understanding of a priori knowledge, (broadly logical) necessity, and/or analyticity notions many philosophers regard as dubious or at least unclear. Perhaps the very idea that there is a non-arbitrary dividing line between logic and other disciplines stands or falls with these notions. But before drawing that conclusion, it seems worth exploring other alternatives. Second, such demarcations threaten to make the scope of logic much broader than it has traditionally been taken to be. For example, the inference from (6) The ball is red. to (7) The ball is colored. is surely analytic, a priori and necessary, if anything is; but it is usually not held to be logically valid. Again, if the natural numbers exist necessarily, then (8) There are infinitely many objects. is a necessary truth; but it is often held that logic alone cannot justify any existence claims. I will not multiply examples. This objection is not merely an appeal to tradition. There are important philosophical positions - notably Kantianism - that cannot even be articulated unless there is a conceptual space between the logical and the necessary and a priori. Third, while it may be true that logic is analytic, knowable a priori, and necessary, it would be nice if we could explain why logic has these features. By building on the notions of analyticity, a prioricity, or necessity into the very concept of logic, we preclude meaningful discussion of whether and why logic is analytic, knowable a priori, or necessary. We also preclude using the notion of logic in an account of analyticity or necessity, on pain of circularity. Yet historically it has usually been the notion of logic that elucidates analyticity and necessity, not vice versa. For example, Kant appeals to logic to clarify the difference between analytic and synthetic judgements, Frege defines analytic truths as those whose justification requires only logic and definitions, and Leibniz invokes the notion of logical compatibility in explaining the notion of a possible world. [An exception to this usual order of explanation is Carnap, who uses the notion of analyticity to explicate logicality and necessity.] For all of these reasons, we ought to seek a demarcation of logic that does not appeal to the notions of analyticity, a prioricity, or necessity. MacFarlane, What does it mean to say that Logic is Formal?, p.4-6
Logicism
[…] mathematical concepts are definable in terms of logical concepts, mathematical truths are reducible to logical truths, and mathematical knowledge is really logical knowledge. MacFarlane, What does it mean to say that logic is formal?, p.7
A popular way to attack logicism is to argue that the “logic” to which mathematics has been reduced is really just more mathematics. Poincare charges that Russel’s “logical” principles are really intuitive, synthetic judgements in disguise: “We regard them as intuitive when we meet them more or less explicitly enunciated in mathematical treatises; have they changed character because the meaning of the word logic has been enlarged and now we find them in a book entitled ‘Treatise on Logic’”? Quine, a more sympathetic critic, draws a similar conclusion: “Frege, Whitehead and Russell made a point of reducing mathematics to logic; Frege claimed in 1884 to have proved in this way, contrary to Kant, that the truths of arithmetic are analytic. But the logic capable of encompassing this reduction was logic inclusive of set theory.” Applied to the full-fledged logicism that identifies numbers with classes, Quine’s criticism is just - and nearly universally accepted. [Note] Frege’s class existence axiom, a plausible candidate for a logical law, was shown to be inconsistent, and all known consistent theories of classes require existence assumptions that seem to lack the “special character” of logic. For Frege, this spelled the death of logicism. Although Russell persisted in maintaining the logicist theses, he acknowledged that his axioms of infinity and reducibility are not logical and must be taken as hypotheses. MacFarlane, What does it mean to say that logic is formal?, p.8
Principled vs Pragmatic Demarcation of Logic
First, pragmatic approaches are guided by what Warmbrod calls a “requirement of minimalism”: … logical theory should be as simple, as modest in its assumptions, and as flexible as possible given the goal of providing a conceptual apparatus adequate for the project of systematization. In practice, the minimalist constraint dictates that the set of terms recognized as logical constants should be as small as possible (Warmbrod 1999:521). While pragmatic demarcations seek to minimize what counts as logic, principled demarcations are inclusive. They count as logical any notion (rule, system, etc.) that has the favored property. It is simply irrelevant whether a notion (rule, system) is required for a particular purpose: its logicality rests on features that it has independently of any use to which we might put it. MacFarlane, What does it mean to say that Logic is Formal?, p.16-17
The literature on demarcating logic contains examples of both general approaches (Principled: Kneale, Tarski, Dummett, Peacocke, Hacking, McCarthy, Sher, Dosen; Pragmatic: Harman, Tharp, Quine, Wagner, Shapiro, Warmbrod) and it is important to recognize three differences between them. MacFarlane, What does it mean to say that Logic is Formal?, p.16
First, it is useful to distinguish between two general strategies for demarcating logic. The first is to identify some favored property (formality, topic-neutrality, conservativeness of introduction and elimination rules, permutation invariance, etc.), or perhaps some combination of properties, as a necessary and sufficient condition for logicality. Call approaches like this principled demarcations. The second strategy is to start with a particular job - for example, to serve as a “framework for the deductive systematization of scientific theories”, or a framework for the characterization of structures - then find something that is capable of doing that job, and identify it as logic. Call approaches like this pragmatic demarcations. MacFarlane, What does it mean to say that Logic is Formal?, p.16
A second difference is that pragmatic approaches tend to be holistic, in a way that principled approaches usually are not. Since it is the whole logical system that does the job, systemic properties - decidability, completeness, compactness, the Lowenheim-Skolem property - play a greater role in pragmatic demarcations than local features of particular notions or inference rules (see Quine 1986 ch.5, Tharp 1975, Wagner 1987). Although nothing about the idea of a principled demarcation excludes appeal to systematic properties, principled demarcations tend to appeal to local properties of particular notions or inference rules (e.g. topic-neutrality, necessity, introducibility through conservative inferential definitions), rather than systemic properties. MacFarlane, What does it mean to say that Logic is Formal?, p.17
The third (and most important) difference between pragmatic and principled demarcations has to do with the consequences one can draw for their verdicts about logicality. A demarcation tells us that this implication is a logical consequence, that one non-logical: but what follows from this classification? Not much, if the demarcation is pragmatic; potentially quite a bit, if the demarcation is principled. To see why, consider the significance of a demarcation of logic for the evaluation of logicism. What would be the upshot of showing that some significant part of mathematics is reducible to logic, where logic is given a pragmatic demarcation? We would have shown that the minimal conceptual apparatus that is significant for some purpose (say, deductive systematization of theories) already allows us to do a considerable amount of mathematics. Such a result would not be uninteresting, but it would not shed much light on traditional questions in the philosophy of mathematics (what is the source of objectivity of mathematics? does mathematics have special objects? how do we come by our mathematical knowledge?). If, on the other hand, we had a principled demarcation of logic, then a logical thesis would have clear philosophical significance: whatever privilege feature we use to pick out logic could be immediately transferred to the reduced body of mathematics. For example, if logical implication were demarcated in part by its necessity (in some sense), then the reduced body of mathematics would have been shown to be necessary (in the same sense). […] MacFarlane, What does it mean to say that Logic is Formal?, p.17-18
It seems to me that the philosophical projects that give point and purpose to demarcating logic in the first place require a principled rather than a pragmatic demarcation. The philosophical interest of projects like logicism depends on logicality having some philosophically interesting essence hence on logic being picked out by a distinguishing property or properties, not by its suitability for some task. […] Hence the focus of this investigation is on principled demarcations. MacFarlane, What does it mean to say that Logic is Formal?, p.19
Aris Goudouras
I don’t really understand the difference between systemic and local properties
Historical Importance of Formality in Logic
[…] the universal and necessary rules of thought in general can concern merely its form and not in any way its matter. Accordingly, the science that contains these universal and necessary rules is merely a science of the form of our cognition through the understanding, or of thought. Kant, Jasche Logic (Logic: A Manual for Lectures), p.12
Logic inquires into the form of thought, as separable from and independent of the matter of thought of. De Morgan, On the Syllogism (1858)
What is of concern to logic is not the special content of any particular relation, but only the logical form. Frege
Thus the absence of all mention of particular things or properties in logic or pure mathematics is a necessary result of the fact that this study is, as we say, “purely formal”. Russell, Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy, p.198
The progress achieved by axiomatics consists in its having neatly separated the logical-formal form from its objective or intuitive content; according to axiomatics the logical-formal alone forms the subject-matter of mathematics, which is not concerned with the intuitive or other content associated with the logical-formal. Einstein, Geometrie and Erfahrung, p.28
[…] since we are concerned with the concept of the logical, i.e., formal, consequence, and thus with a relation which is to be uniquely determined by the form of the sentences between which it holds, this relation cannot be influenced in any way by empirical knowledge, and in particular by knowledge of the objects to which the sentence X or the sentences of the class K refer. The consequence relation cannot be affected by replacing the designations of the objects referred to in these sentences by the designations of any other objects. Tarski, On the Concept of Logical Consequence, p.414-415
These passages exemplify a tradition, going back at least to Kant and encompassing philosophers and logicians with wildly different philosophical views, of demarcating logic by its formality. I call this tradition logical hylomorphism. Logical hylomorphism is a tradition or current, not a thesis, because its advocates understand the formality of logic in very different ways. MacFarlane, What does it mean to say that Logic is Formal?, p.21

MacFarlane lists various representative passages which he considers represent a current in favor of formality in the history of philosophy.

