[…] what constitutes human need (as distinct from animal need) lies in investing the object with a value that exceeds, for example, its simple inscription in the 'instinctual' opposition, nutritive-non-nutritive (which 'holds' for ani­mals as well) and which establishes within the nutritive the distinction between the edible and the non-edible, which creates food in the cultural sense and arranges foods within a hierarchy, classifying them into 'better foods' and foods that are 'not as good' (in the sense of cultural value not in that of subjective tastes). This cultural sampling among available foods and the corresponding hierarchization, struc­turing, etc. are leaning on natural givens, but they do not stem from them. It is social need that creates scarcity as social scarcity, and not the opposite. It is neither the availability of snails and frogs nor their scarcity that makes them for contemporary, nearby and related cultures, in one instance a gourmet's delight and in the other a sure cause of vomiting. One has only to draw up the catalogue of everything that humans can eat, and actually have eaten (not feeling any the worse for it) in different periods and in different societies, to see that what is edible for humans far exceeds what each culture has taken as its food, and that what has determined this choice has not been simply natural availability and technical possibilities. This is even more clearly appar­ent when one examines needs other than food. This choice is carried by a system of imaginary significations that value or devalue, structure and hierarchize an intersecting ensemble of objects and corresponding lacks; and it is here that one can read, more easily than anywhere else, what is just as uncertain as it is incontestable - the orientation of a society. Castoriadis, The Imaginary Institution of Society, p.150
[…] human needs, to the extent that they are social and not simply biological, are inseparable from their objects, and both these needs and their objects are in every instance instituted by the society considered. Castoriadis, The Imaginary Institution of Society, p.171
Needs in Capitalism and Beyond
Marx’s categories of need (we shall see that he gives several interpretations of it) are not as a whole economic categories. He tends to treat concepts of need as non-economic categories, as historical-philosophical, that is as anthropological value categories, and therefore as not subject to definition within the economic system. Agnes Heller, The Theory of Need in Marx, Chapter 1
In our view the “natural needs” are not a group of needs but a limit concept: a limit (different for different societies) beyond which human life is no longer reproducible as such, beyond which the limit of bare existence is passed […]. It would be sheer elitism, at least in our world, to eliminate this limit concept from the discussion of man’s needs. Therefore I shall speak not of “natural needs” but of the “existential limit to the satisfaction of needs”. Agnes Heller, The Theory of Need in Marx, Chapter 1
No specific product or need possesses the quality of being a luxury product or a luxury need. That is determined solely by the question of whether the object is possessed and used (and therefore the corresponding need is satisfied) by the majority of the population or only by a minority which represents a significantly higher level of purchasing power as a result of the social division of labor. As a consequence of increasing productivity, and as a consequence of changes in the social structure, needs that originally were luxury needs become necessary needs, without them undergoing the slightest modification. Agnes Heller, The Theory of Need in Marx, Chapter 1
According to Marx, the end of social production ought to be the satisfaction of social needs. But capitalist industry and agriculture do not produce for needs, nor for their satisfaction. The end of production is the valorisation of capital, and the satisfaction of needs (on the market) is only a means towards this end. Agnes Heller, The Theory of Need in Marx, Chapter 1
Marx judges capitalism as a society that imposes quantitative limits on quality, and in two different relationships: “The transformation into money, exchange value as such, as limit of production, [is equivalent to] restriction of the production of use values by exchange value; or that real wealth has to take a specific form distinct from itself, a form not absolutely identical with it, in order to become an object of production at all.” […] Capitalism “quantifies” all its objective expressions and produces them (as it also produces the needs directed towards them) only if it is “profitable” to do so. Capitalism at the same time quantifies the complexly qualitative world of human needs, turns into quasi-exchange value and renders it “purchasable”; all qualitative needs that can neither be quantified nor purchased are inhibited. Agnes Heller, The Theory of Need in Marx, Chapter 2
How can the values of radical criticism become the values of the masses, that is, how can Ought become the collective Ought? The reply is: “Theory is actualised in a people only in so far as it actualises their needs. … A deep-going revolution can only be a revolution in basic needs.” The “bearers” of radical needs are therefore those who can actualise radical deep-going theory. Marx then looks for the bearers of these radical needs and in the end he finds them in the working class. Agnes Heller, The Theory of Need in Marx, Chapter 3
