There are four different objections which can be levelled at the dichotomy between ideology and utopia. Firstly, the categorisation of ideas into those which change and those which support the existing state of affairs is extremely crude. It leaves no space for ideas which may be neutral, or whose relationship to the present is ambiguous or paradoxical. In Mannheim’s view, almost all ideas are situationally transcendent and are thus either ideologies or utopias: ‘Ideas which correspond to the concretely existing and de facto order are … relatively rare and only a state of mind that has been sociologically fully clarified operates with situationally congruous ideas and motives’. [Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia, Routledge & Kegan Paul 1979, p.175] The second and third problems, namely the notion of ‘adequate realisation’ and the issue of causality, relate to the criterion of success as a defining characteristic of utopia. The idea of adequate realisation implies that one would not expect a utopia to be implemented in all its details; since these are ideal-typical concepts, actual utopias are contaminated with ideological elements. But what degree of realisation will be deemed to be adequate, and who is to make this judgement? Here, Mannheim’s concept of utopia is radically different from Sorel’s concept of myth, for Sorel does not require any correspondence between the content of a mobilising myth and the state of affairs which it brings about; its function is merely to mobilise people to action to overthrow the existing state of affairs. The issue of causality is a further difficulty: it is not merely a matter of utopia anticipating the future – of wanting something which the future turns out to hold – but of utopia creating the future. […] To identify an idea as a utopia, we have therefore to establish not only that a change has occurred sufficiently in line with its content, but also that the idea was instrumental in effecting the change, which in practice is very difficult to do even with the benefit of hindsight. […] Ricoeur, however, does make some extremely pertinent criticisms relating to our fourth area of difficulty, Mannheim’s view of reality. Ricoeur points out that in Mannheim’s analysis the differences between ideology and utopia are in some ways less important than the characteristic which they share, that of being incongruous with or transcending reality, or orientated to objects which do not exist in the actual situation; yet this is to beg the question of what is real. Mannheim treats this as unproblematic: "The nature of ‘reality’ or ‘existence as such’ is a problem which belongs to philosophy, and is of no concern here. However, what is to be regarded as ‘real’ historically or sociologically at a given time is of importance to us and fortunately can be definitely ascertained.” [Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia, Routledge & Kegan Paul 1979, p.174] Ricoeur argues that Mannheim’s notion of reality is inadequate; it is assumed to be something fixed and ‘out there’, of which objective knowledge is possible in a seemingly unproblematic way and which can be contrasted to the symbolic realm of ideas. Mannheim does not perceive that social reality is always and essentially socially mediated, rendering the opposition between ideas and reality, and hence the judgement of (non)congruence, untenable. Levitas, The Concept of Utopia, p.87-89

While the form and content of utopia may be historically variable, its defining characteristic is the capacity to transform the situation and realise itself. Ideologies, on the other hand, are those ‘situationally transcendent ideas which never succeed de facto in the realization of their projected contents’. Mannheim recognises the difficulty in applying this dichotomy. One reason why it is difficult is that ideologies and utopias are by definition tied up in struggles for social power and in these struggles groups have a vested interest in declaring each other’s ideas incongruous with reality. Political discourse consists precisely of the attempt to invalidate opposing views and legitimate one’s own. As Mannheim puts it, subordinate groups have an interest in unmasking the ideas of the dominant as ideological, and dominant groups have an interest in labelling ideas which challenge their authority as utopian (in the colloquial sense of unrealistic) as a means of invalidating them. Levitas, The Concept of Utopia, p.80-81

But because he is examining the shifting constellation of the utopias of different social groups in their conflicts with one another, it becomes necessary to describe this mode of ‘incongruous’ thought as a utopia as well, in spite of the fact that his description makes it more properly an ideology than a utopia. What this illustrates above all is the problematic nature of the distinction between ideology and utopia in the first place, for when conservatism is provoked by its opponents into the need for political legitimation it may also find it necessary to do this by the affirmation of a particular form of society, even if it is a form deemed to be represented by the survivals of the past in the present, whose preservation for the future becomes the overriding concern. Levitas, The Concept of Utopia, p.85