This is not to say that we should ignore all our intuitions about logicality. But before invoking these intuitions in justifying or criticizing a proposed demarcation of logic, we ought to seek their sources in the philosophical tradition. By studying the history of conceptions of logicality we can see why philosophers have the intuitions they do. Knowing this, we can proceed to ask which intuitions we still have reasons to have, which go together, and which come from incompatible traditions. Historical reflection is a way to make our “brute intuitions” less “brute”. MacFarlane, What does it mean to say that Logic is Formal?, p.25-26
[…] Our intuitions about logicality are not a kind of perception of an external reality: they are historical artifacts, a product of our logical and philosophical educations. To the extent that there is intersubjective agreement about them, it should be attributed to a shared tradition, not access to a tradition-independent reality. As Stewart Shapiro and others have pointed out, the very idea of “pretheoretical logical intuitions” is dubious. […] All our intuitions about logicality bear the stamp of theory. If we have the intuition that logic must be “formal”, this is not because of some extrasensory perception of the essence of logic, but because we have encountered the idea so often in the course of our philosophical training. MacFarlane, What does it mean to say that Logic is Formal?, p.26
Logic, it is often said, is distinctively formal: it concerns itself with those relations of implication and consistency that turn only on “forms” or “formal features” of thoughts or statements, abstracting from the “matter” or “content”. MacFarlane, What does it mean to say that Logic is Formal?, p.50
3 Notions of Logical Formality according to MacFarlane
1-formality (Normativity for thought as such)
Consider two kinds of norms for playing chess. On the one hand, there are prescriptions for playing chess well, for carrying out the Queens Indian defense, or for playing an endgame with two rocks. These are norms that are applicable only in specific situations, or only given certain goals or interests: they are “hypothetical” in the sense of Kant’s “hypothetical imperatives”. On the other hand, there are rules of the game. These norms apply to chess playing as such, because they are constitutive of chess playing. […] Unless these norms are binding on one’s moves, one is not playing chess, but some other game. They are “categorical” norms for chess. We can make the same distinction among norms for thought (which, following Kant, I will take as a blanket term for all concept use, including judging, inferring, supposing, asserting, and even perceiving insofar as it involves the application of concepts). On the one hand, there will be norms for certain kinds of concept use (asserting, laying down legal decisions), or for the use of certain kinds of concepts (physical concepts, chemical concepts, moral concepts). These will be “hypothetical” norms for thought, norms with limited or conditional application. On the other hand, there may be norms for concept use as such: norms that are constitutive of concept use. If there are any such norms, they will be “categorical” norms for thought, and they will be universally and unconditionally applicable. MacFarlane, What does it mean to say that Logic is Formal?, p.52
The laws of logic […] are defined [by Kant] as the “necessary laws of understanding and reason in general, or what is one and the same, of the mere form of thought as such”. By “necessary forms of understanding”, Kant means “... those [laws] without which no use of the understanding would be possible at all”, that is, the norms constitutive of thought. Similarly, in the first Critique he says that general logic “... contains the absolutely necessary rules of thought without which there can be no employment whatsoever of the understanding”. In my terminology, this is a demarcation of logic by its 1-formality. MacFarlane, What does it mean to say that Logic is Formal?, p.53
It is important to be clear about the sense in which logical laws are, on this tradition, normative for thought as such. The point is not that nothing can count as thought unless it conforms to the laws of logic. That would make logical error impossible, and it would make nonsense of Kant’s claim that logic is a normative discipline, since the way we ought to think would turn out to be the only way we could think. When Kant says that we cannot think except “according to” the laws of logic, he means that our thought must be responsible to the laws of logic for its assessment. […] What makes it [a thought] a thought is not that it conforms to the laws of logic but that the laws of logic are normative to it. To say that the laws of logic are norms for thought as such, then, is not to say that it is impossible to think illogically, but only that it is impossible to think illogically and be thinking correctly. MacFarlane, What does it mean to say that Logic is Formal?, p.54
[…] it does follow from logic’s being normative for thought as such that it is necessary in a strong sense. We can think about possible worlds or situations in which the physical laws of the actual world do not hold: “where animals speak and stars stand still, where men are turned to stone and trees turn into men …” (Frege). Such thought violates certain contingent norms for thought - norms for correct thought about animals, stars, forces, and so on - and thus does not count as correct thought about these. But considered merely as thought […] it does not violate the norms for thought as such. What makes it possible for us to think correctly about such counterfactual worlds, then, is that we can prescind from some of the norms of thought - by acknowledging our thought as counterfactual, as concerning mere possibility - while continuing to acknowledge others. In the limiting case of logical possibility, we prescind from all contingent forms of thought, acknowledging only the norms of thought as such. But if we try to prescind from these norms, too - say, by thinking about a possible world in which contradictions are true - then no norms remain to which our concept use can be held responsible. In this case it is no longer recognizable as concept use at all, since concept use is essentially evaluable as correct or incorrect. We can correctly think about what the world would be like if the laws of physics were different, but not about what it would be if the laws of logic were different. This is the sense in which the norms for thought as such are necessary: it is impossible to think at all, even counterfactually, without being constrained by them. MacFarlane, What does it mean to say that Logic is Formal?, p.55
In the limiting case of logical possibility, we prescind from all contingent forms of thought, acknowledging only the norms of thought as such. MacFarlane, What does it mean to ay that Logic is Formal?, p.55
We can correctly think about what the world would be like if the laws of physics were different, but not about what it would be if the laws of logic were different. This is the sense in which the norms for thought as such are necessary: it is impossible to think at all, even counterfactually, without being constrained by them. MacFarlane, What does it mean to ay that Logic is Formal?, p.55
[…] in characterizing logic as general, Kant clearly intends to be distinguishing it from mathematics. In the Jasche Logic, for instance, Kant defines general logic as the science of the necessary rules of understanding, “without which no use of the understanding would be possible at all”, contrasting these with various contingent rules for understanding, “without which a certain determinate use of the understanding would not occur”. One of his examples of such a “particular, determinate use of the understanding” is the “use of the understanding in mathematics”. Arithmetic and algebra, then, are not “general” in the sense that logic is. Though they may not have their own special objects, and though their concepts may not distinguish between the particular identities of objects, their laws are applicable only to a “particular, determinate use of the understanding”, not to all uses of the understanding. Because the content of the concept of magnitude depends on sensibility, while thought is intelligible apart from sensibility, the norms governing this concept (i.e., the laws of arithmetic and algebra) cannot be norms of thought as such. […] It appears, then, that when Kant speaks of the generality of logic, he means its 1-formality (constitutive normativity for thought as such), not its 2-formality. MacFarlane, What does it mean to ay that Logic is Formal?, p.86-87
Aris Goudouras
Is this idea supported by the Tractatus too?
2-formality (Indifference to particular identity)
This approach [2-formality] starts with the idea that what makes content specific is its concern with particular individuals. It is clear that the concept ‘horse’, the relation ‘is taller than’, and the quantifier ‘every animal’ have specific content, because they all distinguish between Lucky Feet, on the one hand, and the Statue of Liberty, on the other. - “Lucky Feet is a horse” is true; “The Statue of Liberty is a horse” is false. - “The Statue of Liberty is taller than Lucky Feet” is true; “Lucky Feet is taller than the Statue of Liberty” is false. - The truth that “Every animal is healthy” depends on whether Lucky Feet is healthy, but not on whether the Statue of Liberty is healthy. On the other hand, the concept ‘is a thing’, the relation ‘is identical with’, and the quantifier ‘everything’ do not distinguish between Lucky Feet and the Statue of Liberty. In fact, they do not distinguish between any particular objects. As far as they are concerned, one object is as good as another and might just as well be switched with it. MacFarlane, What does it mean to say that Logic is Formal?, p.56-57
Notions with […] indifference to the particular identities of objects might reasonably be said to abstract from specific content - to be “formal”. Tarski seems to have something like this in mind when he says: “since we are concerned here with the concept of the logical, i.e., formal, consequence, and thus with a relation which is to be determined by the form of the sentences between which it holds, this relation cannot be influenced in any way by empirical knowledge, and in particular by knowledge of the objects to which the sentence X or the sentences of the class K refer. The consequence relation cannot be affected by replacing the designations of the objects referred to in these sentences by the designations of any other objects” (Tarski 1936: 414-5) Call this notion of formality “2-formality”. MacFarlane, What does it mean to say that Logic is Formal?, p.57
One can capture the indifference of logical notions to the particular identities of objects by demanding that they be invariant under the group of all transformations of the objects in a domain. […] For present purposes, this approach can best be illustrated through examples. Unary first-order quantifiers can be modeled semantically as functions from sets (predicate extensions) to truth values. Now consider the quantifier “all chickens”, which takes every set that contains all the chickens in the domain to True and every other set to False. Suppose the domain of objects includes two chickens and two cows. Let K be a set containing two chickens, so that “all chickens” takes the value True on K. If we permute the objects in the domain by switching the chickens for the cows, so that K is now a set containing two cows, then “all chickens” takes the value False on K. Since the truth of sentences containing “all chickens” is sensitive to permutations of the domain, “all chickens” is not permutation-invariant. On the other hand, the numerical quantifier “at least three things”, which takes every set with three or more members to True and every other to False, is permutation-invariant. Permutation invariance can be regarded as a precise technical gloss on the idea of indifference to the particular identities of objects. Whereas “all chickens” is sensitive to the difference between chickens and cows, permutation-invariant notions - like quantifiers and identity - are insensitive to particular identities of the objects to which they apply. […] MacFarlane, What does it mean to say that Logic is Formal?, p.58-59
We motivated 2-formality as a way of thinking about abstraction from specific content. Thus the claim that logic is 2-formal leaves open the possibility that logic is concerned with general content and very general facts about the world. 3-formality […] precludes any concern with content. […] a logic that abstracts from the contents of some concepts (“specific” ones, like “horse” or “red”), but not from the contents of others (“general” or logical ones, like existence, identity, and conjunction), does not count as 3-formal. MacFarlane, What does it mean to say that Logic is Formal?, p.60
3-formality (Abstraction from semantic content)
We motivated 2-formality as a way of thinking about abstraction from specific content. Thus the claim that logic is 2-formal leaves open the possibility that logic is concerned with general content and very general facts about the world. 3-formality […] precludes any concern with content. […] a logic that abstracts from the contents of some concepts (“specific” ones, like “horse” or “red”), but not from the contents of others (“general” or logical ones, like existence, identity, and conjunction), does not count as 3-formal. MacFarlane, What does it mean to say that Logic is Formal?, p.60
What is left to consider when we abstract entirely from semantic content of a thought? Some philosophers would say “nothing”. But some have held that there is more to thought than the concepts it employs: there is also the way they are put together. On Kant’s view, for example, “... all judgements are functions of unity among our representations”, and the various modes of unity determine the possible forms of judgements. “The matter of the judgement consists in the given representations that are combined in the unity of consciousness in the judgement, the form in the determination of the way that the various representations belong, as such, to one consciousness”. General logic, in Kant’s view, abstracts from the matter and considers only the form of judgements: it considers only the way in which concepts are united in judgements. “General logic … abstracts from all content of knowledge, that is, from all relation of knowledge to the object, and considers only the logical form in the relation of any knowledge to any other knowledge; that is, it treats of the form of thought in general.” For example, general logic treats “all horses are mammals” simply as the unification of two concepts in a universal, affirmative, categorical, and assertoric judgement. It abstracts entirely from the content of concepts. The way in which the concepts are united in thought is not, for Kant, a further constituent of the thought (a “binding” concept), but a feature of the thought’s form. MacFarlane, What does it mean to say that Logic is Formal?, p.60-61
To claim that logic is 3-formal presupposes that we can distinguish between the constituents and the form of thought, in such a way that the latter can be understood apart from the former. […] Many twentieth century philosophers accept the distinction, demarcate logic by its concern with the form of thought or conceptual inquiry, and draw the same consequences as Kant: 1. that logic alone tells us nothing about the world; 2. that the world does not constrain logic, so that logical knowledge and knowledge about the world are fundamentally different; and 3. that “logical truths”, if there are such things, do not state facts. MacFarlane, What does it mean to say that Logic is Formal?, p.62
“In this distinction we [The Vienna Circle] had seen the way out of the difficulty which had prevented the older empiricism from giving a satisfactory account of the nature of knowledge in logic and mathematics. ... Our solution, based on Wittgenstein’s conception, consisted in asserting the thesis of empiricism only for factual truth. By contrast, the truths in logic and mathematics are not in need of confirmation by observations, because they do not state anything about the world of facts, they hold for any possible combination of facts” (Schilpp, 1963, The Philosophy of Rudolf Carnap). Carnap acknowledges the influence of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus here, and Wittgenstein does seem to be advocating for a version of the view that logic is 3-formal: “The propositions of logic are tautologies... The propositions of logic therefore say nothing… Theories which make a proposition of logic appear substantial are always false” (TLP, §6.1, 6.11, 6.111) MacFarlane, What does it mean to say that Logic is Formal?, p.63-64
I am not persuaded that 3-formality does not imply 2-formality. It seems to me a stronger version of it as it abstracts entirely from semantic content. (See MacFarlane, What does it mean to say that Logic is Formal?, p.67-68 for a relevant argument).
Although Kant thinks that logic can be formal, he does not take formality to be part of the essence of logic. That a general logic must also be formal is a substantive claim that requires justification, not a matter of semantics. I call this claim Kant’s Thesis: General (i.e., 1-formal) logic must also be formal (i.e. 3-formal). That is, “the universal, and necessary rules of thought in general can concern merely its form and not in any way its matter” (Jasche Logic, p.12). MacFarlane, What does it mean to say that Logic is Formal?, p.91-92
Aris Goudouras
It seems to me that, indeed, if we are not allowed to think of even these very general concepts like identity and conjunction, there is indeed nothing left, so 3-formality sounds too strong to achieve.
Aris Goudouras
General logic seems to be synonymous with Structure for Kant. But how can one describe differences in structure/form if we are not even allowed to have a vocabulary for it (e.g. how do we understand a judgement as assertoric)? It seems to me that it’s just not possible to abstract away from semantics; we need them to at least describe logical forms / structure.
Kant holds logic to be formal in all three senses. MacFarlane, What does it mean to say that Logic is Formal?, p.66
Mathematical Logic
Enderton - A Mathematical Introduction to LogicPDF
Induction
Closed sets under a function
Induction principle for closed sets
Construction of a wff using sentence symbols and applications of formula-building operations
Mathematics
Mathematical Induction
Associativity
Commutativity
Category Theory and Functional Programming
Objects and Elements
Category Theory and Structure
So what is category theory about? In every other aspect, either mathematics or physics or programming, we always look at the structure of things, right? In order to understand something, we want to decompose it and find what’s inside, right? It’s like you get a watch and you want to see like, how does it work? Why is it ticking, right? So you open it, you find the little parts, and then you decompose it into tiny little bits. Maybe you decompose it into atoms and then quartz, depending on how far you want to get to understand it. And category theory is very different from this. In category theory, you say I want to learn about this object, but I’m not going to look inside of this object at all. This object is black box. It’s a point. It has no structure. The structure of this object is given by how it interacts with other similar objects. So you always have a whole category of things. You want to talk about groups? Okay, what’s a category of groups? And in the category of groups, you don’t talk about what a group is like, what’s inside the group. No, you say, how is this group related to other groups, right? It’s more about understanding structure. I mean, it’s an amazing thing what category theory does, that it says, “Here’s a structure, it’s just objects and arrows. That’s it.” There’s nothing else. There’s just objects and arrows. And then you can study it and you can discover that these arrows can move in weird ways and combine in such crazy ways. And if you want to describe objects using just arrows, because arrows tell you how they interact with other objects, right? So there is a completely new way of talking about structure by saying how the arrows arrange themselves, right? And there is this stuff, for instance, called universal construction. Most of the things in category theory are defined using universal construction. A universal construction says, in order to understand this object, you have to tell me how it interacts with the whole universe, with every other object, not just a few objects, okay? No, with every object. That’s the universality of it, right? So this is so philosophical. You can’t be more philosophical than that, right? Make me whole with the universe, right? Bartosz Milewski, https://haskell.foundation/podcast/30/, 38:32
A set as a category with no structure
Composition, Application and Identity
Identity
Function application as function composition
Associativity of composition and its importance to problem-solving
Composition and problem-solving
Definition of function/morphism composition
Expression of composition in Haskell, where types and functions form a Category
Category Theory and other Mathematical Theories
Category theory as complementary to set theory
A set as a category with no structure
Category of Sets (Category of Types and Functions)
Category Theory and Thought Processes
Abstraction as discarding information in a function
Aris Goudouras
Not all functions perform abstraction (Milewski gives an example right after of injective functions / monomorphisms, which don’t abstract).
Morhpism/Function Types
Injective Functions / Monomorphisms
Surjective Functions / Epimorphisms
Bijective Functions / Isomorphisms
Types
Sum Types
Introduction, elimination and computation rules
Product Types
Function Types
Functors
Functorial data types
Type constructors related to container & parameterized types
Important: type constructors not to be confused with arrows between objects
Functor as a kind of mapping that preserves structure
Endofunctors: functors that map a category to itself
Functoriality in Haskell (Functor type class and `fmap`)
Functoriality & Lifting
Type constructors: mapping types to other types
Composition and identity preservation with functors left to the programmer in Haskell
Types of Functors
Important Categories for Programming
Category of Sets (Category of Types and Functions)
Opposite categories
Product categories of interest to programming
Endofunctors: functors that map a category to itself
Natural Transformations
Algebras
Goal: A general procedure for generating and manipulating arbitrary recursive types from simpler pluggable components
Properties of Good Theories
“A theory appears beautiful or elegant […] when it’s simple; in other words when it can be expressed very concisely in terms of mathematics that we’ve already learned for some other reasons.” https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=anHgZru8acg&t=379s
Aris Goudouras
Quoted in https://haskell.foundation/podcast/62/ by Conal Elliott
Parenting
Ελευθερία και Όρια
- Το όριο δεν πληγώνουμε σωματικά κάποιον άλλο δίνεται με την ελευθερία/συμπαράσταση/ενίσχυση να εκφράσουμε τι μας ενόχλησε ή τι θέλουμε. - Το όριο δεν αρπάζουμε από τα χέρια των άλλων δίνεται με θετικό πρόσημο, δείχνοντας στο παιδί πώς ζητάμε κάτι από κάποιον άλλο. - Το όριο περί μη καταστροφής του υλικού δημιουργείται όταν δείχνουμε στο παιδί πώς να χρησιμοποιήσει το υλικό ή όταν παραπέμπουμε το παιδί στο σωστό υλικό για τη δραστηριότητά του. Όταν, για παράδειγμα, παρατηρούμε τα παιδιά να ζωγραφίζουν στους τοίχους ή να βυθίζουν αντικείμενα στο νερό, οι απαγορεύσεις είναι και μάταιες και ανακόπτουν τη δραστηριότητα του παιδιού. Είναι καλύτερα, λοιπόν, να δημιουργήσουμε το υλικό γι’ αυτή τη δραστηριότητα και τον χώρο που μπορεί να συμβαίνει. Ελευθερία και Όρια, Μικρό Δέντρο, Μάρτιος 2019
Όταν κάνουμε μια εξαίρεση, το λέμε. “Αυτό είναι μια εξαίρεση”. Έτσι κάθε φορά που το λέμε αναγνωρίζουμε και ότι το κάνουμε. Είμαστε σε θέση να ξέρουμε πότε είμαστε εντός ορίων, πότε το όριο δεν υπάρχει και όλοι το ξεπερνούν, πότε ο ενήλικας επιλέγει να κάνει εξαιρέσεις και να τις εξηγήσει στο παιδί. Έτσι, μπορούμε να βρεθούμε σε μια κοινή συμφωνία με το παιδί. Είναι τέλος, βασικό, να μην κάνουμε εξαιρέσεις όταν είμαστε στη φάση εδραίωσης ενός καινούριου ορίου. Ελευθερία και Όρια, Μικρό Δέντρο, Μάρτιος 2019
Τα όρια που έχουμε θέσει αφορούν τη χρήση βίας (σωματική, ψυχολογική, λεκτική) και τη χρήση/διαχείριση του υλικού και οφείλουν να τηρούνται από όλα τα άτομα της κοινότητας. Όλοι/ες είμαστε ίσοι/ες απέναντι στο όριο και μάλιστα κάποια από αυτά πρέπει να τηρούνται και αυστηρά. Στο χώρο του σχολείου είναι απαραίτητο να εξασφαλίζουμε τη σωματική ασφάλεια και ακεραιότητα. Η χρήση της σωματικής βίας απαιτεί μια άμεση στο εδώ και τώρα παρέμβαση του ενήλικα για να υποστηρίξει τόσο το παιδί που δέχεται τη βία όσο και αυτό που την ασκεί. Ο ενήλικας πρέπει να βρίσκει τον τρόπο να επικοινωνεί και να υπενθυμίζει ότι είμαστε όλοι διαφορετικοί και ότι χρειάζεται να χρησιμοποιούμε το λόγο (ή και άλλα εκφραστικά μας μέσα) για να διαχειριζόμαστε τις συγκρούσεις. […] Την ίδια στιγμή, θεωρούμε απαραίτητο, η παρέμβαση να γίνεται με τρόπο που να μη δημιουργεί ενοχές στο παιδί που χρησιμοποιεί τη βία και κατ’ επέκταση να μην ποινικοποιεί το συναίσθημά του κατευθύνοντας, μπερδεύοντας ή αμφισβητώντας την κρίση του παιδιού. Οφείλουμε να δείχνουμε σεβασμό και εμπιστοσύνη στις ικανότητες των παιδιών να βιώνουν και να διαχειρίζονται νέες καταστάσεις. Το δεύτερο όριο που έχει προαποφασιστεί από τους ενήλικες σχετίζεται με τη διαχείριση του υλικού. Σημαντική είναι η δική μας στάση πρώτα απ’ όλα απέναντι στο υλικό. Το κατασκευάζουμε, το επιδιορθώνουμε και το καθαρίζουμε ενθαρρύνοντας τα παιδιά να μας βοηθήσουν, το τακτοποιούμε και το χρησιμοποιούμε με αργές και καθαρές κινήσεις. Ακόμη, ενημερώνουμε/υπενθυμίζουμε στα παιδιά, ότι αφενός το υλικό δεν είναι ανεξάντλητο, αφετέρου βρίσκεται εκεί για να διευκολύνει τη χρήση από όλους και όλες. Έχει σημασία, για εμάς, το υλικό να επιστρέφεται στη θέση του. Ελευθερία και Όρια, Μικρό Δέντρο, Μάρτιος 2019
[Τα όρια] είναι η συνειδητοποίηση των περιορισμών που συνεπάγεται ο σεβασμός στην ελευθερία των άλλων. Με άλλα λόγια, δεν επιθυμούμε τα παιδιά να ακολουθούν απλά τα όρια, αλλά κυρίως, να κατανοήσουν ότι τα όρια απορρέουν από την ανάγκη συνύπαρξης με άλλους ανθρώπους. Ελευθερία και Όρια, Μικρό Δέντρο, Μάρτιος 2019
Το όριο ακολουθεί μια πορεία. Όταν ο ενήλικας θέλει να θέσει ένα όριο για τη συμβίωση στο σχολείο ή στο σπίτι πρέπει πρώτα να το στοιχειοθετήσει. Να το αναγνωρίσει. Να γνωρίζει τι θέλει να πετύχει με αυτό και για ποιο λόγο θέλει να το πετύχει αυτό. […] Δίνουμε εξηγήσεις και επεξηγήσεις για τα όρια και φροντίζουμε να τα υπενθυμίζουμε συνεχώς. Επιτρέπουμε να αναδειχθούν οι φυσικές συνέπειες του ξεπεράσματος των ορίων, χωρίς να προσπαθούμε να πληγώσουμε, να τιμωρήσουμε ή να δημιουργούμε ενοχές στα παιδιά. Αναγνωρίζουμε τις προσπάθειές τους, ακόμα κι αν στο παρόν αποτυγχάνουν. Ελευθερία και Όρια, Μικρό Δέντρο, Μάρτιος 2019
Teaching Writing & Math
Aris Goudouras
Some more teaching resources from Moronuki. Interesting stuff for teaching math.
Aris Goudouras
Post that describes an approach for teaching kids to write. She’s also into teaching programming (Haskell) having co-authored my favorite book for functional programming. But she decided to do homeschooling so in general I am skeptical of her methods. Still, interesting read since I personally learn by copying things many times in paper and she also argues for this method more or less here.
Συναισθηματική Νοημοσύνη
Μετά από μια δεκαετία στο εργαστήριό μου, η ερευνητική μου ομάδα εντόπισε μια ομάδα γονέων οι οποίοι έκαναν πέντε πολύ απλά πράγματα όταν τα παιδιά τους ήταν συναισθηματικά φορτισμένα. Αυτά τα πέντε πράγματα τα ονομάσαμε συναισθηματική αγωγή. Διαπιστώσαμε ότι τα παιδιά των οποίων οι γονείς εφαρμόζουν αυτή τη συναισθηματική αγωγή ακολουθούν μια τελείως διαφορετική αναπτυξιακή τροχιά απ’ ότι τα παιδιά άλλων οικογενειών. Οι γονείς που εφαρμόζουν τη συναισθηματική αγωγή διαπλάθουν παιδιά τα οποία στη συνέχεια γίνονται αυτό που ο Daniel Goleman αποκαλεί “συναισθηματικά ευφυή” άτομα. Αυτό σημαίνει ότι τα παιδιά που διαπαιδαγωγούνται με παρόμοιο τρόπο έχουν περισσότερες ικανότητες στον τομέα των συναισθημάτων συγκριτικά με τα άλλα παιδιά. Οι ικανότητες αυτές τους επιτρέπουν να ρυθμίζουν ανά πάσα στιγμή τις συναισθηματικά φορτισμένες καταστάσεις. Τα παιδιά που ανατρέφονταν με συναισθηματική αγωγή μπορούσαν να χαλαρώνουν περισσότερο όταν ήταν αναστατωμένα, να ηρεμούν ευκολότερα και ταχύτερα, ενώ χάρη στην ψυχοβιολογική τους κατάσταση, η οποία τους επέτρεπε να επιτυγχάνουν αυτήν ακριβώς τη χαλάρωση και την ηρεμία, ήταν σαφώς λιγότερο ευάλωτα σε μεταδοτικές ασθένειες. Επιπλέον, έδειχναν μεγαλύτερη συγκέντρωση και μπορούσαν να δημιουργήσουν καλύτερες σχέσεις με τους άλλους ανθρώπους, ακόμη και κάτω από τις αντίξοες συνθήκες που αντιμετωπίζουν τα παιδιά στη μέση παιδική ηλικία (όπως είναι τα πειράγματα), όταν η υπερβολική συναισθηματικότητα αποτελεί περισσότερο βαρύ φορτίο παρά πλεονέκτημα. Έτσι καταλάβαιναν καλύτερα τους ανθρώπους και δημιουργούσαν σταθερότερες και βαθύτερες φιλίες με τα άλλα παιδιά, ενώ παράλληλα είχαν υψηλότερες σχολικές επιδόσεις. Με λίγα λόγια, ανέπτυξαν ένα είδος δείκτη νοημοσύνης ο οποίος τους επέτρεπε να κατανοούν καλύτερα τους ανθρώπους και τον κόσμο των συναισθημάτων: ανέπτυξαν συναισθηματική νοημοσύνη. Gottman, Η Συναισθηματική Νοημοσύνη των Παιδιών, σ.23
[…] Οι γονείς θα πρέπει να δείξουν γνήσιο σεβασμό απέναντι στα συναισθήματα των παιδιών τους. Θα πρέπει να προσπαθήσουν να δείξουν ενσυναίσθηση, να νιώσουν δηλαδή αυτό που νιώθουν και τα παιδιά τους. Η επικοινωνία ανάμεσα στους γονείς και το παιδί οφείλει να διαφυλάσσει τον αυτοσεβασμό και των δύο πλευρών. Οι δηλώσεις κατανόησης θα πρέπει να προηγούνται οποιασδήποτε συμβουλής. Οι γονείς δεν πρέπει να υπαγορεύουν στα παιδιά τους πώς οφείλουν να αισθάνονται, αφού κάτι τέτοιο κάνει τα παιδιά να μην εμπιστεύονται τα συναισθήματά τους. […] τα συναισθήματα των παιδιών δεν παύουν να υπάρχουν όταν οι γονείς λένε “μην αισθάνεσαι έτσι” ή όταν επιμένουν ότι δεν υπάρχει λόγος να νιώθουν έτσι. Παρόλο που δεν είναι όλες οι συμπεριφορές αποδεκτές, δεν ισχύει το ίδιο και για τα συναισθήματα και τις επιθυμίες. Οι γονείς, κατά συνέπεια, πρέπει να θέτουν όρια στις πράξεις, όχι όμως και στα συναισθήματα ή στις επιθυμίες των παιδιών τους. Gottman, Η Συναισθηματική Νοημοσύνη των Παιδιών, σ.46
Social Theory
On Communism and Anarchism
Communists therefore are not those who ‘fight for communism’, as if communism were a fixed thing, a fixed set of rules, of norms we could fight for. There is nothing static in communism understood as social force; all of it is dynamic, flowing and relational, because the commoners create it. Communists are those who take part in the value struggles we are all involved in with awareness that alternatives linking our particular struggles to those of others can only be constructed beyond enclosures and beyond disciplinary integration. […] Communists in this sense are not enchanted by the parables of reform or revolution, since neither of these is the point of the beginning of history. The point is to live a different type of life, linked to others and to nature through different value practices. De Angelis, The Beginning of History, Chapter: Anarchism, Communism and Socialism
Communism in this sense is a social force of progressive decoupling from the monetary circuit of capital, and this can only be done through progressive extension of commons and corresponding communities. De Angelis, The Beginning of History, Chapter: Anarchism, Communism and Socialism
The only difference between communists and any other struggling subjects whatever their identity, is that communists confront capital while holding a mirror in their hands. The alternative to capital, at whatever scale of social action, is a social force that creates a world within the space defined by that reverse image: the image of commons and democratic communities instead of enclosures and market disciplinary integration. Communists are those who seek to create alternative ways to meet needs and follow desires at whatever scale of social action, wherever they are, knowing that the means can be shared, while the goals and the modes of doing that those means make possible can emerge from direct engagement with the other. Just as the social force we call capital seeks to preserve itself by extending and defending enclosures and the realm of the markets, so the social force we call communism can preserve itself only by extending and defending the realm of commons and grass-roots democratic processes and practices. The bottom-line ground within which to problematise alternatives, or the beginning of history is, in my opinion, all here. De Angelis, The Beginning of History, Chapter: Anarchism, Communism and Socialism
The surest way to know that one is in the presence of commu­nistic relations is that not only are no accounts taken, but it would be considered offensive, or simply bizarre, to even consider doing so. Graeber, Debt, p.99
[…] we are not really dealing with reciprocity here-or at best, only with reciprocity in the broadest sense. What is equal on both sides is the knowledge that the other person would do the same for you, not that they necessarily will. The Iroquois example brings home clearly what makes this possible: that such relations are based on a presumption of eternity. Society will always exist. Therefore, there will always be a north and a south side of the village. This is why no accounts need be taken. In a similar way, people tend to treat their mothers and best friends as if they will always exist, however well they know it isn't true. Graeber, Debt, p.100
Finally, once we start thinking of communism as a principle of morality rather than just a question of property ownership, it becomes clear that this sort of morality is almost always at play to some degree in any transaction-even commerce. If one is on sociable terms with someone, it's hard to completely ignore their situation. Merchants of­ ten reduce prices for the needy. Graeber, Debt, p.102
Communism, then, is based neither in exchange nor in reciprocity­ except, as I have observed, in the sense that it does involve mutual ex­pectations and responsibilities. Graeber, Debt, p.102
This is presumably also why in the immediate wake of great di­sasters - a flood, a blackout, or an economic collapse-people tend to behave the same way, reverting to a rough-and-ready communism. However briefly, hierarchies and markets and the like become luxuries that no one can afford. Anyone who has lived through such a moment can speak to their peculiar qualities, the way that strangers become sisters and brothers and human society itself seems to be reborn. This is important, because it shows that we are not simply talking about cooperation. In fact, communism is the foundation of all human socia­bility. It is what makes society possible. Graeber, Debt, p.96
Communalism
Communalism as an ideology is not sullied by the individualism and the often explicit antirationalism of anarchism; nor does it carry the historical burden of Marxism’s authoritarianism as embodied in Bolshevism. It does not focus on the factory as its principal social arena or on the industrial proletariat as its main historical agent; and it does not reduce the free community of the future to a fanciful medieval village. Its most important goal is clearly spelled out in a conventional dictionary definition: Communalism, according to the American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language, is “a theory or system of government in which virtually autonomous local communities are loosely bound in a federation. Bookchin, The Next Revolution: Popular Assemblies and the Promise of Direct Democracy, p.15
Communalism seeks to recapture the meaning of politics in its broadest, most emancipatory sense, indeed, to fulfill the historic potential of the municipality as the developmental arena of mind and discourse. It conceptualizes the municipality, potentially at least, as a transformative development beyond organic evolution into the domain of social evolution. The city is the domain where the archaic blood-tie that was once limited to the unification of families and tribes, to the exclusion of outsiders, was—juridically, at least—dissolved. It became the domain where hierarchies based on parochial and sociobiological attributes of kinship, gender, and age could be eliminated and replaced by a free society based on a shared common humanity. Potentially, it remains the domain where the once-feared stranger can be fully absorbed into the community—initially as a protected resident of a common territory and eventually as a citizen, engaged in making policy decisions in the public arena. It is above all the domain where institutions and values have their roots not in zoology but in civil human activity. As an explicitly political body of ideas, Communalism seeks to recover and advance the development of the city in a form that accords with its greatest potentialities and historical traditions. This is not to say that Communalism accepts the municipality as it is today. Quite to the contrary, the modern municipality is infused with many statist features and often functions as an agent of the bourgeois nation-state. […] The concrete political dimension of Communalism is known as libertarian municipalism. In its libertarian municipalist program, Communalism resolutely seeks to eliminate statist municipal structures and replace them with the institutions of a libertarian polity. It seeks to radically restructure cities’ governing institutions into popular democratic assemblies based on neighborhoods, towns, and villages. In these popular assemblies, citizens—including the middle classes as well as the working classes—deal with community affairs on a face-to-face basis, making policy decisions in a direct democracy and giving reality to the ideal of a humanistic, rational society. […] For Aristotle, and we may assume also for the ancient Athenians, the municipality’s proper functions were thus not strictly instrumental or even economic. As the locale of human consociation, the municipality, and the social and political arrangements that people living there constructed, was humanity’s telos, the arena par excellence where human beings, over the course of history, could actualize their potentiality for reason, self-consciousness, and creativity. Thus, for the ancient Athenians, politics denoted not only the handling of the practical affairs of a polity but civic activities that were charged with moral obligation to one’s community. All citizens of a city were expected to participate in civic activities as ethical beings. Bookchin, The Next Revolution: Popular Assemblies and the Promise of Direct Democracy, p.15-17, 22
Looking beyond these historical functions, the municipality constitutes the only domain for an association based on the free exchange of ideas and a creative endeavor to bring the capacities of consciousness to the service of freedom. It is the domain where a mere animalistic adaptation to an existing and pregiven environment can be radically supplanted by proactive, rational intervention into the world—indeed, a world yet to be made and molded by reason—with a view toward ending the environmental, social, and political insults to which humanity and the biosphere have been subjected by classes and hierarchies. Freed of domination as well as material exploitation—indeed, re-created as a rational arena for human creativity in all spheres of life—the municipality becomes the ethical space for the good life. Communalism is thus no contrived product of mere fancy: it expresses an abiding concept and practice of political life, formed by a dialectic of social development and reason. Bookchin, The Next Revolution: Popular Assemblies and the Promise of Direct Democracy, p.16
The concrete political dimension of Communalism is known as libertarian municipalism. In its libertarian municipalist program, Communalism resolutely seeks to eliminate statist municipal structures and replace them with the institutions of a libertarian polity. It seeks to radically restructure cities’ governing institutions into popular democratic assemblies based on neighborhoods, towns, and villages. In these popular assemblies, citizens—including the middle classes as well as the working classes—deal with community affairs on a face-to-face basis, making policy decisions in a direct democracy and giving reality to the ideal of a humanistic, rational society. Minimally, if we are to have the kind of free social life to which we aspire, democracy should be our form of a shared political life. To address problems and issues that transcend the boundaries of a single municipality, in turn, the democratized municipalities should join together to form a broader confederation. These assemblies and confederations, by their very existence, could then challenge the legitimacy of the state and statist forms of power. They could expressly be aimed at replacing state power and statecraft with popular power and a socially rational transformative politics. And they would become arenas where class conflicts could be played out and where classes could be eliminated. […] Most importantly, in Communalist political life, workers of different occupations would take their seats in popular assemblies not as workers—printers, plumbers, foundry workers, and the like, with special occupational interests to advance—but as citizens, whose overriding concern should be the general interest of the society in which they live. Citizens should be freed of their particularistic identity as workers, specialists, and individuals concerned primarily with their own particularistic interests. Municipal life should become a school for the formation of citizens, both by absorbing new citizens and by educating the young, while the assemblies themselves should function not only as permanent decision-making institutions but as arenas for educating the people in handling complex civic and regional affairs. Bookchin, The Next Revolution: Popular Assemblies and the Promise of Direct Democracy, p.16-17, 20
Libertarian municipalists do not delude themselves that the state will view with equanimity their attempts to replace professionalized power with popular power. They harbor no illusions that the ruling classes will indifferently allow a Communalist movement to demand rights that infringe on the state’s sovereignty over towns and cities. Historically, regions, localities, and above all towns and cities have desperately struggled to reclaim their local sovereignty from the state (albeit not always for high-minded purposes). Communalists’ attempt to restore the powers of towns and cities and to knit them together into confederations can be expected to evoke increasing resistance from national institutions. That the new popular-assemblyist municipal confederations will embody a dual power against the state that becomes a source of growing political tension is obvious. Either a Communalist movement will be radicalized by this tension and will resolutely face all its consequences or it will surely sink into a morass of compromises that absorb it back into the social order that it once sought to change. How the movement meets this challenge is a clear measure of its seriousness in seeking to change the existing political system and the social consciousness it develops as a source of public education and leadership. Bookchin, The Next Revolution: Popular Assemblies and the Promise of Direct Democracy, p.18-19
Communalism constitutes a critique of hierarchical and capitalist society as a whole. It seeks to alter not only the political life of society but also its economic life. On this score, its aim is not to nationalize the economy or retain private ownership of the means of production but to municipalize the economy. It seeks to integrate the means of production into the existential life of the municipality such that every productive enterprise falls under the purview of the local assembly, which decides how it will function to meet the interests of the community as a whole. The separation between life and work, so prevalent in the modern capitalist economy, must be overcome so that citizens’ desires and needs, the artful challenges of creation in the course of production, and role of production in fashioning thought and self-definition are not lost. “Humanity makes itself,” to cite the title of V. Gordon Childe’s book on the urban revolution at the end of the Neolithic age and the rise of cities, and it does so not only intellectually and aesthetically but by expanding human needs as well as the productive methods for satisfying them. We discover ourselves—our potentialities and their actualization—through creative and useful work that not only transforms the natural world but leads to our self-formation and self-definition. We must also avoid the parochialism and ultimately the desires for proprietorship that have afflicted so many self-managed enterprises, such as the “collectives” in the Russian and Spanish revolutions. Not enough has been written about the drift among many “socialistic” self-managed enterprises, even under the red and red-and-black flags, respectively, of revolutionary Russia and revolutionary Spain, toward forms of collective capitalism that ultimately led many of these concerns to compete with one another for raw materials and markets. […] In a Communalist way of life, conventional economics, with its focus on prices and scarce resources, would be replaced by ethics, with its concern for human needs and the good life. Human solidarity—or philia, as the Greeks called it—would replace material gain and egotism. Municipal assemblies would become not only vital arenas for civic life and decision-making but centers where the shadowy world of economic logistics, properly coordinated production, and civic operations would be demystified and opened to the scrutiny and participation of the citizenry as a whole. Bookchin, The Next Revolution: Popular Assemblies and the Promise of Direct Democracy, p.19-20
Communalism, in contrast to anarchism, decidedly calls for decision-making by majority voting as the only equitable way for a large number of people to make decisions. Authentic anarchists claim that this principle—the “rule” of the minority by the majority—is authoritarian and propose instead to make decisions by consensus. Consensus, in which single individuals can veto majority decisions, threatens to abolish society as such. A free society is not one in which its members, like Homer’s lotus-eaters, live in a state of bliss without memory, temptation, or knowledge. Like it or not, humanity has eaten of the fruit of knowledge, and its memories are laden with history and experience. In a lived mode of freedom—contrary to mere café chatter—the rights of minorities to express their dissenting views will always be protected as fully as the rights of majorities. Any abridgements of those rights would be instantly corrected by the community—hopefully gently, but if unavoidable, forcefully—lest social life collapse into sheer chaos. Indeed, the views of a minority would be treasured as a potential source of new insights and nascent truths that, if abridged, would deny society the sources of creativity and developmental advances—for new ideas generally emerge from inspired minorities that gradually gain the centrality they deserve at a given time and place—until, again, they too are challenged as the conventional wisdom of a period that is beginning to pass away and requires new (minority) views to replace frozen orthodoxies. Bookchin, The Next Revolution: Popular Assemblies and the Promise of Direct Democracy, p.25
A Communalist society should rest, above all, on the efforts of a new radical organization to change the world—one that has a new political vocabulary to explain its goals, and a new program and theoretical framework to make those goals coherent. It would, above all, require dedicated individuals who are willing to take on the responsibilities of education and leadership. Unless words are not to become completely mystified and obscure a reality that exists before our very eyes, it should minimally be acknowledged that leadership always exists and does not disappear because it is clouded by euphemisms such as “militants” or, as in Spain, “influential militants.” It must also be acknowledged that many individuals in earlier groups, like the CNT, were not just “influential militants” but outright leaders, whose views were given more consideration—and deservedly so!—than those of others because they were based on more experience, knowledge, and wisdom, as well as the psychological traits that were needed to provide effective guidance. A serious libertarian approach to leadership would indeed acknowledge the reality and crucial importance of leaders—all the more to establish the greatly needed formal structures and regulations that can effectively control and modify “the activities of leaders and recall them when the membership decides their respect is being misused or when leadership becomes an exercise in the abuse of power. A libertarian municipalist movement should function, not with the adherence of flippant and tentative members, but with people who have been schooled in the movement’s ideas, procedures, and activities. They should, in effect, demonstrate a serious commitment to their organization—an organization whose structure is laid out explicitly in a formal constitution and appropriate bylaws. Without a democratically formulated and approved institutional framework whose members and leaders can be held accountable, clearly articulated standards of responsibility cease to exist. Indeed, it is precisely when a membership is no longer responsible to its constitutional and regulatory provisions that authoritarianism develops and eventually leads to the movement’s immolation. Freedom from authoritarianism can best be assured only by the clear, concise, and detailed allocation of power, not by pretensions that power and leadership are forms of “rule” or by libertarian metaphors that conceal their reality. It has been precisely when an organization fails to articulate these regulatory details that the conditions emerge for its degeneration and decay. Ironically, no stratum has been more insistent in demanding its freedom to exercise its will against regulation than chiefs, monarchs, nobles, and the bourgeoisie; similarly, even well-meaning anarchists have seen individual autonomy as the true expression of freedom from the “artificialities” of civilization. In the realm of true freedom, that is, freedom that has been actualized as the result of consciousness, knowledge, and necessity, to know what we can and cannot do is more cleanly honest and true to reality than to avert the responsibility of knowing the limits of the lived world. Bookchin, The Next Revolution: Popular Assemblies and the Promise of Direct Democracy, p.26-27
A Communalist society should rest, above all, on the efforts of a new radical organization to change the world—one that has a new political vocabulary to explain its goals, and a new program and theoretical framework to make those goals coherent. It would, above all, require dedicated individuals who are willing to take on the responsibilities of education and leadership. […] The need for the international Left to advance courageously beyond a Marxist, anarchist, syndicalist, or vague socialist framework toward a Communalist framework is particularly compelling today. Rarely in the history of leftist political ideas have ideologies been so wildly and irresponsibly muddled; rarely has ideology itself been so disparaged; rarely has the cry for “Unity!” on any terms been heard with such desperation. To be sure, the various tendencies that oppose capitalism should indeed unite around efforts to discredit and ultimately efface the market system. To such ends, unity is an invaluable desideratum: a united front of the entire Left is needed in order to counter the entrenched system—indeed, culture—of commodity production and exchange, and to defend the residual rights that the masses have won in earlier struggles against oppressive governments and social systems. The urgency of this need, however, does not require movement participants to abandon mutual criticism or to stifle their criticism of the authoritarian traits present in anticapitalist organization. Least of all does it require them to compromise the integrity and identity of their various programs. The vast majority of participants in today’s movement are inexperienced young radicals who have come of age in an era of postmodernist relativism. As a consequence, the movement is marked by a chilling eclecticism, in which tentative opinions are chaotically mismarried to ideals that should rest on soundly objective premises.19 In a milieu where the clear expression of ideas is not valued and terms are inappropriately used, and where argumentation is disparaged as “aggressive” and worse, “divisive,” it becomes difficult to formulate ideas in the crucible of debate. Ideas grow and mature best, in fact, not in the silence and controlled humidity of an ideological nursery but in the tumult of dispute and mutual criticism. Following revolutionary socialist practices of the past, Communalists would try to formulate a minimum program that calls for the satisfaction of immediate concerns, such as improved wages and shelter or adequate park space and transportation. This minimum program would aim to satisfy the most elemental needs of the people, to improve their access to the resources that make daily life tolerable. The maximum program, by contrast, would present an image of what human life could be like under libertarian socialism, at least as far as such a society is foreseeable in a world that is continually changing under the impact of seemingly unending industrial revolutions. Even more, however, Communalists would see their program and practice as a process. Indeed, a transitional program in which each new demand provides the springboard for escalating demands that lead toward more radical and eventually revolutionary demands. One of the most striking examples of a transitional demand was the programmatic call in the late nineteenth century by the Second International for a popular militia to replace a professional army. In still other cases, revolutionary socialists demanded that railroads be publically owned (or, as revolutionary syndicalists might have demanded, be controlled by railroad workers) rather than privately owned and operated. None of these demands were in themselves revolutionary, but they opened pathways, politically, to revolutionary forms of ownership and operation, which, in turn, could be escalated to achieve the movement’s maximum program. Others might criticize such step-by-step endeavors as “reformist,” but Communalists do not contend that a Communalist society can be legislated into existence. What these demands try to achieve, in the short term, are new rules of engagement between the people and capital—rules that are all the more needed at a time when “direct action” is being confused with protests of mere events whose agenda is set entirely by the ruling classes. On the whole, Communalism is trying to rescue a realm of public action and discourse that is either disappearing or that is being reduced to often-meaningless engagements with the police, or to street theater that, however artfully, reduces serious issues to simplistic performances that have no instructive influence. By contrast, Communalists try to build lasting organizations and institutions that can play a socially transformative role in the real world. Bookchin, The Next Revolution: Popular Assemblies and the Promise of Direct Democracy, p.26-30
Significantly, Communalists do not hesitate to run candidates in municipal elections who, if elected, would use what real power their offices confer to legislate popular assemblies into existence. These assemblies, in turn, would have the power ultimately to create effective forms of town-meeting government. Inasmuch as the emergence of the city—and city councils—long preceded the emergence of class society, councils based on popular assemblies are not inherently statist organs, and to participate seriously in municipal elections countervails reformist socialist attempts to elect statist delegates by offering the historical libertarian vision of municipal confederations as a practical, combative, and politically credible popular alternative to state power. Indeed, Communalist candidacies, which explicitly denounce parliamentary candidacies as opportunist, keep alive the debate over how libertarian socialism can be achieved—a debate that has been languishing for years. Bookchin, The Next Revolution: Popular Assemblies and the Promise of Direct Democracy, p.30
At present, I think it is important to recognize that when we advance a politics of libertarian municipalism, we are not engaged in discussing a mere tactic or strategy for creating a public sphere. Rather, we are trying to create a new political culture that is not only consistent with anarchist communist goals but that includes real efforts to actualize these goals, fully cognizant of all the difficulties that face us and the revolutionary implications that they hold for us in the years ahead. Bookchin, The Next Revolution: Popular Assemblies and the Promise of Direct Democracy, p.45
Marx & Engels’ Vision of Communism
Communism as the positive transcendence of private property as human self-estrangement, and therefore as the real appropriation of the human essence by and for man; communism therefore as the complete return of man to himself as a social (i.e. human) being – a return accomplished consciously and embracing the entire wealth of previous development. This communism, as fully developed naturalism, equals humanism, and as fully developed humanism equal naturalism; it is the genuine resolution of the conflict between man and nature, and between man and man – the true resolution of the strife between existence and essence, between objectification and self-confirmation, between freedom and necessity, between the individual and the species. Communism is the riddle of history solved, and it knows itself to be this solution. Marx, Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts, Collected Works of Marx and Engels (Lawrence & Wishart: London), Vol. 3, p. 296. (Cited in Levitas, The Concept of Utopia, p.47)
Marx’s suggestions as to the nature of communist society range from very abstract principles put forward in the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts to the more specific statements in the Grundrisse. In Marx’s early writings the goal of communism is the transcendence of alienation, the overcoming of the estrangement of human beings from themselves which results from the institution of private property. Levitas, The Concept of Utopia, p.47
The abolition of private property through social ownership transforms the nature of work. It is alienated labour which is the root of alienation; hence it is only through the transformation of the work process and its place in communist society that human estrangement can be overcome. A key issue here is the division of labour, which turns people into extensions of the productive process and prevents the full development of each individual’s broad potential. Hence the familiar statement in The German Ideology that “in communist society, where nobody has one exclusive sphere of activity but each can become accomplished in any branch he wishes, society regulates the general production and thus makes it possible for me to do one thing today and another tomorrow, to hunt in the morning, fish in the afternoon, rear cattle in the evening, criticise after dinner, just as I have a mind, without ever becoming hunter, fisherman, shepherd or critic.” Levitas, The Concept of Utopia, p.47-48
Similarly, ‘in a communist society there are no painters but only people who engage in painting among other activities’. The division between mental and manual labour is abolished, and the division between town and country. On this point, the utopian socialists were commended by Engels in Anti-Dühring: "The utopians were already perfectly clear as to the effects of the division of labour, the stunting on the one hand of the labourer, and on the other of the labour function, which is restricted to the life-long uniform mechanical repetition of one and the same operation. The abolition of the antithesis between town and country was demanded by Fourier, as by Owen, as the first prerequisite for the abolition of the old division of labour altogether ... abolition of the antithesis between town and country ... has become a direct necessity of industrial production itself ... . The abolition of the separation between town and country is therefore not utopian.” Levitas, The Concept of Utopia, p.48
Whether the sexual division of labour is also to be entirely abolished is less clear. There is certainly support for communal living arrangements as a new productive force, involving the development of new machinery and the abolition of the family, in The German Ideology, which is entirely congruent with Engels’s praise for the saving in labour power implied in Owen’s planned communities. Ollman argues that the communal raising of children is implied by the need that parents be prevented from exercising a destructive influence over their children without forcibly separating them from each other. He does concede, however, that this is never made explicit in Marx’s writing, and that Marx never deals with the limitations child-rearing imposes upon the self-development of adults, in practice usually their mothers, although Ollman asserts that ‘he was surely aware of it’. Although it is clearly intended that the all-round development of the individual in communist society should apply to women as well as to men, the means by which this is to be made possible have to be inferred or invented. Levitas, The Concept of Utopia, p.48
In the Grundrisse it is made clear that the new human being who develops with communist society does so through the expansion of ‘free time which is both leisure and time for higher activity’, which transforms ‘its possessor into another subject’. Work remains a realm of necessity in contrast with the realm of freedom outside work, where human development is an end in itself. This does not mean, however, as one commentator has suggested, that the problem of freedom is in the Grundrisse reduced to the problem of free time, nor does it mean that the realm of work consists of alienated labour. Work does not become ‘pure fun, pure amusement, as in Fourier’s ... childishly naive conception’, since ‘really free work ... is also the most damnably difficult, demanding the most intensive effort’. But if ‘labour cannot become a game, as desired by Fourier’, it remains to his great credit that he ‘stated that the ULTIMATE OBJECT is the raising of the mode of production itself, not [that] of distribution, to a higher form’. And the nature and conditions of work are to be transformed so that work, while necessary, is nevertheless free: "Work involved in material production can achieve this character only if (1) its social character is posited; (2) if it is of a scientific character and simultaneously general [in its application], and not the exertion of the worker as a natural force drilled in a particular way, as a subject, which appears in the production process not in a merely natural, spontaneous form, but as an activity controlling all natural forces.” (Marx, Grundrisse, Collected Works of Marx and Engels (Lawrence & Wishart: London), Vol. 28, p. 530; Collected Works of Marx and Engels (Lawrence & Wishart: London), Vol. 29, p. 97) Work in communist society is both greatly reduced and transformed in character. These features depend upon the expansion of productive powers, made possible in the first instance by capitalism but then exponentially so by its demise. Abundance is a necessary condition for communism. These four key features – the abolition of the division of labour, the development of individual potential, the transformation of work and the increase in material prosperity (made possible by the social ownership of the means of production) – are summed up in the Critique of the Gotha Programme: "In a higher phase of a communist society, after the enslaving subordination of the individual to the division of labour, and therewith also the antithesis between mental and physical labour, has vanished; after labour has become not only a means of life but life’s prime want; after the productive forces have also increased with the all-round development of the individual, and all the springs of common wealth flow more abundantly – only then can the narrow horizon of bourgeois right be crossed in its entirety and society inscribe on its banners: From each according to his ability, to each according to his needs!“ (Marx, Critique of the Gotha Programme, Collected Works of Marx and Engels (Lawrence & Wishart: London), Vol. 24, p. 87.) Levitas, The Concept of Utopia, p.49-50
Finally this new society entails the production of a different kind of person, not just in the sense of increasing their powers as atomised individuals but (and in fact this is how the increase of individual powers is possible) as the production of fully social human beings. Alienation affects not just the relationship of people to themselves and to their work, but to one another. The recognition of interdependence and of the social nature of production and of human existence in general leads not only to a transformation of work, but also means that the relationships between individuals both within and outside the work process cease to have the instrumental and competitive nature they assume in capitalist society. Levitas, The Concept of Utopia, p.50
although it [communism] is in one sense a goal, it is not very specific about the precise institutional arrangements which will prevail. There are two reasons for this. The more fundamental objection to describing communist society is that the needs, wants and capacities that will develop within it are neither static nor predictable from within the constraints of capitalism. In addition there is a strategic reason for silence: the criticism of utopian socialism in terms of its supposition that its schemes would be self-realising would be undermined by appearing to offer a competing plan of the good society. Hence Marx’s reluctance to identify communism as a state rather than a process: "Communism is for us not a state of affairs which is to be established, an ideal to which reality [will] have to adjust itself. We call communism the real movement which abolishes the present state of things.” (Marx and Engels, The German Ideology, Collected Works of Marx and Engels (Lawrence & Wishart: London), Vol. 5, p. 49) Levitas, The Concept of Utopia, p.50
The central issue is the counterposing of a distinctly different logic here and now to the logic of capitalism. There is nothing unusual in this: it is part of everyday life. It is the anti-logic of what we think of as humanity, of decency, of dignity; even in the most harmless-looking examples, there is always an underlying insubordination or non-subordination. Dignity will not wait: the crack is a here-and-now insubordination, not a project for the future. It is not 'after the revolution, our lives will not be subordinated to capital', but 'here and now, we refuse to subordinate our activity to the rule of capital: we can and will and are doing something else.' There is a shift in the temporality of rebellion. In all sorts of ways, the urgency of the situation of humanity imprints itself on the way that people struggle. The old notion of planning for the future revolution sounds hollow when we know that there may be only a very limited future. Communism (or whatever we choose to call it) becomes an immediate necessity, not a future stage of development. Holloway, Crack Capitalism, p.26
Opposing the divisions that capitalism has created on the basis of race, gender, and age, reuniting what it has separated in our lives and reconstituting a collective interest must then be a political priority for feminists and other social justice movements today. This is what is ultimately at stake in the politics of the commons, which, at its best, presupposes a sharing of wealth, collective decision making, and a revolution in our relationship with ourselves and others. The social cooperation and knowledge building that Marx attributed to social work can be constructed only through commoning activities - urban gardening, time banking, open sourcing - that are self-organized and require, as well as produce, community. In this sense, insofar as it aims to reproduce our lives in ways that strengthen mutual bonds and set limits to capital accumulation, the politics of the commons, in part, translates Marx’s idea of communism as the abolition of the present state of things. It could also be argued that with the development of online commons - the rise of free software and free culture movements - we are now approximating the universalization of human capacities that Marx anticipated as a result of development of productive forces. But the politics of the commons is a radical departure from what communism has signified in the Marxist tradition and in much of Marx’s work, starting with The Communist Manifesto. There are several crucial differences between the politics of the commons and communism that stand out, especially when we consider these political forms from a feminist and ecological viewpoint. Federici, Re-Enchanting the World, Feminism and the Politics of the Commons, p.166
We set the point of reversal, the way out of the desert, the end of Capital, in the intensity of the link that each person manages to establish between what she thinks and how she lives. Contrary to the upholders of Existential Liberalism, we refuse to view this as a private matter, an individual issue, a question of character. On the contrary, we start from the certainty that this link depends on the construction of shared realms, of placing effective methods in common. Anonymous, Call, p.13
It is obvious, as they claim, that the question of what suits me, of what I need, of what makes up my world has been reduced to the legally enforced fiction of private property, of what belongs to me, of what is mine. Something belongs to me insofar as it joins the realm of my usage — not by virtue of any juridical title. Ultimately, private property has no other reality than the forces that protect it. So the question of communism is, on one hand, to do away with the police, and on the other, to elaborate modes of sharing and uses, among those who live with each other. Anonymous, Call, p.21
The practice of communism, as we live it, we call The Party. When we overcome an obstacle together or when we reach a higher level of sharing, we say that we are “building the Party.” Certainly others, unknown to us at present, are building the Party elsewhere. This call is addressed to them. No experience of communism at the present time can survive without getting organized, tying oneself to others, taking sides in crises, waging war. “For the oases that dispense life are wiped out when we seek refuge in them.” As we understand it, the process of instituting communism can only take the form of a collection of acts of communization, of making common such-and-such space, such-and-such contraption, such and-such knowledge. That is to say, the elaboration of the mode of sharing that attaches to them. Insurrection itself is merely an accelerator, a decisive moment in this process. As we intend it, the Party is not an organization — where everything becomes insubstantial by dint of transparency, and it is not a family — where everything smells like a con by dint of opacity. The Party is a collection of places, infrastructures, communized methods, and the dreams, bodies, murmurs, thoughts, desires that circulate among those places; the use of those methods, the sharing of those infrastructures. Anonymous, Call, p.22
In the final analysis, capitalism consists of nothing more than a reduction of all relations into relations of production. From business to the family, consumption itself appears as another episode in the general production, the production of society. The overthrowing of capitalism will come from those who are able to create the conditions for other types of relations. Therefore the communism we are talking about is the exact opposite of what has been historically termed “communism,” which was mostly nothing but socialism, a form of monopolist state capitalism. Communism is not made through the expansion of new relations of production, but rather in their abolition. Not having relations of production within our milieu or among ourselves means never letting the search for results become more important than paying attention to the process, bankrupting all conventions of value, and watching that we do not disconnect affection and co-operation. Being attentive to worlds, to their perceptible configurations, is exactly what renders the isolation of something like relations of production impossible. In the places we open, around the means we share, it is this favor that we seek, that we experience. To name this experience, we often hear about everything being free. Instead of free, we prefer to speak of communism — for we cannot possibly forget what the practice of this freedom implies in terms of organization, and in the short term, of political antagonism. Anonymous, Call, p.22-23
So, the construction of the Party, in its most visible aspect, consists of the sharing or communization of what we have at our disposal. Communizing a place means this: setting free its use, and on the basis of this liberation, experimenting with refined, intensified, and complexified relations. If private property is essentially the discretionary power of depriving any person of the use of the possessed thing, communization can only mean depriving the agents of Empire of that possession. Anonymous, Call, p.23
As something endured, the process of fragmentation of the world can drive people into misery, isolation, schizophrenia. It can be experienced as a senseless loss in the lives of human beings. We're invaded by nostalgia then. Belonging is all that remains for those who no longer have anything. At the cost of accepting fragmentation as a starting point, it can also give rise to an intensification and pluralization of the bonds that constitute us. Then fragmentation doesn't signify separation but a shimmering of the world. […] With the endless fragmentation of the world there is a vertiginous increase in the qualitative enrich­ ment of life, and a profusion of forms-for someone who thinks about the promise of com­munism it contains. In the fragmentation there is something that points toward what we call "communism": it's the return to earth, the end of any bringing into equivalence, the restitution of all singularities to themselves, the defeat of subsumption, of abstrac­tion, the fact that moments, places, things, beings and animals all acquire a proper name-their proper name. Every creation is born of a splitting off from the whole. As embryology shows, each individual is the possibility of a new species as soon as it appropriates the conditions that immediately surround it. If the Earth is so rich in natural envi­ronments this is due to its complete absence of uniformity. Realizing the promise of communism contained in the world's fragmentation demands a gesture, a gesture to be performed over and over again, a gesture that is life itself: that of creating pathways between the fragments, of placing them in contact, of organizing their encounter, of opening up the roads that lead from one friendly piece of the world to another without passing through hostile territory, that of establishing the good art of distances between worlds. It's true that the world's fragmentation disorients and unsettles all the inherited certainties, that it defies all of our politi­cal and existential categories, that it removes the ground underlying the revolutionary tradition itself: it challenges us. […] Here is the paradox, then: being constrained to unity undoes us, the lie of social life makes us psychotic, and embracing fragmentation is what allows us to regain a serene presence to the world. There is a certain mental position where this fact ceases to be perceived in a contradictory way. That is where we place ourselves. The Invisible Committee, Now, p.45-46
To leave the economy is to bring out the plane of reality it covers over. Commodity exchange and all that it comprises in the way of harsh negotiation, mistrust, deceit, and wabu wabu, as the Melanesians say, is not exclusively Western. In places where people know how to live, one only practices this type of relations with outsiders, people one is not connected with, who are distant enough so that a mix-up cannot develop into a general conflict. To pay, in Latin, comes from pacare, "to satisfy, to calm," for example by distributing money to sol­diers so they can buy themselves some salt-thus a wage. One pays in order to have peace. The whole vocabulary of economy is basically a vocabulary of avoided war. "There is a link, a continuity, between hostile relations and the provision of reciprocal prestations: Exchanges are peacefully resolved wars, and wars are the result of unsuccessful transactions." (Levi-Strauss). Economy's defect is to reduce all possible relationships to hostile rela­tions, every distance to foreignness. What it covers over in this way is the entire gamut, all the grada­tion, all the heterogeneity among the different existing and imaginable relations. Depending on the degree of proximity between beings, there is a commonality of goods, a sharing of certain things, exchange with an adjusted reciprocity, mercantile exchange, or a total absence of exchange. And every form of life has its language and its notions for expressing this multiplicity of regimes. Making the bastards pay is good warfare. When you love you don't count the cost. Where money talks, words are worth nothing. Where words matter, money's worth nothing. Thus, exiting the economy is being able to dearly distinguish between the possible divisions and, from where one is, to deploy a whole art of distances. It's to push the hostile relations - and the sphere of money, accounting, measurement - as far away as possible. It's to banish to the margins of life that which is presently its norm, its core, its essential condition. The Invisible Committee, Now, p.107-108
However repressed it may be, the question of communism remains the heart of our epoch. If only because the rule of its contrary-economy-has never been so complete. The delegations from the Chinese state who go every year to place flowers on Marx's tomb in London don't fool anybody. One can avoid the communist question, of course. One can get used to stepping over the bodies of the homeless or migrants on one's way to the office every morning. One can follow the melting of the polar ice in real time, or the rise of the oceans and the panicked pell-mell migrations of animals and humans alike. One can go on preparing one's cancer with every forkful of mashed potatoes that one swallows. One can tell oneself that the recovery, or a dose of authority, or ecofeminism will eventually fix all this. Continuing in such a manner is possi­ble, at the cost of suppressing our feeling that the society we live in is intrinsically criminal, and one that doesn't miss a chance to remind us that we belong to its little association of miscreants. Every time we come in contact with it-by using any of its devices, consuming the least of its commodities, or doing whatever job we do for it-we make our­ selves its accomplices, we contract a little of the vice on which it is based: that of exploiting, wrecking, undermining the very conditions of every earthly existence. There's no longer any place for innocence in this world. We only have the choice between two crimes: taking part in it or deserting it in order to bring it down. The Invisible Committee, Now, p.127-128
By considering the human subject in isolation from its world, by detaching living beings from all that lives around them, modernity could not help but engender a communism destined to eradicate a socialism. And that socialism could only encounter peasants, nomads, and "savages" as an obstacle to be shoved aside, as an unpleasant residue at the bottom of the national scale of importance. It couldn't even see the communism of which they were the bearers. If modern "com­munism" was able to imagine itself as a universal brotherhood, as a realized equality, this was only through a cavalier extrapolation from the lived experience offraternity in combat, offriendship. For what is friendship if not equality between friends? Without at least the occasional experience of com­munity, we die inside, we dry out, become cynical, harsh, desert-like. Life becomes that ghost city peo­pled by smiling mannequins, which functions. Our need for community is so pressing that after having ravaged all the existing bonds, capitalism is running on nothing but the promise of "community." What are the social networks, the dating apps, if not that promise perpetually disappointed? What are all the modes, all the technologies of communication, all the love songs, if not a way to maintain the dream of a continuity between beings where in the end every contact melts away? Opportunely, this frustrated promise intensifies the need, making it hysterical even, and accelerates the great cash machine of those who exploit it. Maintaining misery while dangling the possibility of escape is capitalism's great stratagem. […] Even this epoch's obsession with sexuality and its hyper-indulgence in pornography attests to the need for community, in the very extremeness of the latter's deprivation. When Milton Friedman says that the market is the magic mechanism enabling "millions of individuals to come together on a daily basis without any need to love one another or even to speak to one another," he's describing the end result while carefully redacting the process that has brought so many people into the market, the thing that keeps them there, which is not just hunger, threat, or the lure of profit. He also spares himself from having to admit the devas­tations of all sorts which make it possible to establish something like "a market," and to present it as natural. […] In reality, the question of commu­nism is also raised in each of our tiny and unique existences in response to what is making us sick. In response to what is slowly killing us, to our failures in love, to what makes us such strangers to each other that by way of an explanation for all the world's ills, we're satisfied with the foolish idea that "People are assholes." Refusing to see this amounts to wearing one's insensitivity like a tattoo. It's well suited to the kind of pale, myopic virility that's required for becoming an economist. The Invisible Committee, Now, p.132-135
One can live a whole life without experiencing anything, by being very careful not to think and feel. Existence is then reduced to a slow process of degradation. It wears down and ruins, instead of giving form. After the miracle of the encounter, relations can only go from wound to wound towards their consumption. Life, on the contrary, gradually gives form to whoever refuses to live beside themselves, to whoever allows themselves to experience. They become a form of life in the full sense of the term. In sharp contrast to that, there are the inherited methods of activist construction, so grossly defec­tive, so exhausting, so destructive, when they are so focused on building. Communism does not hinge on self-renunciation but on the attention given to the smallest action. It's a question of our plane of perception and hence of our way of doing things. A practical matter. What the perception of entities-individual or collective­ bars our access to is the plane where things really happen, where the collective potentials form and fall apart, gain strength or dissipate. […] To live communism is not to work to ensure the existence of the entity we belong to, but to deploy and deepen an ensemble of ties, which sometimes means cutting certain ones. What is essential occurs at the level of the smallest things. […] Perception in terms of bonds dismisses the whole alternative between individual and collective, and does so positively. In a real situation, an "I" that says what needs to be said can be a "we" of extraordinary power. And so, the particular happiness of any "commune" reflects the plenitude of its singularities, a certain quality of ties, the radiant energy of each frag­ment of world that it harbors-good-bye to entities, to their protrusiveness, good-bye to individual and collective confinement, adios to the reign of nar­cissism. The Invisible Committee, Now, p.143-144
For us, therefore, communism is not a finality. There is no "transition" towards it. It is transition entirely: it is en chemin, in transit. The different ways of living will never cease to chafe and move against each other, to clash with and occasionally combat each other. Everything will always have to be rethought. The Invisible Committee, Now, p.154-155
What would be the principle characteristics of the new culture and how would it compare with ancient art? Against the spectacle, the realised situationist culture introduces total participation. Against preserved art, it is the organisation of the directly lived moment. Against particularised art, it will be a global practice with a bearing, each moment, on all the usable elements. Naturally this would tend to collective production which would be without doubt anonymous (at least to the extent where the works are no longer stocked as commodities, this culture will not be dominated by the need to leave traces.) The minimum proposals of these experiences will be a revolution in behaviour and a dynamic unitary urbanism capable of extension to the entire planet, and of being further extensible to all habitable planets. Against unilateral art, situationist culture will be an art of dialogue, an art of interaction. Today artists - with all culture visible - have become entirely separated from society, just as they are separated from each other by competition. But faced with this impasse of capitalism, art has remained essentially unilateral in response. This enclosed era of primitivism must be superseded by complete communication. At a higher stage, everyone will become an artist, i.e., inseparably a producer-consumer of total culture creation, which will help the rapid dissolution of the linear criteria of novelty. Everyone will be a situationist so to speak, with a multidimensional inflation of tendencies, experiences, or radically different "schools" - not successively, but simultaneously. We will inaugurate what will historically be the last of the crafts. The role of amateur-professional situationist - of anti-specialist - is again a specialisation up to the point of economic and mental abundance, when everyone becomes an "artist," in the sense that the artists have not attained the construction of their own life. However, the last craft of history is so close to the society without a permanent division of labour, that when it appeared amongst the S.I., its status as a craft was generally denied. Situationist Manifesto, Internationale Situationniste #4, https://libcom.org/article/situationist-manifesto
Autonomous Society
Until the environment is collectively dominated, there will be no individuals — only specters haunting the objects anarchically presented to them by others. In chance situations we meet separated people moving randomly. Their divergent emotions neutralize each other and maintain their solid environment of boredom. As long as we are unable to make our own history, to freely create situations, striving toward unity will introduce other separations. The quest for a central activity leads to the formation of new specializations. Debord, Critique of Separation (Film), 1961 - https://remixedcity.wordpress.com/2014/02/17/critique-of-separation-english-subtitles-by-guy-debord-1961/
Naming the emancipatory project
But if we are no longer to define ourselves negatively, by our opposition to capital, what will be the name of our positive project? I don’t believe that the old signifier “communism” can be revived for this purpose. It is now irretrievably tainted by terrible associations, forever tied to the nightmares of the twentieth century. At the moment, our desire is nameless — but it is real. Our desire is for the future — for an escape from the impasses of the flatlands of capital’s endless repetitions — and it comes from the future — from the very future in which new perceptions, desires, cognitions are once again possible. As yet, we can grasp this future only in glimmers. But it is for us to construct this future, even as — at another level — it is already constructing us: a new kind of collective agent, a new possibility of speaking in the first person plural. At some point in this process, the name for our new desire will appear and we will recognise it. Mark Fisher & Darren Ambrose, For Now, Our Desire is Nameless - There Is No Desire for Capitalism, K-Punk: The Collected and Unpublished Writings of Mark Fisher, 2018, p.599
Baltas on the importance of keeping the name of Communism
Baltas on Communism
Baltas on the importance of keeping the name of Communism
His [Sorel’s] identification of socialism as a movement rather than a state of society to be treated as a historical goal recalls Marx’s assertion that communism is the real movement which abolishes the present state of things: "Socialism is the workers’ movement, the revolt of the proletariat against ruling institutions. It is the organization which is both economic and ethical at the same time, which we see forming before our eyes, and whose purpose is to struggle against bourgeois traditions.” [Stanley, From Georges Sorel, Oxford University Press, p. 147.] Levitas, The Concept of Utopia, p. 76
The subject position of human flourishing is figured by Bloch in terms of human dignity as the upright gait, ‘the individual who is no longer to be humiliated, enslaved, forsaken, scorned, estranged, annihilated, and deprived of identity’. Bloch concludes The Principle of Hope with the aspiration for the world anticipated as outcome of this process: "But the root of history is the working, creating human being who reshapes and overhauls the given facts. Once he has grasped himself and established what is his, without expropriation and alienation, in real democracy, there arises in the world something which shines into the childhood of all and in which no-one has yet been: *Heimat*. [Bloch, The Principle of Hope, Basil Blackwell 1986, p. 1376.] [The English translation renders Heimat as ‘homeland’. This never captured the resonance of Heimat] Levitas, Utopia as Method, p. 6-7
Feminist Movement
I argue that Marx’s vision of communism as a society beyond exchange value, private property, and money, based on associations of free producers, and governed by the principle “to each according to their needs from each according to their abilities” represents an ideal that no anticapitalist feminist can object to. Feminists can also embrace Marx’s inspiring image of a world beyond the social division of labor, although they may want to ensure that between hunting in the morning, fishing in the afternoon, and criticizing after dinner, there would remain some time for everyone to share cleaning and childcare. Federici, Re-Enchanting the World, Feminism and the Politics of the Commons, p.153-154
[…] Marx’s historical materialist method, which posits that in order to understand history and society we must understand the material conditions of social reproduction, is crucial from a feminist perspective. Recognizing that social subordination is a historical product rooted in a specific organization of work has had a liberating effect on women. It has denaturalized the sexual division of labor and the identities built upon it, projecting gender categories not only as social constructs but as concepts whose content is constantly redefined, infinitely mobile, open-ended, and always politically charged. Federici, Re-Enchanting the World, Feminism and the Politics of the Commons, p.154
The main characteristics of the work-processes described above is that they are all connected with the direct production of life or of use values. A feminist concept of labour has to be oriented towards the production of life as the goal of work and not the production of things and of wealth (see the quotation from Marx above), of which the production of life is then a secondary derivative. The production of immediate life in all its aspects must be the core concept for the development of a feminist concept of work. Maria Mies, Patriarchy and Accumulation on a World Scale, Towards a Feminist Perspective of a New Society, p.217
[…] the development of a feminist concept of labour has to begin with a rejection of the distinction between socially necessary labour and leisure, and the Marxist view that self-realization, human happiness, freedom, autonomy - the realm of freedom - can be achieved only outside the sphere of necessity and of necessary labour, and by a reduction (or abolition) of the latter. If we take as our model of a worker not the white male industrial wage-worker (irrespective of whether he works under capitalist or socialist conditions), but a mother, we can immediately see that her work does not fit into the Marxian concept. For her, work is always both: a burden as well as a source of enjoyment, self-fulfilment, and happiness. Children may give her a lot of work and trouble, but this work is never totally alienated or dead. Even when children turn out to be a disappointment for the mother, when they eventually leave her or feel contempt for her - as in fact many do in our society - the pain she suffers at all this is still more human than the cold indifference of the industrial worker or engineer vis-a-vis his products, the commodities he produces and consumes. The same unity of work as a burden and work as enjoyment can be found among peasants whose production is not yet totally subsumed under commodity production and the compulsions of the market. The peasants who have to work from dawn to dusk during the harvesting season, for instance, feel the burden of work more than anybody else in their bodies and in their muscles. But in spite of the hardship of this work, it is never only ‘a curse’. I remember the times of haymaking or harvesting on our small subsistence farm in my childhood as times of extreme labour intensity for everybody-mother, children, father-and as times of the greatest excitement, enjoyment, social interaction. I found the same phenomenon among poor peasant and agricultural labourer women in India during the season of rice transplantation. […] During the collective work-processes in the fields, they sang an endless number of ballads which helped them ftp bear the burden of work more easily. And in the evening, after the evening meal, they danced and sang together till late (Mies, 1984). Anyone who has had an opportunity to observe the work-process of people involved in non-market oriented subsistence production will have found this interplay of work as necessity and burden, and work as a basic source of enjoyment and self-expression. The same is true for the work of the artisan or in handicrafts production, as long as this work is not yet fully subsumed under the compulsions of the market. Maria Mies, Patriarchy and Accumulation on a World Scale, Towards a Feminist Perspective of a New Society, p.216-217
A feminist concept of labour has, therefore, to be oriented towards a different concept of time, in which time is not segregated into portions of burdensome labour and portions of supposed pleasure and leisure, but in which times of work and times of rest and enjoyment are alternating and interspersed. If such a concept and such an organization of time prevail, the length of the working-day is no longer very relevant. Thus, a long working-day and even a lifetime full of work, will not then be felt as a curse but as a source of human fulfilment and happiness. Maria Mies, Patriarchy and Accumulation on a World Scale, Towards a Feminist Perspective of a New Society, p.217
[…] we can work with Marxist categories, but we must reconstruct them and change their architectural order, so that the center of gravity is not exclusively wage labor and commodity production but the production and reproduction of labor power, especially that part of it that is carried out by women at home. For in doing so, we make visible a new terrain of accumulation and struggle, as well as the full extent of capital’s dependence on unpaid labor and the full length of the working day. Federici, Re-Enchanting the World, Feminism and the Politics of the Commons, p.156
Placing the reproduction of labor power at the center of capitalist production unearths a world of social relations that remains invisible in Marx but is essential to exposing the mechanisms that regulate the exploitation of labor. It discloses that the unpaid labor that capital extracts from the working class is far greater than Marx ever imagined, extending to both the domestic work that women have been expected to perform and the exploitation of the colonies and peripheries of the capitalist world. […] in both cases, not only have the forms of work and coercion involved been naturalized, but both have become part of a global assembly line designed to cut the cost of reproducing the wage workers. On this line, the unpaid domestic labor ascribed to women as their natural destiny joins with and relays the work of millions of campesinas, subsistence farmers, and informal laborers, growing and producing for a pittance the commodities that waged workers consume or providing at the lowest cost the services their reproduction requires. Hence the hierarchies of labor that so much racist ideology has tried to justify, but which only demonstrate that the capitalist class has maintained its power through a system of indirect rule, effectively dividing the working class, with the wage used to delegate to the male workers’ power over the unwaged, starting with the control and supervision of women’s bodies and labor. This means that the wage is not only the terrain on which the working class negotiates the quantity and constitution of socially necessary work - but is also an instrument for the creation of unequal power relations and hierarchies between workers, and that worker’s cooperation in the labor process is by no means sufficient to unify the working class. Federici, Re-Enchanting the World, Feminism and the Politics of the Commons, p.156-157
It took women’s revolt against the housework in the 1960s and 1970s to prove that domestic work is “socially necessary labor” in the capitalist sense, that even though it is not organized on an industrial basis, it is extremely productive, and that to a large extent it is work that cannot be mechanized; for reproducing the individuals in which labor power subsists requires a variety of emotional as well as physical services that are interactive in nature and therefore very labor intensive. This realization has further destabilized Marx’s theoretical and political framework, forcing us to rethink one of the main tenets of Marx’s theory of revolution, that is, the assumption that with the development of capitalism all forms of work will be industrialized and, most important, that capitalism and modern industry are preconditions for the liberation of humanity from exploitations. Federici, Re-Enchanting the World, Feminism and the Politics of the Commons, p.159
[…] Marx’s vision of a society in which necessary labor can be drastically reduced through automation clashes with the fact that the largest amount of work on earth is of a highly relational nature and hardly subject to mechanization. Ideally, in a post-capitalist society we would mechanize several household chores, and we would certainly rely on new forms of communication for company, learning and information, once we controlled what technology is produced, for what purposes, and under what conditions. But how can we mechanize washing, cuddling, consoling, dressing, and feeding a child, providing sexual services, or assisting those who are ill or the elderly and not self-sufficient? What machine could incorporate the skills and affects needed for these tasks? Attempts have been made with the creation of nursebots and interactive lovebots, and it is possible that in the future we may see the production of mechanical mothers. But even assuming that we could afford such devices, we must wonder at what emotional cost we could introduce them in our homes in replacement of living labor. But if reproductive work can only in part be mechanized, then the Marxian scheme that makes the expansion of material wealth dependent on automation and the reduction of necessary labor implodes; for domestic work, and especially the care of children, constitutes most of the work on this planet. The very concept of socially necessary labor loses much of its cogency. How is socially necessary labor to be defined if the largest and most indispensable sector of work on the planet is not recognized as an essential part of it? And by what criteria and principles will the organization of care work, sexual work, and procreation will be governed if these activities are not considered part of socially necessary labor? Federici, Re-Enchanting the World, Feminism and the Politics of the Commons, p.162-163
[…] the collectivization of our everyday reproductive work […] is an essential part of our education to collective government and our recognition of history as a collective project, which is perhaps the main casualty of the neoliberal era of capitalism. On this account, we too must include in our political agenda the communalization of housework, reviving that rich feminist tradition that in the U.S. stretches from the utopian socialist experiments of the mid-nineteenth century to the attempts that “material feminists” made from the late nineteenth century to the early twentieth century to reorganize and socialize domestic work, and thereby the home and the neighborhood, through collective housekeeping […]. These practices and, most importantly, the ability of past feminists to look at reproductive labor as an important sphere of human activity not to be negated but to be revolutionized must be revisited and revalorized. One crucial reason for creating collective forms of living is that the reproduction of human beings is the most labor-intensive work on earth and, to a very large extent, is irreducible to mechanization. We cannot mechanize childcare, health care or the psychological work necessary to reintegrate our physical and emotional balance. Despite the efforts that futuristic industrialists are making, we cannot robotize care except at a terrible cost for the people involved. No one will accept nursebots as caregivers, especially for children and the ill. Shared responsibility and cooperative work not given at the cost of the health of the providers are the only guarantees of proper care. For centuries, the reproduction of human beings has been a collective process. It has been the work of extended families and the communities upon which people could rely, especially in proletarian neighborhoods, even when they lived alone, so that old age was not accompanied by the desolate loneliness and dependence with which so many of our elderly live. It is only with the advent of capitalism that reproduction has been completely privatized, a process that is now extended to a degree that destroys our lives. This trend must be reversed, and the present time is propitious for such a project. Federici, Re-Enchanting the World, Feminism and the Politics of the Commons, p.110-111
[The capitalist mode of production] has been rendered so much more productive not only by the extension of the working day to the humanly possible limits, but also through reproduction being posited as "natural production," which has enabled two workers to be exploited with one wage. and the entire cost of reproduction to be unloaded onto the labor force. Thus it becomes clear that Marxian analysis describes only one half of the process of production - the production of com­modities - and cannot be extended per se to cover reproduction; and further­more, that an analysis of the entire cycle of production cannot be made until reproduction has been analyzed too. This latter analysis can only be made if Marxian categories are not used dogmatically and if they are combined with feminist criticism. Fortunati, The Arcane of Reproduction, p.9-10
It is often asserted that, within the definition of wage labor, women in domestic labor are not productive. In fact precisely the opposite is true if one thinks of the enormous quantity of social services which capitalist organization transforms into privatized activity, putting them on the backs of housewives. Domestic labor is not essentially “feminine work”; a woman doesn’t fulfill herself more or get less exhausted than a man from washing and cleaning. These are social services inasmuch as they serve the reproduction of labor power. And capital, precisely by instituting its family structure, has “liberated” the man from these functions so that he is completely “free” for direct exploitation; so that he is free to “earn” enough for a woman to reproduce him as labor power. It has made men wage slaves, then, to the degree that it has succeeded in allocating these services to women in the family, and by the same process controlled the flow of women onto the labor market […]. And women are of service not only because they carry out domestic labor without a wage and without going on strike, but also because they always receive back into the home all those who are periodically expelled from their jobs by economic crisis. The family, this maternal cradle always ready to help and protect in time of need, has been in fact the best guarantee that the unemployed do not immediately become a horde of disruptive outsiders. Dalla Costa & James, The Power of Women and the Subversion of Community, p.33-34
Now it is clear that not one of us believes that emancipation, liberation, can be achieved through work. Work is still work, whether inside or outside the home. The independence of the Wage earner means only being a “free individual” for capital, no less for women than for men. Those who advocate that the (liberation of the-working class woman lies in her getting a job outside the home are part of the problem, not the solution. Slavery to an assembly line is not a liberation from slavery to a kitchen sink. To deny this is also to deny the slavery of the assembly line itself, proving again that if you don’t know how women are exploited, you can never really know how men are. But this question is so crucial that we deal with it separately. What we wish to make clear here is that by the non-payment of a wage when we are producing in a world capitalistically organized, the figure of the boss is concealed behind that of the husband. He appears to be the sole recipient of domestic services, and this gives an ambiguous and slavelike character to housework. The husband and children, through their loving involvement, their loving blackmail, become the first foremen, the immediate controllers of this labor. Dalla Costa & James, The Power of Women and the Subversion of Community, p.35
The husband tends to read the paper and wait for his dinner to be cooked and served, even when his wife goes out to work as he does and comes home with him. Clearly, the specific form of exploitation represented by domestic work demands a correspondingly specific form of struggle, namely the women’s struggle, within the family. If we fail to grasp completely that precisely this family is the very pillar of the capitalist organization of work, if we make the mistake of regarding it only as a superstructure, dependent for change only on the stages of the struggle in the factories, then we will be moving in a limping revolution that will always perpetuate and aggravate a basic contradiction in the class struggle, and a contradiction which is functional to capitalist development. We would, in other words, be perpetuating the error of considering ourselves as producers of use values only, of considering housewives external to the working class. As long as housewives are considered external to the class, the class struggle at every moment and any point is impeded, frustrated, and unable to find full scope for its action. To elaborate this further is not our task here. To expose and condemn domestic work as a masked form of productive labor, however, raises a series of questions concerning both the aims and the forms of struggle of women. Dalla Costa & James, The Power of Women and the Subversion of Community, p.35-36
In exemplary fashion, the famous feminist motto “the personal is political” intended to convey an idea that was scandalous in the 1960s: that there are “political dimensions to private life, that power relations shaped life in marriage, in the kitchen, the bedroom, the nursery, and at work” (Rosen in Lee 2007:163). […] “The personal is political” means, also, that pervasive cultural norms and social and economic structures are enacted and reproduced through individual action (Butler 1988:522). The feminist movement worked out schemes of political thought and action in line with this politicization of the everyday. It favoured modes of civic engagement that involved “average” women in their everyday lives. The emblematic practice of “consciousness-raising” that has been nurtured in feminist groups purported to empower women politically in their personal relations and life worlds. This process of critical group-thinking embodies a dynamic way of politicizing the personal and a singular modality of politics in the “everyday”. By way of sharing personal experiences and through collective discussion around shared feelings and concerns, it stimulated reflection on the political facets of personal life. Consciousness-raising thus enhanced awareness of everyday oppression. It boosted the self-esteem of women as persons who bring their distinct contribution to politics by cherishing, for example, values of sensitivity and care for the others. It also investigated ways of initiating change in patriarchal norms and subjectivities, in the present tense and from below. Hence, feminist politics intimated the idea that individual acts can be political in the mundane reality of gender relations inasmuch as they recycle cultural conventions of subordination or they undertake to displace and upset them (Hanisch 2006; Butler 1988: 523-4; Lee 2007: 165-6) Kioupkiolis, The Common and Counter-Hegemonic Politics, p.123
Ironically, the reproduction of dual spheres of gender and the anchoring of women to one and not the other is perpetuated and constantly re-established by the very mechanism of the “sex-blind” labour-market, which obtains not for the man/woman distinction directly but rather for the price distinction, or the exchange-value of their labour-power. Indeed, labour markets, if they are to remain markets, must be “sex-blind”. Markets, as the locus of exchanges of equivalents, are supposed to blur concrete differences in a pure comparison of abstract values. How then can this “sex-blind” market reproduce the gender difference? Once a group of individuals, women, are defined as “those who have children” and once this social activity, “having children”, is structurally formed as constituting a handicap, women are defined as those who come to the labour-market with a potential disadvantage. This systematic differentiation — through the market-determined risk identified as childbearing “potential” — keeps those who embody the signifier “woman” anchored to the IMM sphere. Therefore, because capital is a “sex-blind” abstraction, it concretely punishes women for having a sex, even though that “sexual difference” is produced by capitalist social relations, and absolutely necessary to the reproduction of capitalism itself. […]. As an apparent contradiction, once sexual difference becomes structurally defined and reproduced, woman as a bearer of labour-power with a higher social cost becomes its opposite: the commodity labour-power with a cheaper price. […] capitalists […] will […] privilege the labour-power that is likely to be the most reliable over a long period. If the worker is potentially going to leave, then she will not be as good an investment, and will get a lower price. Endnotes, The Logic of Gender, Endnotes #3 (2013), https://endnotes.org.uk/articles/the-logic-of-gender