1. Capitalism is an antinomous society: its essence is alienation. The wealth of the species and the poverty of the individual are reciprocally based and reproduce each other. The antinomy is that of commodity production becoming universal. (Marx says: “Value having become capital, and living labour confronting it as a mere use value, so that living labor appears as a mere means to realise objectified, dead labor …, and having produced, as the end product, alien wealth on one side and, on the other, the penury which is living labour capacity’s sole possession.” 2. Capitalist society, as a totality, as a “social body”, produces not only alienation but the consciousness of alienation, in other words, radical needs. 3. This consciousness (radical needs) is necessarily generated by capitalism. 4. This consciousness (the complex of radical needs) already transcends capitalism by its existence, and its development makes it impossible for capitalism to remain the basis of production. The need to resolve the antinomy and the activity directed towards this end are therefore constituted in the collective Ought, in the consciousness that “exceeds its bounds”. This concept of “consciousness exceeding its bounds” is beyond question the same as the “imputed consciousness” which is a central category in Lukacs’ “History and Class Consciousness” […]. Although Marx does not say so, it is obvious that this “consciousness exceeding its bounds” is not identical with the “empirical consciousness” of the working class. It is not consciousness of misery and still less poverty in the narrow sense: the needs that flow from it (or which constitute its base) are not directed towards “greater possession” and still less towards higher wages or “a better standard of living”. It is the simple consciousness of alienation, the recognition that social relations are alienated. from this there follows (or this constitutes the base for) the need to overcome alienation, to overturn the alienated social and productive relations in a revolutionary way, and to create general social and productive relations which are not alienated. As yet, history has not answered the question as to whether capitalist society in fact produces this “consciousness exceeding its bounds”, which in Marx’s day did not exist, and whose existence Marx therefore had to project. Agnes Heller, The Theory of Need in Marx, Chapter 3
The system of needs in communism must be dealt with from two different aspects: from that of material and non-material needs, and from that of the relation between these two types within a single structure of needs. By “material needs” I mean needs whose objects and means of satisfaction (used in consumption and in productive consumption) must be produced and continually reproduced. Needs of a non-material character are, in contrast, those whose objects of satisfaction are not “produced” in the organic interchange with nature or are not produced at all. (I know this is a not “pure” distinction. To satisfy the need of art, production it to some extent necessary: houses must be built, books must be printed. But the need for art as such is not satisfied either by the house or by the book but by the work of art, which as an objectivation does not belong to the sphere of production). […] In Marx’s view, the sphere of production is the field which will always remain “the field of necessity”; above it is the “realm of freedom”, which subordinates production to its own ends. Agnes Heller, The Theory of Need in Marx, Chapter 4
The category of “socially necessary labor time” will be interpretable only in relation to the process of material production. (The concept of “socially necessary labor time” is not applicable to any “free” activity, whether medicine, teaching, planning, or scientific and artistic activity. Agnes Heller, The Theory of Need in Marx, Chapter 4
Post-Scarcity
The society of the future is also a society of material wealth, which continues to grow. This idea is encountered in virtually all of Marx’s works. I shall cite just one example as proof. In the third volume of Theories of Surplus Value, he describes the two alternatives for increasing “disposable time”. One alternative would be to produce greater wealth in half the current average labour time. The other would be to reduce the labour time by half in such a way as to direct the remaining half towards the satisfaction of “necessary needs” as they are at present. Marx considers it a theoretical mistake, a lack of clarity, to confuse these two alternatives. He explicitly declares himself to be in favour of the first of them. The base for the future development of production will be the extraordinary growth in the proportion of fixed capital, which is quite possible because the increase in production will be independent of the valorisation of capital. The increase in the proportion of fixed capital to levels that are impossible under capitalism is the guarantee that material production will require ever less living labour. This is the only way to reduce labour time uninterruptedly whilst maintaining a constant increase in production. This does not of course mean that dead labour will dominate living labour (because the capital relation no longer exists); on the contrary, living labour will prevail over dead. Agnes Heller, The Theory of Need in Marx, Chapter 4
The “society of associated producers” appears in this quotation as a society in which labour is carried out by machines, in which “fixed capital” therefore completely predominates and in which — at least in the process of material production — labour power is employed only “as watchman and regulator”. To use a modern expression, Marx presupposes complete automation. In this way a specific type of labour acquires an extraordinary importance, namely, scientific labour, or (as Marx calls it) “labour in general”. Scientific labour is not, however, immediately productive labour, but the activity of the general intellect: planning, projection and so forth. This cannot however be measured in labour time, since the concept of “socially necessary labour time” is not applicable. In short, material wealth is still supplied by production, but no longer by productive labour in the conventional sense of the term. This determines the hegemony of intellectual labour over so-called “physical” labour. Agnes Heller, The Theory of Need in Marx, Chapter 4