To Read:

Dalla Costa

Selma James

Fortunati

Maria Mies

Salleh

Federici notes, Re-Enchanting the World, Feminism and the Politics of the Commons, p.170

Technology and Production
The Material Nature of Knowledge Production
human action, or even human thought, can only take place through some kind of material medium and therefore can’t be understood without taking the qualities of that medium into account. Graeber, Toward an Anthropological Theory of Value, p.83
If one were to insist on seeing all such spheres primarily as domains of human action, it quickly becomes obvious that just as much as the production of food requires thinking, art and literature are really a set of material processes. Literature, from this kind of materialist perspective, would no longer be so much about “texts” (usually thought of as abstractions that can then seem to float apart from time or space) but about the writing and reading of them. This is obviously in every way material: actual, flesh-and-blood people have to write them, they have to have the leisure and resources, they need pens or typewriters or computers, there are practical constraints of every sort entailed in the circulation of literature, and so on. Graeber, Toward an Anthropological Theory of Value, p.54
The neat distinction between immaterial and material, therefore, becomes meaningful only from the perspective of relatively isolated and privileged spheres of practices. From the perspective of a radical paradigm and a possible political recomposition, I think this is an isolation that must be overcome, and it can only be overcome if and to the extent that some forms of constituent commoning across ‘material’ and ‘immaterial’ circuits become a reality and a social force at the basis of transformative politics. There is no panacea, no new invention operating as a silver bullet, only the expansion, multiplication and interlacing of commons systems, especially those that reproduce life (food, care, housing, biodiversity, ...). De Angelis, Omnia Sunt Communia, p. 74
Commons-based peer production and post-scarcity
[…] human action, or even human thought, can only take place through some kind of material medium and therefore can’t be understood without taking the qualities of that medium into account. Hence the importance in Turner’s analysis of the notion of material media of circulation. The media have qualities in and of themselves. For all the (often quite legitimate) criticisms of Jack Goody’s dichotomies between orality and literacy, for example, it is simply obvious that technologies of writing allow for possibilities that do not exist in speech (and equally, vice versa). Graeber, Toward an Anthropological Theory of Value, p.83
Digital Media and Computing

The society of the future is a society of material wealth (Marx)

Limiting the realm of necessity -> Enabling Post-Scarcity

Reducing the sphere of society and economy where reciprocity is expected

Patterns and Innovations in the Production of ICT and specifically software

Version Control

Wiggins on version control and collaboration https://open.spotify.com/episode/5HoFWZzo4PAzEhF5Tn3WbD?si=oMSZ_QgzTuGifPp4WHHIJg&context=spotify%3Ashow%3A3YjROlRLxqsTftLd0xGDUI

Social Cooperation at Scale (GitHub)

Modularity and Reuse - Software Package Managers

Collective Creativity & Socialization of Production

Nikolaus Klein: Expanding the sphere of collaboration through computing:

https://open.spotify.com/episode/7DJpJLs0Bdrq9uQWxwuF4L?si=bBiqQxrBR96AeKYUAIWknw&t=726&context=spotify%3Ashow%3A3YjROlRLxqsTftLd0xGDUI

Nikolaus Klein on collective creativity (our ideas vs my ideas, fuzziness of ownership)

https://open.spotify.com/episode/7DJpJLs0Bdrq9uQWxwuF4L?si=k2suMxSkQ--Bj7ZEulR43g&t=961&context=spotify%3Ashow%3A3YjROlRLxqsTftLd0xGDUI

Emphasize on the difference in how FLOSS and SAAS approach modularity and interoperability in comparing capitalist and commons practices and development of productive forces

ICT as a Means of Production

P2P as a relationship and infrastructure enabling Commons-Based Peer Production (CBPP)

Radical expansion of cooperative scale

Automation technology manages mundane tasks, technically opening the way to the realm of freedom

Machine learning & artificial intelligence potentially the next revolution

Post-Scarcity
The society of the future is also a society of material wealth, which continues to grow. This idea is encountered in virtually all of Marx’s works. I shall cite just one example as proof. In the third volume of Theories of Surplus Value, he describes the two alternatives for increasing “disposable time”. One alternative would be to produce greater wealth in half the current average labour time. The other would be to reduce the labour time by half in such a way as to direct the remaining half towards the satisfaction of “necessary needs” as they are at present. Marx considers it a theoretical mistake, a lack of clarity, to confuse these two alternatives. He explicitly declares himself to be in favour of the first of them. The base for the future development of production will be the extraordinary growth in the proportion of fixed capital, which is quite possible because the increase in production will be independent of the valorisation of capital. The increase in the proportion of fixed capital to levels that are impossible under capitalism is the guarantee that material production will require ever less living labour. This is the only way to reduce labour time uninterruptedly whilst maintaining a constant increase in production. This does not of course mean that dead labour will dominate living labour (because the capital relation no longer exists); on the contrary, living labour will prevail over dead. Agnes Heller, The Theory of Need in Marx, Chapter 4
The “society of associated producers” appears in this quotation as a society in which labour is carried out by machines, in which “fixed capital” therefore completely predominates and in which — at least in the process of material production — labour power is employed only “as watchman and regulator”. To use a modern expression, Marx presupposes complete automation. In this way a specific type of labour acquires an extraordinary importance, namely, scientific labour, or (as Marx calls it) “labour in general”. Scientific labour is not, however, immediately productive labour, but the activity of the general intellect: planning, projection and so forth. This cannot however be measured in labour time, since the concept of “socially necessary labour time” is not applicable. In short, material wealth is still supplied by production, but no longer by productive labour in the conventional sense of the term. This determines the hegemony of intellectual labour over so-called “physical” labour. Agnes Heller, The Theory of Need in Marx, Chapter 4
The material wealth which comes about through production is not and cannot be anything but a condition of the general wealth of society. The true wealth of society is realised through the free self-activity of social individuals and through their qualitatively many-sided system of needs. The true wealth of man and society consists not in labour time but in free time. For this very reason the wealth of the society of associated producers cannot be measured by labour time but only by free time. I shall here refer not to the well known passages in the Grundrisse, but to the third volume of Theories of Surplus Value: “Labour time, even if exchange value is eliminated, always remains the creative substance of wealth and the measure of the cost of its production. But free time, disposable time, is wealth itself, partly for the enjoyment of the product, partly for free activity, which - unlike labour - is not dominated by the pressure of an extraneous purpose which must be fulfilled, and the fulfilment of which is regarded as a natural necessity or a social duty, according to one’s inclination.” Agnes Heller, The Theory of Need in Marx, Chapter 4
What are the organisational perspectives of life in a society which authentically "reorganises production on the basis of the free and equal association of the producers"? Work would more and more be reduced as an exterior necessity through the automation of production and the socialisation of vital goods, which would finally give complete liberty to the individual. Thus liberated from all economic responsibility, liberated from all the debts and responsibilities from the past and other people, humankind will exude a new surplus value, incalculable in money because it would be impossible to reduce it to the measure of waged work. The guarantee of the liberty of each and of all is in the value of the game, of life freely constructed. The exercise of this ludic recreation is the framework of the only guaranteed equality with non-exploitation of man by man. The liberation of the game, its creative autonomy, supersedes the ancient division between imposed work and passive leisure. Situationist Manifesto, Internationale Situationniste #4, https://libcom.org/article/situationist-manifesto
What would be the principle characteristics of the new culture and how would it compare with ancient art? Against the spectacle, the realised situationist culture introduces total participation. Against preserved art, it is the organisation of the directly lived moment. Against particularised art, it will be a global practice with a bearing, each moment, on all the usable elements. Naturally this would tend to collective production which would be without doubt anonymous (at least to the extent where the works are no longer stocked as commodities, this culture will not be dominated by the need to leave traces.) The minimum proposals of these experiences will be a revolution in behaviour and a dynamic unitary urbanism capable of extension to the entire planet, and of being further extensible to all habitable planets. Against unilateral art, situationist culture will be an art of dialogue, an art of interaction. Today artists - with all culture visible - have become entirely separated from society, just as they are separated from each other by competition. But faced with this impasse of capitalism, art has remained essentially unilateral in response. This enclosed era of primitivism must be superseded by complete communication. At a higher stage, everyone will become an artist, i.e., inseparably a producer-consumer of total culture creation, which will help the rapid dissolution of the linear criteria of novelty. Everyone will be a situationist so to speak, with a multidimensional inflation of tendencies, experiences, or radically different "schools" - not successively, but simultaneously. We will inaugurate what will historically be the last of the crafts. The role of amateur-professional situationist - of anti-specialist - is again a specialisation up to the point of economic and mental abundance, when everyone becomes an "artist," in the sense that the artists have not attained the construction of their own life. However, the last craft of history is so close to the society without a permanent division of labour, that when it appeared amongst the S.I., its status as a craft was generally denied. Situationist Manifesto, Internationale Situationniste #4, https://libcom.org/article/situationist-manifesto
Defining the new poverty also entails defining the new wealth. To the image propagated by the dominant society - according to which it has evolved (both on its own and in response to acceptable reformist pressure) from an economy of profit to an economy of needs - must be counterposed an economy of desires, which could be defined as: technological society plus the imagination of what could be done with it. The economy of needs is falsified in terms of habit. Habit is the natural process by which fulfilled desire is degraded into need and is confirmed, objectified and universally recognized as need. The present economy is directly geared to the fabrication of habits, and manipulates people by forcing them to repress their desires. Situationist International, The Bad Days will End, Internationale Situationniste #7, https://libcom.org/article/bad-days-will-end-0
The next form of society will not be based on industrial production. It will be a society of realized art. Situationist International, The Bad Days will End, Internationale Situationniste #7, https://libcom.org/article/bad-days-will-end-0
The present era can test innumerable innovations, but it is incapable of putting them to good use because it is chained to the fundamental conservation of an old order. Over and over, in all our innovating formulations, we must stress the need for a revolutionary transformation of society. Now, The SI, Internationale Situationniste #9, https://libcom.org/article/now-si
After thousands of years of torturous development, the countries of the Western world (and potentially all countries) are confronted by the possibility of a materially abundant, almost workless era in which most of the means of life can be provided by machines. As we shall see, a new technology has developed that could largely replace the realm of necessity by the realm of freedom. Bookchin, Post-Scarcity Anarchism, Black Rose Books 1986, p.115
In fact, the real issue we face today is not whether this new technology can provide us with the means of life in a toil-less society, but whether it can help to humanize society, whether it can contribute to the creation of entirely new relationships between man and man. The demand for a guaranteed annual income is still anchored in the quantitative promise of technology — in the possibility of satisfying material needs without toil. This quantitative approach is already lagging behind technological developments that carry a new qualitative promise — the promise of decentralized, communitarian lifestyles, or what I prefer to call ecological forms of human association. * * An exclusively quantitative approach to the new technology, I may add, is not only economically archaic, but morally regressive. This approach partakes of the old principle of justice, as distinguished from the new principle of freedom. Historically, justice is derived from the world of material necessity and toil; it implies relatively scarce resources which are apportioned by a moral principle which is either "just" or "unjust." Justice, even "equal" justice, is a concept of limitation, involving the denial of goods and the sacrifice of time and energy to production. Once we transcend the concept of justice — indeed, once we pass from the quantitative to the qualitative potentialities of modern technology — we enter the unexplored domain of freedom, based on spontaneous organization and full access to the means of life. I am asking a question that is quite different from what is ordinarily posed with respect to modern technology. Is this technology staking out a new dimension in human freedom, in the liberation of man? Can it not only liberate man from want and work, but also lead him to a free, harmonious, balanced human community — an ecocommunity that would promote the unrestricted development of his potentialities? Finally, can it carry man beyond the realm of freedom into the realm of life and desire? Bookchin, Post-Scarcity Anarchism, Black Rose Books 1986, p.116-117
Let me try to answer these questions by pointing to a new feature of modern technology. For the first time in history, technology has reached an open end. The potential for technological development, for providing machines as substitutes for labor is virtually unlimited. Technology has finally passed from the realm of invention to that of design — in other words, from fortuitous discoveries to systematic innovations. Bookchin, Post-Scarcity Anarchism, Black Rose Books 1986, p.117
Work and Play
In light of the freedom to choose products and needs, both as producer and consumer, one can envision a higher ideal of freedom­ one that removes the taint of economism and restores the ethical basis of past times, and that is infused with the options opened by technical achievement. Potentially, at least, we are faced with the broadest con­ception of freedom known thus far: the autonomous individual's freedom to shape material life in a form that is neither ascetic nor hedonistic, but a blend of the best in both-one that is ecological, national, and artistic. Bookchin, The Ecology of Freedom, p.218
Labor, perhaps even more than technics, must recover its own creative voice. Its form, its de­ployment in the framework of linear time as a res temporalis, its cruel objectification as mere, homogeneous energy, must yield to the con­creteness of skill, to the festiveness of communal activity, to a recogni­tion of its own subjectivity. Bookchin, The Ecology of Freedom, p.266
The exaltation of a hard-working ethos, whether it is salaried work (viz. the stigma attached to unemployment) or working out in a gym point to the internalization of the demand made by capital that every human being maximizes his or her productive effort, whatever the circumstances, and the word work ends up encompassing all human activities that can directly or indirectly be turned into a profit. Olivier Frayssé, Work and Labour as Metonymy and Metaphor (triple-C)
Marx’s ideal workday, when I am able “to hunt in the morning, fish in the afternoon, rear cattle in the evening, criticise after dinner, just as I have a mind, without ever becoming hunter, fisherman, shepherd or critic” (Marx and Engels 1845/46, 53), points to a crucial characteristic of work from a eudemonistic perspective: if a change of work is a holiday, then what makes work an especially painful activity is its continuation through an over-extended period of time […]. The repetition of the same, even innocuous per se, becomes a torment, as in the “Chinese water torture” where the pain comes from a steady dripping of water droplets on the same part of the body. And the classical image of the Fordist worker, chained to the assembly line so that he/she must repeat the same motion relentlessly, resembles that of the galley slave who does nothing but work the oars. Relentless repetition of the same is what Thanatos (the death impulse identified by Freud) is about. Relentlessness and endlessness are the two things that make hell hellish […] All in all, man is living through and craving for variety, alternation and diversity. Just as we alternate inhaling and exhaling, chewing and swallowing, sleeping and waking, we need to alternate our activities. Post-Fordist human resources specialists of Internet work, who have understood this, would allow private Internet surfing (cyberloafing) to employees while at their workstation to increase productivity by lowering stress Chen and Lim 2011). This raises the issue of rhythm. Autonomous work (when I choose to work) is set to individual bio-rhythms, heteronomous work (when I have work imposed on me from outside, whether by necessity or violence) is set to extraneous rhythms: slaves on a galley pulling on the oars to the drum’s rhythm, marching soldiers, workers on the assembly-line, Internet slaves desperately trying to catch up with incoming emails are all subject to a form of torture. In moderate doses, the extraneous rhythm energizes, as when dancing to a tune, while it becomes painful and even lethal in excessive doses, as any stimulus. Olivier Frayssé, Work and Labour as Metonymy and Metaphor (triple-C)
Even in the absence of an actual master, the very nature of work involves a certain form of subordination. As a matter of fact, both the goal of the freely chosen work activity, and the specificities of the chosen work material themselves, impose their irreducible strangeness on the worker. When “I’m committed to my work”, the goal, the end in view becomes my master, imposes a discipline, and, when I carve wood, I have to obey the dictates of the wood grain at the very moment when I transform nature. “Nature to be commanded must be obeyed” wrote Francis Bacon (Bacon 1960, 39). Olivier Frayssé, Work and Labour as Metonymy and Metaphor (triple-C)
The factory was not born from a need to integrate labor with modern machinery. On the contrary, this building block of what we call "in­dustrial society" arose from a need to rationalize the labor process - to intensify and exploit it more effectively than employers could ever hope to achieve with early cottage industries based on a self-regulated system of artisanship. Sidney Pollard, quoting an observer of the prefactory era, notes that workers who were free to regulate their own time as domestic craftpersons rarely worked the modern eight-hour day and five-day week. "The weavers were used to 'play frequently all day on Monday and the greater part of Tuesday, and work very late on Thursday night, and frequently all night on Friday' " to ready their cloth for the Saturday market day. This irregularity, or "naturalness," in the rhythm and inten­sity of traditional systems of work contributed more toward the bour­geoisie's craze for social control and its savagely antinaturalistic outlook than did the prices or earnings demanded by its employees. More than any single technical factor, this irregularity led to the rationalization of labor under a single ensemble of rule, to a discipline of work and regulation of time that yielded the modern factory, often with none of the technical developments we impute to the "Industrial Revolution." Before the steam engine, power loom, and flying shuttle came into use­ indeed, before some of these machines were even invented - the tradi­tional spinning wheel, hand loom, and dyeing vat that once filled the working areas of cottagers were assembled in large sheds primarily to mobilize the workers themselves, to regulate them harshly, and to in­tensify the exploitation of their labor. Bookchin, The Ecology of Freedom, p.311
Lund - Playing, Gaming, Working and LabouringPDF
Play, Work and Communicative Action
Carework and Feminist Conceptions of Work
Work and Language
Work and Digital Media
Our central idea is the construction of situations, that is to say, the concrete construction of momentary ambiences of life and their transformation into a superior passional quality. […] Our action on behavior, linked with other desirable aspects of a revolution in mores, can be briefly defined as the invention of games of an essentially new type. The most general goal must be to expand the nonmediocre part of life, to reduce the empty moments of life as much as possible. One could thus speak of our enterprise as a project of quantitatively increasing human life, an enterprise more serious than the biological methods currently being investigated, and one that automatically implies a qualitative increase whose developments are unpredictable. The situationist game is distinguished from the classic notion of games by its radical negation of the element of competition and of separation from everyday life. On the other hand, it is not distinct from a moral choice, since it implies taking a stand in favor of what will bring about the future reign of freedom and play. Debord, Report on the Creation of Situations, theanarchistlibrary.org, p.12
To transform the world and to change life are one and the same thing for the proletariat, the inseparable passwords to its suppression as a class, the dissolution of the present reign of necessity, and the finally possible accession to the reign of freedom. The radical critique and free reconstruction of all the values and patterns of behavior imposed by alienated reality are its maximum program. Free creativity in the construction of all moments and events of life is the only poetry it can acknowledge, the poetry made by all, the beginning of the revolutionary festival. Proletarian revolutions will be festivals or nothing, for festivity is the very keynote of the life they announce. Play (*) is the ultimate principle of this festival, and the only rules it can recognize are to live without dead time and to enjoy without restraints. (*) [The ending is stronger and more scandalous in the original: the French word jouir (“to enjoy”) also means “to come” in the sexual sense.] On the Poverty of Student Life - Members of Situationist International and Students of Strasbourg University (1966), theanarchistlibrary.org, p.19
The next phase of play’s advance seems to require the disappearance of any element of competition. The question of winning or losing, which has to date been nearly inseparable of ludic activity, appears to be tied to every other expression of competition between people in the appropriation of goods. The sense of importance in winning, which concerns concrete (or more frequently illusory) satisfactions, is the wretched product of a wretched society. The feeling [of winning] is, of course, exploited by every conservative force to conceal the monotony and the brutality of the conditions of life they impose. Simply consider the [social] demands détourned by competitive sports, which was most clearly established in its modern form in Great Britain, alongside the rise of factories. Not only do the crowds identify with professional players or clubs (which assume the same mythic role as the movie stars who live, and the statesmen who make decisions, in their place), but the endless sequence of match results also keeps hold over the passions of the spectators . Direct participation in a game, even in those requiring a certain degree of intellectual exertion, becomes uninteresting as soon as the established rules of play involve the acceptance of competition for its own sake. Contribution to a Situationist Definition of Play, Internationale Situationniste #1, https://libcom.org/article/contribution-situationist-definition-play
The element of competition must vanish in favour of a more authentically collective concept of play: the communal creation of selected ludic ambiences. The central distinction made between play and everyday life, which keeps play as an isolated and temporary anomaly, must be surpassed. Johan Huizinga writes, “Into an imperfect world and into the confusion of life, [play] brings a temporary, a limited perfection.” Everyday life, which was previously determined by the question of survival, can now be rationally controlled (this possibility is at the heart of every conflict of our time). Play, radically breaking with a delimited ludic time and space, must invade the whole of life. Perfection cannot be its endpoint, insofar as this perfection signifies a static construction opposed to life. However one can propose to push the beautiful chaos of life to its perfection. […] In this historical perspective, play — the constant experimentation with ludic innovations — only comes into being alongside ethics and questions of life’s meaning. The only success which we can appreciate in play is the immediate success of its ambience, and the constant increase of its powers. In its present co-existence with the residues of the phase of decline, play cannot completely free itself from a competitive aspect, it must at least aim to provoke conditions favourable to living directly. In this sense it is still both a struggle and a representation: a struggle for a life measured by desire, and a concrete representation of such a life. Play often feels imaginary, owing to its fringe existence in comparison to the oppressive reality of work, but the Situationists’ work is precisely the preparation of the ludic possibilities to come. Contribution to a Situationist Definition of Play, Internationale Situationniste #1, https://libcom.org/article/contribution-situationist-definition-play
The traditional goal of aesthetics is to produce, by means of art, impressions of certain past elements of life in circumstances where those elements are lacking or absent, in such a way that those elements escape the disorder of appearances subject to the ravages of time. The degree of aesthetic success is thus measured by a beauty that is inseparable from duration, and that even goes so far as pretensions of eternity. The goal of the situationists is immediate participation in a passionate abundance of life by means of deliberately arranged variations of ephemeral moments. The success of these moments can reside in nothing other than their fleeting effect. The situationists consider cultural activity in its totality as an experimental method for constructing everyday life, a method that can and should be continually developed with the extension of leisure and the withering away of the division of labor (beginning with the division of artistic labor). Debord, Theses on Cultural Revolution, Internationale Situationniste #1, https://libcom.org/article/theses-cultural-revolution-guy-debord
Mascolo is right in saying (in Le Communisme) that the reduction of the work day by the dictatorship of the proletariat is “the most certain sign of the latter’s revolutionary authenticity.” Indeed, “if man is a commodity, if he is treated as a thing, if human relations are relations of thing to thing, this is because it is possible to buy his time.” But Mascolo is too quick to conclude that “the time of a man freely employed” is always well spent, and that “the purchase of time is the sole evil.” There can be no freely spent time until we possess the modern tools for the construction of everyday life. The use of such tools will mark the leap from a utopian revolutionary art to an experimental revolutionary art. Debord, Theses on Cultural Revolution, Internationale Situationniste #1, https://libcom.org/article/theses-cultural-revolution-guy-debord
There is no revolutionary problem of leisure — of an emptiness to be filled — but a problem of free time. As we have already said: “There can be no free use of time until we possess the modern tools for the construction of everyday life. The use of such tools will mark the leap from a utopian revolutionary art to an experimental revolutionary art” (Debord, “Theses on Cultural Revolution,” Internationale Situationniste #1). The supersession of leisure through the development of an activity of free creation-consumption can only be understood in relation with the dissolution of the traditional arts — with their transformation into superior modes of action which do not refuse or abolish art, but fulfill it. In this way art will be superseded, conserved and surmounted within a more complex activity. Its traditional elements may still be partially present, but transformed, integrated and modified by the totality. The Use of Free Time, Internationale Situationniste #4, https://libcom.org/article/use-free-time-0
What are the organisational perspectives of life in a society which authentically "reorganises production on the basis of the free and equal association of the producers"? Work would more and more be reduced as an exterior necessity through the automation of production and the socialisation of vital goods, which would finally give complete liberty to the individual. Thus liberated from all economic responsibility, liberated from all the debts and responsibilities from the past and other people, humankind will exude a new surplus value, incalculable in money because it would be impossible to reduce it to the measure of waged work. The guarantee of the liberty of each and of all is in the value of the game, of life freely constructed. The exercise of this ludic recreation is the framework of the only guaranteed equality with non-exploitation of man by man. The liberation of the game, its creative autonomy, supersedes the ancient division between imposed work and passive leisure. Situationist Manifesto, Internationale Situationniste #4, https://libcom.org/article/situationist-manifesto
What would be the principle characteristics of the new culture and how would it compare with ancient art? Against the spectacle, the realised situationist culture introduces total participation. Against preserved art, it is the organisation of the directly lived moment. Against particularised art, it will be a global practice with a bearing, each moment, on all the usable elements. Naturally this would tend to collective production which would be without doubt anonymous (at least to the extent where the works are no longer stocked as commodities, this culture will not be dominated by the need to leave traces.) The minimum proposals of these experiences will be a revolution in behaviour and a dynamic unitary urbanism capable of extension to the entire planet, and of being further extensible to all habitable planets. Against unilateral art, situationist culture will be an art of dialogue, an art of interaction. Today artists - with all culture visible - have become entirely separated from society, just as they are separated from each other by competition. But faced with this impasse of capitalism, art has remained essentially unilateral in response. This enclosed era of primitivism must be superseded by complete communication. At a higher stage, everyone will become an artist, i.e., inseparably a producer-consumer of total culture creation, which will help the rapid dissolution of the linear criteria of novelty. Everyone will be a situationist so to speak, with a multidimensional inflation of tendencies, experiences, or radically different "schools" - not successively, but simultaneously. We will inaugurate what will historically be the last of the crafts. The role of amateur-professional situationist - of anti-specialist - is again a specialisation up to the point of economic and mental abundance, when everyone becomes an "artist," in the sense that the artists have not attained the construction of their own life. However, the last craft of history is so close to the society without a permanent division of labour, that when it appeared amongst the S.I., its status as a craft was generally denied. Situationist Manifesto, Internationale Situationniste #4, https://libcom.org/article/situationist-manifesto
The next form of society will not be based on industrial production. It will be a society of realized art. Situationist International, The Bad Days will End, Internationale Situationniste #7, https://libcom.org/article/bad-days-will-end-0
The Situationist International (SI) inherited the surrealists’ opposition between the concrete political means of the liberation of work and the utopian end of its abolition. In this sense the SI's theory represents the last sincere gesture of faith in a revolutionary conception of self-management integral to the programmee that propelled their conception of revolutionary activity. This latter consisted of a radical rethinking of the liberation of work, along lines which emphasised the refusal of any separation between revolutionary action and the total transformation of life — an idea expressed implicitly in their original project of “creating situations”. The importance of this development should not be underestimated, for the “critique of separation” here implied a negation of any temporal hiatus between means and ends (thus of any period of transition), as well as a refusal of any synchronic mediations — insisting on universal (direct democratic) participation in revolutionary action. […] It was thus on the basis of an existing workers’ power at the points of production that they saw the abolition of work as becoming possible, both from a technical and organisational standpoint. In transposing the techniques of the cyberneticians and the gestures of the bohemian anti-artist into the trusted, calloused hands of the organised working class, the situationists were able to imagine the abolition of work as the direct result of its liberation; that is, to imagine the overcoming of alienation as a result of an immediate technical-creative restructuring of the workplace by the workers themselves. In this sense the SI's theory represents the last sincere gesture of faith in a revolutionary conception of self-management integral to the programme of the liberation of work. Endnotes, Bring out your Dead, Endnotes #1, https://endnotes.org.uk/articles/bring-out-your-dead
The neoliberal gambit was that the destruction of social security would have a dynamic effect on culture and the economy, liberating an entrepreneurial spirit that was inhibited by the red tape of bureaucratic social democratic institutions. The reality, however, is that innovation requires certain forms of stability. The disintegration of social democracy has had a dampening, rather than a dynamic, effect on culture in highly neoliberalised countries such as the UK. Fredric Jameson’s claims that late-capitalist culture would be given over to pastiche and retrospection have turned out to be extraordinarily prophetic. We’ve grown so accustomed to repetition and recycling that we no longer notice them. Yet it’s no surprise that this is the case. New cultural production requires a use of time that communicative capitalism is profoundly hostile towards. Most social energy is sucked into the vortex of late-capitalist labour and its vast simulation of productivity. Innovation depends upon an absorbed (rather than distracted) drift; but it is increasingly difficult to muster the attentional resources necessary for such immersion. Cyberspatial urgencies — the smartphone’s flashing red light, the siren call of its alert — function like trance-inhibitors or alarm clocks that keep waking us out of collective dreaming. In these conditions, intellectual work can only be undertaken on a short-term basis. Only prisoners have time to read, and if you want to engage in a twenty-year-long research project funded by the state, you will have to kill someone. To understand the time-crisis, we only have to compare the current situation with the height of punk and post-punk in the UK and the US. It’s no accident that the efflorescence of punk and post-punk culture happened at a time when cheap and squatted property was available in London and New York. Now, simply to afford to pay rent in either city entails giving up most of your time and energy to work. The delirious rise in property prices over the last twenty years is probably the single most important cause of cultural conservatism in the UK and the US. In the UK, much of the infrastructure which indirectly supported cultural production has been systematically dismantled by successive neoliberal governments. Most of the innovations in British popular music which happened between the Sixties and the Nineties would have been unthinkable without the indirect funding provided by social housing, unemployment benefit and student grants. These developments precisely opened up a kind of time that is now increasingly difficult to access: a time temporarily freed from the pressure to pay rent or the mortgage; an experimental time, in which the outcomes of activities could neither be predicted nor guaranteed; a time which might turn out to be wasted, but which might equally yield new concepts, perceptions, ways of being. It is this kind of time, not the harassed time of the business entrepreneur, which gives rise to the new. This kind of time, where the collective mind can unfurl, also allows the social imagination to flourish. The neoliberal era — the time when, we were repeatedly told, there was no alternative — has been characterised by a massive deterioration of social imagination, an incapacity to even conceive of different ways to work, produce and consume. It’s now clear that, from the start (and with good reason) neoliberalism declared war on this alternative mode of time. It remains tireless in its propagation of resentment against those few fugitives who can still escape the treadmill of debt and endless work, promising to ensure that soon, they too will be condemned to performing interminable, meaningless labour — as if the solution to the current stagnation lay in more work, rather than an escape from the cult of work. If there is to be any kind of future, it will depend on our winning back the uses of time that neoliberalism has sought to close off and make us forget. Mark Fisher & Darren Ambrose, Time-Wars: Towards an Alternative for the Neo-Capitalist Era, K-Punk: The Collected and Unpublished Writings of Mark Fisher, 2018, p.521-522
We suggest two principles here: shadow and time. Shadow is an unintended consequence, an event vacuum, which remains invisible for passers-by. It does not register on the development maps of the managerial class. Time is needed in order for the substantially different to grow. Maturation, which is creative growth, requires time. Don’t be afraid of the cycle. Who’s afraid of the longue durée? The time of creativity is that of idleness and procrastination, indeed otium. This turns out to be the opposite of frantic entrepreneurship and instant valorization. This is why creative industries policy can only propose fixed formats and known concepts: template capitalism. Maker labs, with their standard 3D printers and software, can only produce more of the same. Open source is not the solution to this problem. Neither is it sufficient to place the wild, weird bohème at the helm. https://networkcultures.org/geert/2014/11/20/the-creative-question-nine-theses/
The pressure of the instantaneous — of what, in their new manifesto, “On the Creative Question — Nine Theses”, Geert Lovink, Sebastian Olma and Ned Rossiter call “frantic entrepreneurship and instant valorisation” — inevitably weighs heavy on cultural producers. In an enigmatic but suggestive formulation, Lovink, Olma and Rossiter argue that the urgencies of the immediate need to be replaced by principles of “shadow and time”. “Shadow,” they write, "is an unintended consequence, an event vacuum, which remains invisible for passers by. It does not register on the development maps of the managerial class. Time is needed in order for the substantially different to grow. Maturation, which is creative growth, requires time. It is imperative that we carve out some spaces beyond the hyper-bright instant. This instant is insomniac, amnesiac; it locks us into a reactive time, which is always full (of outrage and pseudo-novelty). " There is no continuous time in which shadows can grow, only a time that is simultaneously seamless (without gaps: there is always “new” content streaming in) and discontinuous (each new compulsion makes us forget what preceded it). The result is a mechanical and unacknowledged repetition. Is it still possible for us to cultivate shadows? Mark Fisher & Darren Ambrose, A Time for Shadows, K-Punk: The Collected and Unpublished Writings of Mark Fisher, 2018, p.560-561
So far therefore as labour is a creator of use value, is useful labour, it is a necessary condition, independent of all forms of society, for the existence of the human race; it is an eternal nature- imposed necessity, without which there can be no material exchanges between man and Nature, and therefore no life. Marx, Capital, Volume 1, Marx Engels Collected Works Volume 35 (International Publishers), p.53
For us, labour will be defined, in its opposition to non-labour, as an activity that is socially validated as such, because of its specific function, its specific social character in a given mode of production. Other bases for definitions of labour are also possible, to cite a few: exchange between man and nature, expense of energy, distinction between pleasant/unpleasant activities. However, we think that none of these definitions can help us understand anything about the character of unwaged IMM activities. These definitions only take into account their concrete characteristics, and in the case of unwaged IMM activities, this leads to banal or absurd descriptions. Is comforting a child an exchange with nature? Is sleeping a labour that reproduces labour-power? Is brushing one’s teeth labour? Brushing somebody else’s teeth? We think that our definition of labour, while it may seem banal at first glance, is the only one capable of passing over these meaningless questions, and that it constitutes the right starting-point for research into the specific character of these activities. Endnotes, The Logic of Gender, Endnotes #3 (2013), https://endnotes.org.uk/articles/the-logic-of-gender
In the Grundrisse it is made clear that the new human being who develops with communist society does so through the expansion of ‘free time which is both leisure and time for higher activity’, which transforms ‘its possessor into another subject’. Work remains a realm of necessity in contrast with the realm of freedom outside work, where human development is an end in itself. This does not mean, however, as one commentator has suggested, that the problem of freedom is in the Grundrisse reduced to the problem of free time, nor does it mean that the realm of work consists of alienated labour. Work does not become ‘pure fun, pure amusement, as in Fourier’s ... childishly naive conception’, since ‘really free work ... is also the most damnably difficult, demanding the most intensive effort’. But if ‘labour cannot become a game, as desired by Fourier’, it remains to his great credit that he ‘stated that the ULTIMATE OBJECT is the raising of the mode of production itself, not [that] of distribution, to a higher form’. And the nature and conditions of work are to be transformed so that work, while necessary, is nevertheless free: "Work involved in material production can achieve this character only if (1) its social character is posited; (2) if it is of a scientific character and simultaneously general [in its application], and not the exertion of the worker as a natural force drilled in a particular way, as a subject, which appears in the production process not in a merely natural, spontaneous form, but as an activity controlling all natural forces.” (Marx, Grundrisse, Collected Works of Marx and Engels (Lawrence & Wishart: London), Vol. 28, p. 530; Collected Works of Marx and Engels (Lawrence & Wishart: London), Vol. 29, p. 97) Work in communist society is both greatly reduced and transformed in character. These features depend upon the expansion of productive powers, made possible in the first instance by capitalism but then exponentially so by its demise. Abundance is a necessary condition for communism. These four key features – the abolition of the division of labour, the development of individual potential, the transformation of work and the increase in material prosperity (made possible by the social ownership of the means of production) – are summed up in the Critique of the Gotha Programme: "In a higher phase of a communist society, after the enslaving subordination of the individual to the division of labour, and therewith also the antithesis between mental and physical labour, has vanished; after labour has become not only a means of life but life’s prime want; after the productive forces have also increased with the all-round development of the individual, and all the springs of common wealth flow more abundantly – only then can the narrow horizon of bourgeois right be crossed in its entirety and society inscribe on its banners: From each according to his ability, to each according to his needs!“ (Marx, Critique of the Gotha Programme, Collected Works of Marx and Engels (Lawrence & Wishart: London), Vol. 24, p. 87.) Levitas, The Concept of Utopia, p.49-50
Till now we have been considering the estrangement; the alienation of the worker only in one of its aspects, i.e., the worker's relationship to the products of his labour. But the estrangement is manifested not only in the result but in the act of production, within the producing activity itself. How could the worker come to face the product of his activity as a stranger, were it not that in the very act of production he was estranging himself from himself? The product is after all but the summary of the activity, of production. If then the product of labour is alienation, production itself must be active alienation, the alienation of activity, the activity of alienation. In the estrangement of the object of labour is merely summarised the estrangement, the alienation, in the activity of labour itself. What, then, constitutes the alienation of labour? First, the fact that labour is external to the worker, i.e., it does not belong to his intrinsic nature; that in his work, therefore, he does not affirm himself but denies himself, does not feel content but unhappy, does not develop freely his physical and mental energy but mortifies his body and ruins his mind. The worker therefore only feels himself outside his work, and in his work feels outside himself. He feels at home when he is not working, and when he is working he does not feel at home. His labour is therefore not voluntary, but coerced; it is forced labour. It is therefore not the satisfaction of a need; it is merely a means to satisfy needs external to it. Its alien character emerges clearly in the fact that as soon as no physical or other compulsion exists, labour is shunned like the plague. External labour, labour in which man alienates himself, is a labour of self-sacrifice, of mortification. Lastly, the external character of labour for the worker appears in the fact that it is not his own, but someone else's, that it does not belong to him, that in it he belongs, not to himself, but to another. Just as in religion the spontaneous activity of the human imagination, of the human brain and the human heart, operates on the individual independently of him—that is, operates as an alien, divine or diabolical activity—so is the worker's activity not his spontaneous activity. It belongs to another; it is the loss of his self. […] This relation [the relation of labour to the act of production] is the relation of the worker to his own activity as an alien activity not belonging to him; it is activity as suffering, strength as weakness, begetting as emasculating, the worker's own physical and mental energy, his personal life—for what is life but activity?—as an activity which is turned against him, independent of him and not belonging to him. Here we have self-estrangement, as previously we had the estrangement of the thing. Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts, Marx Engels Collected Works Volume 3 (International Publishers), p.274-275

Play

Exploration

Curiosity

Alteration

Work

Goal

Discipline

Repetition

Work: Goal-oriented activity

Thinking about this as a spectrum between 2 opposing types of activity

Division of Labor and Specialization
There is no other way to be faithful to, or even simply to understand, the actions of our comrades of the past than to profoundly reconceive the problem of revolution, which has been increasingly deprived of thought as it has become posed more intensely in concrete reality. But why does this reconception seem so difficult? Starting from an experience of free everyday life (that is, from a quest for freedom in everyday life) it is not so difficult. It seems to us that this question is quite concretely felt today among young people. And to feel it with enough urgency enables one to rediscover lost history, to salvage and rejudge it. It is not difficult for thought that concerns itself with questioning everything that exists. It is only necessary not to have abandoned philosophy (as have virtually all the philosophers), not to have abandoned art (as have virtually all the artists), and not to have abandoned contestation of present reality (as have virtually all the militants). When they are not abandoned, these questions all converge toward the same supersession. The specialists, whose power is geared to a society of specialization, have abandoned the critical truth of their disciplines in order to preserve the personal advantages of their function. But all real researches are converging toward a totality, just as real people are going to come together in order to try once again to escape from their prehistory. Situationist International, The Bad Days will End, Internationale Situationniste #7, https://libcom.org/article/bad-days-will-end-0
The Rise of Division of Labour and Manufacture
Digital Media and Computing
Computers as creative tools
Critique of digital media and computing in capitalism
Decentralized Media
LLMs
History of Technology
Writing
Printing Press
Information Storage
Tools for Thought
Writing
Computers as creative tools
Technical Basis of Production, Technological Development and Automation
Continuous Function of Machinery
Machines, Automation and its Effects in Production and Social Relations
Production and Social Reproduction
Whatever the form of the process of production in a society, it must be a continuous process, must continue to go periodically through the same phases. A society can no more cease to produce than it can cease to consume. When viewed, therefore, as a connected whole, and as flowing on with incessant renewal, every social process of production is, at the same time, a process of reproduction. The conditions of production are also those of reproduction. No society can go on producing, in other words, no society can reproduce, unless it constantly reconverts a part of its products into means of production, or elements of fresh products. All other circumstances remaining the same, the only mode by which it can reproduce its wealth, and maintain it at one level, is by replacing the means of production – i.e., the instruments of labour, the raw material, and the auxiliary substances consumed in the course of the year – by an equal quantity of the same kind of articles; these must be separated from the mass of the yearly products, and thrown afresh into the process of production. Hence, a definite portion of each year’s product belongs to the domain of production. Destined for productive consumption from the very first, this portion exists, for the most part, in the shape of articles totally unfitted for individual consumption. Marx, Capital, Volume 1 (Progress Publishers, 1887), p.401
Variable capital is therefore only a particular historical form of appearance of the fund for providing the necessaries of life, or the labour-fund which the labourer requires for the maintenance of himself and family, and which, whatever be the system of social production, he must himself produce and reproduce. If the labour-fund constantly flows to him in the form of money that pays for his labour, it is because the product he has created moves constantly away from him in the form of capital. But all this does not alter the fact, that it is the labourer’s own labour, realised in a product, which is advanced to him by the capitalist. Let us take a peasant liable to do compulsory service for his lord. He works on his own land, with his own means of production, for, say, 3 days a week. The 3 other days he does forced work on the lord’s domain. He constantly reproduces his own labour-fund, which never, in his case, takes the form of a money payment for his labour, advanced by another person. But in return, his unpaid forced labour for the lord, on its side, never acquires the character of voluntary paid labour. If one fine morning the lord appropriates to himself the land, the cattle, the seed, in a word, the, means of production of this peasant, the latter will thenceforth be obliged to sell his labour-power to the lord. He will, ceteris paribus, labour 6 days a week as before, 3 for himself, 3 for his lord, who thenceforth becomes a wages-paying capitalist. As before, he will use up the means of production as means of production, and transfer their value to the product. As before, a definite portion of the product will be devoted to reproduction. But from the moment that the forced labour is changed into wage labour, from that moment the labour-fund, which the peasant himself continues as before to produce and reproduce, takes the form of a capital advanced in the form of wages by the lord. The bourgeois economist whose narrow mind is unable to separate the form of appearance from the thing that appears, shuts his eyes to the fact, that it is but here and there on the face of the earth, that even nowadays the labour fund crops up in the form of capital. Marx, Capital, Volume 1 (Progress Publishers, 1887), p.402
Apart then from all accumulation, the mere continuity of the process of production, in other words simple reproduction, sooner or later, and of necessity, converts every capital into accumulated capital, or capitalized surplus-value. Even if that capital was originally acquired by the personal labor of its employer, it sooner or later becomes value appropriated without an equivalent, the unpaid labor of others materialized either in money or in some other object. We saw that in order to convert money into capital something more is required than the production and circulation of commodities. We saw that on the one side the possessor of value or money, on the other, the possessor of the value-creating substance; on the one side, the possessor of the means of production and subsistence, on the other, the possessor of nothing but labor-power, must confront one another as buyer and seller. The separation of labor from its product, of subjective labor-power from the objective conditions of labor, was therefore the real foundation in fact, and the starting point of capitalist production. But that which at first was but a starting point, becomes, by the mere continuity of the process, by simple reproduction, the peculiar result, constantly renewed and perpetuated, of capitalist production. On the one hand, the process of production incessantly converts material wealth into capital, into means of creating more wealth and means of enjoyment for the capitalist. On the other hand, the laborer, on quitting the process, is what he was on entering it, a source of wealth, but devoid of all means of making that wealth his own. Since, before entering on the process, his own labor has already been alienated from himself by the sale of his labor-power, has been appropriated by the capitalist and incorporated with capital, it must, during the process, be realized in a product that does not belong to him. Since the process of production is also the process by which the capitalist consumes labor-power, the product of the laborer is incessantly converted, not only into commodities, but into capital, into value that sucks-up the value creating power, into means of subsistence that buy the person of the laborer, into means of production that command the producers. The laborer therefore constantly produces material, objective wealth, but in the form of capital, of an alien power that dominates and exploits him; and the capitalist as constantly produces labor-power, but in the form of a subjective source of wealth, separated from the objects in and by which it can alone be realized; in short he produces the laborer, but as a wage laborer. This incessant reproduction, the perpetuation of the laborer, is the sine qua non of capitalist production. […] Capitalist production, therefore, of itself reproduces the separation between labor-power and the means of labor. It thereby reproduces and perpetuates the condition for exploiting the laborer. It incessantly forces him to sell his labor-power in order to live and enables the capitalist to purchase labor-power in order that he may enrich himself. It is no longer a mere accident, that capitalist and laborer confront each other in the market as buyer and seller. It is the process itself that incessantly hurls back the laborer on to the market as a vendor of his labor-power and that incessantly converts his own product into a means by which another man can purchase him. In reality, the laborer belongs to capital before he has sold himself to capital. His economic bondage is both brought about and concealed by the periodic sale of himself, by his change of masters, and by the oscillations in the market-price of labor-power. Capitalist production, therefore, under its aspect of a continuous connected process, of a process of reproduction, produces not only commodities, not only surplus-value, but it also produces and reproduces the capitalist relation; on the one side the capitalist, on the other the wage laborer. Marx, Capital, Volume 1 (Progress Publishers, 1887), p.403, 407
The husband tends to read the paper and wait for his dinner to be cooked and served, even when his wife goes out to work as he does and comes home with him. Clearly, the specific form of exploitation represented by domestic work demands a correspondingly specific form of struggle, namely the women’s struggle, within the family. If we fail to grasp completely that precisely this family is the very pillar of the capitalist organization of work, if we make the mistake of regarding it only as a superstructure, dependent for change only on the stages of the struggle in the factories, then we will be moving in a limping revolution that will always perpetuate and aggravate a basic contradiction in the class struggle, and a contradiction which is functional to capitalist development. We would, in other words, be perpetuating the error of considering ourselves as producers of use values only, of considering housewives external to the working class. As long as housewives are considered external to the class, the class struggle at every moment and any point is impeded, frustrated, and unable to find full scope for its action. To elaborate this further is not our task here. To expose and condemn domestic work as a masked form of productive labor, however, raises a series of questions concerning both the aims and the forms of struggle of women. Dalla Costa & James, The Power of Women and the Subversion of Community, p.35-36
The Realm of Necessity and Scarcity
Virtually all the Utopias, theories and revolutionary programs of the early nineteenth century were faced with problems of necessity—of how to allocate labor and material goods at a relatively low level of technological development. These problems permeated revolutionary thought in a way comparable only to the impact of original sin on Christian theology. The fact that men would have to devote a substantial portion of their time to toil, for which they would get scant returns, formed a major premise of all socialist ideology — authoritarian and libertarian, Utopian and scientific, Marxist and anarchist. Implicit in the Marxist notion of a planned economy was the fact, incontestably clear in Marx's day, that socialism would still be burdened by relatively scarce resources. Men would have to plan — in effect, to restrict — the distribution of goods and would have to rationalize — in effect, to intensify — the use of labor. Toil, under socialism, would be a duty, a responsibility which every able-bodied individual would have to undertake. Even Proudhon advanced this dour view when he wrote: "Yes, life is a struggle. But this struggle is not between man and man — it is between man and Nature; and it is each one's duty to share it." This austere, almost biblical, emphasis on struggle and duty reflects the harsh quality of socialist thought during the Industrial Revolution. […] The fact remains, however, that in both cases — the Marxist and the anarchist — the answer to the problem of want and work was shot through with ambiguity. The realm of necessity was brutally present; it could not be conjured away by mere theory and speculation. The Marxists could hope to administer necessity by means of a state, and the anarchists, to deal with it through free communities, but given the limited technological development of the last century, in the last analysis both schools depended on an act of faith to cope with the problem of want and work. […] In retrospect, it is astonishing to consider how long the problem of want and work cast its shadow over revolutionary theory. In a span of only nine decades — the years between 1850 and 1940 — Western society created, passed through and evolved beyond two major epochs of technological history — the paleotechnic age of coal and steel, and the neotechnic age of electric power, synthetic chemicals, electricity and internal combustion engines. Ironically, both ages of technology seemed to enhance the importance of toil in society. […] Surprising as it may seem today, little more than a generation ago socialism was equated with a work-oriented society and liberty with the material security provided by full employment. The world of necessity had subtly invaded and corrupted the ideal of freedom. Bookchin, Post-Scarcity Anarchism, Black Rose Books 1986, p.111-115
Social Systems
Systems theory replaces "subject" with "system," "object" with "environment," and conceptualizes the subject's ability to know and to deal with objects as systemic achievements that consist in registering and reducing the complexity of the environment. When systems learn to relate reflexively to their own systemic unity, this is merely an additional step in heightening their own complexity in order to be a better match for the hypercomplexity of the environment; this "self-consciousness" also remains within the logical sphere of the self-maintenance of systems. Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action, Vol 1, p.396
Whether the tendencies toward bureaucratization described by Weber will ever reach the Orwellian state in which all integrativeoperations have been converted from the - in my view, still fundamental-sociative mechanism of reaching understanding in language over to systemic mechanisms, and whether such a state is at all possible without a transformation of anthropologically deep-seated structures - these are open questions. I see the methodological weakness of an absolutized systems functionalism precisely in the fact that it formulates its basic concepts as if that process, whose beginnings Weber perceived, had already been concluded - as if a total bureaucratization had dehumanized society as a whole, consolidated it into a system torn from its roots in a communicatively structured lifeworld, and demoted the lifeworld to the status of one subsystem among many. For Adorno, this "administered world" was a vision of extreme horror; for Luhmann it has become a trivial presupposition. Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action, Vol 2, p.312
The propelling mechanism of the economic system has to be kept as free as possible from lifeworld restrictions as well as from the demands for legitimation directed to the administrative system. The internal systemic logic of capitalism can be rendered in social-theoretical terms by the formula that the functional necessities of systemically integrated domains of action shall be met, if need be, even at the cost of technicizing the lifeworld. Systems theory of the Luhmannian sort transforms this practical postulate into a theoretical one and thus makes its normative content unrecognizable. Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action, Vol 2, p.345
Ethics and Society
All sacred objects-flags, emblems, decorations, tatoos, ornaments, figures, idols, or natural objects and events-share this symbolic status. They figure as signs with conventional significations, and they all have the same semantic core: they represent the power of the sacred; they are "collective ideals that have fixed themselves on material objects:' This formulation comes from the interesting essay in which Durkheim gives his theory of collective consciousness the shape of a theory of symbolic forms: "collective representations originate only when they are embodied in mate- rial objects, things, or beings of every sort-figures, movements, sounds, words, and so on - that symbolize and delineate them in some outward appearance. For it is only by expressing their feelings, by translating them into signs, by symbolizing them externally, that the individual consciousnesses, which are, by nature, closed to each other, can feel that they are communicating and are in unison. The things that embody the collective representations arouse the same feelings as do the mental states that they represent and, in a manner of speaking, materialize. They, too, are respected, feared, and sought after as helping powers”. Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action, Vol.2, p.51-52
In that talk he defined his task as follows: "We shall show that moral rules are invested with a special authority by virtue of which they are obeyed simply because they command. We shall reaffirm, as a result of a purely empirical analysis, the notion of duty and nevertheless give a definition of it closely resembling that already given by Kant. Obligation is, then, one of the primary characteristics of the moral rule.” Violations of these norms are punished because they claim validity in virtue of moral authority; this validity does not accrue to them because external sanctions compel their observance. "The term 'moral authority' is opposed to material authority or physical supremacy.'' The aspect of the validity of moral rules calling for explanation is precisely that they possess a binding power that, rather than itself presupposing sanctions, justifies the applications of sanctions when they are violated. This is what Durkheim is driving at with his comparison between technical and moral rules: "Thus there are rules that present this particular characteristic: we refrain from performing the acts they forbid simply because they are forbidden. This is what is meant by the obligatory character of the moral rule.” Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action, Vol 2, p.48
That an emblem is useful as a rallying-center for any sort of a group it is superfluous to point out. By expressing the social unity in a material form, it makes this more obvious to all, and for that very reason the use of emblematic symbols must have spread quickly when once thought of. But more than that, this idea spontaneously arises out of the conditions of common life; for the emblem is not merely a convenient process for clarifying the sentiments society has of itself: it also serves to create these sentiments; it is one of its constituent elements. In fact, if left to themselves, individual consciousnesses are closed to each other; they can communicate only by means of signs which express their internal states. If the communication established between them is to become a real communion, that is to say, a fusion of all particular sentiments into one common sentiment, the signs expressing them must themselves be fused into one single and unique resultant. It is the appearance of this that informs the individuals that they are in harmony and makes them conscious of their moral unity. It is by uttering the same cry, pronouncing the same words, or performing the same gesture regarding the same object that they become and feel themselves to be in unison. Durkheim, Elementary Forms, p.262, quoted in Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action, Vol.2, p.55
Buber’s argument is that a ‘society is naturally composed not of disparate individuals but of associative units’, and that the health of a society depends on the density of voluntary associations that constitute it; capitalist society is thus ‘a society inherently poor in structure and growing visibly poorer every day’. The strength of utopian socialism is that it addressed itself to the issue of ‘a renewal of society through a renewal of its cell-tissue’, and aimed to ‘substitute society for State to the greatest degree possible’. Levitas, The Concept of Utopia, p.53
According to Precht, the insight that material rewards spoil people’s character has a deeply disturbing aspect. After all, our entire economic system is based on such exchanges. And if economics is the continuation of ethics by other means, as economist Karl Homann and others claim – what kind of ethics is it that causes tens of thousands of people to starve to death every day? They are the ones who did not have enough to offer in market exchanges. Accordingly, the question arises how people might withdraw from this peculiar power of money without a “fundamental criticism of our entire economic system,” which Precht, too, presents as illusory. Social psychologist Harald Welzer rightly deems so-called Realpolitik as a “politics of illusion,” if we consider the extent to which people have closed their eyes on the global societal catastrophes. In this respect, he contends, only utopian politics are realistic. Habermann, We are not Born as Egoists, https://wealthofthecommons.org/essay/we-are-not-born-egoists
Durkheim first discusses the Kantian opposition between duty and inclination from the standpoint that the relation of moral precepts to the interests of the individual is one of tension. Imperatives of self-maintenance, interests in the satisfaction of private needs and desires - in short, action orientations that are utilitarian and related to oneself- are not as such in accord with moral requirements, which demand, rather, that the actor raise himself above himself. The selfiessness of the morally acting individual corresponds to the universality of morally normed expectations, which are directed to all the members of a community: "Morality begins with membership in a group, whatever that group may be.’ Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action, Vol. 2, p.48
Nietzsche and Values
In fact, the notion of value implies a critical reversal. On the one hand, values appear or are given as principles: and evaluation presupposes values on the basis of which phenomena are appraised. But, on the other hand and more pro­foundly, it is values which presuppose evaluations, "perspectives of appraisal", from which their own value is derived. The problem of critique is that of the value of values, of the evaluation from which their value arises, thus the problem of their creation . Evaluation is defined as the differential element of corresponding values, an element which is both critical and creative. Evaluations, in essence, are not values but ways of being, modes of existence of those who judge and evaluate, serving as principles for the values on the basis of which they judge. […] This is the crucial point; high and low,noble and base, are not values but represent the differential element from which the value of values themselves derives. Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy, p.1-2
We need to abandon the idea that there is politics only where there is vision, program, project, and perspective, where there is a goal, decisions to be made, and problems to be solved. What is truly political is only what emerges from life and makes it a definite, oriented reality. And it is born from what is nearby and not from a projection toward the far-distant. The nearby doesn't mean the restricted, the limited, the narrow, the local. It means rather what is in tune, vibrant, adequate, present, sensible, luminous, and familiar-the prehensible and comprehensible. It's not a spatial notion but an ethical one. Geographic distance is unable to remove us from that which we feel to be near. Conversely, being neighbors doesn't always make us close. It's only.from contact that the friend and the enemy are discovered. The Invisible Committee, Now, p.65
The Making of Collective Identities
That an emblem is useful as a rallying-center for any sort of a group it is superfluous to point out. By expressing the social unity in a material form, it makes this more obvious to all, and for that very reason the use of emblematic symbols must have spread quickly when once thought of. But more than that, this idea spontaneously arises out of the conditions of common life; for the emblem is not merely a convenient process for clarifying the sentiments society has of itself: it also serves to create these sentiments; it is one of its constituent elements. In fact, if left to themselves, individual consciousnesses are closed to each other; they can communicate only by means of signs which express their internal states. If the communication established between them is to become a real communion, that is to say, a fusion of all particular sentiments into one common sentiment, the signs expressing them must themselves be fused into one single and unique resultant. It is the appearance of this that informs the individuals that they are in harmony and makes them conscious of their moral unity. It is by uttering the same cry, pronouncing the same words, or performing the same gesture regarding the same object that they become and feel themselves to be in unison. Durkheim, Elementary Forms, p.262, quoted in Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action, Vol.2, p.55
All sacred objects-flags, emblems, decorations, tatoos, ornaments, figures, idols, or natural objects and events-share this symbolic status. They figure as signs with conventional significations, and they all have the same semantic core: they represent the power of the sacred; they are "collective ideals that have fixed themselves on material objects:' This formulation comes from the interesting essay in which Durkheim gives his theory of collective consciousness the shape of a theory of symbolic forms: "collective representations originate only when they are embodied in mate- rial objects, things, or beings of every sort-figures, movements, sounds, words, and so on - that symbolize and delineate them in some outward appearance. For it is only by expressing their feelings, by translating them into signs, by symbolizing them externally, that the individual consciousnesses, which are, by nature, closed to each other, can feel that they are communicating and are in unison. The things that embody the collective representations arouse the same feelings as do the mental states that they represent and, in a manner of speaking, materialize. They, too, are respected, feared, and sought after as helping powers”. Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action, Vol.2, p.51-52
One can see the structural similarities between ritual action and symbolically mediated interaction steered via signals. Paleosymbols have a meaning that is not yet modally differentiated, and, like signals, they possess the power to steer behavior. On the other hand, ritual actions have lost their adaptive function; they serve to establish and maintain a collective identity, on the strength of which the steering of interaction is transferred from a genetic program anchored in the individual organism over to an intersubjectively shared cultural program. This program can be transmitted only if the intersubjective unity of a communication community is secured. The group can constitute itself as a collectivity when the motivational makeup of the associated individuals is taken hold of symbolically and structured through the same semantic contents. The predominantly appelative-expressive character of rites suggests that instinctual residues are symbolically absorbed and sublimated […]. Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action, Vol.2, p.55
In societies that have attained the level of civilizations, worldviews have the function, among others, of legitimating political leadership. They offer a potential for grounding that can be used to justify a political order or the institutional framework of a society in general. Thus they lend support to the moral authority or validity of basic norms. As Weber emphasized, the legitimating power of worldviews is to be explained primarily by the fact that cultural knowledge can meet with rationally motivated approval. The situation is different with the not yet intellectually elaborated worldviews common in tribal societies; they do make available a potential for narrative explanations, but they are still so tightly interwoven with the system of institutions that they explicate it rather than subsequently legitimate it. These worldviews establish an analogical nexus between man, nature, and society which is represented as a totality in the basic concepts of mythical powers. Because these worldviews project a totality in which everything corresponds with everything else, they subjectively attach the collective identity of the group or the tribe to the cosmic order and integrate it with the system of social institutions. In the limit case, worldviews function as a kind of drive belt that transforms the basic religious consensus into the energy of social solidarity and passes it on to social institutions, thus giving them a moral authority. What is of primary interest in analyzing the interrelation between normative consensus, worldview, and institutional system, however, is that the connection is established through channels of linguistic communication. Whereas ritual actions take place at a pregrammatical level, religious worldviews are connected with full-fledged communicative actions. Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action, Vol.2, p.56
We need to abandon the idea that there is politics only where there is vision, program, project, and perspective, where there is a goal, decisions to be made, and problems to be solved. What is truly political is only what emerges from life and makes it a definite, oriented reality. And it is born from what is nearby and not from a projection toward the far-distant. The nearby doesn't mean the restricted, the limited, the narrow, the local. It means rather what is in tune, vibrant, adequate, present, sensible, luminous, and familiar-the prehensible and comprehensible. It's not a spatial notion but an ethical one. Geographic distance is unable to remove us from that which we feel to be near. Conversely, being neighbors doesn't always make us close. It's only.from contact that the friend and the enemy are discovered. The Invisible Committee, Now, p.65
Faced with capitalist organization, a destituent potential cannot confine itself to its own immanence, to all that grows under the ice in the absence of sunshine, to all the attempts at local construction, to a series of punctual attacks, even if this whole little world were to regularly find itself caught up in great turbulent demonstrations. And the insurrection will definitely not wait for every­ one to become insurrectionary. The mistake of the Leninists, Trotskyists, Negriists, and other sub­ politicians, a telling one fortunately, is to believe that a period that sees all the hegemonies lying broken on the ground could still tolerate a political hegemony, even a partisan one of the sort that Pablo Iglesias or Chantal Mouffe fantasize. What they don't see is that in a time of general horizontality, horizontality itself is the verticality. No one can expect to organize the autonomy of others any longer. The only verticality still possible is that of the situation, which commands all of its components because it exceeds them, because the sum of forces in presence is greater than each one of them. The only thing capable of transversally uniting all the elements deserting this society into a historical party is an intelligence of the situation. It is everything that makes the situation gradually understandable, everything that tracks the movements of the adver­sary, everything that identifies the usable paths and the obstacles-the systematic character of the obstacles. Based on that intelligence, an occasional vertical expedient needed to tilt certain situations in the desired direction can well be improvised. The Invisible Committee, Now, p.157-158
Classes and Fragmentation in Society
The attitude of realism that dominant capitalism requires is essentially depressive. The management of this collective depression goes through a series of thresholds. First of all, we come to expect very little: nothing will ever happen again. Then we think that maybe the things that once happened weren’t actually so great. Finally, we accept that nothing has ever happened, nor could ever happen. The more that depression is normalised, the harder it is to even identify it. Radically lowered expectations become habituated. Time flattens out. This generalised depression is one reason that so little has happened since the major capitalist crisis of 2008. Yet this depression is itself both a symptom and a cause of something else: the decomposition of class solidarity. We would have to go deep into the nineteenth century to find a moment when class consciousness was as weak as it is now. Not only capital, but also elements of the post-68 left, have maintained that class is an outmoded category, unfit to deal with the multiplicities and complications of twentyfirst-century life. Yet these complications are in some respects a mirage, concealing the persistence of a class structure in which the majority of the population is marked as inferior. The reality of class continues, but without class consciousness. Beverley Skeggs and Helen Wood’s work on the class basis of reality TV and Owen Jones’s analysis of the “demonisation of the working class” show that class is displayed even as it is disavowed in contemporary culture. Mark Fisher & Darren Ambrose, For Now, Our Desire is Nameless - The Reality of Class Continues, K-Punk: The Collected and Unpublished Writings of Mark Fisher, 2018, p.598
Far from representing the emergence of a coherent agent, the expansion of the surplus population marks the tendential disappearance of the previous revolutionary horizon. It was once possible — indeed quite reasonable — to think of the proletariat as an emergent social subject, becoming ever larger and more unified with the global spread and development of the capitalist mode of production, and particularly with the incorporation of a growing portion of the class into industrial employment. Today, in an era of slowing economic growth — which is also an era of general deindustrialisation — the revolutionary orientations of the past no longer make sense. The working class — always internally differentiated — displays a diminishing capacity for unification under a single hegemonic figure, thus realising its always latent tendency to decompose into fragments, facing off one against the other. At the heart of this fractiousness is the division of the class into two parts: (1) a shrinking one that retains higher wages and social protections, but must constantly fight rearguard actions against capitalist “reforms” and restructurings; and (2) a growing one that faces poor prospects of employment and is offered few social protections. The more secure sector — which is also more organised — often needs the support of the more precarious in order to win its struggles. However, calls for greater “inclusion” of such people may stoke valid fears that this will undermine more secure positions, opening up access to education and training, and thereby increasing labour supply and reducing bargaining power. At the same time, members of the more precarious part may be rightly suspicious of the motives of the more secure: after the sacrifices have been made, won’t it be merely the latter’s rearguard battles that have been won? After all, those with security rarely take to the streets when it is the less fortunate who are getting screwed. The expansion of the surplus population is important in explaining this division, but it is not the only meaningful one within the class. There is a potentially infinite variety of such distinctions, so the question of explaining current divisions can in a sense be reversed: What was the unity that is now in advanced stages of decay? How did it come about? This is a question that we have attempted to answer elsewhere in this issue, in ‘A History of Separation’. For our purposes here though, it is enough to note simply that there was once a hegemonic identity and orientation among workers that could provide grounds for affirming certain struggles as central, while excluding others as secondary or unimportant. It is equally clear that this affirmation seems less and less plausible today. In place of the identity of the worker, we are now faced with so many competing alternatives, each with its own strategic priorities: those who want more jobs against those who want to stave off environmental catastrophe; those who want to preserve the family wage for unionised male workers against those who want gender equality; those of dominant national or racial identities against those of racialised minorities, and so on. In this sense, the fractiousness of “identity politics” is symptomatic of an era. In a period of increasingly slow economic growth under the threat of ecological catastrophe, it seems diminishingly plausible to claim that fighting the battles of one part of the class will advance the class as a whole. This is why we reject any attempt to find in surplus populations an ersatz social subject that might replace the hegemonic role played by the white male factory worker in the workers’ movement. At present there seems to be no class fraction — whether “the most strategically placed” or “the most oppressed” — whose struggles express a general interest. At the same time, attempts to conjure up a new unity from this diversity by simply renaming it as “multitude” or “precariat”, for example, merely gloss over this fundamental problem of internal division. If there is any revolutionary potential at present, it seems that it stands to be actualised not in the struggle of any particular class fraction, but rather, in those moments when diverse fractions are drawn together in struggle in spite of their mutual suspicions; despite the lack of a stable, consistent hegemonic pole. In such moments, the demands of various sections of the class come into conflict with one another — a conflict that may bring the prospect of destabilising or undermining mutually exclusive demands and identities. The modes by which social life is organised and segmented within capitalist societies can then come to appear as obstacles to further struggle, dividing workers against one another. The question of how to move forward is then at least raised, though with no easy answers. After all, a definitive answer would involve an overcoming of the unity-in-separation that organises social life. Endnotes, An Identical Abject-Subject?, Endnotes #4 (2015), https://endnotes.org.uk/articles/an-identical-abject-subject
It is amongst these pressurised sections of the working class — the more insecure, informal, racialised stratum, which struggled to be reabsorbed by the labour market — that the riot became particularly prominent as a mode of struggle, from the mid to late 1970s, and it seems reasonable to hypothesise that this newfound prominence is directly related to the absence of possibilities for “normal”, regulatory, demands-making of the corporatist type. In developments dialectically entwined with the struggles of this section of the working class, the police in this period increasingly developed new tactics of repression specifically targeted at poor urban neighbourhoods. One might even say that the riot and its repression became a sort of proxy way in which class relations were regulated, in the absence of the “normal” mode of regulation exercised by wage bargaining, etc. This is not a perverse point: historically riots have pushed demands towards which the state has made concessions. This proved true of 2011 just as it did of 1981; more recently it has proved true in the US, after the 2014 Ferguson riots. In Endnotes 3 we termed the social logic of stigmatisation associated with such developments “abjection” — a concept borrowed from Imogen Tyler’s recent book Revolting Subjects. With its in some ways dubious provenance, we were not especially fond of this term, but it seemed nonetheless quite appropriate as a name for certain problematics with which we were grappling. What was useful was that this term named a particular kind of abstract structure in which something is cast off, marked as contingent or lowly, without actually being exteriorised. The relevance of such a structure here should be obvious: the initially racialised communities subject to the forms of oppression that develop through this period are socially marked as a problem — or even as a sort of rejection from the healthy core of the body politic — without being literally exteriorised in any sense from either economy or state. Police repression looms large in the immediate experience of abjection in this sense, but the term is also intended to capture broader social processes, such as the moral crusades of reactionary press, or the constant obsessing of politicians over the various failed subjects of the nation. These are not simply unconnected moments; concrete connections between all of them could be articulated such that we see a particular socio-political pattern of oppression. […] If the development of new styles of policing might be partially linked to the management of a surplus population at the outset then, this tie becomes increasingly tenuous as we get into the 1980s and 90s. One might speak of a developing “autonomisation” of the apparatus of repression and its related stigmatising and racialising logics. By this we mean that an apparatus which initially seems to apply in particular to clear, economically marginal, parts of the class, becomes dissociated from that strict function. While those who are subject to these processes of abjection come to symbolise the limits of affirmable class, these limits are in actuality unstable, shifting and ill-defined. They become more a socio-political, or perhaps socio-cultural, than a political-economic construct. If this is the case, it is doubtful whether we are likely to have any luck constructing the object of this apparatus in purely political-economic terms. Who is “abjected” then? We might provisionally reply, somewhat tautologically: those who are defined as such by the fact that they are the object of these processes of repression. There is no particular pre-existing trait or social categorisation which must, in itself, necessarily or inevitably mark one out as an object of these processes, which is not to say that certain social categories do not end up being reproduced in such positions. Abjection is closely related — though not identical — to racialisation. […] If we are now speaking of the subjects of “abjection” rather than “surplus population” here, how about the abject as a social subject? These developments signify, however, not the creation of a new form of social (or potentially, revolutionary) subject, but rather the problem of any class subject at all. In itself, that which is abjected would seem to be by definition unaffirmable, ununifiable, for it is not a positive existence of its own, but merely the negative of something else. Those who are abjected are not something other than the proletariat. More often than not they are workers, students etc. Only, they are workers, students etc who are vilified, cast beyond the pale of social respectability. These developments represent problems for the constitution of a unified class subject; indeed, they are direct expressions of the decomposition of the class. The abject is projected as a sort of limit-concept of affirmable social class, in an operation where that class is itself negatively defined against what has been abjected. “We are not like them” replaces “the workers united will never be defeated”. And as such, abjection can have a somewhat fractal quality: not applying uniformly to one social group, but across and between social groups, depending to some extent on where one stands in the social landscape. There is always someone more abject than you. Endnotes, An Identical Abject-Subject?, Endnotes #4 (2015), https://endnotes.org.uk/articles/an-identical-abject-subject
It is often asserted that, within the definition of wage labor, women in domestic labor are not productive. In fact precisely the opposite is true if one thinks of the enormous quantity of social services which capitalist organization transforms into privatized activity, putting them on the backs of housewives. Domestic labor is not essentially “feminine work”; a woman doesn’t fulfill herself more or get less exhausted than a man from washing and cleaning. These are social services inasmuch as they serve the reproduction of labor power. And capital, precisely by instituting its family structure, has “liberated” the man from these functions so that he is completely “free” for direct exploitation; so that he is free to “earn” enough for a woman to reproduce him as labor power. It has made men wage slaves, then, to the degree that it has succeeded in allocating these services to women in the family, and by the same process controlled the flow of women onto the labor market […]. And women are of service not only because they carry out domestic labor without a wage and without going on strike, but also because they always receive back into the home all those who are periodically expelled from their jobs by economic crisis. The family, this maternal cradle always ready to help and protect in time of need, has been in fact the best guarantee that the unemployed do not immediately become a horde of disruptive outsiders. Dalla Costa & James, The Power of Women and the Subversion of Community, p.33-34
In order to found the bourgeois mode of production, it was not necessary for all workers to be given equality under the sign of “the citizen”. Historically, “citizen” only names a specific category to which both property owners and certain proletarians are able to belong. As capitalist juridical relations disavow class through the reconstitution of the difference between citizen and other, the historical conditions under which the bourgeois mode of production was itself constituted were various forms of unfreedom. For this reason we have citizen and other as mapping onto: male (white)/ non-(white) male. For instance, under the conditions of slavery in North America, the classification of white was necessary to maintain the property of masters over slaves. Women were also classified as other, but for different reasons, as we shall see. […] Endnotes, The Logic of Gender, Endnotes #3 (2013), https://endnotes.org.uk/articles/the-logic-of-gender
Ironically, the reproduction of dual spheres of gender and the anchoring of women to one and not the other is perpetuated and constantly re-established by the very mechanism of the “sex-blind” labour-market, which obtains not for the man/woman distinction directly but rather for the price distinction, or the exchange-value of their labour-power. Indeed, labour markets, if they are to remain markets, must be “sex-blind”. Markets, as the locus of exchanges of equivalents, are supposed to blur concrete differences in a pure comparison of abstract values. How then can this “sex-blind” market reproduce the gender difference? Once a group of individuals, women, are defined as “those who have children” and once this social activity, “having children”, is structurally formed as constituting a handicap, women are defined as those who come to the labour-market with a potential disadvantage. This systematic differentiation — through the market-determined risk identified as childbearing “potential” — keeps those who embody the signifier “woman” anchored to the IMM sphere. Therefore, because capital is a “sex-blind” abstraction, it concretely punishes women for having a sex, even though that “sexual difference” is produced by capitalist social relations, and absolutely necessary to the reproduction of capitalism itself. […]. As an apparent contradiction, once sexual difference becomes structurally defined and reproduced, woman as a bearer of labour-power with a higher social cost becomes its opposite: the commodity labour-power with a cheaper price. […] capitalists […] will […] privilege the labour-power that is likely to be the most reliable over a long period. If the worker is potentially going to leave, then she will not be as good an investment, and will get a lower price. Endnotes, The Logic of Gender, Endnotes #3 (2013), https://endnotes.org.uk/articles/the-logic-of-gender
Aris Goudouras
It seems that the Endnotes group admits that there is no strict politico-economic category for a unified working class subject (corresponding to surplus population). And Laclau and Mouffe’stegory constructed in the socio-political or (at least partially) discursive field. Laclau and Mouffe’s theory of hegemony could be useful here.
Needs and Scarcity
[…] what constitutes human need (as distinct from animal need) lies in investing the object with a value that exceeds, for example, its simple inscription in the 'instinctual' opposition, nutritive-non-nutritive (which 'holds' for ani­mals as well) and which establishes within the nutritive the distinction between the edible and the non-edible, which creates food in the cultural sense and arranges foods within a hierarchy, classifying them into 'better foods' and foods that are 'not as good' (in the sense of cultural value not in that of subjective tastes). This cultural sampling among available foods and the corresponding hierarchization, struc­turing, etc. are leaning on natural givens, but they do not stem from them. It is social need that creates scarcity as social scarcity, and not the opposite. It is neither the availability of snails and frogs nor their scarcity that makes them for contemporary, nearby and related cultures, in one instance a gourmet's delight and in the other a sure cause of vomiting. One has only to draw up the catalogue of everything that humans can eat, and actually have eaten (not feeling any the worse for it) in different periods and in different societies, to see that what is edible for humans far exceeds what each culture has taken as its food, and that what has determined this choice has not been simply natural availability and technical possibilities. This is even more clearly appar­ent when one examines needs other than food. This choice is carried by a system of imaginary significations that value or devalue, structure and hierarchize an intersecting ensemble of objects and corresponding lacks; and it is here that one can read, more easily than anywhere else, what is just as uncertain as it is incontestable - the orientation of a society. Castoriadis, The Imaginary Institution of Society, p.150
[…] human needs, to the extent that they are social and not simply biological, are inseparable from their objects, and both these needs and their objects are in every instance instituted by the society considered. Castoriadis, The Imaginary Institution of Society, p.171
Needs in Capitalism and Beyond
Marx’s categories of need (we shall see that he gives several interpretations of it) are not as a whole economic categories. He tends to treat concepts of need as non-economic categories, as historical-philosophical, that is as anthropological value categories, and therefore as not subject to definition within the economic system. Agnes Heller, The Theory of Need in Marx, Chapter 1
In our view the “natural needs” are not a group of needs but a limit concept: a limit (different for different societies) beyond which human life is no longer reproducible as such, beyond which the limit of bare existence is passed […]. It would be sheer elitism, at least in our world, to eliminate this limit concept from the discussion of man’s needs. Therefore I shall speak not of “natural needs” but of the “existential limit to the satisfaction of needs”. Agnes Heller, The Theory of Need in Marx, Chapter 1
No specific product or need possesses the quality of being a luxury product or a luxury need. That is determined solely by the question of whether the object is possessed and used (and therefore the corresponding need is satisfied) by the majority of the population or only by a minority which represents a significantly higher level of purchasing power as a result of the social division of labor. As a consequence of increasing productivity, and as a consequence of changes in the social structure, needs that originally were luxury needs become necessary needs, without them undergoing the slightest modification. Agnes Heller, The Theory of Need in Marx, Chapter 1
According to Marx, the end of social production ought to be the satisfaction of social needs. But capitalist industry and agriculture do not produce for needs, nor for their satisfaction. The end of production is the valorisation of capital, and the satisfaction of needs (on the market) is only a means towards this end. Agnes Heller, The Theory of Need in Marx, Chapter 1
Marx judges capitalism as a society that imposes quantitative limits on quality, and in two different relationships: “The transformation into money, exchange value as such, as limit of production, [is equivalent to] restriction of the production of use values by exchange value; or that real wealth has to take a specific form distinct from itself, a form not absolutely identical with it, in order to become an object of production at all.” […] Capitalism “quantifies” all its objective expressions and produces them (as it also produces the needs directed towards them) only if it is “profitable” to do so. Capitalism at the same time quantifies the complexly qualitative world of human needs, turns into quasi-exchange value and renders it “purchasable”; all qualitative needs that can neither be quantified nor purchased are inhibited. Agnes Heller, The Theory of Need in Marx, Chapter 2
How can the values of radical criticism become the values of the masses, that is, how can Ought become the collective Ought? The reply is: “Theory is actualised in a people only in so far as it actualises their needs. … A deep-going revolution can only be a revolution in basic needs.” The “bearers” of radical needs are therefore those who can actualise radical deep-going theory. Marx then looks for the bearers of these radical needs and in the end he finds them in the working class. Agnes Heller, The Theory of Need in Marx, Chapter 3
1. Capitalism is an antinomous society: its essence is alienation. The wealth of the species and the poverty of the individual are reciprocally based and reproduce each other. The antinomy is that of commodity production becoming universal. (Marx says: “Value having become capital, and living labour confronting it as a mere use value, so that living labor appears as a mere means to realise objectified, dead labor …, and having produced, as the end product, alien wealth on one side and, on the other, the penury which is living labour capacity’s sole possession.” 2. Capitalist society, as a totality, as a “social body”, produces not only alienation but the consciousness of alienation, in other words, radical needs. 3. This consciousness (radical needs) is necessarily generated by capitalism. 4. This consciousness (the complex of radical needs) already transcends capitalism by its existence, and its development makes it impossible for capitalism to remain the basis of production. The need to resolve the antinomy and the activity directed towards this end are therefore constituted in the collective Ought, in the consciousness that “exceeds its bounds”. This concept of “consciousness exceeding its bounds” is beyond question the same as the “imputed consciousness” which is a central category in Lukacs’ “History and Class Consciousness” […]. Although Marx does not say so, it is obvious that this “consciousness exceeding its bounds” is not identical with the “empirical consciousness” of the working class. It is not consciousness of misery and still less poverty in the narrow sense: the needs that flow from it (or which constitute its base) are not directed towards “greater possession” and still less towards higher wages or “a better standard of living”. It is the simple consciousness of alienation, the recognition that social relations are alienated. from this there follows (or this constitutes the base for) the need to overcome alienation, to overturn the alienated social and productive relations in a revolutionary way, and to create general social and productive relations which are not alienated. As yet, history has not answered the question as to whether capitalist society in fact produces this “consciousness exceeding its bounds”, which in Marx’s day did not exist, and whose existence Marx therefore had to project. Agnes Heller, The Theory of Need in Marx, Chapter 3
The system of needs in communism must be dealt with from two different aspects: from that of material and non-material needs, and from that of the relation between these two types within a single structure of needs. By “material needs” I mean needs whose objects and means of satisfaction (used in consumption and in productive consumption) must be produced and continually reproduced. Needs of a non-material character are, in contrast, those whose objects of satisfaction are not “produced” in the organic interchange with nature or are not produced at all. (I know this is a not “pure” distinction. To satisfy the need of art, production it to some extent necessary: houses must be built, books must be printed. But the need for art as such is not satisfied either by the house or by the book but by the work of art, which as an objectivation does not belong to the sphere of production). […] In Marx’s view, the sphere of production is the field which will always remain “the field of necessity”; above it is the “realm of freedom”, which subordinates production to its own ends. Agnes Heller, The Theory of Need in Marx, Chapter 4
The category of “socially necessary labor time” will be interpretable only in relation to the process of material production. (The concept of “socially necessary labor time” is not applicable to any “free” activity, whether medicine, teaching, planning, or scientific and artistic activity. Agnes Heller, The Theory of Need in Marx, Chapter 4
Post-Scarcity
The society of the future is also a society of material wealth, which continues to grow. This idea is encountered in virtually all of Marx’s works. I shall cite just one example as proof. In the third volume of Theories of Surplus Value, he describes the two alternatives for increasing “disposable time”. One alternative would be to produce greater wealth in half the current average labour time. The other would be to reduce the labour time by half in such a way as to direct the remaining half towards the satisfaction of “necessary needs” as they are at present. Marx considers it a theoretical mistake, a lack of clarity, to confuse these two alternatives. He explicitly declares himself to be in favour of the first of them. The base for the future development of production will be the extraordinary growth in the proportion of fixed capital, which is quite possible because the increase in production will be independent of the valorisation of capital. The increase in the proportion of fixed capital to levels that are impossible under capitalism is the guarantee that material production will require ever less living labour. This is the only way to reduce labour time uninterruptedly whilst maintaining a constant increase in production. This does not of course mean that dead labour will dominate living labour (because the capital relation no longer exists); on the contrary, living labour will prevail over dead. Agnes Heller, The Theory of Need in Marx, Chapter 4
The “society of associated producers” appears in this quotation as a society in which labour is carried out by machines, in which “fixed capital” therefore completely predominates and in which — at least in the process of material production — labour power is employed only “as watchman and regulator”. To use a modern expression, Marx presupposes complete automation. In this way a specific type of labour acquires an extraordinary importance, namely, scientific labour, or (as Marx calls it) “labour in general”. Scientific labour is not, however, immediately productive labour, but the activity of the general intellect: planning, projection and so forth. This cannot however be measured in labour time, since the concept of “socially necessary labour time” is not applicable. In short, material wealth is still supplied by production, but no longer by productive labour in the conventional sense of the term. This determines the hegemony of intellectual labour over so-called “physical” labour. Agnes Heller, The Theory of Need in Marx, Chapter 4
The material wealth which comes about through production is not and cannot be anything but a condition of the general wealth of society. The true wealth of society is realised through the free self-activity of social individuals and through their qualitatively many-sided system of needs. The true wealth of man and society consists not in labour time but in free time. For this very reason the wealth of the society of associated producers cannot be measured by labour time but only by free time. I shall here refer not to the well known passages in the Grundrisse, but to the third volume of Theories of Surplus Value: “Labour time, even if exchange value is eliminated, always remains the creative substance of wealth and the measure of the cost of its production. But free time, disposable time, is wealth itself, partly for the enjoyment of the product, partly for free activity, which - unlike labour - is not dominated by the pressure of an extraneous purpose which must be fulfilled, and the fulfilment of which is regarded as a natural necessity or a social duty, according to one’s inclination.” Agnes Heller, The Theory of Need in Marx, Chapter 4
What are the organisational perspectives of life in a society which authentically "reorganises production on the basis of the free and equal association of the producers"? Work would more and more be reduced as an exterior necessity through the automation of production and the socialisation of vital goods, which would finally give complete liberty to the individual. Thus liberated from all economic responsibility, liberated from all the debts and responsibilities from the past and other people, humankind will exude a new surplus value, incalculable in money because it would be impossible to reduce it to the measure of waged work. The guarantee of the liberty of each and of all is in the value of the game, of life freely constructed. The exercise of this ludic recreation is the framework of the only guaranteed equality with non-exploitation of man by man. The liberation of the game, its creative autonomy, supersedes the ancient division between imposed work and passive leisure. Situationist Manifesto, Internationale Situationniste #4, https://libcom.org/article/situationist-manifesto
What would be the principle characteristics of the new culture and how would it compare with ancient art? Against the spectacle, the realised situationist culture introduces total participation. Against preserved art, it is the organisation of the directly lived moment. Against particularised art, it will be a global practice with a bearing, each moment, on all the usable elements. Naturally this would tend to collective production which would be without doubt anonymous (at least to the extent where the works are no longer stocked as commodities, this culture will not be dominated by the need to leave traces.) The minimum proposals of these experiences will be a revolution in behaviour and a dynamic unitary urbanism capable of extension to the entire planet, and of being further extensible to all habitable planets. Against unilateral art, situationist culture will be an art of dialogue, an art of interaction. Today artists - with all culture visible - have become entirely separated from society, just as they are separated from each other by competition. But faced with this impasse of capitalism, art has remained essentially unilateral in response. This enclosed era of primitivism must be superseded by complete communication. At a higher stage, everyone will become an artist, i.e., inseparably a producer-consumer of total culture creation, which will help the rapid dissolution of the linear criteria of novelty. Everyone will be a situationist so to speak, with a multidimensional inflation of tendencies, experiences, or radically different "schools" - not successively, but simultaneously. We will inaugurate what will historically be the last of the crafts. The role of amateur-professional situationist - of anti-specialist - is again a specialisation up to the point of economic and mental abundance, when everyone becomes an "artist," in the sense that the artists have not attained the construction of their own life. However, the last craft of history is so close to the society without a permanent division of labour, that when it appeared amongst the S.I., its status as a craft was generally denied. Situationist Manifesto, Internationale Situationniste #4, https://libcom.org/article/situationist-manifesto
Defining the new poverty also entails defining the new wealth. To the image propagated by the dominant society - according to which it has evolved (both on its own and in response to acceptable reformist pressure) from an economy of profit to an economy of needs - must be counterposed an economy of desires, which could be defined as: technological society plus the imagination of what could be done with it. The economy of needs is falsified in terms of habit. Habit is the natural process by which fulfilled desire is degraded into need and is confirmed, objectified and universally recognized as need. The present economy is directly geared to the fabrication of habits, and manipulates people by forcing them to repress their desires. Situationist International, The Bad Days will End, Internationale Situationniste #7, https://libcom.org/article/bad-days-will-end-0
The next form of society will not be based on industrial production. It will be a society of realized art. Situationist International, The Bad Days will End, Internationale Situationniste #7, https://libcom.org/article/bad-days-will-end-0
The present era can test innumerable innovations, but it is incapable of putting them to good use because it is chained to the fundamental conservation of an old order. Over and over, in all our innovating formulations, we must stress the need for a revolutionary transformation of society. Now, The SI, Internationale Situationniste #9, https://libcom.org/article/now-si
After thousands of years of torturous development, the countries of the Western world (and potentially all countries) are confronted by the possibility of a materially abundant, almost workless era in which most of the means of life can be provided by machines. As we shall see, a new technology has developed that could largely replace the realm of necessity by the realm of freedom. Bookchin, Post-Scarcity Anarchism, Black Rose Books 1986, p.115
In fact, the real issue we face today is not whether this new technology can provide us with the means of life in a toil-less society, but whether it can help to humanize society, whether it can contribute to the creation of entirely new relationships between man and man. The demand for a guaranteed annual income is still anchored in the quantitative promise of technology — in the possibility of satisfying material needs without toil. This quantitative approach is already lagging behind technological developments that carry a new qualitative promise — the promise of decentralized, communitarian lifestyles, or what I prefer to call ecological forms of human association. * * An exclusively quantitative approach to the new technology, I may add, is not only economically archaic, but morally regressive. This approach partakes of the old principle of justice, as distinguished from the new principle of freedom. Historically, justice is derived from the world of material necessity and toil; it implies relatively scarce resources which are apportioned by a moral principle which is either "just" or "unjust." Justice, even "equal" justice, is a concept of limitation, involving the denial of goods and the sacrifice of time and energy to production. Once we transcend the concept of justice — indeed, once we pass from the quantitative to the qualitative potentialities of modern technology — we enter the unexplored domain of freedom, based on spontaneous organization and full access to the means of life. I am asking a question that is quite different from what is ordinarily posed with respect to modern technology. Is this technology staking out a new dimension in human freedom, in the liberation of man? Can it not only liberate man from want and work, but also lead him to a free, harmonious, balanced human community — an ecocommunity that would promote the unrestricted development of his potentialities? Finally, can it carry man beyond the realm of freedom into the realm of life and desire? Bookchin, Post-Scarcity Anarchism, Black Rose Books 1986, p.116-117
Let me try to answer these questions by pointing to a new feature of modern technology. For the first time in history, technology has reached an open end. The potential for technological development, for providing machines as substitutes for labor is virtually unlimited. Technology has finally passed from the realm of invention to that of design — in other words, from fortuitous discoveries to systematic innovations. Bookchin, Post-Scarcity Anarchism, Black Rose Books 1986, p.117
The wealth of the commune will hardly be the same as the wealth we know, only produced under different relations. Nor is the point to give metropolitan residents more of what they already have: more flights, cars, cell-phones, and ugly, cheap t-shirts. And not because those needs could be denounced as “artificial” and juxtaposed with so-called natural ones. As the late Marxists from Frankfurt demonstrated, distinguishing between artificial and natural needs tends to be arbitrary in an authoritarian sense, because nature, as manifested in individuals’ drives, and society are inextricably intertwined in every need. As products of the existing class society, however, needs are not innocent nor should they always be projected into a classless society. Adorno answered this dilemma on the one hand with the dialectical core of his argument: reorganizing production towards the satisfaction of “even and especially those [needs] produced by capitalism—then the needs themselves would be decisively transformed”. It would “quickly emerge” that the masses don’t need the “trash” forced upon them today. On the other hand, he answered with ideas of equality and solidarity: “The question of the immediate satisfaction of need is not to be posed in terms of social and natural, primary and secondary, correct and false; rather, it coincides with the question of the suffering of the vast majority of all humans on earth. If we produced that which all humans now most urgently need, then we would be relieved of inflated social-psychological concerns about the legitimacy of their needs.” […] Without posing the question of ‘true’ and ‘false’ needs and far from any austere anti-hedonism in a green guise, a social revolutionary movement would aim at a different kind of wealth in the capitalist centres. While wealth today presents itself as an ‘immense accumulation of commodities’, being not so much social, but a mere sum total of private, unequally distributed possessions, the commune would have to aim not only for maximal socialization in the sphere of production, but also in the spheres of use and consumption. Contrary to any cult of community, the “right to solitude” (Marcuse) and the retreat into private life would be inviolable. However, unlike in the profit economy, built on bulk sales and planned obsolescence, the private sphere in the commune would no longer be primarily the space in which a steadily increasing flow of accumulated commodities must be devoured in order to keep the machine running. If canteens and laundromats became spaces of encounter beyond their bare functionality, it would no longer be necessary to have a dishwasher and washing machine in every apartment. With a few immediate measures, the commune would be capable of solving problems in a flash that technocrats endlessly grind their teeth on. Rather than continuing with the unmitigated disaster that is “e-mobility”—electric cars consume the same amount of labour, resources, streets and space in cities as cars that run on gas, and instead of exhaust gas pollution there is the highly toxic production of batteries — the commune could simply build a few tramways (with cars gone, there is no need to expend huge amounts of effort to dig tunnels into the earth). With no harried tourists and managers, air traffic could be reduced drastically in order to let the planet breathe a little. Friends of Classless Society, Contours of the World Commune, 2019, https://www.endnotes.org.uk/issues/issue-5/contours-of-the-world-commune---friends-of-the-classless-society