The material wealth which comes about through production is not and cannot be anything but a condition of the general wealth of society. The true wealth of society is realised through the free self-activity of social individuals and through their qualitatively many-sided system of needs. The true wealth of man and society consists not in labour time but in free time. For this very reason the wealth of the society of associated producers cannot be measured by labour time but only by free time. I shall here refer not to the well known passages in the Grundrisse, but to the third volume of Theories of Surplus Value: “Labour time, even if exchange value is eliminated, always remains the creative substance of wealth and the measure of the cost of its production. But free time, disposable time, is wealth itself, partly for the enjoyment of the product, partly for free activity, which - unlike labour - is not dominated by the pressure of an extraneous purpose which must be fulfilled, and the fulfilment of which is regarded as a natural necessity or a social duty, according to one’s inclination.” Agnes Heller, The Theory of Need in Marx, Chapter 4
What are the organisational perspectives of life in a society which authentically "reorganises production on the basis of the free and equal association of the producers"? Work would more and more be reduced as an exterior necessity through the automation of production and the socialisation of vital goods, which would finally give complete liberty to the individual. Thus liberated from all economic responsibility, liberated from all the debts and responsibilities from the past and other people, humankind will exude a new surplus value, incalculable in money because it would be impossible to reduce it to the measure of waged work. The guarantee of the liberty of each and of all is in the value of the game, of life freely constructed. The exercise of this ludic recreation is the framework of the only guaranteed equality with non-exploitation of man by man. The liberation of the game, its creative autonomy, supersedes the ancient division between imposed work and passive leisure. Situationist Manifesto, Internationale Situationniste #4, https://libcom.org/article/situationist-manifesto
What would be the principle characteristics of the new culture and how would it compare with ancient art? Against the spectacle, the realised situationist culture introduces total participation. Against preserved art, it is the organisation of the directly lived moment. Against particularised art, it will be a global practice with a bearing, each moment, on all the usable elements. Naturally this would tend to collective production which would be without doubt anonymous (at least to the extent where the works are no longer stocked as commodities, this culture will not be dominated by the need to leave traces.) The minimum proposals of these experiences will be a revolution in behaviour and a dynamic unitary urbanism capable of extension to the entire planet, and of being further extensible to all habitable planets. Against unilateral art, situationist culture will be an art of dialogue, an art of interaction. Today artists - with all culture visible - have become entirely separated from society, just as they are separated from each other by competition. But faced with this impasse of capitalism, art has remained essentially unilateral in response. This enclosed era of primitivism must be superseded by complete communication. At a higher stage, everyone will become an artist, i.e., inseparably a producer-consumer of total culture creation, which will help the rapid dissolution of the linear criteria of novelty. Everyone will be a situationist so to speak, with a multidimensional inflation of tendencies, experiences, or radically different "schools" - not successively, but simultaneously. We will inaugurate what will historically be the last of the crafts. The role of amateur-professional situationist - of anti-specialist - is again a specialisation up to the point of economic and mental abundance, when everyone becomes an "artist," in the sense that the artists have not attained the construction of their own life. However, the last craft of history is so close to the society without a permanent division of labour, that when it appeared amongst the S.I., its status as a craft was generally denied. Situationist Manifesto, Internationale Situationniste #4, https://libcom.org/article/situationist-manifesto
Defining the new poverty also entails defining the new wealth. To the image propagated by the dominant society - according to which it has evolved (both on its own and in response to acceptable reformist pressure) from an economy of profit to an economy of needs - must be counterposed an economy of desires, which could be defined as: technological society plus the imagination of what could be done with it. The economy of needs is falsified in terms of habit. Habit is the natural process by which fulfilled desire is degraded into need and is confirmed, objectified and universally recognized as need. The present economy is directly geared to the fabrication of habits, and manipulates people by forcing them to repress their desires. Situationist International, The Bad Days will End, Internationale Situationniste #7, https://libcom.org/article/bad-days-will-end-0
The next form of society will not be based on industrial production. It will be a society of realized art. Situationist International, The Bad Days will End, Internationale Situationniste #7, https://libcom.org/article/bad-days-will-end-0
The present era can test innumerable innovations, but it is incapable of putting them to good use because it is chained to the fundamental conservation of an old order. Over and over, in all our innovating formulations, we must stress the need for a revolutionary transformation of society. Now, The SI, Internationale Situationniste #9, https://libcom.org/article/now-si
After thousands of years of torturous development, the countries of the Western world (and potentially all countries) are confronted by the possibility of a materially abundant, almost workless era in which most of the means of life can be provided by machines. As we shall see, a new technology has developed that could largely replace the realm of necessity by the realm of freedom. Bookchin, Post-Scarcity Anarchism, Black Rose Books 1986, p.115