Freedom and Liberty
The Hellenic ideal of freedom - an ideal confined to the citizen -­ was different. Freedom existed for activity, not from activity. It was not a realm but a practice-the practice of being free by participating in free institutions, by daily recreating, elaborating, and fostering the activity of being free. One was not merely "free" in the passive sense of freedom from constraint, but in the active sense of "freeing," both of oneself and one's fellow citizens. An authentic community is not merely a structural constellation of human beings but rather the practice of communizing. Hence, freedom in the polis was a constellation of relationships that was continually in the process of reproduction. Bookchin, The Ecology of Freedom, p.263
Χώροι του Ανθρώπου, σ.225
 Χώροι του Ανθρώπου, σ.226
The Political
W.B.Gallie and William E. Connolly sought to explain why central political concepts, including ‘politics’ itself, are inherently susceptible to endless dispute over their meaning and range of application. When a concept is ‘appraisive’, denoting a valued activity; when it is internally complex, referring to a cluster of different dimensions; and when its rules of application are relatively open and an object of disagreement themselves, then the concept is ‘essentially contested’. It is obvious that ‘politics’ qualifies as such. Politics implicates many different dimensions, including collective decision-making, legally binding authority, interests, conflict, negotiation, public administration, government and power, which are themselves internally complex and fuzzy. And people will dissent over whether sexuality, mathematics and religion are, or should be, political issues subject to public decision-making. Kioupkiolis, The Common and Counter-Hegemonic Politics, p.119
Hence, a reasonable construal of the political should, first, remain alert to its historical limitations and its contestable validity, rather than make any pretence to universal truth. Second, it should be informed by a historicized hermeneutics that puts forth context-bound interpretations, taking its cues from the contingent, contextual ideas about politics, while testing their bounds and creatively recalibrating them. Third, one should reckon with the diversity and the contentiousness of political positions and acts, while also acknowledging the openness of political action to the radically new. Finally, a pluralist and self-reflective conception of the political should closely attend to actual social conditions, and it should dialogically interact with the arena of mainstream politics as well as with grassroots civic activity and critical thinking. In a nutshell, a qualified, contextualized, plural and open notion of the political should remain alive to a tradition of political thought that was championed by Hand J. Morgenthau in 1933: ‘The concept of the political does not have a fixed content which can be determined once and for all’. ‘The political nature of these matters thus depends on circumstances of time and place and does not result from a ground of principle’. Kioupkiolis, The Common and Counter-Hegemonic Politics, p.119
[…] ‘the political’ bears on social activity that deliberatively intervenes in existing social relations, structures and embedded subjectivities in order to shape them intentionally by challenging them, transfiguring them, displacing them, managing them or defending them against challenges. Kioupkiolis, The Common and Counter-Hegemonic Politics, p.119
In exemplary fashion, the famous feminist motto “the personal is political” intended to convey an idea that was scandalous in the 1960s: that there are “political dimensions to private life, that power relations shaped life in marriage, in the kitchen, the bedroom, the nursery, and at work” (Rosen in Lee 2007:163). […] “The personal is political” means, also, that pervasive cultural norms and social and economic structures are enacted and reproduced through individual action (Butler 1988:522). The feminist movement worked out schemes of political thought and action in line with this politicization of the everyday. It favoured modes of civic engagement that involved “average” women in their everyday lives. The emblematic practice of “consciousness-raising” that has been nurtured in feminist groups purported to empower women politically in their personal relations and life worlds. This process of critical group-thinking embodies a dynamic way of politicizing the personal and a singular modality of politics in the “everyday”. By way of sharing personal experiences and through collective discussion around shared feelings and concerns, it stimulated reflection on the political facets of personal life. Consciousness-raising thus enhanced awareness of everyday oppression. It boosted the self-esteem of women as persons who bring their distinct contribution to politics by cherishing, for example, values of sensitivity and care for the others. It also investigated ways of initiating change in patriarchal norms and subjectivities, in the present tense and from below. Hence, feminist politics intimated the idea that individual acts can be political in the mundane reality of gender relations inasmuch as they recycle cultural conventions of subordination or they undertake to displace and upset them (Hanisch 2006; Butler 1988: 523-4; Lee 2007: 165-6) Kioupkiolis, The Common and Counter-Hegemonic Politics, p.123
There is a plurality of realms. Of realms that are all the more real because they are shared. And that coexist. Politics, in truth, is the interplay between different realms, the alliance between those that are compatible and the confrontation between those that are irreconcilable. Anonymous, Call, p.7
"Politique" should never have become a noun. It should have remained an adjective. An attribute, and not a substance. There are conflicts, there are encounters, there are actions, there are speech interventions that are "political," because they make a decisive stand against something in a given situation, and because they express an affirmation concerning the world they desire. Political is that which bursts forth, which forms an event, which punches a hole in the orderly progression of the disaster. That which provokes polarization, drawing a line, choosing sides. […] Everything is political that relates to the encounter, the friction, or the conflict between forms of life, between regimes of perception, between sensibilities, between worlds once this contact attains a certain threshold of intensity. The crossing of this threshold is signaled immediately by its effects: frontlines are drawn, friendships and enmities are affirmed, cracks appear in the uniform surface of the social, there is a splitting apart of what was falsely joined together and subsurface communications between the different resulting fragments. The Invisible Committee, Now, p.61-62
We need to abandon the idea that there is politics only where there is vision, program, project, and perspective, where there is a goal, decisions to be made, and problems to be solved. What is truly political is only what emerges from life and makes it a definite, oriented reality. And it is born from what is nearby and not from a projection toward the far-distant. The nearby doesn't mean the restricted, the limited, the narrow, the local. It means rather what is in tune, vibrant, adequate, present, sensible, luminous, and familiar-the prehensible and comprehensible. It's not a spatial notion but an ethical one. Geographic distance is unable to remove us from that which we feel to be near. Conversely, being neighbors doesn't always make us close. It's only.from contact that the friend and the enemy are discovered. The Invisible Committee, Now, p.65
Direct/Participatory Democracy
Communalism, in contrast to anarchism, decidedly calls for decision-making by majority voting as the only equitable way for a large number of people to make decisions. Authentic anarchists claim that this principle—the “rule” of the minority by the majority—is authoritarian and propose instead to make decisions by consensus. Consensus, in which single individuals can veto majority decisions, threatens to abolish society as such. A free society is not one in which its members, like Homer’s lotus-eaters, live in a state of bliss without memory, temptation, or knowledge. Like it or not, humanity has eaten of the fruit of knowledge, and its memories are laden with history and experience. In a lived mode of freedom—contrary to mere café chatter—the rights of minorities to express their dissenting views will always be protected as fully as the rights of majorities. Any abridgements of those rights would be instantly corrected by the community—hopefully gently, but if unavoidable, forcefully—lest social life collapse into sheer chaos. Indeed, the views of a minority would be treasured as a potential source of new insights and nascent truths that, if abridged, would deny society the sources of creativity and developmental advances—for new ideas generally emerge from inspired minorities that gradually gain the centrality they deserve at a given time and place—until, again, they too are challenged as the conventional wisdom of a period that is beginning to pass away and requires new (minority) views to replace frozen orthodoxies. Bookchin, The Next Revolution: Popular Assemblies and the Promise of Direct Democracy, p.25
The concrete political dimension of Communalism is known as libertarian municipalism. In its libertarian municipalist program, Communalism resolutely seeks to eliminate statist municipal structures and replace them with the institutions of a libertarian polity. It seeks to radically restructure cities’ governing institutions into popular democratic assemblies based on neighborhoods, towns, and villages. In these popular assemblies, citizens—including the middle classes as well as the working classes—deal with community affairs on a face-to-face basis, making policy decisions in a direct democracy and giving reality to the ideal of a humanistic, rational society. Minimally, if we are to have the kind of free social life to which we aspire, democracy should be our form of a shared political life. To address problems and issues that transcend the boundaries of a single municipality, in turn, the democratized municipalities should join together to form a broader confederation. These assemblies and confederations, by their very existence, could then challenge the legitimacy of the state and statist forms of power. They could expressly be aimed at replacing state power and statecraft with popular power and a socially rational transformative politics. And they would become arenas where class conflicts could be played out and where classes could be eliminated. […] Most importantly, in Communalist political life, workers of different occupations would take their seats in popular assemblies not as workers—printers, plumbers, foundry workers, and the like, with special occupational interests to advance—but as citizens, whose overriding concern should be the general interest of the society in which they live. Citizens should be freed of their particularistic identity as workers, specialists, and individuals concerned primarily with their own particularistic interests. Municipal life should become a school for the formation of citizens, both by absorbing new citizens and by educating the young, while the assemblies themselves should function not only as permanent decision-making institutions but as arenas for educating the people in handling complex civic and regional affairs. Bookchin, The Next Revolution: Popular Assemblies and the Promise of Direct Democracy, p.16-17, 20
Η άνοδος της Ασημαντότητας, σ.266-267
Η Άνοδος της Ασημαντότητας, σ.268-269
Χώροι του Ανθρώπου, σ.220
 Χώροι του Ανθρώπου, σ.226
Castoriadis - Democracy and Paideia
Η άνοδος της Ασημαντότητας, σ.279-280
Η άνοδος της Ασημαντότητας, σ.277
Χώροι του Ανθρώπου, σ.228
There can therefore be no clear rules about how these principles should be translated into organisation, but on idea much emphasised in practice is that of 'horizontaJity'. Horizontality is part of the assertion of our own subjectivity, the rejection of vertical structures, chains of command which tell us what to do, which make us the object of the decision making of others, whoever those others may be. The idea of horizontality is that all should be involved in decision-making processes on an equal basis and that there should be no leaders. In practice, it is difficult to make this work in absolute terms, since informal patterns of leadership often grow up even where there are no formal structures, so it is probably more helpful to think of horizontality not as an absolute rule but as a constant struggle against verticality. Raquel Gutierrez, in her study of the struggles in Bolivia (2009), emphasises that the important thing is not the adoption of any particular model, but the production of shared horizons of meaning through an effective process of collective deliberation. Holloway, Crack Capitalism, p.43-44
A related, but slightly different idea is expressed in the Zapatista principle of mandar obedeciendo ('to command obeying'), the principle that those in a position of authority must always obey those over whom they exercise that authority. Here a degree of non-horizontality is accepted, but the classic council principle of accountability and instant recallability ensures that those who (temporarily) occupy positions of respon­ sibility should obey the wishes of the community. In many cases (in the tradition of indigenous communities, for example), this is supplemented by the idea of a rotation of responsibilities: part of belonging to a community is to accept that one may be called upon by the community to assume certain communal responsibilities for certain periods, but always in obedience to the wishes of the community. All of this expresses the rejection of representative democracy as a form of organisation that excludes the represented. All the organisational forms that we have mentioned can be seen as developments of direct democracy, not as a set of rules but as a constant process of experimenting with democratic forms, ways of overcoming people's inhibitions, ways of controlling people's aggressions or sexist or racist assumptions. The central challenge is how to articulate effectively the we do that is the core of the cracks: how to articulate the we that is the subject of the movement, as a cohesive and yet open we, and how to articulate the do, the we as subject, as doer. The Zapatista mandar obedeciendo ('to command obeying') not only presents a solution to these questions but indicates oxymoronically a real field of tension and challenge. That the process must be understood as both exploratory and open is underlined by another central principle of the Zapatistas: preguntando caminamos, 'asking we walk'. These can all be seen as examples of pre-figurative politics, the idea that the struggle for a different society must create that society through its forms of struggle. The term describes the idea that if you can embody the change you struggle for, you have already won - not by fighting but by becoming. Holloway, Crack Capitalism, p.44-45
Critique of social forms in direct democracy attempts
A dear-headed and completely unresigned militant recently gave this testimony: "Today, I know that disinterested militancy doesn't exist. Our upbringing, our schooling, our family, the social world as a whole rarely make us into well­ rounded and serene personalities. We're full of hurts, existential issues to be resolved, relational expectations, and it's with this 'inner baggage' that we enter into a militant life. Through our struggles, we're all looking for 'something else,' for gratifica­tions, recognition, social and friendly relations, human warmth, meaning to give to our life. In most militants this search for gratifications remains rather discreet, it doesn't take up all the space. In certain persons, it should be said, it occupies a disproportionate space. We can all think of examples of militants constantly monopolizing the talk or trying to control everything, of others putting on a performance or always playing on peoples' feelings, of others who are especially sensitive, very aggressive or peremptory in the ways they express themselves … These problems of recognition, gratifications, or power seem to me to explain single-handedly the majority of conflicts in the radical groups […] In my view, many apparently political conflicts mask conflicts of ego and between persons. That's my hypothesis. It's not necessarily correct. But from my experience, I have the strong feeling that something else is at play in the meetings, the mobilizations, the radical organi­zations, 'something else' than the struggle properly speaking, a veritable human theater with its comedies, its tragedies, its smooth marivaudages, which often push the political objectives which supposedly brought us together into the background." The Invisible Committee, Now, p.53-54
The experience of Nuit debout in Paris, which conveys many of the limitations of attempts to direct-democratic and horizontal forms
Under the intellectual leadership of Amadeo Bordiga, the Italian Left had long criticised council communism (which in “Left-wing Communism, an Infantile Disorder” Lenin lumped together with the Italian Left) for its championing of form over content, and its uncritical conception of democracy.8 It is this position, filtered through the influence of the dissident Bordigist journal Invariance, which underlies Gilles Dauvé's critique of council communism in “Leninism and the Ultraleft”, one of the foundational texts of the tendency we are describing.9 Dauvé accuses council communism of formalism on two counts: their approach to the question of organisation sees the form of organisation as the decisive factor (an “inverted Leninism”), and their conception of post-revolutionary society transforms the form (the councils) into the content of socialism, through depicting the latter as fundamentally a question of management. For Dauvé, as for Bordiga, this was a false question, for capitalism is not a mode of management but a mode of production, in which “managers” of any sort (capitalists, bureaucrats, or even workers) are merely the functionaries through which the law of value is articulated. As Pierre Nashua (La Vielle Taupe) and Carsten Juhl (Invariance) would also later argue, such a preoccupation with form over content effectively replaces the communist goal of the destruction of the economy with a mere opposition to its management by the bourgeoisie. Endnotes, Bring out your Dead, Endnotes #1, https://endnotes.org.uk/articles/bring-out-your-dead
Critique of Capitalism
Capitalism / Empire’s Social Order & Cohesion Structures
Autonomization / fixity of institutions
Subjects & human archetypes in contemporary capitalist societies
Culture and Art
Consumerism and Society of the Spectacle
Resilience of the social order which appears as a totality
Co-optation and safety valves
Criminalization and Repression
Ideology (discourse)
Surveillance, Discipline, Control and Cybernatization
Material aspects and value
Domination of the private sphere and dissolution of communal relations
Communication and Media
Heteronomy
Historical Development and Dynamics of Capitalism
What does the primitive accumulation of capital, i.e., its historical genesis, resolve itself into? In so far as it is not immediate transformation of slaves and serfs into wage labourers, and therefore a mere change of form, it only means the expropriation of the immediate producers, i.e., the dissolution of private property based on the labour of its owner. Private property, as the antithesis to social, collective property, exists only where the means of labour and the external conditions of labour belong to private individuals. But according as these private individuals are labourers or not labourers, private property has a different character. The numberless shades, that it at first sight presents, correspond to the intermediate stages lying between these two extremes. The private property of the labourer in his means of production is the foundation of petty industry, whether agricultural, manufacturing, or both; petty industry, again, is an essential condition for the development of social production and of the free individuality of the labourer himself. Of course, this petty mode of production exists also under slavery, serfdom, and other states of dependence. But it flourishes, it lets loose its whole energy, it attains its adequate classical form, only where the labourer is the private owner of his own means of labour set in action by himself: the peasant of the land which he cultivates, the artisan of the tool which he handles as a virtuoso. This mode of production presupposes parcelling of the soil and scattering of the other means of production. As it excludes the concentration of these means of production, so also it excludes co-operation, division of labour within each separate process of production, the control over, and the productive application of the forces of Nature by society, and the free development of the social productive powers. It is compatible only with a system of production, and a society, moving within narrow and more or less primitive bounds. To perpetuate it would be, as Pecqueur rightly says, “to decree universal mediocrity". At a certain stage of development, it brings forth the material agencies for its own dissolution. From that moment new forces and new passions spring up in the bosom of society; but the old social organisation fetters them and keeps them down. It must be annihilated; it is annihilated. Its annihilation, the transformation of the individualised and scattered means of production into socially concentrated ones, of the pigmy property of the many into the huge property of the few, the expropriation of the great mass of the people from the soil, from the means of subsistence, and from the means of labour, this fearful and painful expropriation of the mass of the people forms the prelude to the history of capital. It comprises a series of forcible methods, of which we have passed in review only those that have been epoch-making as methods of the primitive accumulation of capital. The expropriation of the immediate producers was accomplished with merciless Vandalism, and under the stimulus of passions the most infamous, the most sordid, the pettiest, the most meanly odious. Self-earned private property, that is based, so to say, on the fusing together of the isolated, independent labouring individual with the conditions of his labour, is supplanted by capitalistic private property, which rests on exploitation of the nominally free labour of others, i.e., on wage labour. As soon as this process of transformation has sufficiently decomposed the old society from top to bottom, as soon as the labourers are turned into proletarians, their means of labour into capital, as soon as the capitalist mode of production stands on its own feet, then the further socialisation of labour and further transformation of the land and other means of production into socially exploited and, therefore, common means of production, as well as the further expropriation of private proprietors, takes a new form. That which is now to be expropriated is no longer the labourer working for himself, but the capitalist exploiting many labourers. This expropriation is accomplished by the action of the immanent laws of capitalistic production itself, by the centralisation of capital. One capitalist always kills many. Hand in hand with this centralisation, or this expropriation of many capitalists by few, develop, on an ever-extending scale, the co-operative form of the labour process, the conscious technical application of science, the methodical cultivation of the soil, the transformation of the instruments of labour into instruments of labour only usable in common, the economising of all means of production by their use as means of production of combined, socialised labour, the entanglement of all peoples in the net of the world market, and with this, the international character of the capitalistic regime. Along with the constantly diminishing number of the magnates of capital, who usurp and monopolise all advantages of this process of transformation, grows the mass of misery, oppression, slavery, degradation, exploitation; but with this too grows the revolt of the working class, a class always increasing in numbers, and disciplined, united, organised by the very mechanism of the process of capitalist production itself. The monopoly of capital becomes a fetter upon the mode of production, which has sprung up and flourished along with, and under it. Centralisation of the means of production and socialisation of labour at last reach a point where they become incompatible with their capitalist integument. This integument is burst asunder. The knell of capitalist private property sounds. The expropriators are expropriated. The capitalist mode of appropriation, the result of the capitalist mode of production, produces capitalist private property. This is the first negation of individual private property, as founded on the labour of the proprietor. But capitalist production begets, with the inexorability of a law of Nature, its own negation. It is the negation of negation. This does not re-establish private property for the producer, but gives him individual property based on the acquisition of the capitalist era: i.e., on co-operation and the possession in common of the land and of the means of production. The transformation of scattered private property, arising from individual labour, into capitalist private property is, naturally, a process, incomparably more protracted, violent, and difficult, than the transformation of capitalistic private property, already practically resting on socialised production, into socialised property. In the former case, we had the expropriation of the mass of the people by a few usurpers; in the latter, we have the expropriation of a few usurpers by the mass of the people. Marx, Capital, Volume 1 (Progress Publishers, 1887), p.541-542
Political Forms and Capitalism
Technical Basis of Production, Technological Development and Automation
Relations between Labour and Capital as Classes
Contradictions and Dissolution of Capitalism
Epochal Historical Development and Changes in the Material Structure of Society
Reproduction and accumulation of capital
The Rise of Fascism
The spectacle of politics lives on as the spectacle of its decomposition. Disbelief goes nicely with the filthy landscape. The National Front, that politi­cal negation of politics, that negation of politics on the terrain of politics, logically occupies the "center" of this chessboard of smoking ruins. The human passengers, spellbound, are watching their shipwreck like a first-rate show. They are so enthralled that they don't feel the water that's already bathing their legs. The Invisible Committee, Now, p.8
This world no longer needs explaining, critiquing, denouncing. We live enveloped in a fog of com­mentaries and commentaries on commentaries, of critiques and critiques of critiques of critiques, of revelations that don't trigger anything, other than revelations about the revelations. And this fog is taking away any purchase we might have on the world. There's nothing to criticize in Donald Trump. As to the worst that can be said about him, he's already absorbed, incorporated it. He embodies it. He displays on a gold chain all the complaints that people have ever lodged against him. He is his own caricature, and he's proud of it. Even the creators of South Park are throwing in the towel: "It's very complicated now that satire has become reality. We really tried to laugh about what is going on but it wasn't possible to maintain the rhythm. What was happening was much funnier that what could be imagined. So we decided to let it go, to let them do their comedy, and we'll do ours." We live in a world that has established itself beyond any justification. Here, criticism doesn't work, any more than satire does. Neither one has any impact. To limit oneself to denouncing discriminations, oppressions, and injustices, and expect to harvest the fruits of that is to get one's epochs wrong. Leftists who think they can make something happen by lifting the lever of bad conscience are sadly mistaken. They can go and scratch their scabs in public and air their grievances hoping to arouse sympathy as much as they like; they'll only give rise to contempt and the desire to destroy them. "Victim" has become an insult in every part of the world. The Invisible Committee, Now, p.9
There is a social use of language. No one still believes in it. Its exchange value has fallen to zero. Hence this inflationist bubble of idle talk. Everything social is mendacious, and everyone knows that now. It's no longer just the governing authorities, the publicists and public personalities who "do communication," it's every self-entrepreneur that this society wants to turn us into who prac­tices the art of "public relations." Having become an instrument of communication, language is no longer its own reality but a tool for operating on the real, for obtaining effects in accordance with more or less conscious strategies. Words are no longer put into circulation except in order to dis­ tort things. Everything sails under false flags. This usurpation has become universal. One doesn't shrink from any paradox. The state of emergency is the rule of law. War is made in the name of peace. The bosses "offer jobs." The surveillance cameras are "video-protection devices." The executioners complain that they're being persecuted. The trai­tors profess their sincerity and their allegiance. The mediocre are everywhere cited as examples. There is actual practice on the one hand, and on the other, discourse, which is its relentless counter­ point, the perversion of every concept, the universal deception of oneself and of others. In all quarters it's only a question of preserving or extending one's interests. The Invisible Committee, Now, p.9-10
Official politics has become so manifestly a repugnant sphere of decep­tion that the only events still happening in that sphere reduce down to a paradoxical expression of hatred of politics. If Donald Trump is truly a figure of hatred it's because he is first and foremost a figure of the hatred of politics. And it's this hatred that carried him to power. The Invisible Committee, Now, p.60
An essential aspect of fascism is its birth in the streets, its use of disorder to impose order, its mobilisation of the old middle classes crazed by their own decline, and its regeneration, from without, of a state unable to deal with the crisis of capitalism. Giles Dauve, When Insurrections Die, Endnotes #1, https://endnotes.org.uk/articles/when-insurrections-die
Dictatorship is not a weapon of capital (as if capital could replace it with other, less brutal weapons): dictatorship is one of its tendencies, a tendency realised whenever it is deemed necessary. A “return” to parliamentary democracy, as it occurred in Germany after 1945, indicates that dictatorship is useless for integrating the masses into the state (at least until the next time). The problem is therefore not that democracy ensures a more pliant domination than dictatorship: anyone would prefer being exploited in the Swedish mode to being abducted by the henchmen of Pinochet. But does one have the choice? Even the gentle democracy of Scandinavia would be turned into a dictatorship if circumstances demanded it. The state can only have one function, which it fulfils democratically or dictatorially. The fact that the former is less harsh does not mean that it is possible to reorient the state to dispense with the latter. Capitalism’s forms depend no more on the preferences of wage workers than they do on the intentions of the bourgeoisie. Weimar capitulated to Hitler with open arms. Giles Dauve, When Insurrections Die, Endnotes #1, https://endnotes.org.uk/articles/when-insurrections-die
Fascism is unique in giving counter-revolution a mass base and in mimicking revolution. Fascism turns the call to “transform the imperialist war into civil war” against the workers’ movement, and it appears as a reaction of demobilised veterans returning to civilian life, where they are nothing, only held together by collective violence, and bent on destroying everything they imagine to be a cause of their dispossession: subversives, enemies of the nation, etc. Giles Dauve, When Insurrections Die, Endnotes #1, https://endnotes.org.uk/articles/when-insurrections-die
The rise of fascism in the start of the 20th century
In order to found the bourgeois mode of production, it was not necessary for all workers to be given equality under the sign of “the citizen”. Historically, “citizen” only names a specific category to which both property owners and certain proletarians are able to belong. As capitalist juridical relations disavow class through the reconstitution of the difference between citizen and other, the historical conditions under which the bourgeois mode of production was itself constituted were various forms of unfreedom. For this reason we have citizen and other as mapping onto: male (white)/ non-(white) male. For instance, under the conditions of slavery in North America, the classification of white was necessary to maintain the property of masters over slaves. Women were also classified as other, but for different reasons, as we shall see. […] Endnotes, The Logic of Gender, Endnotes #3 (2013), https://endnotes.org.uk/articles/the-logic-of-gender
Marx - Capital
Habermas’ critique to Marx’s theory of value
Bookchin’s critique to Marx’s theory of value
Labor-power and its value
The sphere of circulation
Marx’s method & ontology
Marx - Capital (By Chapter)
The effects of changes in the productivity of labor to social relations and value
Utopian Studies
The use of the term utopia to refer to a category of social fictions is rejected by Mannheim as historically naïve and descriptive rather than analytical. Literary works commonly designated utopias are, at least initially, only individual expressions; they can become truly utopian only if and when they become the expression of the will of a social group, and the inspiration of successful social action in pursuit of change. Much of what is conventionally (and sometimes pejoratively) regarded as utopian is therefore excluded on this definition and consigned to the realm of ideology. Levitas, The Concept of Utopia, p.80
According to Precht, the insight that material rewards spoil people’s character has a deeply disturbing aspect. After all, our entire economic system is based on such exchanges. And if economics is the continuation of ethics by other means, as economist Karl Homann and others claim – what kind of ethics is it that causes tens of thousands of people to starve to death every day? They are the ones who did not have enough to offer in market exchanges. Accordingly, the question arises how people might withdraw from this peculiar power of money without a “fundamental criticism of our entire economic system,” which Precht, too, presents as illusory. Social psychologist Harald Welzer rightly deems so-called Realpolitik as a “politics of illusion,” if we consider the extent to which people have closed their eyes on the global societal catastrophes. In this respect, he contends, only utopian politics are realistic. Habermann, We are not Born as Egoists, https://wealthofthecommons.org/essay/we-are-not-born-egoists
Bloch thus traces a path through ‘the little waking dreams to the strong ones, via the wavering dreams that can be abused to the rigorous ones, via the shifting castles in the air to the One Thing that is outstanding and needful’. All merit inclusion as utopian, because all are examples of wishful thinking. The notion of wishful thinking does not here carry its usual pejorative connotations. Bloch would agree with Mannheim that ‘wishful thinking has always figured in human affairs’ and that ‘myths, fairy-tales, other-worldly promises of religion, humanistic fantasies, romances, have been continually changing expressions of what was lacking in actual life’. Levitas, The Concept of Utopia, p.100
It is fundamental to Bloch’s argument and to the concept of the Not-Yet-Become that the material world is essentially unfinished, the future is indeterminate and therefore that the future constitutes a realm of possibility. Once the world is seen as in a constant state of process, but a process whose direction and outcome is not predetermined, there are always many possible futures – futures which are real possibilities, rather than merely formal possibilities. Not all projected futures are real possibilities; there are of course constraints, and Bloch’s model is not one of pure voluntarism. Nor are all real possibilities desirable: they include ‘devastatingly, possible fascist Nothing’ as well as ‘finally feasible and overdue, socialism’. These possible futures must be seen as part of, rather than outside, reality despite the fact that the indeterminacy of the future means that there is no necessary development from potentiality to actuality, and despite the fact that not all real possibilities will in fact be realised. Utopia, as the expression of the Not-Yet-Conscious, is vindicated in so far as it reaches forward to the real possibility of the Not-Yet-Become; it is thus actively bound up in the process of the world’s becoming, as an anticipation of the future (rather than merely a compensation in the present) and, through its human purpose and action, as a catalyst of the future. Human activity, informed by imagination, has a decisive role to play: ‘the hinge in human history is its producer’.9 Utopia is the expression of hope, a hope construed ‘not ... only as emotion ... , but more essentially as a directing act of a cognitive kind ’. Levitas, The Concept of Utopia, p.101-102
With no other writer is the rejection of form as a defining characteristic of utopia as consistent and explicit as it is with Bloch. The reason for this rejection is simultaneously political and theoretical: Bloch’s Marxism, unorthodox though it may be, means that his central preoccupation is change. The assumption that dreams of a better life may play a part in this leads Bloch to define utopia in analytic terms, as an element in this process, rather than in descriptive terms; hence the overt emphasis on function rather than form or content. Since the function of expressing, anticipating and effecting the future can be identified in a vast range of cultural forms, the subject matter of utopia is identified in terms of the common characteristic of the intention towards a better life. Levitas, The Concept of Utopia, p.116
The preoccupation with change makes the function of utopia its central characteristic. This was true for Marx and Engels, although for them utopia was defined largely in terms of its negative function of obstructing the revolution. Bloch abandons these negative connotations, and (like Mannheim), defines utopia in terms of the positive function of effecting transformation. The process of change is a complex one, and consequently the function of utopia has several aspects. Hudson identifies four of these: “its cognitive function as a mode of operation of constructive reason, its educative function as a mythography which instructs men to will and desire more and better, its anticipatory function as a futurology of possibilities which later become actual, and its causal function as an agent of historical change.” One might add a fifth, which precedes all of these: its expressive function, as an articulation of dissatisfaction. These are properly read not as separate functions, but as different facets of a unified utopian function. This model of utopia, which is later reasserted in the work of Zygmunt Bauman, confronts many of the usual objections to utopia. These include the claims that utopia is unrealistic because it refuses to respect the constraints of external conditions, as well as dangerous since the pursuit of utopia leads inexorably to totalitarianism. It is essential to Bloch’s view of utopia that he rebuts both claims. With the Not-Yet-Become, the emphasis on process and tendency, he denies not the existence of constraints but the degree of constraint implied in ‘finished’, closed and static world. The space that is opened up in Bloch’s cosmology requires utopia in order that humanity may be able to imagine, will and effect the future. Levitas, The Concept of Utopia, p.117-118
News from Nowhere was written in 1890 and has always been by far the most widely known of Morris’s socialist writings. […] Subtitled An Epoch of Rest, it is an account of England in the twenty-second century, to which Morris travels in a dream, waking up on the site of his own house by the Thames at Hammersmith. The first part of the book describes a journey from here to meet ‘Old Hammond’ at the British Museum. The second part is a long conversation with Hammond (who, it is whimsically implied, is Morris’s grandson), explaining both how society works and the revolution by which the change came about. The third part is a journey up the Thames from Hammersmith to Kelmscott in Oxfordshire (where Morris had his country home) for hay-making. The world portrayed in the first and third sections is compatible, at least on a superficial reading, with a view of Morris as woolly, well-meaning and fundamentally impractical; but this is substantially belied by the insistence on the need for revolutionary change and for the building and growth of the new society. In this future England, most of London has disappeared to be replaced by fields and gardens: the distinction between town and country had been abolished. Villages remain, with communal meeting places, and markets where produce is brought for distribution, but no money is used; one simply asks for what one wants. Schools no longer exist, and children learn practical skills through both play and participation in society. The Houses of Parliament are used to store manure – ‘dung is not the worst kind of corruption’. The ugliness of industrialism has been superseded by an ecologically sustainable system largely based on craft production. However, in spite of the apparent dominance of handwork there is machinery available, and power which can be used as fuel for transport as well as supplied as required to small workshops, making large factories unnecessary. The central theme is of work as pleasure, and the separation between mental and manual labour has been overcome. It is a dream from which Morris wakes to the reality of industrial capitalism and political struggle; but the book ends with the words ‘if others can see it as I have seen it, then it may be called a vision rather than a dream’. Despite the fact that News from Nowhere contains a long section on ‘how the change came about’, which takes the form of a proletarian revolution followed by the withering away of the state, the dominant mood of the book remains anti-industrial and the society presented by Morris is one of much greater simplicity than can be regarded as feasible. Levitas, The Concept of Utopia, p.124-125
“I believe that the ideal of the future does not point to the lessening of men’s energy by the reduction of labour to a minimum, but rather to the reduction of pain in labour to a minimum, so small that it will cease to be a pain; a gain to humanity which can only be dreamed of till men are more completely equal than Mr. Bellamy’s Utopia would allow them to be, but will most assuredly come about when men are really equal in condition ... the true incentive to useful and happy labour is and must be pleasure in the work itself ...” Morris, ‘Looking Backward’, in A. L. Morton (1984), Political Writings of William Morris (Lawrence & Wishart: London), pp. 252–3, quoted in Levitas, The Concept of Utopia, p.126
Thus the transformation of work lies at the heart of socialism. Moreover, this is not something that can be brought about by massive centralisation, but requires the active participation of individuals in all aspects of the social process: "there are some Socialists who do not think that the problem of the organization of life and necessary labour can be dealt with by a huge national centralisation, working by a kind of magic for which no-one feels himself responsible; that on the contrary it will be necessary for the unit of administration to be small enough for every citizen to feel himself responsible for its details, and be interested in them; that individual men cannot shuffle off the business of life on to the shoulders of some abstraction called the State, but must deal with it in conscious association with each other; that variety of life is as much an aim of true Communism as equality of condition, and that nothing but a union of these two will bring about real freedom: that modern nationalities are mere artificial devices for the commercial war that we seek to put an end to, and will disappear with it. And finally, that art, using that word in its widest and due signification, is not a mere adjunct of life which free and happy men can do without, but the necessary expression and indispensable instrument of human happiness." [William Morris, quoted by Levitas] Levitas, The Concept of Utopia, p.126
For Bloch, on the other hand, the utopian function of art is more active. It nourishes the sense that ‘something’s missing’, and is a necessary inspiration to social transformation. Without art to embody the dream of a matter, we will not be able to possess it in reality. Levitas, The Concept of Utopia, p.129
Hope. Now there's at least one disease this civilization has not infected us with. We're not despairing for all that. No one has ever acted out of hope. Hope is of a piece with waiting, with the refusal to see what is there, with the fear of breaking into the present - in short, with the fear of living. To hope is to declare one­ self in advance to be without any hold on that from which something is expected nonetheless. It's to remove oneself from the process so as to avoid any connection with its outcome. It's wanting things to be different without embracing the means for this to come about. It's a kind of cowardice. One has to know what to commit to and then commit to it. Even if it means making enemies. Or making friends. Once we know what we want, we're no longer alone, the world repopulates. Everywhere there are allies, closenesses, and an infinite gradation of possible friendships. Nothing is close for someone who floats. Hope, that very slight but constant impetus toward tomorrow that is communicated to us day by day, is the best agent of the maintenance of order. We're daily informed of problems we can do nothing about, but to which there will surely be solutions tomor­row. The whole oppressive feeling of powerlessness that this social organization cultivates in everyone is only an immense pedagogy of waiting. It's an avoidance of now. But there isn't, there's never been, and there never will be anything but now. And even if the past can act upon the now, this is because it has itself never been anything but a now. Just as our tomorrow will be. The only way to understand something in the past is to under­ stand that it too used to be a now. It's to feel the faint breath of the air in which the human beings of yesterday lived their lives. If we are so much inclined to flee from now, it's because now is the time of decision. It's the locus of the "I accept" or the "I refuse," of ''I'll pass on that" or ''I'll go with that." It's the locus of the logical act that imme­diately follows the perception. It is the present, and hence the locus ofpresence. It is the moment, endlessly renewed, of the taking of sides. Thinking in distant terms is always more comfortable. "In the end," things will change; "in the end," beings will be transfigured. Meanwhile, let's go on this way, let's remain what we are. A mind that thinks in terms of the future is incapable of acting in the present. It doesn't seek transformation; it avoids it. The current disaster is like a monstrous accumu­lation of all the deferrals of the past, to which are added those of each day and each moment, in a continuous time slide. But life is always decided now, and now, and now. Everyone can see that this civilization is like a train rolling toward the abyss, and picking up speed. The faster it goes, the more one hears the hysterical cheers of the boozers in the discotheque car. You have to listen carefully to make out the paralyzed silence of the rational minds that no longer under­stand anything, that of the worriers who bite their nails, and the accent of false calm in the exclama­tions of the card players who wait. Inwardly, many people have chosen to leap off the train, but they hesitate on the footboard. They're still restrained by so many things. They feel held back because they've made the choice, but the decision is lacking. Decision is what traces in the present the manner and possibility of acting, of making a leap that is not into the void. We mean the decision to desert, to desert the ranks, to organize, to undertake a secession, be it imperceptibly, but in any case, now. The epoch belongs to the determined. The Invisible Committee, Now, p.16-18
Such demands today are not based on some sort of utopianism. They are based first of all on the struggle of the proletariat at all levels, and on all the forms of explicit refusal or profound indifference that the unstable ruling society constantly has to combat with every means. They are also based on the lesson of the fundamental defeat of all attempts at less radical changes. Finally, they are based on the extremist strivings and actions appearing today among certain sectors of youth (despite all the efforts at disciplining them and repressing them) and in a few artistic milieus. But this basis is indeed utopian in another sense of the word, in that it involves inventing and experimenting with solutions to current problems without being preoccupied with whether or not the conditions for their realization are immediately present. (It should be noted that this utopian type of experimentation now also plays a key role in modern science). This temporary, historical utopianism is legitimate; and is necessary because it serves to incubate the projection of desires without which free life would be empty of content. It is inseparable from the necessity to dissolve the present ideology of everyday life, and therefore the bonds of everyday oppression, so that the revolutionary class can disabusedly discover present and future possibilities of freedom. Utopian practice makes sense, however, only if it is closely linked to the practice of revolutionary struggle. This latter, in turn, cannot do without such utopianism without being condemned to sterility. Those seeking an experimental culture cannot hope to realize it without the triumph of the revolutionary movement, while the latter cannot itself establish authentic revolutionary conditions without resuming the efforts of the cultural avant-garde toward the critique of everyday life and its free reconstruction. Canjuers & Debord, A Unitary Revolutionary Program, 1960 (Situationist International Anthology, PM Press, p.392)
[…] the fact that utopia is no longer constrained by the need to appear immediately possible allows a freer exploration of desire. Utopia can be a much deeper exploration of the implications of alternative values than when it must be seen as realistically attainable from the here and now. And most utopias now present the transition as (i) merely possible, rather than inevitable; (ii) involving some kind of radical break from the present, necessary because it is not possible to identify trends in the present which seem likely to lead to utopia; (iii) a very vaguely defined event. The transition does not form a central issue. Levitas, The Concept of Utopia, p.228
The essence of utopia seems to be desire – the desire for a different, better way of being. Levitas, The Concept of Utopia, p.209
Defining utopia and delineating utopian studies
In exploring existing definitions of utopia we can consider three different aspects: content, form and function. Firstly, there is content. There is a common assumption that utopia should be a portrayal of the good society. It is however obvious that this will vary, being a matter not just of personal taste, but of the issues which appear to be important to different social groups, either in the same society or in different historical circumstances. […] The variation in content, however, makes it particularly difficult to use this as part of the definition of utopia. Definitions in terms of content tend to be evaluative and normative, specifying what the good society would be, rather than reflecting on how it may be differently perceived. The issue of possibility also relates directly to the content of a utopia, and again judgements differ. Secondly, one can attempt to define utopia descriptively, in terms of form. The common sense equation of utopia with a description of a good society (leaving aside the question of possibility) is one version of such a definition. Another is the equation of utopia with an ideal commonwealth. Some commentators take the form of More’s Utopia as a model and argue that utopia is a literary genre, involving the fictional depiction of an alternative society in some detail. However, as we have already suggested, depictions of the good society do not necessarily take the form of literary fictions – and indeed this form is only available under certain very specific historical conditions; is it then to be assumed that when these conditions do not exist, there are no utopias? Broader historical comparisons require more inclusive definitions, to accommodate changes in the way in which aspirations for a better life may be expressed. Thirdly, one may define utopia in terms of its function. This is less obvious; to focus on the function of utopia is already to move away from colloquial usage, which says nothing about what utopia is for, but implies that it is useless. […] utopia is seen as presenting some kind of goal, even if commentators as opposed to the authors of utopias do not see them as necessarily realisable in all their details. At the very least, utopias raise questions about what the goal should be. Many commentators, however, go further and use the function of utopia as a defining characteristic – although that function is differently represented by different authors. […] Broadly, one may divide approaches to utopian studies into two streams. The liberal-humanist tradition tends to focus on definitions in terms of form. In contrast a largely, but not exclusively, Marxist tradition has defined utopia in terms of its function – either a negative function of preventing social change or a positive function of facilitating it, either directly or through the process of the ‘education of desire’. Contemporary utopian studies draws on both these traditions, and definitions of both kinds may be found, although those in terms of form tend to predominate. […] It is argued that all definitions in terms of form, function or content are problematic. Not only do they place limits upon what may properly be regarded as utopian and thus upon the field of enquiry itself, they also obscure variations in the utopian genre. In order to make such a claim, one must of course be able to locate something which remains constant while content, form and function vary. This element, I would argue, is that of desire – desire for a better way of being and living. Levitas, The Concept of Utopia, p.5-8
Both the colloquial definitions and the anti-utopian position illustrate the fact that the concept itself is an ideological battleground. The elision between perfection and impossibility can serve to invalidate all attempts at change, reinforcing the claim that there is no alternative, and sustaining the status quo. Perhaps, as Khayyám suggests, we would do better to forget the future and drown our sorrows. But even among different groups committed to change, the derogatory meaning attaching to utopia is what dominates. People rarely claim that their own aspirations are utopian but even dream- ers may hurl the epithet at others. The rejection of other people’s projects as utopian and unrealistic is part of the process of promoting the merits of one’s own plans, and is thus an intrinsic part of the political process. Levitas, The Concept of Utopia, p.4
Colloquial usage thus tends to dismiss speculation about the good society as intrinsically impractical. This dismissal may be tolerantly good-humoured, seeing utopia as an interesting if esoteric byway of culture and the utopian as a well-meaning dreamer. It may, on the other hand, be extremely hostile, seeing attempts at instituting utopia as highly dangerous and leading to totalitarianism. This anti-utopian position is typified by Karl Popper and Friedrich Hayek. Levitas, The Concept of Utopia, p.3
Sometimes utopia embodies more than an image of what the good life would be and becomes a claim about what it could and should be: the wish that things might be otherwise becomes a conviction that it does not have to be like this. Utopia is then not just a dream to be enjoyed, but a vision to be pursued. Yet the very term utopia suggests to most people that this dream of the good life is an impossible dream – an escapist fantasy, at best a pleasant but pointless entertainment. Those utopians who seek to make their dreams come true are deemed to be hopelessly unrealistic, or worse, actively dangerous. The view that utopia is not escapist nonsense but a significant part of human culture is a fundamental assumption of the expanding field of utopian studies. Levitas, The Concept of Utopia, p.1
Utopia is the expression of the desire for a better way of being. This includes both the objective, institutional approach to utopia, and the subjective, experiential concern of disalienation. It allows for this desire to be realistic or unrealistic. It allows for the form, function and content to change over time. And it reminds us that, whatever we think of particular utopias, we learn a lot about the experience of living under any set of conditions by reflecting upon the desires which those conditions generate and yet leave unfulfilled. For that is the space which utopia occupies. Levitas, The Concept of Utopia, p.9
Bloch refuses the identification of utopia with a literary genre: "to limit the utopian to the Thomas More variety, or simply to orientate it in that direction, would be like trying to reduce electricity to the amber from which it gets its Greek name and in which it was first noticed. Indeed, the utopian coincides so little with the novel of an ideal state that the whole total of philosophy becomes necessary … to do justice to the content of that designated by utopia.” [Bloch The Principle of Hope, Basil Blackwell: Oxford 1986, p. 15.] Levitas, The Concept of Utopia, p. 99
Bloch would agree with Mannheim that ‘wishful thinking has always figured in human affairs’ and that ‘myths, fairy-tales, other-worldly promises of religion, humanistic fantasies, romances, have been continually changing expressions of what was lacking in actual life’. He would agree too that they have a compensatory aspect and even that they are susceptible to manipulation: the mirror in which wishful images are reflected is ‘a beautifying mirror which often only reflects how the ruling class wishes the wishes of the weak to be’. However, the compensatory aspect of wishful thinking does not in itself mean that it operates, as Mannheim supposes, to sustain the status quo. It is not merely fictitious compensation for the discomforts of experienced reality, but a venturing beyond that reality which is essential to the inauguration of a transformed future. Utopia contains compensation, but also anticipation. Levitas, The Concept of Utopia, p. 100-101
The danger of utopianism non-grounded to materialism and class struggle
While both the mass strike debate of the Second International and the theory of council communism were more than mere reflections of real struggles, they did refer to such struggles — “The soviet was not a theoretical discovery” (Guy Debord). Today’s musings on a new society, however, seem to be mere abstract utopianism, exactly the kind rejected by an entire lineage of critical theorists, from Marx to the famous Bilderverbot of Frankfurt’s late Marxists. This line of thought saw utopias as presumptuous phantasies and held that it should be left to the people liberating themselves to determine the new forms of their collective life. Against ready-made outlines of a “liberated society”, counterposed to the status quo in a purely abstract way, the Frankfurt School rightly insisted on working from concrete social contradictions: only the proletarians themselves, through lengthy class struggles, might eventually be able to build a new society. Communism should not be an ideal but a “real movement”. Endnotes, Contours of the World Commune, Endnotes #5, p.163
“The significance of Critical-Utopian Socialism ... bears an inverse relation to historical development. In proportion as the modern class struggle develops and takes definite shape, this fantastic standing apart from the contest, these fantastic attacks on it, lose all practical value and all theoretical justification. Therefore, although the originators of these systems were, in many respects, revolutionary, their disciples have, in every case, formed mere reactionary sects. They hold fast by the original views of their masters, in opposition to the progressive historical development of the proletariat. They, therefore, endeavour, and that consistently, to deaden the class struggle and to reconcile the class antagonisms. They still dream of experimental realisation of their social utopias, of founding isolated ‘phalanstères’, of establishing ‘Home Colonies’, of setting up a ‘Little Icaria’ ... and to realise all these castles in the air, they are compelled to appeal to the feelings and purses of the bourgeois.” [Marx and Engels, Manifesto of the Communist Party, Collected Works of Marx and Engels (Lawrence & Wishart: London), Vol. 6, pp. 515–16.] The fundamental error of the utopian socialists which gives rise to this unacceptable political position is the expectation that society can be changed by the appeal to all classes on the basis of reason and justice, and the belief that their blueprints of the good society will be the cause of social transformation. It is this idealist, as opposed to materialist, concept of social change which is the real problem. Levitas, The Concept of Utopia, p.60
It is clear that the basis of Marx’s and Engels’s criticisms of utopian socialism is not an objection to speculation about the future, but a difference of view about the process of transformation. As Vincent Geoghegan puts it, ‘what is under attack here is not anticipation as such, but rather the failure to root this anticipation in a theoretical framework cognizant of the essential dynamics of capitalism’. […] Utopian socialism draws up schemes for the future. Its main fault however is not that it does this, or that the schemes themselves outline the wrong sort of future, but that it entails an idealist model of social change, suggesting that the mere propagation of such schemes will have a transformative effect. Utopia here is effectively defined in terms of its function, which is seen as a negative, counter-revolutionary, one: "The chief offence does not lie in having inscribed [a] specific nostrum in [a] programme, but in taking a retrograde step at all from the standpoint of a class movement to that of a sectarian movement.” [Marx, Critique of the Gotha Programme, Collected Works of Marx and Engels (Lawrence & Wishart: London), Vol. 24, p. 93] In their terms the key question is whether movements foster a deeper understanding of the class struggle, or whether they disguise it behind plans to persuade all classes to combine in the construction of a society based on harmony. Levitas, The Concept of Utopia, p. 64, 66
if one does not think of revolution as being a complete miracle, as something that proletarians will achieve in the heat of the moment, almost accidentally, spontaneously, and without any goal set in advance, and if one does not delegate the project of human emancipation to the machines, then it would appear reasonable to try and reach some sort of understanding concerning the basic features of a classless society. Several objections to this have been raised: it’s premature (“the struggles aren’t quite there yet, the time isn’t ripe”), unnecessary (“people will take care of it eventually”), pretentious (“you can’t just predetermine it”), or simply impossible (“you can’t anticipate that”). But there’s never been a continuous movement defying the existing order without an idea, however vague, of what could take its place. A purely negative critique of the status quo, which some radical leftists invoke, is ultimately impossible. For example, aiming for “a community of free individuals, carrying on their work with the means of production in common” (Capital) follows necessarily from the critique of private property. But because this leaves a lot of room for imagination — including scenarios that have little to do with freedom and happiness — revolutionaries should state clearly what they want. Not in order to peddle recipes for redemption, but as a contribution to the necessary discussion on how to leave the old world behind. Friends of Classless Society, Contours of the World Commune, 2019, https://www.endnotes.org.uk/issues/issue-5/contours-of-the-world-commune---friends-of-the-classless-society
Master Thesis: Towards a Communist Theory of Value
Main Argument
The Need to Redefine Value
Value and Ethics: Needs and Reciprocity
Value and the Commons: Prefiguring New Value Arrangements
Value and Technology: Towards Post-Scarcity
Introduction
Kioupkiolis’ Feedback (27/4/2023) 1. Need to mention/answer newer conceptions on value (on the ones that deny it is applicable). E.g. Hardt & Negri (Multitude & Commonwealth mainly) and Fuchs. 2. Need to emphasize on the novel points of the argument early on 3. Commons theories: De Angelis, Bollier & Helfrich, P2PF (no need to pick one)
The Material Nature of Knowledge Production
human action, or even human thought, can only take place through some kind of material medium and therefore can’t be understood without taking the qualities of that medium into account. Graeber, Toward an Anthropological Theory of Value, p.83
If one were to insist on seeing all such spheres primarily as domains of human action, it quickly becomes obvious that just as much as the production of food requires thinking, art and literature are really a set of material processes. Literature, from this kind of materialist perspective, would no longer be so much about “texts” (usually thought of as abstractions that can then seem to float apart from time or space) but about the writing and reading of them. This is obviously in every way material: actual, flesh-and-blood people have to write them, they have to have the leisure and resources, they need pens or typewriters or computers, there are practical constraints of every sort entailed in the circulation of literature, and so on. Graeber, Toward an Anthropological Theory of Value, p.54
The neat distinction between immaterial and material, therefore, becomes meaningful only from the perspective of relatively isolated and privileged spheres of practices. From the perspective of a radical paradigm and a possible political recomposition, I think this is an isolation that must be overcome, and it can only be overcome if and to the extent that some forms of constituent commoning across ‘material’ and ‘immaterial’ circuits become a reality and a social force at the basis of transformative politics. There is no panacea, no new invention operating as a silver bullet, only the expansion, multiplication and interlacing of commons systems, especially those that reproduce life (food, care, housing, biodiversity, ...). De Angelis, Omnia Sunt Communia, p. 74
Value and the Totalities we Operate in
The ultimate stakes of politics, according to Turner, is not even the struggle to appropriate value; it is the struggle to establish what value is Graeber, Toward an Anthropological theory of value, p.88
if there’s one thing that almost all the classic traditions of the study of meaning agree on—dialectical, hermeneutic, and structuralist alike—it is that for human beings, meaning is a matter of comparison. Parts take on meaning in relation to each other, and that process always involves reference to some sort of whole: whether it be a matter of words in a language, episodes in a story, or “goods and services” on the market. So too for value. The realization of value is always, necessarily, a process of comparison; for this reason it always, necessarily, implies an at least imagined audience. As I’ve already suggested, for the actor, that’s all that “society” usually is. Graeber, Toward an Anthropological theory of value, p.86-87
Really, society is not a thing at all: it is the total process through which all this activity is coordinated, and value, in turn, the way that actors see their own activity as meaningful as part of it. Doing so always, necessarily, involves some sort of public recognition and comparison. This is why economic models, which see those actions as aimed primarily at individual gratification, fall so obviously short: they fail to see that in any society—even within a market system—solitary pleasures are relatively few. The most important ends are ones that can only be realized in the eyes of some collective audience. In fact, one might go so far as to say that while from an analytical perspective “society” is a notoriously fluid, open-ended set of processes, from the perspective of the actors, it is much more easily defined: “society” simply consists of that potential audience, of everyone whose opinion of you matters in some way, as opposed to those whose opinion of you, you would never think about at all. But value is not created in that public recognition. Rather, what is being recognized is something that was, in a sense, already there. Graeber, Toward an Anthropological theory of value, p.76-77
Value is inherently contrastive; thus it can only be made into a reality (“realized”) in a relatively public context, as part of some larger social whole. Graeber, Toward an Anthropological theory of value, p.70
Similarly, the ultimate freedom is not the freedom to create or accumulate value, but the freedom to decide (collectively or individually) what it is that makes life worth living. In the end, then, politics is about the meaning of life. Any such project of constructing meanings necessarily involves imagining totalities (since this is the stuff of meaning), even if no such project can ever be completely translated into reality—reality being, by definition, that which is always more complicated than any construction we can put on it. Graeber, Toward an Anthropological theory of value, p.88

Graeber seems to support something close to Laclau and Mouffe’s theory of Hegemony. His arguments are constructivist and he really seems to be concerned with the hegemonization of the “value” as a concept

Value needs to have some objective form (legitimacy maybe?)

Value and the totalities we operate in

Needs in Capitalism and Beyond
Marx’s categories of need (we shall see that he gives several interpretations of it) are not as a whole economic categories. He tends to treat concepts of need as non-economic categories, as historical-philosophical, that is as anthropological value categories, and therefore as not subject to definition within the economic system. Agnes Heller, The Theory of Need in Marx, Chapter 1
In our view the “natural needs” are not a group of needs but a limit concept: a limit (different for different societies) beyond which human life is no longer reproducible as such, beyond which the limit of bare existence is passed […]. It would be sheer elitism, at least in our world, to eliminate this limit concept from the discussion of man’s needs. Therefore I shall speak not of “natural needs” but of the “existential limit to the satisfaction of needs”. Agnes Heller, The Theory of Need in Marx, Chapter 1
No specific product or need possesses the quality of being a luxury product or a luxury need. That is determined solely by the question of whether the object is possessed and used (and therefore the corresponding need is satisfied) by the majority of the population or only by a minority which represents a significantly higher level of purchasing power as a result of the social division of labor. As a consequence of increasing productivity, and as a consequence of changes in the social structure, needs that originally were luxury needs become necessary needs, without them undergoing the slightest modification. Agnes Heller, The Theory of Need in Marx, Chapter 1
According to Marx, the end of social production ought to be the satisfaction of social needs. But capitalist industry and agriculture do not produce for needs, nor for their satisfaction. The end of production is the valorisation of capital, and the satisfaction of needs (on the market) is only a means towards this end. Agnes Heller, The Theory of Need in Marx, Chapter 1
Marx judges capitalism as a society that imposes quantitative limits on quality, and in two different relationships: “The transformation into money, exchange value as such, as limit of production, [is equivalent to] restriction of the production of use values by exchange value; or that real wealth has to take a specific form distinct from itself, a form not absolutely identical with it, in order to become an object of production at all.” […] Capitalism “quantifies” all its objective expressions and produces them (as it also produces the needs directed towards them) only if it is “profitable” to do so. Capitalism at the same time quantifies the complexly qualitative world of human needs, turns into quasi-exchange value and renders it “purchasable”; all qualitative needs that can neither be quantified nor purchased are inhibited. Agnes Heller, The Theory of Need in Marx, Chapter 2
How can the values of radical criticism become the values of the masses, that is, how can Ought become the collective Ought? The reply is: “Theory is actualised in a people only in so far as it actualises their needs. … A deep-going revolution can only be a revolution in basic needs.” The “bearers” of radical needs are therefore those who can actualise radical deep-going theory. Marx then looks for the bearers of these radical needs and in the end he finds them in the working class. Agnes Heller, The Theory of Need in Marx, Chapter 3
1. Capitalism is an antinomous society: its essence is alienation. The wealth of the species and the poverty of the individual are reciprocally based and reproduce each other. The antinomy is that of commodity production becoming universal. (Marx says: “Value having become capital, and living labour confronting it as a mere use value, so that living labor appears as a mere means to realise objectified, dead labor …, and having produced, as the end product, alien wealth on one side and, on the other, the penury which is living labour capacity’s sole possession.” 2. Capitalist society, as a totality, as a “social body”, produces not only alienation but the consciousness of alienation, in other words, radical needs. 3. This consciousness (radical needs) is necessarily generated by capitalism. 4. This consciousness (the complex of radical needs) already transcends capitalism by its existence, and its development makes it impossible for capitalism to remain the basis of production. The need to resolve the antinomy and the activity directed towards this end are therefore constituted in the collective Ought, in the consciousness that “exceeds its bounds”. This concept of “consciousness exceeding its bounds” is beyond question the same as the “imputed consciousness” which is a central category in Lukacs’ “History and Class Consciousness” […]. Although Marx does not say so, it is obvious that this “consciousness exceeding its bounds” is not identical with the “empirical consciousness” of the working class. It is not consciousness of misery and still less poverty in the narrow sense: the needs that flow from it (or which constitute its base) are not directed towards “greater possession” and still less towards higher wages or “a better standard of living”. It is the simple consciousness of alienation, the recognition that social relations are alienated. from this there follows (or this constitutes the base for) the need to overcome alienation, to overturn the alienated social and productive relations in a revolutionary way, and to create general social and productive relations which are not alienated. As yet, history has not answered the question as to whether capitalist society in fact produces this “consciousness exceeding its bounds”, which in Marx’s day did not exist, and whose existence Marx therefore had to project. Agnes Heller, The Theory of Need in Marx, Chapter 3
The system of needs in communism must be dealt with from two different aspects: from that of material and non-material needs, and from that of the relation between these two types within a single structure of needs. By “material needs” I mean needs whose objects and means of satisfaction (used in consumption and in productive consumption) must be produced and continually reproduced. Needs of a non-material character are, in contrast, those whose objects of satisfaction are not “produced” in the organic interchange with nature or are not produced at all. (I know this is a not “pure” distinction. To satisfy the need of art, production it to some extent necessary: houses must be built, books must be printed. But the need for art as such is not satisfied either by the house or by the book but by the work of art, which as an objectivation does not belong to the sphere of production). […] In Marx’s view, the sphere of production is the field which will always remain “the field of necessity”; above it is the “realm of freedom”, which subordinates production to its own ends. Agnes Heller, The Theory of Need in Marx, Chapter 4
The category of “socially necessary labor time” will be interpretable only in relation to the process of material production. (The concept of “socially necessary labor time” is not applicable to any “free” activity, whether medicine, teaching, planning, or scientific and artistic activity. Agnes Heller, The Theory of Need in Marx, Chapter 4
Value arising from relationships - the need for a relational theory of value
Books & Papers
Re-Imagining Value - Bollier, Graeber, P2P, Heinrich Boll.pdfPDF
Graeber - It is value that brings universes into beingPDF
De Angelis_Omnia Sunt CommuniaPDF
David Bollier & Silke Helfrich- Free, Fair and AlivePDF
Open Source Challenges

Value

Needs-Based (Bookchin/Marx) -> Do we want to measure value at all?

Gentle Reciprocity -> Bollier & Helfrich

Value as the importance of actions -> Graeber

DisCO?

Capitalism

Strict Equivalence -> Value, Commodity

Private Property

Commons

Gentle Reciprocity

Usufruct

Central Themes

Commons vs Capitalism

Gentle Reciprocity vs Strict Equivalence (Value)

Post-Scarcity vs Scarcity

Knowledge Commons & Software?