In fact, the real issue we face today is not whether this new technology can provide us with the means of life in a toil-less society, but whether it can help to humanize society, whether it can contribute to the creation of entirely new relationships between man and man. The demand for a guaranteed annual income is still anchored in the quantitative promise of technology — in the possibility of satisfying material needs without toil. This quantitative approach is already lagging behind technological developments that carry a new qualitative promise — the promise of decentralized, communitarian lifestyles, or what I prefer to call ecological forms of human association. * * An exclusively quantitative approach to the new technology, I may add, is not only economically archaic, but morally regressive. This approach partakes of the old principle of justice, as distinguished from the new principle of freedom. Historically, justice is derived from the world of material necessity and toil; it implies relatively scarce resources which are apportioned by a moral principle which is either "just" or "unjust." Justice, even "equal" justice, is a concept of limitation, involving the denial of goods and the sacrifice of time and energy to production. Once we transcend the concept of justice — indeed, once we pass from the quantitative to the qualitative potentialities of modern technology — we enter the unexplored domain of freedom, based on spontaneous organization and full access to the means of life. I am asking a question that is quite different from what is ordinarily posed with respect to modern technology. Is this technology staking out a new dimension in human freedom, in the liberation of man? Can it not only liberate man from want and work, but also lead him to a free, harmonious, balanced human community — an ecocommunity that would promote the unrestricted development of his potentialities? Finally, can it carry man beyond the realm of freedom into the realm of life and desire? Bookchin, Post-Scarcity Anarchism, Black Rose Books 1986, p.116-117
Let me try to answer these questions by pointing to a new feature of modern technology. For the first time in history, technology has reached an open end. The potential for technological development, for providing machines as substitutes for labor is virtually unlimited. Technology has finally passed from the realm of invention to that of design — in other words, from fortuitous discoveries to systematic innovations. Bookchin, Post-Scarcity Anarchism, Black Rose Books 1986, p.117
The wealth of the commune will hardly be the same as the wealth we know, only produced under different relations. Nor is the point to give metropolitan residents more of what they already have: more flights, cars, cell-phones, and ugly, cheap t-shirts. And not because those needs could be denounced as “artificial” and juxtaposed with so-called natural ones. As the late Marxists from Frankfurt demonstrated, distinguishing between artificial and natural needs tends to be arbitrary in an authoritarian sense, because nature, as manifested in individuals’ drives, and society are inextricably intertwined in every need. As products of the existing class society, however, needs are not innocent nor should they always be projected into a classless society. Adorno answered this dilemma on the one hand with the dialectical core of his argument: reorganizing production towards the satisfaction of “even and especially those [needs] produced by capitalism—then the needs themselves would be decisively transformed”. It would “quickly emerge” that the masses don’t need the “trash” forced upon them today. On the other hand, he answered with ideas of equality and solidarity: “The question of the immediate satisfaction of need is not to be posed in terms of social and natural, primary and secondary, correct and false; rather, it coincides with the question of the suffering of the vast majority of all humans on earth. If we produced that which all humans now most urgently need, then we would be relieved of inflated social-psychological concerns about the legitimacy of their needs.” […] Without posing the question of ‘true’ and ‘false’ needs and far from any austere anti-hedonism in a green guise, a social revolutionary movement would aim at a different kind of wealth in the capitalist centres. While wealth today presents itself as an ‘immense accumulation of commodities’, being not so much social, but a mere sum total of private, unequally distributed possessions, the commune would have to aim not only for maximal socialization in the sphere of production, but also in the spheres of use and consumption. Contrary to any cult of community, the “right to solitude” (Marcuse) and the retreat into private life would be inviolable. However, unlike in the profit economy, built on bulk sales and planned obsolescence, the private sphere in the commune would no longer be primarily the space in which a steadily increasing flow of accumulated commodities must be devoured in order to keep the machine running. If canteens and laundromats became spaces of encounter beyond their bare functionality, it would no longer be necessary to have a dishwasher and washing machine in every apartment. With a few immediate measures, the commune would be capable of solving problems in a flash that technocrats endlessly grind their teeth on. Rather than continuing with the unmitigated disaster that is “e-mobility”—electric cars consume the same amount of labour, resources, streets and space in cities as cars that run on gas, and instead of exhaust gas pollution there is the highly toxic production of batteries — the commune could simply build a few tramways (with cars gone, there is no need to expend huge amounts of effort to dig tunnels into the earth). With no harried tourists and managers, air traffic could be reduced drastically in order to let the planet breathe a little. Friends of Classless Society, Contours of the World Commune, 2019, https://www.endnotes.org.uk/issues/issue-5/contours-of-the-world-commune---friends-of-the-classless-society