Capitalism Pillars

Private Property

Value

Wage Labor

Scarcity

Capitalism: reduces all relationships to transaction

Strategies for Transitioning to Communism
The difference between Marxism and utopian socialism does not, then, rest on the existence or otherwise of an image of the socialist society to be attained, nor even on the content of that image. It rests upon disagreements about the process of transition. Even here the question of who is most utopian in the sense of unrealistic is a matter of dispute. Martin Buber, in Paths in Utopia, defends the orientation of utopian socialism (including not just Saint-Simon, Fourier and Owen, but Proudhon, Kropotkin and Landauer) to this problem. Buber’s argument is that a ‘society is naturally composed not of disparate individuals but of associative units’, and that the health of a society depends on the density of voluntary associations that constitute it; capitalist society is thus ‘a society inherently poor in structure and growing visibly poorer every day’. The strength of utopian socialism is that it addressed itself to the issue of ‘a renewal of society through a renewal of its cell-tissue’, and aimed to ‘substitute society for State to the greatest degree possible’. Buber argues that neither Marx nor Engels gave sufficient attention to the process of social restructuring, in spite of the assertion that the new society matures in the womb of the old. Organic restructuring necessitates the development of a network of cooperative settlements which go beyond simple consumer or producer cooperatives – as in the Israeli kibbutzim. […] His arguments in favour of cooperative settlements rest upon a recognition that the social relations of production lie at the root of the character of society. His claim, however, is that the post-revolutionary leap and the dictatorship of the proletariat involve a contradiction between means and ends which is not present in utopian socialism. The so-called utopian does not believe in this post-revolutionary leap, but in ‘continuity within which revolution is only the accomplishment, the setting free and extension of a reality that has already grown to its true possibilities’. In Buber’s view the ‘utopian’ approach to the problem is more realistic, since it is difficult to see how the centralisation of the first phase of socialism will give way to full communism. In other words, the expectation that the state will somehow wither away is itself utopian, i.e. unrealistic. Levitas, The Concept of Utopia, p.53
Criticism of “utopian” socialism movements by the Marxist tradition
“The significance of Critical-Utopian Socialism ... bears an inverse relation to historical development. In proportion as the modern class struggle develops and takes definite shape, this fantastic standing apart from the contest, these fantastic attacks on it, lose all practical value and all theoretical justification. Therefore, although the originators of these systems were, in many respects, revolutionary, their disciples have, in every case, formed mere reactionary sects. They hold fast by the original views of their masters, in opposition to the progressive historical development of the proletariat. They, therefore, endeavour, and that consistently, to deaden the class struggle and to reconcile the class antagonisms. They still dream of experimental realisation of their social utopias, of founding isolated ‘phalanstères’, of establishing ‘Home Colonies’, of setting up a ‘Little Icaria’ ... and to realise all these castles in the air, they are compelled to appeal to the feelings and purses of the bourgeois.” [Marx and Engels, Manifesto of the Communist Party, Collected Works of Marx and Engels (Lawrence & Wishart: London), Vol. 6, pp. 515–16.] The fundamental error of the utopian socialists which gives rise to this unacceptable political position is the expectation that society can be changed by the appeal to all classes on the basis of reason and justice, and the belief that their blueprints of the good society will be the cause of social transformation. It is this idealist, as opposed to materialist, concept of social change which is the real problem. Levitas, The Concept of Utopia, p.60
It is clear that the basis of Marx’s and Engels’s criticisms of utopian socialism is not an objection to speculation about the future, but a difference of view about the process of transformation. As Vincent Geoghegan puts it, ‘what is under attack here is not anticipation as such, but rather the failure to root this anticipation in a theoretical framework cognizant of the essential dynamics of capitalism’. […] Utopian socialism draws up schemes for the future. Its main fault however is not that it does this, or that the schemes themselves outline the wrong sort of future, but that it entails an idealist model of social change, suggesting that the mere propagation of such schemes will have a transformative effect. Utopia here is effectively defined in terms of its function, which is seen as a negative, counter-revolutionary, one: "The chief offence does not lie in having inscribed [a] specific nostrum in [a] programme, but in taking a retrograde step at all from the standpoint of a class movement to that of a sectarian movement.” [Marx, Critique of the Gotha Programme, Collected Works of Marx and Engels (Lawrence & Wishart: London), Vol. 24, p. 93] In their terms the key question is whether movements foster a deeper understanding of the class struggle, or whether they disguise it behind plans to persuade all classes to combine in the construction of a society based on harmony. Levitas, The Concept of Utopia, p. 64, 66
Sorel’s Concept of Revolutionary Myth
The particular myth which is central to revolutionary syndicalism is the myth of the proletarian general strike, construed both as a possible actual event in the future and more importantly as a myth which mobilises people to action. Sorel observes that ‘men who are participating in a great social movement always picture their coming action as a battle in which their cause is certain to triumph’; it is to these images that he applies the term myth. The function of any such myth is to facilitate action and it must therefore be judged in these terms, not in terms of its empirical accuracy, so that it should not be taken seriously as a prediction. It operates intuitively rather than intellectually, and thus is fundamentally different from a utopia. The myth of the general strike is ‘a body of images capable of evoking instinctively all the sentiments which correspond to the different manifestations of the war undertaken by Socialism against modern society’. Revolutionary myths are thus expressions of will rather than descriptions of the future and as such ‘lead men to prepare themselves for a combat which will destroy the existing state of things’. Levitas, The Concept of Utopia, p.75
A myth cannot be separated into its constituent parts and judged against reality, for it only operates as a whole, and it is not susceptible to refutation by empirical evidence: “A myth cannot be refuted since it is, at bottom, identical with the convictions of a group, being the expression of these convictions in the language of movement; and it is, in consequence, unanalysable into parts which could be placed on the plane of historical descriptions.” [Sorel, Reflections on Violence, p. 133] Levitas, The Concept of Utopia, p.75-76
The myth of the general strike is thus virtually unadulterated by utopia. It operates in terms of feeling, intuition and instinct rather than intellect, and promotes action rather than contemplation or reflection. The function of utopia is criticism, but an impotent criticism; the function of myth is transformation and change. The superiority of myth over utopia is not just that it is more effective at changing the world. Myth is morally superior because of the state of mind which it induces and the action which it gives rise to. Sorel’s ethical standard is the heroic individual – a distinctly male individual modelled on soldiers fighting for noble causes. The image of virility is epitomised in Sorel’s extolling action over thought in the phrase ‘words are female and only acts are male’. And it is in action – specifically in revolutionary action – that the individual possesses the greatest freedom and thus most completely himself. […] Myths are necessary because without them, revolts will not provoke revolution. Whether they bear any relation to future history is irrelevant to their power and their value. At the centre of the myth lies the experi- ence of grasping the inner self, of becoming and possessing oneself more intensely than is possible in normal life. Utopias, on the other hand, are cognitive constructs, products of the intellect, of reason. As such they are divorced from the soul of the proletariat, have no real connection with anything, are at best impotent and at worst diversionary and reactionary. Myths emphasise process, utopias portray ends. Thus ‘syndicalism is free of all utopianism in the sense that it subordinates prospects for its triumph to the complex of conditions, and while waiting it performs the role of a cleansing agent in the world’. Levitas, The Concept of Utopia, p.76-78
But what is most striking, for the time being, is not the arrogance of empire, but rather the weakness of the counter-attack. Like a colossal paralysis. A mass paralysis, which will sometimes cause people to say that nothing can be done, but who will sometimes concede, when pushed to their limit, that “there is so much to do” — which isn’t any different. Anonymous, Call, p.3
The We that speaks here is not a definable, isolated We, the We of a group. It is the We of a position. This position is asserted currently as a double secession: first a secession from the process of capitalist valorization, then secession from all the sterility imposed by a mere opposition to empire (extra-parliamentary or otherwise); a secession therefore from the Left. Here secession means less a practical refusal to communicate than a disposition to forms of communication so intense that, when put into practice, they snatch from the enemy most of its power. To put it briefly, such a position borrows sudden force from the Black Panthers, collective dining halls from the German Autonomen, tree houses and the art of sabotage from the British neo-Luddites, the careful choice of words from radical feminists, mass self-reductions from the Italian autonomists, and armed joy from the June 2nd Movement. Anonymous, Call, p.5
Nothing that is expressed in the known distribution of political identities is able to lead beyond the disaster. Therefore, we begin by withdrawing from them. We contest nothing, we demand nothing. We constitute ourselves as a force, as a material force, as an autonomous material force within the Global Civil War. Anonymous, Call, p.6
When they see us withdraw from the painful rituals of classical politics — the general assembly, the meeting, the negotiation, the protest, the demand — when they hear us speak about the perceptible realm rather than about work, IDs, pensions, or freedom of movement, militants give us a pitying look. “Poor guys,” they seem to say, “they are resigning themselves to minority politics, they have retreated into their ghetto, and renounced any widening of the struggle. They will never be part of a movement.” But we believe exactly the opposite: it is they who resign themselves to minority politics by speaking their language of false objectivity, whose gravity consists of nothing more than repetition and rhetoric. Nobody is fooled by the veiled contempt with which they talk about the worries of The People, and which allows them to go from the unemployed person to the illegal immigrant, from the striker to the prostitute without ever putting themselves at risk — their contempt is that obvious. Their will to widen the struggle is nothing but a way to flee from those who are already there, and, above all, from those they would dread living with. And finally, it is they who are loath to admit the political meaning of sensitivity, who have to rely on sentimentality as their pitiful driving force. All in all, we prefer to start from small and dense nuclei than from a vast and loose network. We are familiar enough with that spinelessness. Anonymous, Call, p. 8
Critique of activists’ tactical approach
Then, at the margins of this paralysis, there is the “we really have to do something, anything” of the activists. […] Everywhere militantism has gone back to raising its rickety constructions, its depressing networks, until it is exhausted. Anonymous, Call, p.3-4
Those who would respond to the urgency of the situation with the urgency of their reaction only add to the suffocation. Their manner of intervention, of their agitation, points to the rest of their politics. That it might take a generation to build a victorious revolutionary movement in all its breadth does not cause us to retreat. We think about this with serenity. Anonymous, Call, p.9
We have known, and are still familiar with, the temptation of activism. The counter-summits, the campaigns against evictions, against new security laws and the building of new prisons, the occupations, the No-Border camps; the parade of all of this. The progres- sive dispersion of collectives responding to the same dispersion of activity. Running after the movements. Feeling our power on an ad hoc basis, but at the price of returning each time to an underlying powerlessness. Paying a high price for each campaign. Letting it consume all the energy that we have. Then moving to the next one, each time more out of breath, more exhausted, more saddened. And little by little, through demanding, through denouncing, we become incapable of sensing what is supposed to be the basis of our engagement, the nature of the urgency that flows through us. Anonymous, Call, p.9
Activism is the first reflex. The standard response to the urgency of the present situation. The perpetual mobilization in the name of urgency is what our governments and our bosses have made us used to, even when we fight against them. Forms of life disappear every day; plant and animal species, human experiences and countless relationships between living beings and ways of living. But our feeling of urgency is tied less to the speed of these extinctions than to their irreversibility, and even more to our inability to repopulate the desert. The activist mobilizes herself against the catastrophe. But only to prolong it. Her haste con- sumes what little of the world remains. The activist answer to urgency remains faithful to the regime of urgency, with no hope of getting out of it or interrupting it. The activist wants to be everywhere. She goes everywhere the rhythm of the breakdown of the machine leads her. Everywhere she brings her pragmatic inventiveness, the festive energy of her opposition to the catastrophe. Without a doubt, the activist gets shit done. But she never devotes herself to thinking about how to do it. How to hinder concretely the progress of the desert, in order to establish inhabitable worlds without waiting. Anonymous, Call, p.9-10
We desert activism. Without forgetting what gives it strength: a certain presence within the situation. An ease of movement within it. A way to apprehend the struggle; not from a moral or ideological angle, but technically and tactically. Anonymous, Call, p.9
What we desert in militantism is this absence from the situation. Just as we desert the inconsistency to which activism condemns them. Activists themselves feel this inconsistency. And this is why, periodically, they turn toward their elders, the militants. They borrow their strategies, terrains of struggle, slogans. What appeals to them in militantism is the consistency, the structure, the loyalty they lack. And so the activists revert to old-new disputes and demand — “citizenship for all,” “free movement of people,” “guaranteed income,” “free public transport.” The problem with demands is that, by formulating needs in terms that make them audible to power, they say nothing about those needs, and what real transformations of the world they require. Thus, demanding free public transportation says nothing of our need to travel rather than be transported, of our need for slowness. Anonymous, Call, p.10
Those who would respond to the urgency of the situation with the urgency of their reaction only add to the suffocation. Their manner of intervention, of their agitation, points to the rest of their politics. That it might take a generation to build a victorious revolutionary movement in all its breadth does not cause us to retreat. We think about this with serenity. Anonymous, Call, p.9
Critique of traditional militants in the Left
Old militantism provides the opposite example. There is something amazing about the cluelessness of militants in various situations. We remember this scene from Genoa: about 50 militants of the Trostkyist Ligue Communiste Révolutionnaire wave their red flags labeled “100% on the Left.” They are motionless, timeless. They shout their pre-approved slogans, surrounded by peace-police. […] When compelled to com- ment on us the militants speak of adventurism, mindlessness. Their pretext is that the conditions are not right. We say that nothing was lacking, that everything was there — except them. What we desert in militantism is this absence from the situation. Anonymous, Call, p.10
What we desert in militantism is this absence from the situation. Just as we desert the inconsistency to which activism condemns them. Activists themselves feel this inconsistency. And this is why, periodically, they turn toward their elders, the militants. They borrow their strategies, terrains of struggle, slogans. What appeals to them in militantism is the consistency, the structure, the loyalty they lack. And so the activists revert to old-new disputes and demand — “citizenship for all,” “free movement of people,” “guaranteed income,” “free public transport.” The problem with demands is that, by formulating needs in terms that make them audible to power, they say nothing about those needs, and what real transformations of the world they require. Thus, demanding free public transportation says nothing of our need to travel rather than be transported, of our need for slowness. Anonymous, Call, p.10
Thus, demanding free public transportation says nothing of our need to travel rather than be transported, of our need for slowness. In addition, demands often end up masking the real conflicts. Demanding free public transportation only slows the spread of fare-dodging techniques, at least for this specific milieu. Calling for the free movement of people merely means avoiding the issue of a practical escape from a tightening of control. Fighting for a guaranteed income is, at best, to condemn ourselves to the illusion that an amelioration of the worst of capitalism is necessary to get out of it. Whatever form it takes, the impasse is always the same: the subjective resources mobilized may be revolutionary, yet they remain imbedded in a program of (radical) reformism. Under the pretext of overcoming the alternative between reform and revolution we sink into a timely ambiguity. Anonymous, Call, p.10
During the conflict against the loi Travail, the emergence of what became the "cortege de tete," the lead contingent in marches, was the result of a vision. A few hundred "young people" saw, as early as the first demonstrations, that the union groups were marching like zombies, that they didn't believe a word of the slogans they were mouthing, that their security marshals were clubbing the high-school students, that there was no way to follow that big cadaver, and so it was necessary to claim the front of the demonstration at all costs. Which is what was done. And done again. And again. Until a limit was reached where, with the "cortege de tete" repeating itself, it was no longer a gesture in a situation, but a subject mirrored back in the media, the alternative media in particular. So it was time to desert that desertion, which was congealing and becoming a parody of itself. And to keep moving. That being said, for the whole time it was vibrant, the "cortege de tere" was the locus from which things became clear, the site of a contagion in the ability to see what was going down. From the simple fact that there was struggle, that different determinations were clashing, that forces were joining, allying, separating, that strategies were called into play, and that all this was manifesting in the streets and not just on tele­ vision, there was a situation. The Invisible Committee, Now, p.150-151
The formation of new organizations depends on a deeper critique, translated into acts. There must be a complete break with ideology, in which revolutionary groups think they possess official titles guaranteeing their function (that is, we must resume the Marxian critique of the role of ideologies). It is thus necessary to leave the terrain of specialized revolutionary activity -- the terrain of the self-mystification of "serious politics" -- because it has long been seen that such specialization encourages even the best people to demonstrate stupidity regarding all other questions; with the result that they end up failing even in their merely political struggles, since the latter are inseparable from all other aspects of the overall problem of our society. Specialization and pseudoseriousness are among the primary defensive outposts that the organization of the old world occupies in everyone's mind. A revolutionary association of a new type will also break with the old world by permitting and demanding of its members an authentic and creative participation, instead of expecting a participation of militants measurable in attendance time, which amounts to recreating the sole control possible in the dominant society: the quantitative criterion of hours of labor. A genuine enthusiastic participation on the part of everyone is necessitated by the fact that the classical political militant, who "devotes himself" to his radical duties, is everywhere disappearing along with classical politics itself; and even more by the fact that devotion and sacrifice always engender authority (even if only purely moral authority). Boredom is counterrevolutionary. In every way. Situationist International, The Bad Days will End, Internationale Situationniste #7, https://libcom.org/article/bad-days-will-end-0
For Mouvement Communiste, Négation, Intervention Communiste, and others the breakdown of the old workers’ movement was something to be celebrated, not because the corrupt leadership of the workers’ organisations would no longer be able to restrain the autonomy of the masses, but because such a shift represented a transcendence of the historical function of the workers’ movement, a transcendence that would mark the reemergence of the communist movement, the “real movement which abolishes the present state of things”. And it did so in an immediate sense, for the riots and wildcat strikes of that decade were read by these writers as a total refusal of all the mediations of the workers’ movement, not in favour of some other more “democratic” mediation like that of workers’ councils, but in a way that posed the immediate production of communist relations as the only possible revolutionary horizon. Thus whereas communism had previously been seen as something that needed to be created after the revolution, the revolution was now seen as nothing other than the production of communism (abolishing wage labour and the state). The notion of a period of transition was jettisoned. Endnotes, Bring out your Dead, Endnotes #1, https://endnotes.org.uk/articles/bring-out-your-dead
The workers’ failures were necessary since it was capital that constituted their organizing principle: “The example of the German, and above all, of the Russian revolutions, shows that the proletariat was fully capable of destroying a social order which presented an obstacle to the development of the productive forces, and thus to the development of capital, but that at the moment that it became a matter of establishing a different community, it remained a prisoner of the logic of the rationality of the development of those productive forces, and confined itself within the problem of managing them.” [Jacques Camatte, ‘Proletariat and Revolution’, 1975] In a recent text Dauvé sums up this estimation of the old workers’ movement: “The workers’ movement that existed in 1900, or still in 1936, was neither crushed by fascist repression nor bought off by transistors or fridges: it destroyed itself as a force of change because it aimed at preserving the proletarian condition, not superseding it. … The purpose of the old labour movement was to take over the same world and manage it in a new way: putting the idle to work, developing production, introducing workers’ democracy (in principle, at least). Only a tiny minority, ‘anarchist’ as well as 'marxist', held that a different society meant the destruction of State, commodity and wage labour, although it rarely defined this as a process, rather as a programme to put into practice after the seizure of power…” [Gilles Dauvé, ‘Out of the Future’ in Eclipse and Reemergence of the Communist Movement (1997) pp. 12-13.] Endnotes, Bring out your Dead, Endnotes #1, https://endnotes.org.uk/articles/bring-out-your-dead
We know that building a power of any scale will take time. There are many things that we no longer know how to do. In fact, those of us who benefit from the modernization and the education dispensed in our developed lands barely know how to make anything ourselves. Even gathering plants for cooking or medicine — rather than merely for decoration — is regarded as archaic at best, at worst as a nice hobby. We make a simple observation: everyone has access to a certain quantity of resources and knowledge made available by the simple fact of living in these lands of the old world, and we can communize them. The question is not whether to live with or without money, to steal or to buy, to work or not, but how to use the money we have to increase our autonomy from the commodity sphere. And if we prefer to steal instead of working, or produce for ourselves instead of stealing, it is not due to a concern with purity. It is because the flows of power that accompany the flows of commodities, the subjective submission that conditions our access to survival, have become too expensive. There would be many inappropriate ways to express what we envision: we neither want to leave for the countryside nor reappropriate and accumulate ancient knowledge. We are not merely concerned with a reappropriation of methods. Nor with a reappropriation of knowledge. If we put together all that knowledge, those techniques, and all the inventiveness displayed in the field of activism, we would still not get a revolutionary movement. It is a question of temporality. A question of creating the conditions where an offensive can sustain itself without fading away, of establishing the material solidarities that allow us to maintain it. We believe there is no revolution without the constitution of a common material force. We do not ignore the anachronism of this belief. We know it is both too early and too late, which is why we have time. We have stopped waiting. Anonymous, Call, p.11-12
We set the point of reversal, the way out of the desert, the end of Capital, in the intensity of the link that each person manages to establish between what she thinks and how she lives. Contrary to the upholders of Existential Liberalism, we refuse to view this as a private matter, an individual issue, a question of character. On the contrary, we start from the certainty that this link depends on the construction of shared realms, of placing effective methods in common. Anonymous, Call, p.13
These are so-called ethical questions which must of course be asked and above all, they are those that we find at the very heart of the political: how to respond to emotional neutralization and to the potential effects of decisive thoughts? And also: how do modern societies work with these neutralizations, or rather, how are they made into essential cogs in its continual functioning? How does the material effectiveness of the empire relate to our predisposition toward giving up, regardless of our collective experiences? Anonymous, Call, p.15
On the subject of strategy, we have learned all the lessons from the tradition of the defeated. We remember the beginnings of the labor movement. The lessons are near to us. Because what was put into practice in its initial phase relates directly to how we are living, to what we want to put into practice today. The building up of what was to be in force called the labor movement first rested on the sharing of criminal practices. The secret strike funds, the acts of sabotage, the secret societies, the class violence, the first forms of unemployment insurance seen in the recovery of individual clearheadedness, that were developed with the consciousness of their illegal and antagonistic nature. Anonymous, Call, p.18
In Europe, the integration of workers’ organizations into the state management apparatus — the foundation of social democracy — was paid for with the renunciation of the least ability to be a nuisance. Here too the emergence of the labor movement was a matter of material solidarities, of an urgent need for communism. The Maisons du Peuple were the last refuges for this confusion between the need for immediate communization and the strategic requirements of a practical implementation of the revolutionary process. The labor movement then developed as a progressive separation between the co-operative current, an economic niche cut off from its strategic raison d’être, and the political and union forms working on the terrain of electoralism or joint management. It is from the abandonment of any secessionist aim that this absurdity was born: the Left. The climax is reached when unionists denounce any resort to violence, loudly proclaiming to all who wish to hear it, that they will collaborate with the cops to control rioters. Anonymous, Call, p.18
Autonomous Spaces and Cracks in Capitalism
Often such activities are part-time: the people in the social centre, say, devote as much time as possible to anti-capitalist struggle, but they all take jobs at least occasionally in order to survive; or the friend who decide to live by cultivating their own food create their ideal community using the pensions they have already earned by working. There is no purity here, but there is a common rejection of the cohesive logic of capitalism, and an attempt to create something else. Holloway, Crack Capitalism, p.23
Are we to say, then, that any construction of other forms of organization outside the mainstream of capitalist social relations should be seen as a crack in capitalist domination? Not if we think of a crack as a space or moment of negation-and-creation, of refusal and other doing. Being unemployed or living in a slum in Mumbai does not necessarily involve any refusal of capitalism. It is rather that the relations of mutual support that are created in such situations can easily become the material basis for a sort of a flip-over, a real detournement in which victims suddenly emerge as rebels, and the structures of suffering are suddenly transformed into anticipations of a better world. Holloway, Crack Capitalism, p.24
This ever-renewed creation of organisational forms builds, however, upon a long tradition. The idea that our forms of organisation are radically different from their forms of organisation is profoundly rooted in the whole history of anti­ capitalism. Capitalist organisations are marked by hierarchy and the pursuit of efficiency. The anti-capitalist tradition of which we speak is characterised by respect for all those involved, the promotion of active participation, direct democracy and comradeship. This is the tradition of the commune, council, soviet, or assembly. This is a form of organisation celebrated in Marx's discussion of the Paris Commune in The Civil War in France, and one that recurs, with variations, in all the major uprisings against capitalism: in the soviets of the Russian revolution, the workers' councils of Italy and Germany, in the Spanish Civil War, recently in the communal councils of the Zapatistas, the cabildos in Bolivia, the asambleas barriales in Argentina and the forms of horizontal (or anti-vertical) organisation adopted by groups all over the world. These are non-instrumental forms of organisation that focus on the articulation of the opinions of all those involved in the struggles, working outwards from there rather than backwards from the goal to be achieved. The council, then, is quite different from the party, which is a form of organisation conceived as a means to an end, the end of winning state power. In the council, what is important is the effective articulation of collective self-determination; in the party, the important thing is to achieve a pre-determined goal. The council is not only something that arises in revolutionary situations. The sort of relationship that it is at the base of the council is profoundly rooted in everyday struggle, that is to say, in everyday life. We go out for a meal with a group of friends and we take the decision on where to go through a discussion that aims to respect everyone’s preferences. This sort of decision-making is just an integral part of ordinary life. We think of it as friendship or comradeship. Holloway, Crack Capitalism, p.40-41
Comradeship, dignity, amorosity, love, solidarity, fraternity, friendship, ethics: all these names stand in contrast to the commodified, monetised relations of capitalism, all describe relations developed in struggles against capitalism and which can be seen as anticipating or creating a society beyond capitalism. They stand in contrast to the commodified relations of capitalism not as timeless alternatives, but as struggle-against. Holloway, Crack Capitalism, p.43
The spaces and moments we have called cracks are often described as autonomous spaces, or spaces of exodus or escape. We have tended to avoid these terms here simply because they draw attention away from the crucial issue: the conflict between these space-moments and the world that surrounds them. It is important to sing the glories of the worlds that are being created, the new social relations and the new ways of doing things: but we cannot go very far without talking of the clash with the world to which these dignities are opposed. There is a constant antagonism, a constant pressure to make the otherness yield to the enormous cohesive force of the society that surrounds us. The spaces are not autonomous, though they aspire to be. They are rather cracks, the sharp ends of a social conflict. Holloway, Crack Capitalism, p.49
Building a new world does of course mean changing the existing one, but the shift in emphasis is crucial: instead of focusing our attention on the destruction of capitalism, we concentrate on building something else. This is an inversion of the traditional revolutionary perspective that puts the destruction of capitalism first and the construction of the new society second. To make a new world means to cut the web that binds us into the cohering force of capitalist society, so that we can create something different. The enemy is the social synthesis of capitalist society. Holloway, Crack Capitalism, p.50
We do not impute these weaknesses to the squat form. We neither deny nor desert it. We say that squatting will only make sense again for us on the condition that we clarify the basis of the sharing we engage in. In the squat, like anywhere else, the collective creation of a strategy is the only alternative to retreating into an identity, either through assimilation or the ghetto. Anonymous, Call, p.18
The recent increase of policing functions of the State proves only this: that Western societies have lost all ability to cohere. They are only able to manage their inexorable decay. That is to say, essentially, to prevent any re-consolidation, to crush anyone who stands out. Anyone who deserts. Anyone who gets out of line. But there is nothing to be done. The condition of inner ruin of these societies allows an increasing number of cracks to appear. The continual renovation of appearances can achieve nothing: there, worlds form. Squats, communes, groupuscules, barrios, all try to extract themselves from capitalist desolation. Most often these attempts come to nothing or die from autarky, for lack of having established contacts, appropriate solidarities. Also for lack of conceiving of themselves as full-time partisans in the Global Civil War. Anonymous, Call, p.18-19
But all of these attempted re-consolidations are still nothing compared to mass desire, with the constantly deferred desire to drop out. To leave. In ten years, between two censuses, a hundred thousand people have disappeared in Great Britain. They have boarded a truck, bought a ticket, dropped acid, or gone underground. They have disaffiliated. They have left. We would have liked, in our disaffiliation, to have had a place to rejoin, a side to take, a road to follow. Many who leave get lost. And never arrive. Our strategy is therefore the following: to establish and maintain a series of centers of desertion, of poles of secession, of rallying points. For runaways. For those who leave. A series of places where we can escape from the influence of a civilization that is headed for the abyss. Anonymous, Call, p.19
It is a matter of giving ourselves the means, of finding the methods whereby all those questions can be resolved; questions which, when addressed separately, can drive us to depression. How to dissolve the dependencies that weaken us? How to organize ourselves so we no longer have to work? How to settle beyond the toxicity of the metropole without going Back To Nature? How to shut down nuclear plants? How not to be forced to resort to psychiatric pulverization when a friend goes mad; or to the crude remedies of mechanistic medicine when she falls ill? How to live together without mutual suppression? How to take in the death of a comrade? How to ruin Empire? Anonymous, Call, p.19
We know our weaknesses: we were born and we have grown up in pacified societies, dissolved. We have not had the opportunity to acquire the strength that moments of intense collective confrontation can provide. Nor the knowledge that is linked to them. We have a political education to develop together. A theoretical and practical education. For this, we need locations. Places where we can organizes ourselves, where we can share and develop the required techniques. Where we can learn to handle all that may prove necessary. Where we can co-operate. Had it not renounced any political perspective, the experimentations of the Bauhaus, with all the materiality and the rigor it contained, would evoke the idea that we can create for ourselves space-times dedicated to the transmission of knowledge and experience. The Black Panthers equipped themselves with such places, to which they added their politico-military capacity, the ten thousand free lunches they distributed every day, and their autonomous press. Before long, they formed a threat so tangible to Power that the Feds had to be sent in to massacre them. Anonymous, Call, p.19
The practice of communism, as we live it, we call The Party. When we overcome an obstacle together or when we reach a higher level of sharing, we say that we are “building the Party.” Certainly others, unknown to us at present, are building the Party elsewhere. This call is addressed to them. No experience of communism at the present time can survive without getting organized, tying oneself to others, taking sides in crises, waging war. “For the oases that dispense life are wiped out when we seek refuge in them.” As we understand it, the process of instituting communism can only take the form of a collection of acts of communization, of making common such-and-such space, such-and-such contraption, such and-such knowledge. That is to say, the elaboration of the mode of sharing that attaches to them. Insurrection itself is merely an accelerator, a decisive moment in this process. As we intend it, the Party is not an organization — where everything becomes insubstantial by dint of transparency, and it is not a family — where everything smells like a con by dint of opacity. The Party is a collection of places, infrastructures, communized methods, and the dreams, bodies, murmurs, thoughts, desires that circulate among those places; the use of those methods, the sharing of those infrastructures. Anonymous, Call, p.22
The notion of the Party responds to the necessity of a minimal formalization, which makes us accessible as well as allowing us to remain invisible. It belongs to the communist way that we explain to ourselves, to formulate the basis of our sharing. So that the most recent arrival is, at the very least, the equal of the eldest. Looking closer at it, the Party could be nothing but this: the formation of intuition as a force. The deployment of an archipelago of worlds. What would a political force be, under Empire, that didn’t have its farms, its schools, its arms, its medicines, its collective houses, its editing desks, its printing presses, its delivery vans, and its bridgeheads in the metropole? It appears more and more absurd that some of us still have to work for Capital — aside from the usual work of infiltration of course. The offensive power of the Party derives from the fact that it is also a power of production; however, in essence, those relationships are only incidentally relationships of production. Anonymous, Call, p.22
So, the construction of the Party, in its most visible aspect, consists of the sharing or communization of what we have at our disposal. Communizing a place means this: setting free its use, and on the basis of this liberation, experimenting with refined, intensified, and complexified relations. If private property is essentially the discretionary power of depriving any person of the use of the possessed thing, communization can only mean depriving the agents of Empire of that possession. Anonymous, Call, p.23
As social cybernetization progresses, the normal situation becomes more urgent. As a consequence, situations of crisis and malfunction multiply in a completely logical way. From the point of view of Empire, a power failure, a hurricane, or a social movement are all the same. They are disturbances. They must be managed. For now, meaning on account of our weakness, these situations of interruption appear as moments in which Empire pops up, takes its place in the materiality of worlds, experiments with new managerial procedures. It is precisely there that it attaches itself more firmly to the populations it claims to assist. Empire always devotes itself to being the agent of returning the situation to normal. Our task, conversely, is to make the situation of exception livable. We will genuinely succeed in blocking corporate society only on condition that such a blockage is filled with desires other than those for a return to normal. What takes place during a strike or during a natural disaster is, in a way, quite similar: a in- terruption of the organized stability of our dependencies. The existence of need (the communist essence) — that which essentially binds us and essentially separates us — is laid bare during each of them. The blanket of shame that normally covers it is torn up. Receptiveness for encounters, for experimentation with other relations to the world, to others, to oneself, as it manifests in these moments, is enough to sweep away any doubt about the possibility of communism. About the need for communism as well. What is now required is our ability to self-organize, our ability (by immediately organizing ourselves on the basis of our needs) to prolong, extend, and ultimately render the situation of exception effective, against the terror upon which Imerial power rests. Anonymous, Call, p.26
Critique of Cooperativism
One can live a whole life without experiencing anything, by being very careful not to think and feel. Existence is then reduced to a slow process of degradation. It wears down and ruins, instead of giving form. After the miracle of the encounter, relations can only go from wound to wound towards their consumption. Life, on the contrary, gradually gives form to whoever refuses to live beside themselves, to whoever allows themselves to experience. They become a form of life in the full sense of the term. In sharp contrast to that, there are the inherited methods of activist construction, so grossly defec­tive, so exhausting, so destructive, when they are so focused on building. Communism does not hinge on self-renunciation but on the attention given to the smallest action. It's a question of our plane of perception and hence of our way of doing things. A practical matter. What the perception of entities-individual or collective­ bars our access to is the plane where things really happen, where the collective potentials form and fall apart, gain strength or dissipate. […] To live communism is not to work to ensure the existence of the entity we belong to, but to deploy and deepen an ensemble of ties, which sometimes means cutting certain ones. What is essential occurs at the level of the smallest things. […] Perception in terms of bonds dismisses the whole alternative between individual and collective, and does so positively. In a real situation, an "I" that says what needs to be said can be a "we" of extraordinary power. And so, the particular happiness of any "commune" reflects the plenitude of its singularities, a certain quality of ties, the radiant energy of each frag­ment of world that it harbors-good-bye to entities, to their protrusiveness, good-bye to individual and collective confinement, adios to the reign of nar­cissism. The Invisible Committee, Now, p.143-144
Prefiguration
Buber’s argument is that a ‘society is naturally composed not of disparate individuals but of associative units’, and that the health of a society depends on the density of voluntary associations that constitute it; capitalist society is thus ‘a society inherently poor in structure and growing visibly poorer every day’. The strength of utopian socialism is that it addressed itself to the issue of ‘a renewal of society through a renewal of its cell-tissue’, and aimed to ‘substitute society for State to the greatest degree possible’. Buber argues that neither Marx nor Engels gave sufficient attention to the process of social restructuring, in spite of the assertion that the new society matures in the womb of the old. Organic restructuring necessitates the development of a network of cooperative settlements which go beyond simple consumer or producer cooperatives – as in the Israeli kibbutzim. Levitas, The Concept of Utopia, p.53
There is a general context — capitalism, civilization, empire, as you wish — a general context that not only intends to control each situation but, even worse, seeks a way to make sure as often as possible, that there is no situation. They have planned out streets and homes, language and emotions, even the global tempo that drives all of it, only for that purpose. Everywhere different realms are made to slide by each other and be ignored. The normal situation is this absence of a situation. To get organized means: to get out of the situation and not merely challenge it. To take sides within it. Weaving the necessary material, emotional, and political solidarities. This is what any strike does in any office, in any factory. This is what any gang does. Any underground; any revolutionary or counter-revolutionary party. To get organized means: to give substance to the situation. Making it real, tangible. Reality is not capitalist. Our position within a situation determines our need to become allies, and for that reason to establish some lines of communication, some wider current or tendency. In turn those new links reconfigure the situation. Anonymous, Call, p.5
The practice of communism, as we live it, we call The Party. When we overcome an obstacle together or when we reach a higher level of sharing, we say that we are “building the Party.” Certainly others, unknown to us at present, are building the Party elsewhere. This call is addressed to them. No experience of communism at the present time can survive without getting organized, tying oneself to others, taking sides in crises, waging war. “For the oases that dispense life are wiped out when we seek refuge in them.” As we understand it, the process of instituting communism can only take the form of a collection of acts of communization, of making common such-and-such space, such-and-such contraption, such and-such knowledge. That is to say, the elaboration of the mode of sharing that attaches to them. Insurrection itself is merely an accelerator, a decisive moment in this process. As we intend it, the Party is not an organization — where everything becomes insubstantial by dint of transparency, and it is not a family — where everything smells like a con by dint of opacity. The Party is a collection of places, infrastructures, communized methods, and the dreams, bodies, murmurs, thoughts, desires that circulate among those places; the use of those methods, the sharing of those infrastructures. Anonymous, Call, p.22
From every side we oppose the extortion of having to choose between the offensive and the constructive, negativity and positivity, life and survival, war and the everyday. We will not respond to it. We understand only too well how this dismembering alternative splits and re-splits all existing collectives. For a force which is deployed, it is impossible to say if the annihilation of a device that harms it is a constructive or offensive matter, if achieving dietary or medical autonomy constitutes an act of war or subtraction. There are circumstances, like in a riot, in which the ability to heal our comrades considerably augments our ability to wreak havoc. Who can say that arming ourselves would not be part of the material constitution of a collectivity? When we agree on a common strategy, there is no choice between the offensive and the constructive; obviously there exists, in every situation, what increases our power and what harms it, what is opportune and what is not. And when the evidence is lacking, there is discussion, and in the worst case, there is gambling. In a general way, we do not see how anything else but a force, a reality able to survive the total dislocation of capitalism could truly attack it, up to the very moment of its dislocation. When that moment comes, it will be a matter of actually turning the generalized social collapse to our advantage, to transform a collapse (like the Argentine or the Soviet) into a revolutionary situation. Those who pretend to separate material autonomy from the sabotage of the Imperial machine show that they want neither. Anonymous, Call, p.23
As social cybernetization progresses, the normal situation becomes more urgent. As a consequence, situations of crisis and malfunction multiply in a completely logical way. From the point of view of Empire, a power failure, a hurricane, or a social movement are all the same. They are disturbances. They must be managed. For now, meaning on account of our weakness, these situations of interruption appear as moments in which Empire pops up, takes its place in the materiality of worlds, experiments with new managerial procedures. It is precisely there that it attaches itself more firmly to the populations it claims to assist. Empire always devotes itself to being the agent of returning the situation to normal. Our task, conversely, is to make the situation of exception livable. We will genuinely succeed in blocking corporate society only on condition that such a blockage is filled with desires other than those for a return to normal. What takes place during a strike or during a natural disaster is, in a way, quite similar: a in- terruption of the organized stability of our dependencies. The existence of need (the communist essence) — that which essentially binds us and essentially separates us — is laid bare during each of them. The blanket of shame that normally covers it is torn up. Receptiveness for encounters, for experimentation with other relations to the world, to others, to oneself, as it manifests in these moments, is enough to sweep away any doubt about the possibility of communism. About the need for communism as well. What is now required is our ability to self-organize, our ability (by immediately organizing ourselves on the basis of our needs) to prolong, extend, and ultimately render the situation of exception effective, against the terror upon which Imerial power rests. Anonymous, Call, p.26
Critique of social movements
What is now required is our ability to self-organize, our ability (by immediately organizing ourselves on the basis of our needs) to prolong, extend, and ultimately render the situation of exception effective, against the terror upon which Imerial power rests. This is particularly striking in social movements. Even the expression social movement seems to suggest that what really matters is what we are moving towards, rather than what’s happening here and now. Up till now in all social movements, there has been a prejudice to avoid seizing the time, which explains why they are never able to get together; rather they seem to chase each other away. Hence the particular texture, so volatile, of their sociality, where any commitment appears revocable. Hence also their invariable dramatic arc: a quick ascent thanks to some popular resonance highlighted in the media; next, due to this hasty aggregation, a slow but inevitable erosion; and finally, the dried up movement, the last handful of diehards who get a card from this or that union, found this or that association, thereby hoping to find an organizational continuity to their commitment. But we are not looking for such continuity: having premises where we might meet, and a photocopier to print leaflets. The continuity we seek is the one which allows us, after having struggled for months, not to go back to work, not to start working again as before, to keep doing harm. And this can only be built during movements. It is a matter of putting into place an immediate, material sharing, the construction of a real revolutionary war machine, the construction of the Party. Anonymous, Call, p.26-27
Up till now in all social movements, there has been a prejudice to avoid seizing the time, which explains why they are never able to get together; rather they seem to chase each other away. Hence the particular texture, so volatile, of their sociality, where any commitment appears revocable. Hence also their invariable dramatic arc: a quick ascent thanks to some popular resonance highlighted in the media; next, due to this hasty aggregation, a slow but inevitable erosion; and finally, the dried up movement, the last handful of diehards who get a card from this or that union, found this or that association, thereby hoping to find an organizational continuity to their commitment. But we are not looking for such continuity: having premises where we might meet, and a photocopier to print leaflets. The continuity we seek is the one which allows us, after having struggled for months, not to go back to work, not to start working again as before, to keep doing harm. And this can only be built during movements. It is a matter of putting into place an immediate, material sharing, the construction of a real revolutionary war machine, the construction of the Party. We must, as we were saying, organize ourselves on the basis of our needs — to manage to answer in turn the collective questions of eating, sleeping, thinking, loving, creating forms, coordinating our forces — and conceive all this as an opportunity in the war against Empire. It is only in this way, by inhabiting the disturbances of its very program, that we will be able to counter that economic liberalism which is only the strict consequence, the logical application, of the Existential Liberalism that is accepted and practiced everywhere. To which each one is attached as if it were the most basic right, including those who would like to challenge Neo- Liberalism. This is the way the Party will be built; as a trail of habitable places left behind by each situation of exception that Empire encounters. We will not fail to notice, then, how the subjectivities and the revolutionary collectives become less flakey, as they show what they’re really made of. Anonymous, Call, p.26-27
Hope. Now there's at least one disease this civilization has not infected us with. We're not despairing for all that. No one has ever acted out of hope. Hope is of a piece with waiting, with the refusal to see what is there, with the fear of breaking into the present - in short, with the fear of living. To hope is to declare one­ self in advance to be without any hold on that from which something is expected nonetheless. It's to remove oneself from the process so as to avoid any connection with its outcome. It's wanting things to be different without embracing the means for this to come about. It's a kind of cowardice. One has to know what to commit to and then commit to it. Even if it means making enemies. Or making friends. Once we know what we want, we're no longer alone, the world repopulates. Everywhere there are allies, closenesses, and an infinite gradation of possible friendships. Nothing is close for someone who floats. Hope, that very slight but constant impetus toward tomorrow that is communicated to us day by day, is the best agent of the maintenance of order. We're daily informed of problems we can do nothing about, but to which there will surely be solutions tomor­row. The whole oppressive feeling of powerlessness that this social organization cultivates in everyone is only an immense pedagogy of waiting. It's an avoidance of now. But there isn't, there's never been, and there never will be anything but now. And even if the past can act upon the now, this is because it has itself never been anything but a now. Just as our tomorrow will be. The only way to understand something in the past is to under­ stand that it too used to be a now. It's to feel the faint breath of the air in which the human beings of yesterday lived their lives. If we are so much inclined to flee from now, it's because now is the time of decision. It's the locus of the "I accept" or the "I refuse," of ''I'll pass on that" or ''I'll go with that." It's the locus of the logical act that imme­diately follows the perception. It is the present, and hence the locus ofpresence. It is the moment, endlessly renewed, of the taking of sides. Thinking in distant terms is always more comfortable. "In the end," things will change; "in the end," beings will be transfigured. Meanwhile, let's go on this way, let's remain what we are. A mind that thinks in terms of the future is incapable of acting in the present. It doesn't seek transformation; it avoids it. The current disaster is like a monstrous accumu­lation of all the deferrals of the past, to which are added those of each day and each moment, in a continuous time slide. But life is always decided now, and now, and now. Everyone can see that this civilization is like a train rolling toward the abyss, and picking up speed. The faster it goes, the more one hears the hysterical cheers of the boozers in the discotheque car. You have to listen carefully to make out the paralyzed silence of the rational minds that no longer under­stand anything, that of the worriers who bite their nails, and the accent of false calm in the exclama­tions of the card players who wait. Inwardly, many people have chosen to leap off the train, but they hesitate on the footboard. They're still restrained by so many things. They feel held back because they've made the choice, but the decision is lacking. Decision is what traces in the present the manner and possibility of acting, of making a leap that is not into the void. We mean the decision to desert, to desert the ranks, to organize, to undertake a secession, be it imperceptibly, but in any case, now. The epoch belongs to the determined. The Invisible Committee, Now, p.16-18
Against the possibility of communism, against any possibility of happiness, there stands a hydra with two heads. On the public stage each one of them makes a show of being the sworn enemy of the other. On one side, there is the program for a fascistic restoration of unity, and on the other, there is the global power of the merchants of infrastructure-Google as much as Vinci, Amazon as much as Veolia. Those who believe that it's one or the other will have them both. Because the great builders of infrastructure have the means for which the fascists only have the folkloric discourse. For the former, the crisis of the old unities is primarily the opportunity for a new unification. In the con­temporary chaos, in the crumbling of institutions, in the death of politics, there is a perfectly profitable market for the infrastructural powers and for the giants of the Internet. A totally fragmented world remains completely manageable cybernetically. A shattered world is even the precondition for the omnipotence of those who manage its channels of communication. The program of these powers is to deploy behind the cracked facades of the old hege­monies a new, purely operational, form of unity, which doesn't get bogged down in the ponderous production of an always shaky feeling of belonging, but operates directly on "the real," reconfiguring it. A form of unity without limits, and without pretentious, which aims to build absolute order under absolute fragmentation. An order that has no intention of fabricating a new phantasmal belonging, but is content to furnish, through its networks, its servers, its highways, a materiality that is imposed on everyone without any questions being asked. No other unity than the standardization of interfaces, cities, landscapes; no other continuity than that of information. The hypothesis of Silicon Valley and the great merchants of infrastructure is that there's no more need to tire oneself out by staging a unity of facade: the unity it intends to construct will be integral with the world, incorpo­rated in its networks, poured into its concrete. Obviously we don't feel like we belong to a "Google humanity," but that's fine with Google so long as all our data belong to it. Basically, provided we accept being reduced to the sad ranks of"users," we all belong to the cloud, which does not need to proclaim it. To phrase it differently, fragmentation alone does not protect us from an attempt to reunify the world by the "rulers of tomorrow": fragmenta­tion is even the prerequisite and the ideal texture for such an initiative. From their point of view, the symbolic fragmentation of the world opens up the space for its concrete unification; segregation is not contradictory to the ultimate networking. On the contrary, it gives it its raison d'etre. The necessary condition for the reign of the GAFA (Google, Apple, Facebook, Amazon) is that beings, places, fragments of the world remain without any real contact. Where the GAFA claim to be "linking up the entire world" what they're actually doing is working toward the real isolation of everybody. By immobilizing bodies. By keeping everyone clois­tered in their signifying bubble. The power play of cybernetic power is to give everyone the impression that they have access to the whole world when they are actually more and more separated, that they have more and more "friends" when they are more and more autistic. The serial crowd of public transportation was always a lonely crowd, but people didn't transport their personal bubble along with them, as they have done since smartphones appeared. A bubble that immunizes against any contact, in addition to constituting a perfect snitch. This separation engineered by cybernetics pushes in a non-accidental way in the direction of making each fragment into a little paranoid entity, towards a drifting of the existential continents where the estrangement that already reigns between individuals in this "society" collectivizes ferociously into a thousand delirious little aggre­gates. In the face of all that, the thing to do, it would seem, is to leave home, take to the road, go meet up with others, work towards forming con­nections, whether conflictual, prudent, or joyful, between the different parts of the world. Organizing ourselves has never been anything else than loving each other. The Invisible Committee, Now, p. 46-49
The strategy of Destitution
Critique of constituent strategies
Breaking the circle that turns our contestation into a fuel for what dominates us, marking a rup­ture in the fatality that condemns revolutions to reproduce what they have driven out, shattering the iron cage of counter-revolution-this is the purpose of destitution. The notion of destitution is necessary in order to free the revolutionary imaginary of all the old constituent fantasies that weigh it down, of the whole deceptive legacy of the French Revolution. […] Destituere in Latin means: to place standing separate, raise up in isolation; to abandon; put aside, let drop, knock down; to let down, deceive. Whereas constituent logic crashes against the power apparatus it means to take control of, a destituent potential is concerned instead with escaping from it, with removing any hold on it which the apparatus might have, as it increases its hold on the world in the separate space that it forms. Its characteristic gesture is exiting, just as the typical constituent gesture is taking by storm. The Invisible Committee, Now, p.76, 78-79
Thus, where the "constituents" place themselves in a dialectical relation of struggle with the ruling authority in order to take possession of it, des­tituent logic obeys the vital need to disengage from it. It doesn't abandon the struggle, it fastens on to the struggles positivity. It doesn't adjust itself to the movements of the adversary but to what is required for the increase of its own potential. So it has little use for criticizing: "The choice is either to get out without delay, without wasting one's time criticizing, simply because one is placed elsewhere than in the region of the adversary, or else one criticizes, one keeps one foot in it, and has the other one outside. We need to leap outside and dance above it," as Jean-Francois Lyotard explained, by way of recognizing the gesture of Deleuze and Guattari's Anti-Oedipus. And Deleuze made this remark: "Roughly speaking, one recognizes a Marxist by their saying that a society contradicts itself, is defined by its contradictions, especially its class contradictions. We say rather is that in a society everything is escaping, that a society is defined by its lines of escape [ . . . ] Escape, but while escaping look for a weapon." The Invisible Committee, Now, p.79-80
Typically, the operation that the cortege de tete causes the processional setup of union demonstrations to undergo is an operation of destitution. With the vital joy it expressed, the rightness of its gesture, its determination, with its affirmative as well as offensive character, the cortege de tete drew in all that was still lively in the militant ranks and it destituted demonstrations as an institution. Not with a critique of the rest of the march but something other than a symbolic use of capturing the street. The Invisible Committee, Now, p.80
Withdrawing from the institutions is anything but leaving a void, it's suppressing them in a positive way. To destitute is not primarily to attack the insti­tution, but to attack the need we have of it. It's not to criticize it-the first critics of the state are the civil servants themselves; as to the militant, the more they criticize power the more they desire it and the more they refuse to acknowledge their desire - but to take to heart what the institution is meant to do, from outside it. To destitute the uni­versity is to establish, at a distance, the places of research, of education and thought, that are more vibrant and more demanding than it is-which would not be hard-and to greet the arrival of the last vigorous minds who are tired of frequenting the academic zombies, and only then to adminis­ter its death blow. To destitute the judicial system is to learn to settle our disputes ourselves, applying some method to this, paralyzing its faculty of judgment and driving its henchmen from our lives. To destitute medicine is to know what is good for us and what makes us sick, to rescue from the institu­ tion the passionate knowledges that survive there out of view, and never again to find oneself alone at the hospital, with one's body handed over to the artistic sovereignty of a disdainful surgeon. To destitute the government is to make ourselves ungovernable. Who said anything about winning? Overcoming is everything. The destituent gesture does not oppose the institution. It doesn't even mount a frontal fight, it neutralizes it, empties it of its substance, then steps to the side and watches it expire. It reduces it down to the incoherent ensemble of its practices and makes decisions about them. The Invisible Committee, Now, p.80-81
Fernand Deligny said: "In order to fight against language and the institution, the right phrase is perhaps not to fight against, but to take the most distance possible, even if this means signaling one's position. The Invisible Committee, Now, p.83
Destitution makes it possible to rethink what we mean by revolution. The traditional revolu­tionary program involved a reclaiming of the world, an expropriation of the expropriators, a vio­lent appropriation of that which is ours, but which we have been deprived of. But here's the problem: capital has taken hold of every detail and every dimension of existence. It has created a world in its image. From being an exploitation of the existing forms of life, it has transformed itself into a total universe. It has configured, equipped, and made desirable the ways of speaking, thinking, eating, working and vacationing, of obeying and rebelling, that suit its purpose. In doing so, it has reduced to very little the share of things in this world that one might want to reappropriate. Who would wish to reappropriate nuclear power plants, Amazon's warehouses, the expressways, ad agencies, high-speed trains, Dassault, La Defense business complex, auditing firms, nanotechnologies, supermarkets and their poisonous merchandise? Who imagines a people's takeover of industrial farming operations where a single man plows 400 hectares of eroded ground at the wheel of his megatractor piloted via satellite? No one with any sense. The Invisible Committee, Now, p.84-85
The destituent gesture is thus desertion and attack, creation and wrecking, and all at once, in the same gesture. It defies the accepted logics of alternativism and activism at the same time. It forms a linkage between the extended time of construction and the spasmodic time of intervention, between the disposition to enjoy our piece of the world and the disposition to place it at stake. The Invisible Committee, Now, p.88
Strategies for destituting the police
During the conflict against the loi Travail, the emergence of what became the "cortege de tete," the lead contingent in marches, was the result of a vision. A few hundred "young people" saw, as early as the first demonstrations, that the union groups were marching like zombies, that they didn't believe a word of the slogans they were mouthing, that their security marshals were clubbing the high-school students, that there was no way to follow that big cadaver, and so it was necessary to claim the front of the demonstration at all costs. Which is what was done. And done again. And again. Until a limit was reached where, with the "cortege de tete" repeating itself, it was no longer a gesture in a situation, but a subject mirrored back in the media, the alternative media in particular. So it was time to desert that desertion, which was congealing and becoming a parody of itself. And to keep moving. That being said, for the whole time it was vibrant, the "cortege de tere" was the locus from which things became clear, the site of a contagion in the ability to see what was going down. From the simple fact that there was struggle, that different determinations were clashing, that forces were joining, allying, separating, that strategies were called into play, and that all this was manifesting in the streets and not just on tele­ vision, there was a situation. The Invisible Committee, Now, p.150-151
Faced with capitalist organization, a destituent potential cannot confine itself to its own immanence, to all that grows under the ice in the absence of sunshine, to all the attempts at local construction, to a series of punctual attacks, even if this whole little world were to regularly find itself caught up in great turbulent demonstrations. And the insurrection will definitely not wait for every­ one to become insurrectionary. The mistake of the Leninists, Trotskyists, Negriists, and other sub­ politicians, a telling one fortunately, is to believe that a period that sees all the hegemonies lying broken on the ground could still tolerate a political hegemony, even a partisan one of the sort that Pablo Iglesias or Chantal Mouffe fantasize. What they don't see is that in a time of general horizontality, horizontality itself is the verticality. No one can expect to organize the autonomy of others any longer. The only verticality still possible is that of the situation, which commands all of its components because it exceeds them, because the sum of forces in presence is greater than each one of them. The only thing capable of transversally uniting all the elements deserting this society into a historical party is an intelligence of the situation. It is everything that makes the situation gradually understandable, everything that tracks the movements of the adver­sary, everything that identifies the usable paths and the obstacles-the systematic character of the obstacles. Based on that intelligence, an occasional vertical expedient needed to tilt certain situations in the desired direction can well be improvised. The Invisible Committee, Now, p.157-158
Theory and Communist Strategy
Deleuze said in 1968 that it was a "phenomenon of clairvoyance: a society suddenly saw what it contained that was intolerable and also saw the possibility of something else." To which Benjamin adds: "Clairvoyance is the vision of that which is taking form. [ . . . ] Perceiving exactly what is taking place is more decisive than knowing the distant future in advance." In ordinary circumstances most people do end up seeing, but when it is much too late-when it's become impossible not to see and, quite often, seeing no longer serves any purpose. This aptitude owes nothing to any great body of knowledge, which often serves for overlooking what's essential. Conversely, ignorance can crown the most banal insistence on not seeing. Let's say that social life demands of everyone that they not see, or at least act as if they didn't see anything. It makes no sense to share things if one doesn't begin by communizing the ability to see. Without that, living the communist way is like a wild dance in utter darkness; one crashes against the others, one gets hurt, one inflicts bruises on the body and the soul without meaning to and without even knowing exactly who to be angry with. Compounding every­ one's capacity for seeing in every domain, composing new perceptions and endlessly refining them, resulting in an immediate increase of potential, must be the central object of any communist development. Those who don't want to see any­ thing cannot help but produce collective disasters. We must become seers, for ourselves as much as for others. The Invisible Committee, Now, p.151-152
The assault of the first workers movement against the whole organization of the old world came to an end long ago, and nothing can bring it back to life. It failed. Certainly it achieved immense results, but not the ones it had originally intended. No doubt such deviation toward partially unexpected results is the general rule in human actions; but the one exception to this rule is precisely the moment of revolutionary action, the moment of the all-or-nothing qualitative leap. The classical workers movement must be reexamined without any illusions, particularly without any illusions regarding its various political and pseudotheoretical heirs, for all they have inherited is its failure. The apparent successes of this movement are actually its fundamental failures (reformism or the establishment of a state bureaucracy), while its failures (the Paris Commune or the 1934 Asturian revolt) are its most promising successes so far, for us and for the future. This movement must be precisely delineated in time. The classical workers movement can be considered to have begun a couple decades before the official formation of the International, with the first linkup of communist groups of several countries that Marx and his friends organized from Brussels in 1845. And it was completely finished after the failure of the Spanish revolution, that is, after the Barcelona May days of 1937. We need to rediscover the whole truth of this period and to reexamine all the oppositions between revolutionaries and all the neglected possibilities, without any longer being impressed by the fact that some won out over others and dominated the movement; for we now know that the movement within which they were successful was an overall failure. Marx's thought is obviously the first which must be rediscovered -- a task that should not present much difficulty in view of the extensive existing documentation and the crudeness of the lies about it. But it is also necessary to reassess the anarchist positions in the First International, Blanquism, Luxemburgism, the council movement in Germany and Spain, Kronstadt, the Makhnovists, etc. Without overlooking the practical influence of the utopian socialists. All this, of course, not with the aim of scholarship or academic eclecticism, but solely in order to contribute toward the formation of a new, profoundly different revolutionary movement, a movement of which we have seen so many premonitory signs over the last few years, one of which is our own existence. We must understand these signs through the study of the classical revolutionary project and vice versa. It is necessary to rediscover the history of the very movement of history, which has been so thoroughly hidden and distorted. There is no other way to be faithful to, or even simply to understand, the actions of our comrades of the past than to profoundly reconceive the problem of revolution, which has been increasingly deprived of thought as it has become posed more intensely in concrete reality. Situationist International, The Bad Days will End, Internationale Situationniste #7, https://libcom.org/article/bad-days-will-end-0
The formation of new organizations depends on a deeper critique, translated into acts. There must be a complete break with ideology, in which revolutionary groups think they possess official titles guaranteeing their function (that is, we must resume the Marxian critique of the role of ideologies). It is thus necessary to leave the terrain of specialized revolutionary activity -- the terrain of the self-mystification of "serious politics" -- because it has long been seen that such specialization encourages even the best people to demonstrate stupidity regarding all other questions; with the result that they end up failing even in their merely political struggles, since the latter are inseparable from all other aspects of the overall problem of our society. Specialization and pseudoseriousness are among the primary defensive outposts that the organization of the old world occupies in everyone's mind. A revolutionary association of a new type will also break with the old world by permitting and demanding of its members an authentic and creative participation, instead of expecting a participation of militants measurable in attendance time, which amounts to recreating the sole control possible in the dominant society: the quantitative criterion of hours of labor. A genuine enthusiastic participation on the part of everyone is necessitated by the fact that the classical political militant, who "devotes himself" to his radical duties, is everywhere disappearing along with classical politics itself; and even more by the fact that devotion and sacrifice always engender authority (even if only purely moral authority). Boredom is counterrevolutionary. In every way. Situationist International, The Bad Days will End, Internationale Situationniste #7, https://libcom.org/article/bad-days-will-end-0
There is no other way to be faithful to, or even simply to understand, the actions of our comrades of the past than to profoundly reconceive the problem of revolution, which has been increasingly deprived of thought as it has become posed more intensely in concrete reality. But why does this reconception seem so difficult? Starting from an experience of free everyday life (that is, from a quest for freedom in everyday life) it is not so difficult. It seems to us that this question is quite concretely felt today among young people. And to feel it with enough urgency enables one to rediscover lost history, to salvage and rejudge it. It is not difficult for thought that concerns itself with questioning everything that exists. It is only necessary not to have abandoned philosophy (as have virtually all the philosophers), not to have abandoned art (as have virtually all the artists), and not to have abandoned contestation of present reality (as have virtually all the militants). When they are not abandoned, these questions all converge toward the same supersession. The specialists, whose power is geared to a society of specialization, have abandoned the critical truth of their disciplines in order to preserve the personal advantages of their function. But all real researches are converging toward a totality, just as real people are going to come together in order to try once again to escape from their prehistory. Situationist International, The Bad Days will End, Internationale Situationniste #7, https://libcom.org/article/bad-days-will-end-0
We believe that the role of theorists - a role which is indispensable, but which must not be dominant - is to provide information and conceptual tools that can shed light on people's hidden desires and on the social crisis they are experiencing; to clarify things and show how they fit together; to make the new proletariat aware of the "new poverty" that must be named and described. Situationist International, Ideologies, Classes and Domination, Internationale Situationniste #8, https://libcom.org/article/ideologies-classes-and-domination-nature
For us, therefore, communism is not a finality. There is no "transition" towards it. It is transition entirely: it is en chemin, in transit. The different ways of living will never cease to chafe and move against each other, to clash with and occasionally combat each other. Everything will always have to be rethought. There are bound to be the usual Leninists who will reject an immanent conception of communism such as this, by citing the necessity of a vertical, strategic articulation of the struggle, and an instant later we're sure to hear the lumbering "question of organization." The "question of organization" is still and always the Leviathan. In a time when the apparent unity of the Self can no longer mask the chaos of forces, attachments, and participations that we are, how could we still believe in the fable of organic unity? The myth of "organization" owes everything to the depictions of the hierarchy of natural faculties that were handed down to us by ancient psychology and Christian theology. We are no longer nihilistic enough to think that inside us there is something like a stable psychic organ-a will, let's say-that directs our other faculties. This neat invention of the theolo­gians, much more political than it appears, had a dual purpose: first, to make man, newly provided with a "free will," into a moral subject and to deliver him over in this way to the Last Judgment and the century's punishments; second, based on the theological idea of a God having "freely'' created the world and essentially standing apart from his action, to institute a formal separation between being and acting. For centuries, this separation, which was to mark Western political ideas in a durable way, made ethical realities illegible-the plane of forms-of-life being precisely that of a non­ differentiation between what one is and what one does. So "the question of organization" exists since those Bolsheviks of Late Antiquity, the Church Fathers. It was the instrument of legitimation of the Church just as it would later be that of the legitimation of the Party. Against this opportunistic question, against the postulated existence of the "will”, it's necessary to emphasize that what "wants" within us, what inclines us, is never the same thing. That it is a simple outcome, crucial at certain moments, of the combat waged within and outside us by a tangled network of forces, affects, and inclinations, resulting in a temporary assemblage in which some force has just as temporarily subdued other forces. That the sequence of these assemblages produces a kind of coherence that may culminate in a form is a fact. But to always label with the same noun something that in a contingent way finds itself in a position to dominate or give the decisive impetus, to convince oneself that it's always a matter of the same authority, to convince oneself finally that every form and every decision are dependent on a decision organ, is to perform quite a trick, but one that's been repeated all too long. By believing in such an organ for such a long time, by stimulating that imaginary muscle over and over again, one ends up in a fatal aboulia that seems nowadays to be afflicting the late offspring of the Christian Empire that we happen to be. In opposition to that, we propose paying careful attention to situations and to the forces that inhabit and traverse beings, in conjunction with an art of decisive assemblages. The Invisible Committee, Now, p.154-157
The only thing capable of transversally uniting all the elements deserting this society into a historical party is an intelligence of the situation. It is everything that makes the situation gradually understandable, everything that tracks the movements of the adver­sary, everything that identifies the usable paths and the obstacles-the systematic character of the obstacles. Based on that intelligence, an occasional vertical expedient needed to tilt certain situations in the desired direction can well be improvised. A strategic verticality of this kind can only emerge from a constant, generous discussion, undertaken in good faith. In this epoch, the means of commu­nication are the forms of organization. It's our weakness, for the means aren't in our hands, and those who control them are not our friends. So there's no other choice but to deploy an art of conversation between worlds that is cruelly deficient, but from which, in contact with the situation, the right decision must emanate. Such a discussion can gain the center, from the periphery where it is cur­rently contained, only through an offensive from the domain of sensibility, on the plane of percep­tions, and not of discourse. We're talking about addressing bodies and not just the head. The Invisible Committee, Now, p.158
Emancipatory communication and media
The only thing capable of transversally uniting all the elements deserting this society into a historical party is an intelligence of the situation. It is everything that makes the situation gradually understandable, everything that tracks the movements of the adver­sary, everything that identifies the usable paths and the obstacles-the systematic character of the obstacles. Based on that intelligence, an occasional vertical expedient needed to tilt certain situations in the desired direction can well be improvised. A strategic verticality of this kind can only emerge from a constant, generous discussion, undertaken in good faith. In this epoch, the means of commu­nication are the forms of organization. It's our weakness, for the means aren't in our hands, and those who control them are not our friends. So there's no other choice but to deploy an art of conversation between worlds that is cruelly deficient, but from which, in contact with the situation, the right decision must emanate. Such a discussion can gain the center, from the periphery where it is cur­rently contained, only through an offensive from the domain of sensibility, on the plane of percep­tions, and not of discourse. We're talking about addressing bodies and not just the head. The Invisible Committee, Now, p.158
Those who want to supersede the old established order in all its aspects cannot cling to the disorder of the present, even in the sphere of culture. In culture as in other areas, it is necessary to struggle without waiting any longer for some concrete appearance of the moving order of the future. The possibility of this ever-changing new order, which is already present among us, devalues all expressions within existing cultural forms. If we are ever to arrive at authentic direct communication (in our working hypothesis of higher cultural means: the construction of situations), we must bring about the destruction of all the forms of pseudocommunication. Debord, Theses on Cultural Revolution, Internationale Situationniste #1, https://libcom.org/article/theses-cultural-revolution-guy-debord
Ultimately, the problem with commercial offers and decentralized software applications boils down to the same thing. In order to challenge state reLavabitn and capitalist exploitation effectively, it is necessary to stand and organize collectively against the state and capital. Cypherpunk initiatives like Lavabit or decentralized software can go a long way to challenge the status quo, but they are historically limited by their understanding of social change and social conflict. Social change is not simply a matter of consumer preference like the choice of an individual’s email provider, neither social conflicts are mere mathematical problems that can be resolved through a strategic application of mathematics. Radical technology collectives build political solidarity and nurture security behaviors within and between activist groups in addition to providing things like email and putting the right cryptographic algorithms in place. Autistici/Inventati - +KAOS - 10 Years of Hacking and Media Activism, Institute of Network Cultures 2021, p.12
Communisation
What provided the impetus for a new conception of revolution and communism (as communisation) was not simply an understanding of the content of communism derived from a close reading of Marx and Bordiga, but also the influence of a whole wave of class struggles of the late sixties and early seventies which would give a new meaning to “the refusal of work” as a specific content of the revolution. By the early 1970s journalists and sociologists began to speak of a “revolt against work” afflicting an entire new generation of workers in traditional industries, with rapidly rising rates of absenteeism and sabotage, as well as a widespread disregard for the authority of the union. Commentators variously blamed: the feeling of expendability and insecurity brought about by automation; the increasing assertiveness of traditionally oppressed minorities; the influence of an anti-authoritarian counter-culture; the power and sense of entitlement afforded by the prolonged post-war boom and its hard-won “social wage”. Whatever the reason for these developments, what seemed to characterize the new struggles was a breakdown in the traditional forms through which workers sought to gain control over the labour process, leaving only the expression of an apparent desire to work less. For many of those who had been influenced by the SI, this new proletarian “assault” was characterized by a “refusal of work” shorn of the techno-utopian and bohemian-artistic elements which the SI had never been able to abandon. Groups like Négation and Intervention Communiste argued that it was not only the power of the union which was being undermined in these struggles, but the entire Marxist and Anarchist programme of the liberation of work and the triumph of “workers’ power”. Far from liberating their work, bringing it under their own control, and using it to seize control of society through self-managing their workplaces, in the French May and the subsequent “creeping May” in Italy, the “critique of work” took the form of hundreds of thousands of workers deserting their workplaces. Rather than an indication that struggles hadn't gone far enough, the absence of workers’ councils during this period was thus understood as an expression of a rupture with what would come to be known as “the old workers’ movement.” Endnotes, Bring out your Dead, Endnotes #1, https://endnotes.org.uk/articles/bring-out-your-dead
[…] groups like Mouvement Communiste, Négation, and La Guerre Sociale advocated a conception of revolution as the immediate destruction of capitalist relations of production, or “communisation”. As we shall see, the understanding of communisation differed between different groups, but it essentially meant the application of communist measures within the revolution — as the condition of its survival and its principal weapon against capital. Any “period of transition” was seen as inherently counter-revolutionary, not just in so far as it entailed an alternative power structure which would resist “withering away” (c.f. anarchist critiques of “the dictatorship of the proletariat”), nor simply because it always seemed to leave unchallenged fundamental aspects of the relations of production, but because the very basis of workers’ power on which such a transition was to be erected was now seen to be fundamentally alien to the struggles themselves. Workers’ power was just the other side of the power of capital, the power of reproducing workers as workers; henceforth the only available revolutionary perspective would be the abolition of this reciprocal relation. Endnotes, Bring out your Dead, Endnotes #1, https://endnotes.org.uk/articles/bring-out-your-dead
Those who developed the theory of communisation rejected this posing of revolution in terms of forms of organisation, and instead aimed to grasp the revolution in terms of its content. Communisation implied a rejection of the view of revolution as an event where workers take power followed by a period of transition: instead it was to be seen as a movement characterised by immediate communist measures (such as the free distribution of goods) both for their own merit, and as a way of destroying the material basis of the counter-revolution. If, after a revolution, the bourgeoisie is expropriated but workers remain workers, producing in separate enterprises, dependent on their relation to that workplace for their subsistence, and exchanging with other enterprises, then whether that exchange is self-organised by the workers or given central direction by a “workers’ state” means very little: the capitalist content remains, and sooner or later the distinct role or function of the capitalist will reassert itself. By contrast, the revolution as a communising movement would destroy — by ceasing to constitute and reproduce them — all capitalist categories: exchange, money, commodities, the existence of separate enterprises, the state and — most fundamentally — wage labour and the working class itself. Endnotes, Communisation and Value Form Theory, Endnotes #2 (2010), https://endnotes.org.uk/articles/communisation-and-value-form-theory
For TC [Theorie Communiste] the communist revolution understood as communisation does not establish a “republic of labour” or any new form of management of the means of production. Rather, it is the overcoming of the alienated social relation of production which constitutes the separation of subjectivity and objectivity experienced in capitalism. In the overcoming of the separation of individuals from each other and from the means of production, communisation overcomes the separation of human subjectivity from “objectified labour,” i.e. the subject/object split that forms the basis of social reality under capitalism. TC envisage this as an overcoming of each dimension which Marx describes in the Grundrisse: labour ceases to exist as a separate activity; production no longer distinguishes itself from and dominates reproduction; needs are no longer separate from capacities; and individuals no longer confront their sociality through the mediation of the exchange of their products or in the form of the state — they become directly social. The revolution as communisation dissolves both the social form of things, i.e. their existence as carriers of ‘objectified labour’, of value (they become things again), and the atomised, empty and separated out subject-form of the individual. Thus for TC, as for Marx in the Grundrisse, the formerly “objective” moment of production no longer dominates the subjective, but rather becomes “the organic social body in which the individuals reproduce themselves as individuals, but as social individuals.” Endnotes, Communisation and Value Form Theory, Endnotes #2 (2010), https://endnotes.org.uk/articles/communisation-and-value-form-theory
Communism necessitates the abolition of a multifaceted relation [value] that has evolved over time, but to abolish it simply means that we cease to constitute value, and it ceases to constitute us. The radicality of our own period is that this is now the only way we can conceive it. Endnotes, Communisation and Value Form Theory, Endnotes #2 (2010), https://endnotes.org.uk/articles/communisation-and-value-form-theory
[…] like the proletariat, we cannot claim to be unexploitable in the present conditions; the best we can do is to work to make any such exploitation entail the greatest possible risk for the exploiters. Now, The SI, Internationale Situationniste #9, https://libcom.org/article/now-si
If one does not think of revolution as being a complete miracle, as something that proletarians will achieve in the heat of the moment, almost accidentally, spontaneously, and without any goal set in advance, and if one does not delegate the project of human eman- cipation to the machines, then it would appear reasonable to try and reach some sort of understanding concerning the basic features of a classless society. Several objections to this have been raised: it’s premature (“the struggles aren’t quite there yet, the time isn’t ripe”), unnecessary (“people will take care of it eventually”), pretentious (“you can’t just predetermine it”), or simply impossible (“you can’t anticipate that”). But there’s never been a continuous movement defying the existing order without an idea, however vague, of what could take its place. A purely negative critique of the status quo, which some radical leftists invoke, is ultimately impossible. For example, aiming for “a community of free individuals, carrying on their work with the means of production in common” (Capital) follows necessarily from the critique of private property. But because this leaves a lot of room for imagination — including scenarios that have little to do with freedom and happiness — revolutionaries should state clearly what they want. Not in order to peddle recipes for redemption, but as a contribution to the necessary discussion on how to leave the old world behind. The commune shouldn’t be conceived as something that will put an end to all of humanity’s problems. On the contrary, only after the relations of production have been revolutionized will everything that is today “solved” by blind mediation, domination, and force even begin to appear as a problem requiring a solution. It is in this sense that Walter Benjamin rejected the accusation that he absolutized communism as “the solution for humanity”. On the contrary, he soberly described it as the possibility to “abolish the unproductive pretensions of solutions for humanity by means of the feasible findings of this very system; indeed, to give up entirely the immodest prospect of ‘total’ systems and at least to make the attempt to construct the days of humanity in just as loose a fashion as a rational person who has had a good night’s sleep begins his day”. Endnotes, Contours of the World Commune, Endnotes #5, p.164-165
Consciousness-raising opens up the possibility of living, not merely theorising about, a collective perspective. It can give us the resources to behave, think and act differently at work (if it makes any sense to talk about being “at” work anymore), where capitalist realism has become second nature. The roots of any successful struggle will come from people sharing their feelings, especially their feelings of misery and desperation, and together attributing the sources of these feelings to impersonal structures, albeit impersonal structures mediated by particular figures to which we must attach populist loathing. In the harsh conditions of cyberspatialised capitalism — conditions that, as Jennifer M. Silva demonstrates, have produced a “hardening” of the self, especially in the young — consciousness-raising can produce a new compassion, for others and for ourselves. Neurotic-Oedipalising capitalism responsibilises, harshly blaming us, while — in its therapeutic mode — telling us that we have the power as individuals to change anything and everything: if we’re unhappy, it’s up to us to fix it. Consciousness-raising, meanwhile, is about positive depersonalisation: it’s not your fault, it’s capitalism. No individuals can change anything, not even themselves; but collective activation is already, immanently, overcoming individualised immiseration. […] The chief obstruction […] is what, in a trenchant and clear-eyed analysis, Ewa Jasiewicz calls “time poverty”: "Our time is under attack. Work will be intensified, worse paid, and more casualised — if we don’t have it, we’ll be working to have it; mandatory and supervised job searches and workfare will see people forced to spend their time locked into coerced, computerised distraction. A real, diverse, working class self-representative movement needs to include people facing and living these experiences, but how will that happen when we’re too tied up working? Access to time and our own labour is key and will determine participation and the ability to organise. If we can’t have our own time to organise, we can’t organise, we can’t meet each other, we cannot find each other. Work and the benefits regime — which is work under different conditions and profit margins — are key sites of struggle. Solidarity will need to step up if we are to win workplace disputes and strikes, refusals of workfare and support for people getting sanctioned, so that people have more control over their time and labour. All our commons are under attack. The condition of time poverty and its roots — intensification of labour, welfare repression, criminalisation and incarceration — have to be recognised as major obstacles to movement, diversity and power. These obstacles need to be tackled if we want to overcome the ideology of wage labour as a determinant of human value on a popular level.” The problem is that, in order to struggle against time poverty, the main resource we require is time — a nasty vicious circle that capital, with its malevolent genius, now has... This problem is absolutely immanent — writing this and the other posts I have completed this week has meant that I have fallen enormously behind on my work, which is storing up stress for the next week or so. The first thing we must do in response to all this is to put into practice what I outlined above: try not to blame ourselves. #Itsnotyourfault We must try to do everything we can to politicise time poverty rather than accept blame as individuals for failing to complete our work on time. The reason we feel overwhelmed is that we are overwhelmed — it isn’t an individual failing of ours; it isn’t because we haven’t “managed our time” properly. However, we can use the scarce resources we already have more effectively if we work together to codify practices of collective re-habituation (setting new rules for our engagement with social media and capitalist cyberspace in general for example). Mark Fisher & Darren Ambrose, Abandon Hope (Summer is Coming) - Knowing Someone in this Life Feels as Desperate as Me, K-Punk: The Collected and Unpublished Writings of Mark Fisher, 2018, p.593-595
Aris Goudouras
Anti-hegemonic argument: forming temporary assemblages and not more permanent hegemonic ones. Also, priority to affects and multiple “centers” of creating wants within us, as contrasted to the discursive approach of the theory of hegemony.
Social Relations
Reciprocity, Gift and Exchange
The modern ideal of the gift, then, becomes an impossible mirror of market behavior: an act of pure generosity untrammeled by any thought of personal gain. But as the members of the MAUSS group endlessly insist, this does not mean people no longer give gifts: even in modern, capitalist societies things are constantly changing hands without any immediate return or ex- plicit agreement about a future one. It does not even mean that gifts are no longer important. In fact, they argue, modern society could not function without them. The gift has become the “hidden face of modernity” (Nicolas 1991): “hidden” because one can always produce some reason to say any particular gift (money given to children, wedding presents, donations of blood, dinners for business associates, offering advice to friends or spending hours listening to their tedious problems) are not really gifts at all. So too in social theory. The result, as Godbout puts it, is a science that has “come to speak of social ties without using the words that are associated with them in daily life: surrender, forgiveness, renunciation, love, respect, dignity, redemption, salvation, redress, compassion, everything that is at the heart of relationships between people and that is nourished by the gift” Graeber, Toward an Anthropological Theory of Value, p.161
[…] the most valuable objects in gift economies are valued primarily because they embody some human quality, whether this be the creative potential of human action, or fertility, or the like, or particular histories and identities that have already been achieved. Of course, I’ve already argued something similar about market economies as well; but here, one can say that the ideal of the complete detachability of persons and things (which Mauss emphasized) is part of that same overall movement that led also to the separation of the spheres of production and consumption, emphasized by Marx, which allows these essential links to be obscured. In this sense it is not gift economies but market economies that deny “the true soil of their own life,” since they are constantly obscuring the fact that all “economic” activity is ultimately a means to the creation of certain sorts of person. Graeber, Toward an Antrhopological Theory of Value, p.211
As should be obvious by now, gifts do not always have to be repaid. The question should really be: When do they have to be repaid? What sort of gifts? In what circumstances? And what precisely can count as a repayment? The conclusion would have been impossible to avoid had Mauss made a serious effort to explore his own notion of the “total prestation” (which he also referred to as “total reciprocity”), instead of moving directly to “the pot- latch.” Because in the former, gifts do not have to be repaid. This is because unlike competitive gift exchange, “total prestations” created permanent relationships between individuals and groups, relations that were permanent precisely because there was no way to cancel them out by a repayment. The demands one side could make on the other were open ended because they were permanent; nothing would be more absurd than for the member of an Iroquois moiety to keep count of how many of the other’s side dead each had recently buried, to see which was ahead. This is why Mauss considered them “communistic”: they corresponded to Louis Blanc’s famous phrase “From each according to his abilities, to each according to his needs.” Most of us treat our closest friends this way. No accounts need be kept because the relation is not treated as if it will ever end. […] When do gifts have to be repaid? If one is speaking of strict equivalence, the answer is: Gifts have to be repaid when “communistic” relations are so identified with inequality that not doing so would place the recipient in the position of an inferior. Such forms of exchange then are about establishing a kind of fragile, competitive equality between actors who are almost always themselves hierarchical superiors to someone else. Graeber, Toward an Anthropological Theory of Value, p.217-218
Sahlins, on the other hand, defines “generalized reciprocity” as the kind of open-ended responsibility that prevails among close kin, all of whom will do whatever they can to help the other, not because they expect repayment, but simply because they know that in a similar crisis, the other would do the same. He contrasts it with the “balanced reciprocity” that prevails between people who, though less close, are nonetheless close enough that they feel obliged to deal with each other on a moral basis. “Balanced reciprocity,” in- terestingly enough, would thus include both classical gift exchange and the less cutthroat forms of trade or barter. […] Rather than “generalized” or “balanced” reciprocity, then, it might be better to think of reciprocity as relatively “open” and “closed”: open reciprocity keeps no accounts, because it implies a relation of permanent mutual commitment; it becomes closed reciprocity when a balancing of accounts closes the relationship off, or at least maintains the constant possibility of doing so. Phrasing it this way also makes it easier to see the relation as a matter of degree and not of kind: closed relations can become more open, open ones more closed. It seems difficult to avoid the impression, then, that the closed reciprocity of gift and countergift is in fact the form of gift exchange that least embodies what makes a “gift economy” different from one dominated by market exchange. It is competitive, individualistic, and can easily slip into something resembling barter. Graeber, Toward an Anthropological Theory of Value, p.218-220
While it is certainly true that tit-for-tat exchange of this sort can help create an ongoing, mutually supportive relationship, it has only really done so when it stops being strictly tit for tat. Graeber, Toward an Anthropological Theory of Value, p.219
To give a gift is to transfer something without any immediate return, or guarantee that there will ever be one. This is the definition adopted by the MAUSS group (e.g., Godbout and Caillé 1998), and it seems about as good a general definition as we’re going to get. It also makes it clear that the term can apply to an enormous variety of transactions, and that the term “gift economy” can apply to any not organized on market principles. Graeber, Toward an Anthropological Theory of Value, p.225
The notion of “total prestation” is in fact an excellent place to start, provided one is willing to break it down into its constituent elements. This means that timeless relations of open-ended, communistic reciprocity, whether they apply to groups like moieties or clans, or members of a family, or a network of individuals (as in Mauss’ “individualistic communism”) have to be distinguished from balanced gift-exchange. While the former can often slip into relations of patronage and exploitation (and it is often very hard to tell, from either the analyst’s or actor’s point of view, just when one definitively turns into the other), the latter has a tendency to degenerate into outright competition—most often the kinds of contest of generosity that Mauss labeled “the potlatch” but which should probably be best referred to just as “agonistic exchange.” Alternately, as it focuses more on the objects, it can become continuous with forms of exchange that look increasingly like barter. As structures of action, one is concerned with maintaining the value of a timeless human commitment; the other, that of a more ephemeral autonomy. Graeber, Toward an Anthropological Theory of Value, p.225
[A mode of relating] in which two parties act, or are disposed to act, toward one another in equivalent ways. Graeber, Toward an Anthropological Theory of Value, p.225
[…] we are not really dealing with reciprocity here-or at best, only with reciprocity in the broadest sense. What is equal on both sides is the knowledge that the other person would do the same for you, not that they necessarily will. The Iroquois example brings home clearly what makes this possible: that such relations are based on a presumption of eternity. Society will always exist. Therefore, there will always be a north and a south side of the village. This is why no accounts need be taken. In a similar way, people tend to treat their mothers and best friends as if they will always exist, however well they know it isn't true. Graeber, Debt, p.100
Exchange is all about equivalence. It's a back-and-forth process involving two sides in which each side gives as good as it gets. This is why one can speak of people exchanging words (if there's an argu­ment), blows, or even gunfire.25 In these examples, it's not that there is ever an exact equivalence--even if there were some way to measure an exact equivalence--but more a constant process of interaction tend­ing toward equivalence. Actually, there's something of a paradox here: each side in each case is trying to outdo the other, but, unless one side is utterly put to rout, it's easiest to break the whole thing off when both consider the outcome to be more or less even. When we move to the exchange of material goods, we find a similar tension. Often there is an element of competition; if nothing else, there's always that pos­sibility. But at the same time, there's a sense that both sides are keeping accounts, and that, unlike what happens in communism, which always partakes of a certain notion of eternity, the entire relationship can be canceled out, and either party can call an end to it at any time. Graeber, Debt, p.103
What marks commercial exchange is that it's "impersonal": who it is that is selling something to us, or buying something from us, should in principle be entirely irrelevant. We are simply comparing the value or two objects. Graeber, Debt, p.103
Exchange allows us to cancel out our debts. It gives us a way to call it even: hence, to end the relationship Graeber, Debt, p.104
What, then, is debt? Debt is a very specific thing, and it arises from very specific situ­ations. It first requires a relationship between two people who do not consider each other fundamentally different sorts of being, who are at least potential equals, who are equals in those ways that are really important, and who are not currently in a state of equality-but for whom there is some way to set matters straight. In the case of gift-giving, as we've seen, this requires a certain equality of status. […] During the time that the debt remains unpaid, the logic of hierar­chy takes hold. There is no reciprocity. […] A debt, then, is just an exchange that has not been brought to completion. It follows that debt is strictly a creature of reciprocity and has little to do with other sorts of morality (communism, with its needs and abilities; hierarchy, with its customs and qualities). True, if we were really determined, we could argue (as some do) that communism is a condition of permanent mutual indebtedness, or that hierarchy is con­ structed out of unpayable debts. But isn't this just the same old story, starting from the assumption that all human interactions must be, by definition, forms of exchange, and then performing whatever mental somersaults are required to prove it? No. All human interactions are not forms of exchange. Only some are. Exchange encourages a particular way of conceiving human rela­tions. This is because exchange implies equality, but it also implies separation. It's precisely when the money changes hands, when the debt is cancelled, that equality is restored and both parties can walk away and have nothing further to do with each other. Debt is what happens in between: when the two parties cannot yet walk away from each other, because they are not yet equal. But it is carried out in the shadow of eventual equality. Because achieving that equality, however, destroys the very reason for having a relation­ ship, just about everything interesting happens in between Graeber, Debt, p.120-122
Gentle Reciprocity
This element of competition can work in completely different ways. In cases of barter or commercial exchange, when both parties to the transaction are only interested in the value of goods being trans­ acted, they may well-as economists insist they should - try to seek the maximum material advantage. On the other hand, as anthropologists have long pointed out, when the exchange is of gifts, that is, the objects passing back and forth are mainly considered interesting in how they reflect on and rearrange relations between the people carrying out the transaction, then insofar as competition enters in, it is likely to work precisely the other way around-to become a matter of contests of generosity, of people showing off who can give more away. Graeber, Debt, p.103
To leave the economy is to bring out the plane of reality it covers over. Commodity exchange and all that it comprises in the way of harsh negotiation, mistrust, deceit, and wabu wabu, as the Melanesians say, is not exclusively Western. In places where people know how to live, one only practices this type of relations with outsiders, people one is not connected with, who are distant enough so that a mix-up cannot develop into a general conflict. To pay, in Latin, comes from pacare, "to satisfy, to calm," for example by distributing money to sol­diers so they can buy themselves some salt-thus a wage. One pays in order to have peace. The whole vocabulary of economy is basically a vocabulary of avoided war. "There is a link, a continuity, between hostile relations and the provision of reciprocal prestations: Exchanges are peacefully resolved wars, and wars are the result of unsuccessful transactions." (Levi-Strauss). Economy's defect is to reduce all possible relationships to hostile rela­tions, every distance to foreignness. What it covers over in this way is the entire gamut, all the grada­tion, all the heterogeneity among the different existing and imaginable relations. Depending on the degree of proximity between beings, there is a commonality of goods, a sharing of certain things, exchange with an adjusted reciprocity, mercantile exchange, or a total absence of exchange. And every form of life has its language and its notions for expressing this multiplicity of regimes. Making the bastards pay is good warfare. When you love you don't count the cost. Where money talks, words are worth nothing. Where words matter, money's worth nothing. Thus, exiting the economy is being able to dearly distinguish between the possible divisions and, from where one is, to deploy a whole art of distances. It's to push the hostile relations - and the sphere of money, accounting, measurement - as far away as possible. It's to banish to the margins of life that which is presently its norm, its core, its essential condition. The Invisible Committee, Now, p.107-108
Social Action & Rationality
Critique to Instumental Reason
Horkheimer’s Support of Objective Reason
Social Action
Habermas’ Communicative Rationality
Price Signaling and the Market
Property and Usufruct
Private property can be abolished only on condition of an all-round development of individuals, because the existing character of intercourse and productive forces is an all-round one, and only individuals that are developing in an all-round fashion can appropriate them, i.e. can turn them into free manifestations of their lives. Marx, The German Ideology, p. 483
The word property connotes an individual ap­propriation of goods, a personal claim to tools, land, and other resources. Conceived in this loose sense, property is fairly common in organic societies, even in groups that have a very simple, undeveloped technology. By the same token, cooperative work and the sharing of resources on a scale that could be called communistic is also fairly com­ mon. On both the productive side of economic life and the consumptive, appropriation of tools, weapons, food, and even clothing may range widely - often idiosyncratically, in western eyes - from the possessive and seemingly individualistic to the most meticulous, often ritualistic, parceling out of a harvest or a hunt among members of a community. But primary to both of these seemingly contrasting relationships is the practice of usufruct, the freedom of individuals in a community to appropriate resources merely by virtue of the fact that they are using them. Such resources belong to the user as long as they are being used. Function, in effect, replaces our hallowed concept of possession-not merely as a loan or even "mutual aid," but as an unconscious emphasis on use itself, on need that is free of psychological entanglements with proprietorship, work, and even reciprocity. The western identification of individuality with ownership and personality with craft - the latter laden with a metaphysics of selfhood as expressed in a crafted object wrested by human powers from an intractable nature-has yet to emerge from the notion of use itself and the guileless enjoyment of needed things. Need, in effect, still orchestrates work to the point where property of any kind, communal or otherwise, has yet to acquire independence from the claims of satisfaction. A collective need subtly orchestrates work, not personal need alone, for the collective claim is implicit in the primacy of usufruct over proprietorship. Hence, even the work performed in one's own dwelling has an underlying collective dimension in the potential availability of its products to the entire community. Bookchin, The Ecology of Freedom, p.50
Among Liberal tenets is behaving like an owner, even towards your own experiences. This is why not behaving like a Liberal individual means primarily not valuing your properties. Or really another meaning should be given to “properties”: not what belongs to me in particular, but what connects me to the world, and what is therefore not reserved for me, has nothing to do with private property, nor with what is supposed to define an identity (the “that’s just the way I am,” and its confirmation “that’s just like you!”). While we reject the idea of individual property, we have nothing against commitments. The question of appropriation or re-appropriation comes down to the question of knowing what is appropriate for us, that is to say adequate, in terms of use, in terms of need, in terms of relation to a place, to a moment of the world. Anonymous, Call, p.13-14
Ανάμεσα στα προφανή του φιλελευθερισμού, είναι και το να συμπεριφέρεσαι, ακόμα και με τις εμπειρίες σου, ως ιδιοκτήτης. Γι’ αυτό και το να μη φέρεσαι σαν φιλελεύθερο άτομο, σημαίνει κατ’ αρχήν να μην κλείνεσαι μέσα στις ιδιοκτησίες σου. Διαφορετικά πρέπει να δοθεί άλλο νόημα στις “ιδιοκτησίες”: όχι αυτό που μου ανήκει, αλλά αυτό που με δένει με τον κόσμο, και ως εκ τούτου δεν είναι αποκλειστικότητά μου, δεν έχει καμία σχέση ούτε με ατομική ιδιοκτησία ούτε με αυτό που θεωρείται ότι ορίζει μια ταυτότητα (το “έτσι είμαι εγώ” και η επιβεβαίωσή του, “αυτό είσαι!”). Μπορεί να απορρίπτουμε την ιδέα της ατομικής ιδιοκτησίας, δεν έχουμε όμως τίποτα εναντίον των δεσμών. Η απαίτηση οικειοποίησης ή επανοικειοποίησης περιορίζεται για εμάς στο ερώτημα τι είναι οικείο, δηλαδή κατάλληλο ως προς τη χρήση, ως προς την ανάγκη, ως προς τη σχέση με έναν τόπο, με μια στιγμή του κόσμου. Anonymes, Κάλεσμα, σ.32
It is obvious, as they claim, that the question of what suits me, of what I need, of what makes up my world has been reduced to the legally enforced fiction of private property, of what belongs to me, of what is mine. Something belongs to me insofar as it joins the realm of my usage — not by virtue of any juridical title. Ultimately, private property has no other reality than the forces that protect it. So the question of communism is, on one hand, to do away with the police, and on the other, to elaborate modes of sharing and uses, among those who live with each other. Anonymous, Call, p.21
So, the construction of the Party, in its most visible aspect, consists of the sharing or communization of what we have at our disposal. Communizing a place means this: setting free its use, and on the basis of this liberation, experimenting with refined, intensified, and complexified relations. If private property is essentially the discretionary power of depriving any person of the use of the possessed thing, communization can only mean depriving the agents of Empire of that possession. Anonymous, Call, p.23
In so far as each single transaction invariably conforms to the laws of the exchange of commodities, the capitalist buying labor-power, the laborer selling it, and we will assume at its real value; in so far as all of this is true, it is evident that the laws of appropriation or of private property, laws that are based on the production and circulation of commodities, become by their own inner and inexorable dialectic changed into their very opposite. The exchange of equivalents, the original operation with which we started, has now become turned round in such a way that there is only an apparent exchange. This is owing to the fact, first, that the capital which is exchanged for labor-power is itself but a portion of the product of other’s labor appropriated without an equivalent; and, secondly, that this capital must not only be replaced by its producer, but replaced together with an added surplus. The relation of exchange subsisting between capitalist and laborer becomes a mere semblance appertaining to the process of circulation, a mere form, foreign to the real nature of the transaction, and only mystifying it. The ever-repeated purchase and sale of labor-power is now the mere form; what really takes place is this – the capitalist again and again appropriates, without equivalent, a portion of the previously materialized labor of others, and exchanges it for a greater quantity of living labor. At first the rights of property seemed to us to be based on a man’s own labor. [...] Now, however, property turns out to be the right, on the part of the capitalist, to appropriate the unpaid labor of others or its products, and to be the impossibility, on the part of the laborer, of appropriating his own product. The separation of property from labor has become the necessary consequence of a law that apparently originated in their identity. Marx, Capital, Volume 1 (Progress Publishers, 1887), p.412-413
Private property thus results by analysis from the concept of alienated labour, i.e., of alienated man, of estranged labour, of estranged life, of estranged man. True, it is as a result of the movement of private property that we have obtained the concept of alienated labour (of alienated life) in political economy. But analysis of this concept shows that though private property appears to be the reason, the cause of alienated labour, it is rather its consequence, just as the gods are originally not the cause but the effect of man's intellectual confusion. Later this relationship becomes reciprocal. Only at the culmination of the development of private property does this, its secret, appear again, namely, that on the one hand it is the product of alienated labour, and that on the other it is the means by which labour alienates itself, the realisation of this alienation. Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts, Marx Engels Collected Works Volume 3 (International Publishers), p.279-280
Value as a Social Relation
Value arising from relationships - the need for a relational theory of value
Value and the Totalities we Operate in
The political significance of Value as a concept and field of struggle
The struggle for alternatives to this must find a way to go beyond that struggle, the struggle the subsumption of which gives rise to the mechanisms described in the last chapter, the constitution of norms of production throughout the social body behind the backs of the producers themselves. To overcome this is to go beyond the value-generating powers of the system and pose new social relations on the basis of new values and new ways of articulating values. The search for new value practices however, cannot be defined in abstract. The issue of alternatives to a mode of articulation is not an ‘ethical’ question that can be addressed with the correct application of abstract principles and norms. Abstract principles must be seen as the emergent properties of concrete subjects positing their concrete values in different contexts. Values of this kind, I would argue, can only emerge from communities in struggle constituting their own measures, their own commons. De Angelis, The Beginning of History, Chapter 13: Measuring and Struggles
Why Value? Definition of Value
The Need to Redefine Value
Capitalist Value and Measurement
Dynamics of the generalization of capitalist value as the dominant social relation
Critique of Ideology and Discourse Analysis
Williams argues that the idea of society as a totality consisting of symbolic and cultural as well as economic practices (which both Ricoeur and Mannheim are employing) has certain advantages in that it represents the complexity of reality. On the other hand, the danger is that any notion of economic or class determination is lost. Only by simultaneously using Gramsci’s concept of hegemony is it possible to grasp both the class character of society and the role of ideas, meanings and values within an essentially dynamic social process. We can then locate a ‘central, effective and dominant system of meanings and values, which are not merely abstract but which are organized and lived’. This dominant culture is not homogeneous; it contains alternatives within it (so that the much vaunted diversity of choice of both products and life-styles proffered by advanced capitalism may represent both an economic benefit of market segmentation and an ideological advantage). However, there are also ‘practices, experiences, meanings, values which are not part of the effective dominant culture’, which may be alternative or oppositional. The difference between alternative and oppositional modes depends on whether the intention is to be left alone to live alongside the dominant culture or, in the case of oppositional forms and practices, to transform it. This formulation goes beyond Mannheim’s simple dichotomy between ideology and utopia. Moreover, Williams posits the existence of residual and emergent forms as part of a process which cuts across the categories of dominant, alternative and oppositional modes, rather than being elided with them; both residual and emergent practices may be either alternative or oppositional, but are commonly subject to a process of incorporation into the dominant sphere. Levitas, The Concept of Utopia, p.90-91
There is a plurality of realms. Of realms that are all the more real because they are shared. And that coexist. Politics, in truth, is the interplay between different realms, the alliance between those that are compatible and the confrontation between those that are irreconcilable. Anonymous, Call, p.7
Politics, in truth, is the interplay between different realms, the alliance between those that are compatible and the confrontation between those that are irreconcilable. Therefore we say that the central political fact of the last thirty years went unnoticed. Because it took place at such a deep level of reality that it cannot be called political without bringing about a revolution in the very notion of the political. Because this level of reality is also the one where the division is elaborated between what is taken for reality and what is not. This central fact is the triumph of Existential Liberalism. The fact that it is now considered natural for everyone to have a rapport with the world based on the idea that each person has her own life. That such a life consists in a series of choices, good or bad. That each person can define herself by an ensemble of qualities, of properties, that make her, through her continual balancing of those properties, a unique and irreplaceable being. That the contract adequately epitomizes relations between individuals, and that respect epitomizes all virtue. That language is nothing but a means of arriving at an agreement. That, in reality, the world is composed on one side of things to manage, and on the other of an ocean of self-absorbed individuals, who in turn have a regrettable tendency to turn themselves into things, letting themselves become managed. Of course, cynicism is only one of the possible features of the infinite clinical diagnoses of Existential Liberalism. It also includes depression, apathy, immunodeficiency (every immune system is intrinsically collective), dishonesty, judicial harassment, chronic dissatisfaction, denied affection, isolation, illusions of citizenship, and the loss of all generosity. Existential liberalism has propagated its desert so well that even the most sincere Leftists express their utopia with its very terms. “We will rebuild an egalitarian society in which each person makes her contribution and from which each person gets her needs met from it... As far as individual desires are concerned, it could be egalitarian if each person consumes in proportion to the efforts she is ready to contribute. Naturally it will be necessary to redefine the method of evaluating the efforts contributed by each person,” write the organizers of the Alternative, Anti-capitalist, and Anti-war Village against the G8 summit in Evian in a text entitled When Capitalism and Wage Labor Will Have Been Abolished! Here is a key to the triumph of Empire: managing to keep in the shadows, to surround with silence the very terrain on which it maneuvers, the field upon which it fights the decisive battle: that of manipulating feelings, of defining the limits of the perceptible. In such a way it preventively paralyzes any defense at the very moment of its operation, and ruins the very idea of a counter-offensive. The victory is won whenever the militant, at the end of a hard day of Political Work, slumps down in front of an action movie. Anonymous, Call, p.7-8
There is a social use of language. No one still believes in it. Its exchange value has fallen to zero. Hence this inflationist bubble of idle talk. Everything social is mendacious, and everyone knows that now. It's no longer just the governing authorities, the publicists and public personalities who "do communication," it's every self-entrepreneur that this society wants to turn us into who prac­tices the art of "public relations." Having become an instrument of communication, language is no longer its own reality but a tool for operating on the real, for obtaining effects in accordance with more or less conscious strategies. Words are no longer put into circulation except in order to dis­ tort things. Everything sails under false flags. This usurpation has become universal. One doesn't shrink from any paradox. The state of emergency is the rule of law. War is made in the name of peace. The bosses "offer jobs." The surveillance cameras are "video-protection devices." The executioners complain that they're being persecuted. The trai­tors profess their sincerity and their allegiance. The mediocre are everywhere cited as examples. There is actual practice on the one hand, and on the other, discourse, which is its relentless counter­ point, the perversion of every concept, the universal deception of oneself and of others. In all quarters it's only a question of preserving or extending one's interests. The Invisible Committee, Now, p.9-10
Social fragmentation dynamics
The unity of the Republic, that of science, that of the personality, that of the national territory, or that of "culture" have never been anything but fic­tions. But they were effective. What is certain is that the illusion of unity can no longer do its work offoolingpeople, of bringing them into line, of dis­ciplining them. In every domain, hegemony is dead and the singularities are becoming wild: they bear their own meaning in themselves, no longer expecting it from a general order. The Invisible Committee, Now, p.22
As something endured, the process of fragmentation of the world can drive people into misery, isolation, schizophrenia. It can be experienced as a senseless loss in the lives of human beings. We're invaded by nostalgia then. Belonging is all that remains for those who no longer have anything. At the cost of accepting fragmentation as a starting point, it can also give rise to an intensification and pluralization of the bonds that constitute us. Then fragmentation doesn't signify separation but a shimmering of the world. […] With the endless fragmentation of the world there is a vertiginous increase in the qualitative enrich­ ment of life, and a profusion of forms-for someone who thinks about the promise of com­munism it contains. In the fragmentation there is something that points toward what we call "communism": it's the return to earth, the end of any bringing into equivalence, the restitution of all singularities to themselves, the defeat of subsumption, of abstrac­tion, the fact that moments, places, things, beings and animals all acquire a proper name-their proper name. Every creation is born of a splitting off from the whole. As embryology shows, each individual is the possibility of a new species as soon as it appropriates the conditions that immediately surround it. If the Earth is so rich in natural envi­ronments this is due to its complete absence of uniformity. Realizing the promise of communism contained in the world's fragmentation demands a gesture, a gesture to be performed over and over again, a gesture that is life itself: that of creating pathways between the fragments, of placing them in contact, of organizing their encounter, of opening up the roads that lead from one friendly piece of the world to another without passing through hostile territory, that of establishing the good art of distances between worlds. It's true that the world's fragmentation disorients and unsettles all the inherited certainties, that it defies all of our politi­cal and existential categories, that it removes the ground underlying the revolutionary tradition itself: it challenges us. […] Here is the paradox, then: being constrained to unity undoes us, the lie of social life makes us psychotic, and embracing fragmentation is what allows us to regain a serene presence to the world. There is a certain mental position where this fact ceases to be perceived in a contradictory way. That is where we place ourselves. The Invisible Committee, Now, p.45-46
Against the possibility of communism, against any possibility of happiness, there stands a hydra with two heads. On the public stage each one of them makes a show of being the sworn enemy of the other. On one side, there is the program for a fascistic restoration of unity, and on the other, there is the global power of the merchants of infrastructure-Google as much as Vinci, Amazon as much as Veolia. Those who believe that it's one or the other will have them both. Because the great builders of infrastructure have the means for which the fascists only have the folkloric discourse. For the former, the crisis of the old unities is primarily the opportunity for a new unification. In the con­temporary chaos, in the crumbling of institutions, in the death of politics, there is a perfectly profitable market for the infrastructural powers and for the giants of the Internet. A totally fragmented world remains completely manageable cybernetically. A shattered world is even the precondition for the omnipotence of those who manage its channels of communication. The program of these powers is to deploy behind the cracked facades of the old hege­monies a new, purely operational, form of unity, which doesn't get bogged down in the ponderous production of an always shaky feeling of belonging, but operates directly on "the real," reconfiguring it. A form of unity without limits, and without pretentious, which aims to build absolute order under absolute fragmentation. An order that has no intention of fabricating a new phantasmal belonging, but is content to furnish, through its networks, its servers, its highways, a materiality that is imposed on everyone without any questions being asked. No other unity than the standardization of interfaces, cities, landscapes; no other continuity than that of information. The hypothesis of Silicon Valley and the great merchants of infrastructure is that there's no more need to tire oneself out by staging a unity of facade: the unity it intends to construct will be integral with the world, incorpo­rated in its networks, poured into its concrete. Obviously we don't feel like we belong to a "Google humanity," but that's fine with Google so long as all our data belong to it. Basically, provided we accept being reduced to the sad ranks of"users," we all belong to the cloud, which does not need to proclaim it. To phrase it differently, fragmentation alone does not protect us from an attempt to reunify the world by the "rulers of tomorrow": fragmenta­tion is even the prerequisite and the ideal texture for such an initiative. From their point of view, the symbolic fragmentation of the world opens up the space for its concrete unification; segregation is not contradictory to the ultimate networking. On the contrary, it gives it its raison d'etre. The necessary condition for the reign of the GAFA (Google, Apple, Facebook, Amazon) is that beings, places, fragments of the world remain without any real contact. Where the GAFA claim to be "linking up the entire world" what they're actually doing is working toward the real isolation of everybody. By immobilizing bodies. By keeping everyone clois­tered in their signifying bubble. The power play of cybernetic power is to give everyone the impression that they have access to the whole world when they are actually more and more separated, that they have more and more "friends" when they are more and more autistic. The serial crowd of public transportation was always a lonely crowd, but people didn't transport their personal bubble along with them, as they have done since smartphones appeared. A bubble that immunizes against any contact, in addition to constituting a perfect snitch. This separation engineered by cybernetics pushes in a non-accidental way in the direction of making each fragment into a little paranoid entity, towards a drifting of the existential continents where the estrangement that already reigns between individuals in this "society" collectivizes ferociously into a thousand delirious little aggre­gates. In the face of all that, the thing to do, it would seem, is to leave home, take to the road, go meet up with others, work towards forming con­nections, whether conflictual, prudent, or joyful, between the different parts of the world. Organizing ourselves has never been anything else than loving each other. The Invisible Committee, Now, p. 46-49
It is amusing to remark, that many of those who advise a union with the middle classes are strenuous supporters of the present co-operative system; they seek the support of the middle class, and tell us to expect it—with the same breath shouting to the world, that their "co-operation" will destroy the shopkeepers! Ernest Jones, Collected Works of Marx and Engels (Lawrence & Wishart: London), Vol. 11, pp.575
Ideology and Subjectification
As St Paul admirably puts it, it is in the 'Logos', in other words, in ideology, that we 'live and move and have our being?' It follows that the category of the subject is a primary 'self-evident fact' for you and me (self-evident facts are always primary): it is clear that you are a (free, moral, responsible, and so on) subject, and that I am, too. Like all self-evident facts, including those that make a word 'name a thing' or 'have a meaning' (including, therefore, the self-evident facts of the 'transparency' of language), the 'self-evident fact' that you and I are subjects - and that that is not a problem - is an ideological effect, the elementary ideological effect. For it is characteristic of ideology to impose self-evident facts as self-evident facts […]. Althusser, On the Reproduction of Capitalism, Verso 2014, p.188-189
Clearly to grasp what follows, we must bear firmly in mind that both he who is writing these lines and the reader who is reading them are themselves subjects, and therefore ideological subjects (the proposition is itself tautological). That is, we have to be aware that both author and reader of these lines live 'spontaneously' or 'naturally' in ideology, in the sense in which we have said that 'man is by nature an ideological animal'. Althusser, On the Reproduction of Capitalism, Verso 2014, p.188
We may add that what thus seems to happen outside ideology […] really happens in ideology. What really happens in ideology thus seems to happen outside it. That is why those who are in ideology, you and I, believe that they are by definition outside ideology: one of the effects of ideology is the practical denegation of the ideological character of ideology by ideology. Ideology never says 'I am ideological'. One has to be outside ideology, in other words, in scientific knowledge, to be able to say 'I am in ideology' (a quite exceptional case) or (the general case) 'I was in ideology'. As is very well known, the accusation of being in ideology applies only to others, never to oneself (unless one is truly a Spinozist or Marxist, which, as far as this point goes, is to take exactly the same position). This amounts to saying that ideology has no outside (for itself), but, at the same time, that it is nothing but outside (for science and reality). Althusser, On the Reproduction of Capitalism, Verso 2014, p.191-192
[…] all ideology hails or interpellates concrete individuals as concrete subjects, through the functioning of the category of the subject. This proposition implies that we should distinguish, for the moment, between concrete individuals on the one hand and concrete subjects on the other, although, at this level, there is no concrete subject that does not have a concrete individual as its support. We shall go on to suggest that ideology 'acts' or 'functions' in such a way as to 'recruit' subjects among individuals (it recruits them all) or 'transforms' individuals into subjects (it transforms them all) through the very precise operation that we call interpellation or hailing. It can be imagined along the lines of the most commonplace, everyday hailing, by (or not by) the police: 'Hey, you there!' If, to offer readers the most concrete sort of concreteness, we suppose that the theoretical scene we are imagining happens in the street, the hailed individual turns around. With this simple 180-degree physical conversion, he becomes a subject. Why? Because he has recognized that the hail 'really' was addressed to him and that 'it really was he who was hailed' (not someone else). Althusser, On the Reproduction of Capitalism, Verso 2014, p.190-191
'ideas', or representations and the like, which seem to make up ideology, have, not an ideal, idea-dependent [ideale, ideelle] or spiritual existence, but a material one. an ideology always exists in an apparatus and in the practice or practices of that apparatus. This existence is material. Of course, the material existence of ideology in an apparatus and its practices does not have the same modality as the material existence of a paving stone or rifle. However, at the risk of being called a neoAristotelian (let us note in passing that Marx held Aristotle in very high esteem), we shall say that 'matter is expressed in several senses' or, rather, that it exists in diff erent modalities, all rooted, in the last instance, in 'physical' matter. It accordingly appears that the subject acts insofar as he is acted by the following system (set out in the order of its real determination) : ideology existing in a material ideological apparatus, prescribing material practices regulated by a material ritual, which practices exist in the material acts of a subject acting in all good conscience in accordance with his belief. Althusser, On the Reproduction of Capitalism, Verso 2014, p.184-187
[…] ‘people' do not 'represent' their real conditions of existence in ideology, but, above all, their relation to those real conditions of existence. That relation is at the centre of every ideological, hence imaginary, representation of the real world. To put this in Marxist terms, if it is true that the representation of the real conditions of existence of individuals holding posts of agents of production, exploitation, repression, ideologization and scientific practice arises, in the last instance, from the relations of production and relations deriving from them, we may say the following: every ideology represents, in its necessarily imaginary distortion, not the existing relations of production (and the other relations deriving from them) , but, above all, individuals' (imaginary) relation to the relations of production and the relations deriving from them. What is represented in ideology is therefore not the system of real relations governing individuals' existence, but those individuals' imaginary relation to the real relations in which they live. Althusser, On the Reproduction of Capitalism, Verso 2014, p.183
[…] our presentation reveals that we have retained the following notions: subject, consciousness, belief, acts. From this sequence, we shall immediately extract the decisive central term on which everything depends: the notion of the subject. And we shall immediately state two conjoint theses: 1) There is no practice whatsoever except by and under an ideology. 2) There is no ideology except by the subject and for subjects. […] In other words, there is no ideology except for concrete subjects (such as you and me) , and this destination for ideology is only made possible by the subject: in other words, by the category of the subject and its functioning. We mean by this that, even if it appears under this name (the subject) only with the advent of bourgeois ideology, legal ideology in particular (Which borrows the legal category of the 'subject of law' and transforms it into an ideological notion: man is by nature a subject), the category of the subject (which may function under other names: for example, the soul in Plato, God, and so on) is the category constitutive of all ideology, whatever its (regional or class) determination and whatever its historical date - since ideology has no history. We say that the category of the subject is constitutive of all ideology, but we also immediately add that the category of the subject is constitutive of every ideology only insofar as every ideology has the function (which defines it) of 'constituting' concrete subjects (such as you and me). The functioning of all ideology exists in the play of this twofold constitution, since ideology is nothing but its functioning in the material forms of existence of that functioning. Clearly to grasp what follows, we must bear firmly in mind that both he who is writing these lines and the reader who is reading them are themselves subjects, and therefore ideological subjects (the proposition is itself tautological). That is, we have to be aware that both author and reader of these lines live 'spontaneously' or 'naturally' in ideology, in the sense in which we have said that 'man is by nature an ideological animal'. As St Paul admirably puts it, it is in the 'Logos', in other words, in ideology, that we 'live and move and have our being?' It follows that the category of the subject is a primary 'self-evident fact' for you and me (self-evident facts are always primary): it is clear that you are a (free, moral, responsible, and so on) subject, and that I am, too. Like all self-evident facts, including those that make a word 'name a thing' or 'have a meaning' (including, therefore, the self-evident facts of the 'transparency' of language), the 'self-evident fact' that you and I are subjects - and that that is not a problem - is an ideological effect, the elementary ideological effect. For it is characteristic of ideology to impose self-evident facts as self-evident facts […]. […] you and I are always already subjects and, as such, constantly practice the rituals of ideological recognition, which guarantee for us that we are indeed concrete, individual, unmistakable and, naturally, irreplaceable subjects. Althusser, On the Reproduction of Capitalism, Verso 2014, p.187-189
[…] you and I are always already subjects and, as such, constantly practice the rituals of ideological recognition, which guarantee for us that we are indeed concrete, individual, unmistakable and, naturally, irreplaceable subjects. […] That an individual is always-already a subject, even before she is born, is nevertheless the plain fact of the matter, accessible to everyone and not a paradox at all. Freud shows that individuals are always 'abstract' with respect to the subjects they always-already are, simply by noting the ideological ritual that surrounds the expectation of a 'birth', that 'happy event'. Everyone knows how much, and how (a good deal could be said about that 'how'), an unborn child is expected. This comes down to saying, very prosaically, if we agree to leave aside 'sentiments', in other words, the forms of familial ideology (paternal/maternal/conjugal/fraternal) in which the unborn child is expected, that it is certain in advance that it will bear its father's name and so have an identity and be irreplaceable. Before its birth, then, a child is always-already a subject, marked out [assi gne] as a subject in and by the particular familial ideological configuration in which it is 'expected' once it has been conceived ('deliberately' or 'by accident'). There is no need to add that this familial ideological configuration is, in its singularity, terribly structured, and that it is in this implacable, more or less 'pathological' (if any meaning can be assigned to that word) structure that the quondam subject-to-be has to 'find' 'its' place, that is, 'become' the sexual subject (boy or girl) it already is in advance. It needs no genius to suggest that this ideological constraint and marking out, and all the rituals of family child-rearing-and-training and family education, bear some relation to what Freud studied in the forms of the pre-genital and genital 'stages' of sexuality, and thus to the 'take' [prise] of what he identified, by its effects, as the unconscious. […] Apart from the limit case of the 'prenatal child', this means, concretely, the following. When religious ideology begins to function directly by interpellating the little child Louis as a subject, little Louis is already-subject - not yet religious-subject, but familial-subject. When legal ideology (later, let us suppose) begins to interpellate little Louis by talking to him about, not Mama and Papa now, or God and the Little Lord Jesus, but Justice, he was already a subject, familial, religious, scholastic, and so on. I shall skip the moral stage, aesthetic stage, and others. Finally, when, later, thanks to auto-heterobiographical circumstances of the type Popular Front, Spanish Civil War, Hitler, 1940 Defeat, captivity, encounter with a communist, and so on, political ideology (in its differential forms) begins to interpellate the now adult Louis as a subject, he has already long been, always-already been, a familial, religious, moral, scholastic and legal subject … and is now, lo and behold, a political subject! This political subject begins, once back from captivity, to make the transition from traditional Catholic activism to advanced - semi-heretical - Catholic activism, then begins reading Marx, then joins the Communist Party, and so on. So life goes. Ideologies never stop interpellating subjects as subjects, never stop 'recruiting' individuals who are always-already subjects. The play of ideologies is superposed, criss-crossed, contradicts itself on the same subject: the same individual always-already (several times) subject. Let him figure things out, if he can… Althusser, On the Reproduction of Capitalism, Verso 2014, p.189, 192-193
Sociology of Knowledge
The overall project of Ideology and Utopia is the development of the sociology of knowledge and Mannheim stresses two principles. First, it deals not with individuals but with styles of thought characteristic of particular groups in specific historical circumstance. Mannheim goes so far as to say that ‘strictly speaking it is incorrect to say that the single individual thinks. Rather ... he participates in thinking further what other men have thought before him’ – and this in a specific situation which is, from the point of view of the individual, predetermined. Secondly, and more importantly, he makes the point that thought is not a process of contemplation but is intrinsically bound up with action; this action is collective; and its guiding principle is the will to preserve or to change existing conditions. Levitas, The Concept of Utopia, p.93
Subjective Roots of the Revolutionary Project
These are so-called ethical questions which must of course be asked and above all, they are those that we find at the very heart of the political: how to respond to emotional neutralization and to the potential effects of decisive thoughts? And also: how do modern societies work with these neutralizations, or rather, how are they made into essential cogs in its continual functioning? How does the material effectiveness of the empire relate to our predisposition toward giving up, regardless of our collective experiences? Anonymous, Call, p.15
We set the point of reversal, the way out of the desert, the end of Capital, in the intensity of the link that each person manages to establish between what she thinks and how she lives. Contrary to the upholders of Existential Liberalism, we refuse to view this as a private matter, an individual issue, a question of character. On the contrary, we start from the certainty that this link depends on the construction of shared realms, of placing effective methods in common. Anonymous, Call, p.13
I desire and I feel the need to live in a society other than the one surrounding me. Like most people, I can live in this one and adapt to it - at any rate, I do live in it. However critically I may try to look at myself, neither my capacity for adaptation, nor my assimilation of reality seems to me to be inferior to the sociological average. I am not asking for immortality, ubiquity or omniscience. I am not asking society to 'give me happiness'; I know that this is not a ration that can be handed out by City Hall or my neighbourhood Workers' Council and that, if this thing exists, I have to make it for myself, tailored to my own needs, as this has happened to me already and as this will probably happen to me again. In life, however, as it comes to me and to others, I run up against a lot of unacceptable things; I say that they are not inevitable and that they stem from the organization of society. I desire, and I ask, first of all that my work be meaningful, that I may approve what it is used for and the way in which it is done, that it allow me genuinely to expend myself, to make use of my faculties and at the same time to enrich and develop myself. And I say that this is possible, with a different organization of society, possible for me and for every­ one. I say that it would already be a basic change in this direction if I were allowed to decide, together with everyone else, what I had to do and, with my fellow workers, how to do it. I should like, together with everyone else, to know what is going on in society, to control the extent and the quality of the information I receive. I ask to be able to participate directly in all the social decisions that may affect my existence, or the general course of the world in which I live. I do not accept the fact that my lot is decided, day after day, by people whose projects are hostile to me or simply unknown to me, and for whom we, that is I and everyone else, are only numbers in a general plan or pawns on a chess board, and that, ultimately, my life and my death are in the hands of people whom I know to be, necessarily, blind. I know perfectly well that realizing another social organization, and the life it would imply, would by no means be simple, that difficult problems would arise at every step. But I prefer contending with real problems rather than with the consequences of de Gaulle's delirium, Johnson's schemes or Khrushchev's intrigues. Even if I and the others should fail along this path, I prefer failure in a meaningful attempt to a state that falls short of either failure or non-failure, and which is merely ridiculous. I wish to be able to meet the other person as a being like myself and yet absolutely different, not like a number or a frog perched on another level (higher or lower, it matters little) of the hierarchy of revenues and powers. I wish to see the other, and for the other to see me, as another human being. I want our relationships to be something other than a field for the expression of aggressivity, our competition to remain within the limits of play, our conflicts - to the extent that they cannot be resolved or overcome - to concern real problems and real stakes, carrying with them the least amount of unconsciousness possible, and that they be as lightly loaded as possible with the imaginary. I want the other to be free, for my freedom begins where the other's freedom begins, and, all alone, I can at best be merely 'virtuous in misfortune'. I do not count on people changing into angels, nor on their souls becoming as pure as mountain lakes - which, moreover, I have always found deeply boring. But I know how much present culture aggravates and exasperates their difficulty to be and to be with others, and I see that it multiplies to infinity the obstacles placed in the way of their freedom. I know, of course, that this desire cannot be realized today; nor even were the revolution to take place tomorrow, could it be fully realized in my lifetime. I know that one day people will live, for whom the problems that cause us the most anguish today will no longer even exist. This is my fate, which I have to assume and which I do assume. But this cannot reduce me to despair or to catatonic ruminations. Possessing this desire, which indeed is mine, I can only work to realize it. And already in the choice of my main interest in life, in the work I devote to it, which for me is meaningful (even when I encounter, and accept, partial failure, delays, detours and tasks that have no sense in themselves), in the participation in a group of revolutionaries which is attempting to go beyond the reified and alienated relations of current society - I am in a position partially to realize this desire. If I had been born in a communist society, would happiness have been easier to attain - I really do not know, and at any rate can do nothing about it. I am not, under this pretext, going to spend my free time watching television or reading detective novels. Does my attitude amount to denying the reality principle? But what is the content of this principle? Is it that work is necessary - or that it is necessary that work be meaningless, exploited, that it contradict the objectives for which it is allegedly done? Is this principle valid, in this form , for someone of independent means? Is it valid, in this form, for the natives of the Trobriand islands or Samoa? Is it still valid today for fishermen in a poor Mediterranean village? Up to what point does the reality principle reveal nature, and at what point does it begin to reveal society? Why not serfdom, slave galleys, concentration camps? Where does a philosophy get the right to tell me: here, on exactly this inch of existing institutions, I am going to show you the borderline between the phenomenon and the essence, between passing historical forms and the eternal being of society? I accept the reality principle, for I accept the necessity of work (as long, in any case, as it is real, for it is becoming less obvious every day) and the necessity of a social organization of work. But I do not accept the appeal to a false psychoanalysis and to a false metaphysics, which introduces the precise discussion of historical possibilities, gratuitous assertions about alleged impossibilities, about which this philosophy knows nothing at all. Might my desire be infantile? But the infantile situation is that life is given to you and that the Law is given to you. In the infantile situation, life is given to you for nothing; and the Law is given to you without anything else, without anything more, without any possible discussion. What I want is just the opposite: I want to make my life and to give life if possible , and in any event to give something for my life. I want the Law not to be simply given, but for me to give it to myself at the same time. The person who remains constantly in the infantile situation is the conformist and the apolitical person, for they accept the Law without any discussion and do not want to participate in shaping it. Someone who lives in society without any will concerning the Law, without any political will, has merely replaced the private father with the anonymous social father. The infantile situation is first receiving without giving, and then doing or being in order to receive. What I want is a just exchange to begin with, passing beyond exchange afterwards. The infantile situation is the relation of duality, the phantasy of fusion - and in this sense it is the present society that constantly infantilizes everyone, by the imaginary fusion with unreal entities: leaders, nations, cosmonauts or idols. What I want is for society to cease to be a family, moreover a false one and even a grotesque one; I want it to acquire its peculiar dimension as a society, a network of relationships among autonomous adults. Is my desire a desire for power? But what I want is the abolition of power in the current sense; I want the power of each and every one. For current power, other people are things, and all that I want goes against this. The person for whom others are things is himself a thing, and I do not want to be a thing either for myself or for others. I do not want others to be things, I would have no use for this. If I may exist for others, be recognized by them, I do not want this to be in terms of the possession of something external to me - power; nor to exist for them only in an imaginary realm. The recognition of others has value to me only inasmuch as I recognize them as well. Am I in danger of forgetting all this if ever events were to carry me close to 'power'? This seems more than improbable to me. If this were to happen, a battle would perhaps be lost but not the war, and am I to rule my entire life on the assumption that I might one day slip back into childhood? Should I follow this chimera of wanting to eliminate the tragic side of human existence? It seems to me that instead I want to eliminate the melodramatic aspect, the false tragedy - the one in which catastrophe arrives without necessity, in which everything could have been otherwise if only the characters had known this or had done that. That people should die of hunger in India, while in America or in Europe governments penalize farmers who 'over'-produce - this is a macabre farce, this is Grand Guignol in which the cadavres and the suffering are real, but this is not tragedy, there is nothing ineluctable here. And if one day humanity perishes by hydrogen bombs, I refuse to call this a tragedy. I would call it stupidity. I would like an end to Guignol and to the transformation of people into puppets by other puppets who 'govern' them. When a neurotic repeats for the 14th time the same behaviour-pattern of failure, reproducing for himself and for those nearby the same type of misfortune, helping this person get out of such a situation is to rid his or her life of grotesque farce, not tragedy; it is to allow the person finally to see the real problems of life and the tragic element they may contain - which the neurosis served in part to express but especially to mask. When one of Buddha's disciples came to tell him, after a long voyage in the West, that miraculous things, instruments, medications, methods of thinking and institutions had transformed people's lives since the time the Master had retreated into the mountains, Buddha stopped him after a few words. Have they wiped out sadness, sickness, old age and death? he asked. No, replied the disciple. Then, they might as well have kept still, thought the Master. And he plunged back into his contemplation, without bothering to show his disciple that he was no longer listening to him. Castoriadis, The Imaginary Institution of Society, p.90-95
Like many, we have experienced that emotions stuck internally turn out badly: they can even turn into symptoms. The rigidities we observe in ourselves come from the partitions that every person believes herself obliged to put up in order to define her own limits, and to contain within herself what must not burst forth. When, for some reason or other, these partitions happen to crack and break, then things come up that might be unpleasant, which may even appear frightful — but it is a fright capable of freeing us from fear. Calling into question both our individual limits and the borders drawn by civilization can be a life-saver. The existence of any real community necessitates a certain physical danger: when emotions and thoughts are no longer ascribable to any one person, when interactions are recovered in which feelings, ideas, impressions, and emotions are exchanged carelessly. It must be understood that community per se is not the solution: it is its disappearance, everywhere and always, that is the problem. Anonymous, Call, p.15
We have been sold this lie: that what is most particular to us is what distinguishes us from the common. We experience the contrary: every singularity is felt in the manner and in the intensity with which a being brings into existence something common. At root it is here that we begin, where we find each other. What is most singular in us calls to be shared. Anonymous, Call, p.17
Hope. Now there's at least one disease this civilization has not infected us with. We're not despairing for all that. No one has ever acted out of hope. Hope is of a piece with waiting, with the refusal to see what is there, with the fear of breaking into the present - in short, with the fear of living. To hope is to declare one­ self in advance to be without any hold on that from which something is expected nonetheless. It's to remove oneself from the process so as to avoid any connection with its outcome. It's wanting things to be different without embracing the means for this to come about. It's a kind of cowardice. One has to know what to commit to and then commit to it. Even if it means making enemies. Or making friends. Once we know what we want, we're no longer alone, the world repopulates. Everywhere there are allies, closenesses, and an infinite gradation of possible friendships. Nothing is close for someone who floats. Hope, that very slight but constant impetus toward tomorrow that is communicated to us day by day, is the best agent of the maintenance of order. We're daily informed of problems we can do nothing about, but to which there will surely be solutions tomor­row. The whole oppressive feeling of powerlessness that this social organization cultivates in everyone is only an immense pedagogy of waiting. It's an avoidance of now. But there isn't, there's never been, and there never will be anything but now. And even if the past can act upon the now, this is because it has itself never been anything but a now. Just as our tomorrow will be. The only way to understand something in the past is to under­ stand that it too used to be a now. It's to feel the faint breath of the air in which the human beings of yesterday lived their lives. If we are so much inclined to flee from now, it's because now is the time of decision. It's the locus of the "I accept" or the "I refuse," of ''I'll pass on that" or ''I'll go with that." It's the locus of the logical act that imme­diately follows the perception. It is the present, and hence the locus ofpresence. It is the moment, endlessly renewed, of the taking of sides. Thinking in distant terms is always more comfortable. "In the end," things will change; "in the end," beings will be transfigured. Meanwhile, let's go on this way, let's remain what we are. A mind that thinks in terms of the future is incapable of acting in the present. It doesn't seek transformation; it avoids it. The current disaster is like a monstrous accumu­lation of all the deferrals of the past, to which are added those of each day and each moment, in a continuous time slide. But life is always decided now, and now, and now. Everyone can see that this civilization is like a train rolling toward the abyss, and picking up speed. The faster it goes, the more one hears the hysterical cheers of the boozers in the discotheque car. You have to listen carefully to make out the paralyzed silence of the rational minds that no longer under­stand anything, that of the worriers who bite their nails, and the accent of false calm in the exclama­tions of the card players who wait. Inwardly, many people have chosen to leap off the train, but they hesitate on the footboard. They're still restrained by so many things. They feel held back because they've made the choice, but the decision is lacking. Decision is what traces in the present the manner and possibility of acting, of making a leap that is not into the void. We mean the decision to desert, to desert the ranks, to organize, to undertake a secession, be it imperceptibly, but in any case, now. The epoch belongs to the determined. The Invisible Committee, Now, p.16-18
Along with the taste for risk-taking, the reasons for living disappear. Comfort - which clouds perceptions, takes pleasure in repeating words that it empties of any meaning, and prefers not to know anything - is the real enemy, the enemy within. The Invisible Committee, Now, p.88-89
It is a matter of giving ourselves the means, of finding the methods whereby all those questions can be resolved; questions which, when addressed separately, can drive us to depression. How to dissolve the dependencies that weaken us? How to organize ourselves so we no longer have to work? How to settle beyond the toxicity of the metropole without going Back To Nature? How to shut down nuclear plants? How not to be forced to resort to psychiatric pulverization when a friend goes mad; or to the crude remedies of mechanistic medicine when she falls ill? How to live together without mutual suppression? How to take in the death of a comrade? How to ruin Empire? Anonymous, Call, p.19
One can live a whole life without experiencing anything, by being very careful not to think and feel. Existence is then reduced to a slow process of degradation. It wears down and ruins, instead of giving form. After the miracle of the encounter, relations can only go from wound to wound towards their con­sumption. Life, on the contrary, gradually gives form to whoever refuses to live beside themselves, to whoever allows themselves to experience. They become a form of life in the full sense of the term. The Invisible Committee, Now, p.143
A person’s life is a succession of fortuitous situations, and even if none of them is exactly the same as another the immense majority of them are so undifferentiated and so dull that they give a definite impression of sameness. As a result, the rare intensely engaging situations found in life only serve to strictly confine and limit that life. We must try to construct situations, that is to say, collective ambiences, ensembles of impressions determining the quality of a moment. If we take the simple example of a gathering of a group of individuals for a given time, it would be desirable, while taking into account the knowledge and material means we have at our disposal, to study what organization of the place, what selection of participants and what provocation of events are suitable for producing the desired ambience. The powers of a situation will certainly expand considerably in both time and space with the realizations of unitary urbanism or the education of a situationist generation. Debord, Report on the Creation of Situations, theanarchistlibrary.org, p.14
The construction of situations begins beyond the ruins of the modern spectacle. It is easy to see how much the very principle of the spectacle — nonintervention — is linked to the alienation of the old world. […] The role played by a passive or merely bit-part playing “public” must constantly diminish, while that played by those who cannot be called actors, but rather, in a new sense of the term, “livers,” must steadily increase. […] Situationist theory resolutely supports a noncontinuous conception of life. The notion of unity must cease to be seen as applying to the whole of one’s life (where it serves as a reactionary mystification based on the belief in an immortal soul and, in the final analysis, on the division of labor); instead, it should apply to the construction of each particular moment of life through the unitary use of situationist methods. In a classless society there will no longer be “painters,” but only situationists who, among other things, sometimes paint. The main emotional drama of life, aside from the perpetual conflict between desire and reality hostile to desire, seems to be the sensation of the passage of time. In contrast to the aesthetic modes that strive to fix and eternalize some emotion, the situationist attitude consists in going with the flow of time. In so doing, in pushing ever further the game of creating new, emotionally provocative situations, the situationists are gambling that change will usually be for the better. In the short term the odds are obviously against that bet. But even if we have to lose it a thousand times, we see no other choice for a progressive attitude. Debord, Report on the Creation of Situations, theanarchistlibrary.org, p.14, 15
All existing equilibrium, however, is brought back into question each time unknown people try to live differently. But it’s always far away. We learn of it through the papers and newscasts. We remain outside it, confronted with just another spectacle. We are separated from it by our own nonintervention. It makes us disappointed in ourselves. At what moment was choice postponed? We haven’t found the arms we needed. We have let things go. I have let time slip away. I have lost what I should have defended. This general critique of separation obviously contains and covers some particular memories. A less recognized pain, the awareness of a less explainable indignity. Exactly what separation was it? How quickly we have lived! It is to this point in our unreflecting history that I bring us back. Everything that concerns the sphere of loss — that is to say, the past time I have lost, as well as disappearance, escape, and more generally the flowing past of things, and even what in the prevalent and therefore most vulgar social sense of the use of time is called wasted time — all this finds in that strangely apt old military expression, en enfants perdus, its meeting ground with the sphere of discovery, of exploration of unknown terrains; with all the forms of quest, investigation, adventure, avant-garde. It is the crossroads where we have found and lost ourselves. Debord, Critique of Separation (Film), 1961 - https://remixedcity.wordpress.com/2014/02/17/critique-of-separation-english-subtitles-by-guy-debord-1961/
[…] like the proletariat, we cannot claim to be unexploitable in the present conditions; the best we can do is to work to make any such exploitation entail the greatest possible risk for the exploiters. Now, The SI, Internationale Situationniste #9, https://libcom.org/article/now-si
We have invented nothing. We adapt ourselves, with a few variations, into the network of possible courses. We get used to it, it seems. No one has the enthusiasm on returning from a venture that they had on setting out on it. My dears, adventure is dead. Debord, Critique of Separation (Film), 1961 - https://remixedcity.wordpress.com/2014/02/17/critique-of-separation-english-subtitles-by-guy-debord-1961/
Emancipated Human Archetypes
At a higher stage, everyone will become an artist, i.e., inseparably a producer-consumer of total culture creation, which will help the rapid dissolution of the linear criteria of novelty. Everyone will be a situationist so to speak, with a multidimensional inflation of tendencies, experiences, or radically different "schools" - not successively, but simultaneously. We will inaugurate what will historically be the last of the crafts. The role of amateur-professional situationist - of anti-specialist - is again a specialisation up to the point of economic and mental abundance, when everyone becomes an "artist," in the sense that the artists have not attained the construction of their own life. However, the last craft of history is so close to the society without a permanent division of labour, that when it appeared amongst the S.I., its status as a craft was generally denied. Situationist Manifesto, Internationale Situationniste #4, https://libcom.org/article/situationist-manifesto
Finally this new society entails the production of a different kind of person, not just in the sense of increasing their powers as atomised individuals but (and in fact this is how the increase of individual powers is possible) as the production of fully social human beings. Alienation affects not just the relationship of people to themselves and to their work, but to one another. The recognition of interdependence and of the social nature of production and of human existence in general leads not only to a transformation of work, but also means that the relationships between individuals both within and outside the work process cease to have the instrumental and competitive nature they assume in capitalist society. Levitas, The Concept of Utopia, p.50
The subject position of human flourishing is figured by Bloch in terms of human dignity as the upright gait, ‘the individual who is no longer to be humiliated, enslaved, forsaken, scorned, estranged, annihilated, and deprived of identity’. Bloch concludes The Principle of Hope with the aspiration for the world anticipated as outcome of this process: "But the root of history is the working, creating human being who reshapes and overhauls the given facts. Once he has grasped himself and established what is his, without expropriation and alienation, in real democracy, there arises in the world something which shines into the childhood of all and in which no-one has yet been: *Heimat*. [Bloch, The Principle of Hope, Basil Blackwell 1986, p. 1376.] [The English translation renders Heimat as ‘homeland’. This never captured the resonance of Heimat] Levitas, Utopia as Method, p. 6-7